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Introduction
Why did Yugoslavia fall apart? Was its violent demise inevitable? Did its 
population simply fall victim to the lure of nationalism? How did this multina-
tional state manage to survive for so long? And where do we situate the short 
life of Yugoslavia in the long history of the twentieth century? This book tells 
the story of why and under which conditions Yugoslavia was created, what 
held the multinational state together for more than seventy years, and why it 
finally broke apart in violence. It is a tale of confidence and doubt, of progress 
and decline, of extremes and excesses, of utopia and demise.
No other European country was as colorful, multifaceted, or complex 
as Yugoslavia. Its turbulent history made it a byword for Balkan confusion 
and animosity; it stood for the backward, barbaric, and abhorrent contrast to 
the supposedly so civilized European continent. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, to cross the Danube by steamboat from the Austrian city of Semlin 
(Zemun) to Belgrade or travel by the Hungarian state railway over the great 
iron Sava Bridge to reach the train station of Bosanski Brod was to enter an 
exotic world that appeared both mysterious and fabulous but also at times 
appalling and threatening.1 Shrouded in such mystery and foreignness, “the 
Balkans” were consistently written out of the European context, as unfor-
tunately still happens occasionally even today. However, a closer look soon 
dispels this shroud of mystery, because the region is tightly intertwined in the 
timeline of Europe’s history in both good and bad ways. Although popular 
images and stereotypes of a backward and violence-ridden “European other” 
have since been debunked as a “convenient prejudice,” the idea of the region’s 
structural backwardness persists, without the least empirical evidence.2
In contrast, this book addresses Yugoslav history from the perspective 
of the major social, economic, and intellectual changes that affected all of 
Europe at the turn of the twentieth century and marked its transition to modern 
industrialized mass society. The “great acceleration” first reached Western 
societies but soon expanded out toward the European periphery.3 The em-
phasis here will not be primarily on structures of the longue durée and the 
unique developments in Balkan history, but on the overarching dynamics of 
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change, on interrelations and interaction, and on common European features 
and parallels during the “long twentieth century.” 4
In Southeast Europe, the economy, social relations, cultural expression, 
mentalities, and daily life were undergoing fundamental transformation in the 
decades around 1900. The region also faced unanticipated challenges from the 
scientific-technological and economic progress of the West. Growing interna-
tional competition and aggressive imperialism made it imperative to overcome 
backwardness as a matter of survival, in a very literal sense. It was against this 
background that the South Slavic idea took shape: the project of a common 
political future for culturally related peoples unified in a single state. After all, 
the liberation from foreign rule and the founding of an independent and sov-
ereign Yugoslavia appeared to be the premise for securing a self-determined 
future in Europe.
Twice, in 1918 and 1945, Yugoslavia became a reality, each time with 
a thoroughly different political system: first as a centralized, constitutional, 
and parliamentary monarchy, then as a one-party socialist federation. Both 
models faced four fundamental long-term problems: the unresolved national 
question that challenged the identity and cohesion of the state; the underdevel-
opment and poverty in a predominantly peasant society; and the dependence 
on foreign political and economic powers. These three problems exacerbated 
the fourth, namely the enormous historical, cultural, and socioeconomic dis-
parities between the various components of multiethnic Yugoslavia, which 
repeatedly raised anew issues concerning political legitimacy and a suitable 
constitutional order.
One of the main questions addressed here is how, under these circum-
stances, development and progress were conceived at various times and what 
means were employed to pursue them. An increasing number of the elite 
believed that they were living in an age in which tradition, customs, patri-
archy, and long-existing community relations were vanishing — and should 
vanish — to make way for the advantages and merits of modernity, specifically 
of a world of expanding technology. However, competing political forces and 
intellectuals embraced very different answers to the coercions, aspirations, 
and challenges of a dramatically changing world. Who were the agents driv-
ing social change, and how did they envision the future? What alternatives to 
Western modernity were discussed?
The approach adopted in this book distances itself from popular explana-
tions of the Yugoslav problem that emphasize ethnic, religious, and cultural 
divisions, or incompatible and even “clashing” civilizations. Instead of noto-
rious Balkan intractability and ancient hatreds, the argument presented here 
stresses the politicization of differences in twentieth-century modern mass 
society. Peoples, nations, and cultures are not transhistorical entities; they 
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are subject to historical realities and change, and so are conflicts. A central 
question thus focuses on why, how, and under what conditions ethnic identity 
and diversity were turned into a matter of contention and by whom. Important 
are the interests, views, and motives of the major actors, the socioeconomic 
developments, and, last but not least, the cultural-historical dimensions of 
collective experiences, memories, and interpretations of history.
Very few scholars have yet attempted to provide a comprehensive history 
of Yugoslavia covering the entire twentieth century.5 The pickings are partic-
ularly thin in the literature of the Yugoslav successor states.6 Even before the 
wars of the 1990s, it was a tricky business to seek a common denominator 
among the various regional and national perspectives. Federalism, also in 
the realm of academia, granted each people its own way of dealing with its 
past, its own national images and narratives of its history. As a result, no 
master narrative ever evolved that was supported by all: too different, too 
politically laden were the interpretations and depictions. Quarrels over in-
terpretation cut short the multivolume History of the Yugoslav Peoples at the 
year 1800. Likewise, the History of the Yugoslav Communist Party/League of 
Communists disappeared into oblivion. Nor did the historical contributions to 
the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia fare any better. Since the country’s inception 
there has never been a standard narrative about Yugoslavia’s origins, historical 
development, and problems. So far, everyone attempting the task has ended 
up in the crossfire of criticism.7
In stark contrast to the scarcity of general comprehensive works is the 
overabundance of books and articles dealing with the Yugoslav wars of the 
1990s. For the most part, they interpret Yugoslavia’s history from the per-
spective of its bloody demise, analyze its congenital defects, and characterize 
the creation of the South Slavic state as artificial in order to underscore the 
inevitability of its failure. Yet Yugoslavia cannot be explained only by the 
way it began or the way it ended. The state existed for a good seventy years, 
which raises the question about what held its peoples together for so long and 
what eventually divided them, a question that has not become obsolete since 
Yugoslavia fell apart. This book attempts to avoid deterministic explanations 
and to grasp the history of Yugoslavia as an essentially open-ended process 
from different thematic approaches.
Many recent studies no longer deal with Yugoslavia but concentrate en-
tirely on its successor states. The existence of Slovenia, Croatia, or Kosovo 
today is interpreted retrospectively and the past is read teleologically, as if dis-
tant history was a harbinger of modern statehood. Interactions with neighbors 
are often presented only in the form of conflicts and wars. In the process, the 
Yugoslav period is reduced to a very short — albeit not completely insignifi-
cant — episode in a centuries-long national history. By contrast, the objective 
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of this book is to encapsulate various local and national historical perspectives 
and place them in relation to one another, which then relativizes many an al-
leged regional particularity. However, in order to maintain a balance between 
diversity and unity, the various republics and peoples can only be treated in 
an illustrative manner. In many instances, Eastern Bosnia serves as the mi-
crohistorical example, for it is the proverbial heart of Yugoslavia over which 
many sides have fought in the course of the twentieth century.
This book is conceived as a topically comprehensive but compact ap-
proach to a complex, almost boundless, subject whose potential for study is 
far from exhausted. It is based in part on my own research but primarily on a 
broad scope of secondary literature. Publications on specific topics and time 
periods are numerous, but syntheses remain few and far between, and there are 
many areas in which little or no research has been done. This is particularly 
true with regard to the post-1945 period.
Every general overview needs a perspective and a focal point that decide 
how to select topics and questions. No narrative, therefore, can do without 
condensing and generalizing. Certain subjects that are the standard narrative 
of Yugoslavia’s political history were kept short so as to better examine the 
deeper underlying socioeconomic and cultural dynamics and the daily life of 
common people in addition to the events and major actors. The chronological 
narrative alternates with cross-sectional analyses, which offers a deeper look 
into society and culture at a given period of time. A lack of space in the end-
notes prevented the extensive citation of each important work that influenced 
this book. To facilitate readability, reference is often made to “Yugoslavs,” 
namely to citizens with no mention of their ethnic affiliation. Nationality was 
specified only when the way people identified themselves was relevant to 
explain certain contexts.
Terminology, in this context, is a real minefield. Should one speak of na-
tions, nationalities, or ethnic groups? Did peoples speak different languages or 
just varieties or dialects of one common language? Notions of all these terms 
have changed over time, as will be discussed here, and they have been and 
still are a matter of political disputes.
Interpretations of the Yugoslav past are even more emotionally laden, and 
discussions are often conducted not with factual but with moral arguments. 
Opposing interpretations of history provide explosive material for political 
confrontation. Those who do not clearly choose one side or another quickly 
open themselves up to unpleasant polemics. Grounded in the fundamental 
principles of good academic practice, this account attempts to weigh the 
various perspectives against one another, even if the limited space does not 
permit the extensive treatment of all theories and controversies. In the spirit 
 Introduction xiii
of Alexis de Tocqueville, I hope to have written this book without prejudice 
but not without passion.
This book was made possible by the generous support of the Freiburg 
Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS), which awarded me an eighteen-month 
research sabbatical. I am particularly indebted to Ulrich Herbert for inspiring 
this project and including it in the German series European History in the 
20th Century. Also, I am most grateful to Charles Ingrao for encouraging 
the English edition, which was thematically expanded and updated to include 
most recent research. Dona Geyer’s thorough translation and the invaluable 
comments by two anonymous readers were greatly appreciated. Last but not 
least, I thank Purdue University Press and Verlag C.H. Beck for their unfail-
ingly gracious and active support.

Abbreviations
AVNOJ Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of 
Yugoslavia (Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja 
Jugoslavije)
BITEF Belgrade International Theater Festival (Beogradski 
Internacio nalni Teatarski Festival)
BSC Bosnian-Serbian-Croatian
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CPY Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija 
Jugo slavije)
DEMOS Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratska 
opozicija Slov enije)
DFJ Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (Demokratska 
Federativna Ju go slavija)
FNRJ Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna 
Narodna Republika Jugoslavija)
FYROM The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica)
HDZ-BiH Croatian Democratic Union, Bosnia-Herzegovina
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia
IDP Internally Displaced Person
JMO Yugoslav Muslim Organization (Jugoslovenska musli-
manska organizacija)
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslavenska narodna 
armija)
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike 
e Kosovës)
MASPOK Masovni pokret (Mass Movement)
NDH Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska)
xvi Abbreviations
NIN Nedeljne Informativne Novine (Informative weekly 
magazine)
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OKW German High Command (Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht)
OOUR Basic Organization of Associated Labor (Osnovna orga-
nizacija udru ženog rada)
ORJUNA Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija 
Jugoslav enskih nacionalista)
OZNA Department for the People’s Protection (Odsjek za 
zaštitu naroda)
SANU Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Srpska aka-
demija nauka i umetnosti)
SDA Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske 
akcije)
SDS Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka)
SLS Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka)
SFRJ Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička 
Federativna Republika Jugoslavija)
SHS Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kraljevina 
Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca)
SIV Federal Executive Council (Savezno izvršno vijeće)
SOUR Complex Organization of Associated Labor (Složena 
organizacija udruženog rada)
TO BiH Territorial Defence Force of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina (Teritorijalna odbrana Bosne i 
Hercegovine)
UÇK Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)
UDB State Security Administration (Uprava državne 
bezbednosti)
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
VMRO Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija)
VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity 
(Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija—
Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno 
Edinstvo)
Chronology
About 1800–1918 South Slavic Movement and the founding  
of Yugoslavia
1804–1813 First Serb Uprising against the Ottoman Empire
1809–1813 Founding of the “Illyrian Provinces” along the north and east 
coasts of the Adriatic Sea by Napoleon Bonaparte; harmoni-
zation of administration and standardization of the “Slavonic 
language”
1814 Creation of the Kingdom of Illyria as successor state to 
Illyrian Provinces after the territory’s repossession by Austria-
Hungary; existence until 1849
1815–1817 Second Serb Uprising
1830 Founding of the Illyrian Movement by Ljudevit Gaj (promot-
ing the idea of South Slavic cultural unity); autonomy of the 
Principality of Serbia
1835 Novine Horvatzke (Croatian news) and Danicza (Morning star), 
publications advancing the cause of the Illyrian Movement
1844 Načertanije (The plan) by Serbian statesman Ilija Garašanin 
propagating the idea of expanding Serbia’s borders and 
influence
1848/1849 Hungarian Revolution against the rule of the Austrian 
Habsburg monarchy
1849 Founding of Croatia-Slavonia as a crown land within the 
Habsburg monarchy; appointment of Baron Josip Jelačić as 
governor (Ban)
1850 Vienna (Literary) Agreement on a standardized Serbo-
Croatian language based on the Štokavian dialect
1860 Jugoslovjenstvo, a manifesto by the Croat historian Franjo 
Rački on Yugoslavism
1866 Founding of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in 
Zagreb by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački
1868 Croatian-Hungarian Settlement (Nagodba) between Hungary 
and the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia
xviii Chronology
1875–1878 Great Eastern Crisis; Russo-Turkish War
1878 Congress of Berlin; occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by 
Austria- Hungary; independence of Serbia and Montenegro; 
Kosovo and Macedonia remain in the Ottoman Empire; 
Slovenian and Croatian territories remain part of the Habsburg 
Monarchy (Slovenia, Dalmatia, Istria under Austrian rule; 
Croatia and Vojvodina under Hungarian); emergence of the 
Albanian national movement (League of Prizren)
1881 Abolishment of the Military Frontier
1882 Principality of Serbia becomes the Kingdom of Serbia
1889 Five hundredth anniversary of the historic Battle of Ko sovo (28 
June)
1892 Birth of Josip Broz in Kumrovec (Croatia)
1893 Founding of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization
1903 Murder of Serbian king Aleksandar Obrenović; election of 
Peter I. Karadjordjević as his successor; Ilinden Uprising 
of Macedonians against the Ottoman Empire; “People’s 
Movement” and mass protests against the Hungarian governor 
in Croatia
1905 Resolution of Fiume calling for Croatian self-rule and general 
civil rights and liberties; Serb–Croat party coalition in Croatia; 
“New Course” in Serb–Croat cooperation
1906–1911 Austro-Hungarian customs war against Serbia (“Pig War”)
1908 Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary; 
Bosnian annexation crisis; partition of Sandžak between Ser-
bia and Montenegro; founding of the Serb National Defense 
(Narodna odbrana)
1909 First pan-Yugoslav conference of South Slavic socialists
1911 Founding of the Black Hand
1912 Founding of the Balkan League by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Montenegro to liberate “European Turkey”; First Balkan 
War (against the Ottoman Empire); founding of Albania
1913 Demise of the Balkan League due to conflicts over the partition 
of Macedonia; Second Balkan War (between the former allies); 
Treaty of Bucharest; annexation of Kosovo by Serbia and the 
partition of Macedonia between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria
1914 Assassination of Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip; Austro-Hungarian declaration of 
war on Serbia; July Crisis and the outbreak of the First World 
War; Austrian invasion into Serbia
 Chronology xix
1915 Retreat of the Serbian government and army through Albania 
to Corfu (“Albanian Golgotha”); occupation of Serbia and 
Macedonia by the Central Powers; founding of the Yugoslav 
Committee in London, headed by Ante Trumbić
1917 Corfu Declaration; agreement between the Croat-led Yugoslav 
Committee and the Serbian government on the founding of a 
South Slavic kingdom under the Karadjordjević dynasty
1918 Allied breakthrough on the Salonica Front; surrender of 
Austria-Hungary; founding of the National Council of 
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs; secession of South Slavs from the 
Habsburg monarchy and resolution to unify with Serbia
1918–1941 The First Yugoslavia
1918 Proclamation creating the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slo-
venes (SHS) by King Peter I. Karadjordjević
1919–1920 Paris Peace Treaties; international recognition of the Kingdom 
of SHS and the demarcation of its borders; founding of the Free 
State of Fiume by Gabriele d’Annunzio
1920 Popular referendum in Carinthia; creation of the Little Entente 
with Czechoslovakia and Romania as part of the French secu-
rity system; introduction of universal male suffrage; elections 
to the constitutional assembly; founding and outlawing of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia
1921 Passage of the centralist Vidovdan Constitution despite Croat 
boycott; intensification of the Serb-Croat constitutional conflict
1924 Third Party Congress of the CPY with a focus on the national 
question (recognition of different Yugoslav peoples/nations)
1925 Treaty of Nettuno on the demarcation of Italy’s borders
1928 Assassination in the Skupština (National Assembly) of the 
Croa tian Peasant Party politician Stjepan Radić; government 
crisis
1929 Suspension of the constitution by King Alexander 
Karadjordjević; declaration of a royal dictatorship; renaming 
of the SHS state to “Kingdom of Yugoslavia”; administrative 
reorganization into banovine; founding of the Croat Ustasha 
movement
1930 Intensification of the Great Depression’s impact on Yugoslavia
1931 Constitutional octroi and the introduction of a sham democratic 
system
1934 Assassination of King Alexander I in Marseille; regency of 
Paul Karadjordjević
xx Chronology
1935 Election of the semiauthoritarian Milan Stojadinović as prime 
minister; abatement of Great Depression; state intervention in 
the economy; rapprochement with Germany and Italy
1936 Liquidation of farmers’ debts
1937 Failure of the Concordat with the Vatican
1939 Tito ś official appointment to the position of CPY General 
Secretary; Serb-Croat Settlement (Sporazum) to create the 
autonomous Banovina of Croatia
1941–1945 The Second World War
1941 Entry of Yugoslavia into the Tripartite Pact; military coup 
in Belgrade; German attack on Yugoslavia (Operation 
Retribution); surrender of Yugoslav army; flight into exile of 
the king and his government; dissolution of Yugoslavia; found-
ing of the Independent State of Croatia (under Ante Pavelić); 
German military government in Serbia (Milan Nedić’s regime); 
annexation of various areas by Italy, Germany, Hungary, 
Albania, and Bulgaria; formation of a nationalist Serb resis-
tance movement under Draža Mihailović (Chetniks) and the 
Yugoslav communist partisan movement under Josip Broz 
(Tito); “general insurrection”; the founding and fall of the 
partisan republic of Užice; extreme acts of “retribution” by 
occupational forces; massive “ethnic cleansing”; start of the 
extermination of Jews and Roma
1942 Battle of Sutjeska; first meeting of the Antifascist Council 
of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia Antifascist Council 
(AVNOJ) in Bihać
1943 Launching of Operation White and Operation Black by 
German military to combat partisans; Battle of Neretva; Italy’s 
surrender; second meeting of the Antifascist Council of the 
People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce; announce-
ment of creation of a federal and socialist Yugoslavia; Allied 
recognition of Tito; partisan military victories
1944 March of the People’s Liberation Army into Belgrade; Vis 
Agreement between Tito and the royal exile government on 
the re-establishment of Yugoslavia; formation of a common in-
terim government; measures expropriating the ethnic German 
population
1945 Unconditional surrender of Germany; Bleiburg massacre; cre-
ation of the People’s Front; abolition of the monarchy
 Chronology xxi
1945–1991 The Second Yugoslavia
1945 Proclamation of the creation of the Democratic Federal 
Yugoslavia (DFJ); elections to the constitutional assembly; 
Trieste crisis; land reform and state purchasing program for 
agricultural produce
1946 Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FNRJ); partition into six equal constituent republics; war 
criminal trials; nationalization of large landholdings, banks, 
and means of production
1947  Paris Peace Conference; recognition of Yugoslavia’s borders 
(annexation of Istria without Trieste)
1948 Break with Stalin; expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform; 
political purges
1949 Expulsion from the founding of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance
1950 Introduction of self-management system; Cazin peasant upris-
ing; Yugoslavia’s stance of neutrality between the power blocs 
in the East–West conflict
1952 Renaming of Communist Party of Yugoslavia as the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia
1953 Constitutional reform incorporating the self-management 
system
1954 Expulsion of Milovan Djilas from the Central Committee of 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; normalization of re-
lations with the Soviet Union; Novi Sad agreement on a written 
Serbo-Croatian language in two variants
1955 Declaration in Moscow by Khrushchev and Tito on the right 
of every country to pursue socialism its own way; Bandung 
Conference and the beginnings of the Nonaligned Movement
1957 Severance of diplomatic relations by West Germany in line 
with the Hallstein Doctrine
1961 First conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Belgrade
1963 Passage of a new constitution transforming the Federal 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia into the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY); formation of the Praxis group
1964 Eighth Party Congress of the League of Communists; introduc-
tion of market-economy reforms and the federalization of the 
constitution
1966 Removal of Aleksandar Ranković as the head of the secret 
police
xxii Chronology
1967 “Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary 
Language”
1968 Student revolts; Albanian uprising in Kosovo and West 
Macedonia; recognition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth 
constituent people; introduction of national security doctrine of 
“All-People’s Defense”
1970 Islamic Declaration by Alija Izetbegović
1971 Croatian Spring; ousting from power of party leadership in 
Zagreb; constitutional amendment expanding the federalization 
of Yugoslavia; Brezhnev’s visit to Belgrade
1972 Ousting from power of party leadership in Belgrade; political 
purge within the party
1974 Passage of a new constitution; granting of greater authority and 
power to the republics and autonomous provinces; confirma-
tion of Tito as president for life
1976 Law on Associated Labor to expand self-management
1977 CSCE meeting in Belgrade
1980 Tito’s death; collective presidency: growing economic prob-
lems and national tensions
1981 Kosovo uprising; imposition of martial law; political trials
1987 Rise of Slobodan Milošević to the top of party leadership in 
Serbia; party infighting with Serbian president Ivan Stambolić; 
memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; 
nationalistic meetings and mobilization efforts; Bosnian 
Agrokomerc affair
1989 Election of Slobodan Milošević as Serbia’s president; revoca-
tion of autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina; 600th anniversary 
celebration of the Battle of Kosovo; economic crisis; growing 
conflict over reform within Yugoslavia; institutional paralysis 
and legislative backlog
1990 Disbanding of the League of Communists; introduction of 
the multiparty system; failure of reforms proposed by Ante 
Marković; Franjo Tudjman’s assumption of power as Croatia’s 
president; declarations of sovereignty by the parliaments of 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo; Slovenian referendum on 
independence; Serb-Montenegrin veto of the Croat Stipe Mesić 
as the president of Yugoslavia; declaration of autonomy by 
Croatian Serbs
1991–2018 Collapse of Yugoslavia and Successor States
1991 Violent incidents in the regions of Croatia inhabited by Serbs; 
declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and 
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Macedonia; deployment of the Yugoslav People’s Army; out-
break of war in Slovenia and Croatia; German recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia; declaration creating the Republic of Serb 
Krajina; resolution on independence passed by Bosnian diet 
despite Serb veto.
1992 Ceasefire and the stationing of UNPROFOR in Croatia; 
founding of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Serbia and 
Montenegro; founding of the Serb Republic within Bosnia-
Herzegovina; independence referendum and international 
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina; outbreak of war; massive 
“ethnic cleansing” actions
1993 “War within the war” between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-
Herzegovina; creation of UN safe areas; establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
1994 Shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo; begin of NATO 
air strikes against Serb positions; founding of the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croats and Muslims
1995 Croatian military operations Flash and Storm to retake 
Krajina; Srebrenica massacre; Dayton Peace Accord
1996 Founding of the Kosovo Liberation Army
1998 Armed conflict between Albanian guerilla fighters and Serb 
security forces in Kosovo; mass exodus and expulsion
1999 Failure of the Rambouillet negotiations for a self-governed 
Kosovo; NATO strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo; 
UN Resolution 1244 setting up an interim administration mis-
sion in Kosovo; start of the process to determine the status of 
Kosovo
2000 Defeat of Slobodan Milošević by the democratic opposition in 
Serbia; start of the EU Stabilization and Association Process 
for the Western Balkan states
2001 Armed revolt by Albanian extremists in South Serbia and 
Macedonia; Ohrid Framework Agreement on equal rights for 
Albanians
2003 Transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
2004 Accession of Slovenia to the European Union
2006 Referendum on independence and international recognition of 
Montenegro
2008 Unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo
2013 Accession of Croatia to the European Union
2018 European Commission’s new Western Balkan Strategy
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The South Slavic Countries around 1900:  
The Dawn of a New Century
At the turn of the century, optimism prevailed throughout the entire South 
Slavic region. Even in very remote corners like the provincial Bosnian town 
of Višegrad, wrote the town’s chronicler Ivo Andrić, “events too quickened 
their pace. . . . Exciting news was no longer something rare and unusual but 
an everyday food and a real need. The whole of life seemed to be hastening 
somewhere, suddenly speeded up, as a freshet quickens its pace before it 
breaks into rapids, rushes over steep rocks and becomes a cascade.”1 However, 
at this point only a few people were aware that they were living in an era of 
millenarian changes and that intellectual innovation and political impetus 
were also emerging from profound social upheavals. In any case, the young 
Bosnian revolutionary Vladimir Gaćinović hoped that the old feudal system, 
the major clans, and the patriarchal mindset of his home would soon belong 
to the past and that new ideas and a strong push to create a nation state would 
emerge.2 Since large areas of the countryside still remained mired in dire pov-
erty and old traditions, the idea of integrating all South Slavs into a single state 
appeared to be no more than a pipe dream in the eyes of many people. At the 
time it was not evident, let alone certain, that one day their so very dissimilar 
regions would indeed merge into a single body politic. It quickly becomes clear 
just how complicated the starting point truly was when we retrospectively 
comb the historical regions of Yugoslavia in fast motion.
The Historical Regions
At the turn of the century, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were living in two 
empires — the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman — and in two independent 
nation states — Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, our fictional trip through 
the South Slavic countries around 1900 begins in the Austrian crown lands 
of Carniola, Styria, Carinthia, Gorizia, Istria, and then moves to Trieste, the 
home to approximately 1.32 million Slovenes, who would become the smallest 
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population located the farthest west in what would later be the multinational 
state of Yugoslavia. In Trieste they made up about three-fourths of the popula-
tion and lived in confluence with Germans, Italians, Croats, and other peoples. 
They were the only group among the South Slavs never to have suffered longer 
phases of military threat, wartime destruction, or even depopulation. Their 
agriculture was varied and productive, and the standard of living and level of 
education were higher here than in the neighboring regions. The architecture 
reflected nearly 500 years of Habsburg rule and still today seems quintessen-
tially Austrian. The areas in which Slovenes lived were still split into different 
administrative jurisdictions, but even in the past there had never been a state 
entity named Slovenia.3
Further west and south, the Slovenian regions passed seamlessly into the 
settlement areas of the approximately 2.9 million Croats, who were also part 
of Austria-Hungary.4 The Croats exemplified internal fragmentation to an 
even greater degree than the Slovenes. They were dispersed throughout no 
less than seven separate political-territorial units within the Habsburg mon-
archy, each with very different socioeconomic structures, ethnic mixes, and 
cultural influences. Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed autonomy within the Hungarian 
half of the empire. Istria and Dalmatia, however, were under direct Austrian 
rule, whereas the port city of Fiume (Rijeka), as a corpus separatum, was 
governed by Hungary. Croats also lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in south-
ern Hungary. Until the outbreak of the First World War, not a single railway 
connection existed between Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.5
Highly diverse cultural influences intermingled in Croatian regions. In 
the cities of northern and eastern Croatia, such as Zagreb, Varaždin, and 
Osijek, the Austrian and southern German influences are still evident today 
in the baroque style of aristocratic residences and the old town centers and in 
the interiors of city palaces and patrician homes. Along the coast, in Dalmatia 
and Istria, the architecture in cities like Pula, Split, and Dubrovnik points 
to ancient origins as well as to the centuries-long and very close ties to the 
cultures and histories of Venice, Florence, and Rome.6
Since 1881, Croatia-Slavonia also had included the former Military 
Frontier (krajina), a province under special military administration that ex-
isted for 400 years. This area extended along the Sava and Danube rivers 
before reaching the Adriatic coast farther south in western Bosnia. In order to 
shield its empire militarily from the “Turkish peril,” Vienna had settled Serb 
refugees and others as free soldier-peasants in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and created an administrative district with its own social order. 
These “frontiersmen” formed military regiments to defend the monarchy.7 
The Habsburgs had also attracted non-Slavic colonists to the area, including 
German-speaking Danube Swabians.
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Beyond the Military Frontier lay Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1878 Congress 
of Berlin had placed it under Austro-Hungarian military occupation, while 
formally leaving it under the administration of the Ottomans, who had ruled 
there since the fifteenth century. In 1908, the Austrian emperor annexed it in 
a surprise move, thereby also incorporating into the empire the autochthonous 
Muslim population. Around 1900, the South Slavic population totaled about 
1.6 million, of which 43 percent were Orthodox Christian, 35 percent Muslim, 
21 percent Roman Catholic, and the rest a combination of Jews, Vlachs, Turks, 
Roma, and other minorities.
The first thing to stand out in this newly annexed territory was the archi-
tectural mastery of the Turkish builders. Sarajevo dazzled visitors with the 
magnificence of the Gazi Husrev-beg Mosque, one of the largest and most 
artistic religious buildings left by Islam on European soil. Also world famous 
was the bold sweep of the stone bridge over the Drina in Višegrad, which, 
according to its inscription, could be found “nowhere else in the world.”8 Built 
in the fifteenth century on orders of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Paša Sokolović, 
a child of the region, this remnant of East–West interlock was immortalized 
by Ivo Andrić in his Nobel Prize–winning novel.9 And then there is the Drina 
River itself. Originally the Turks and Austrians declared it to be the dividing 
line between their empires; later, in the twentieth century, it became a highly 
contested site of memory. Was the picturesque river the supportive backbone 
of Serb settlement beyond the political borders of Serbia or was it the insur-
mountable watershed between Catholic and Orthodox civilizations? For their 
part, the communists later summarily declared the Drina to be a symbol of 
Yugoslav unity.
Under Austro-Hungarian rule, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina was exposed 
to central European architectural influences. Sarajevo received a modern 
city center with representational administrative buildings, a theater, and a 
central post office right next to the Turkish old town with its bazaar — the 
Baščaršija — numerous mosques, hammams, Koran schools, dervish monas-
teries, and caravansaries.10 In the late nineteenth century, the traveler Heinrich 
Renner wrote: “looks more Turkish here than in Sofia and Philippopolis; the 
regional costume still prevails; turban and fez are preferred,” despite the al-
ready “prevalent” European clothing.11
Travel was very strenuous at the time. The trip by coach, caravan, or 
horse from Sarajevo to Mostar, located about 84 miles away, lasted three 
grueling days. To venture into more remote regions, a person either used one 
of the hazardous horse trails or walked.12 Therefore, from eastern Bosnia it 
took a difficult climb through the mountains to reach Montenegro, which 
had been independent since 1878. For centuries, the seclusion of the Karst 
had conserved the traditional clan order. The overwhelming majority of the 
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Montenegrin population were Orthodox Slavs, but a few thousand Turkish, 
Albanian, and Slavic Muslims also lived there. This tiny country with its 
population of about 200,000 always captured the imagination of foreign vis-
itors, in particular, as a symbol for the irrepressible will of a small mountain 
people to be free; as the homeland of banditry, blood feuds, and barbarism; 
and not least as the stage for comical political conditions. Except for a small 
idyllic strip of coastline, the living conditions here were merciless. The coun-
try had almost no infrastructure, what cattle-raising and meager farming there 
was yielded little, and indescribable poverty prevailed. Deep in the interior, 
explained the Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, a close collaborator of Tito, this 
land was “extremely barren and crippling quiet,” a place where “all things 
living and all things created by the human hand” vanished. “There is no oak, 
no white or copper beach, just dry, brittle, barely green grass. . . . Everything 
is stone.”13
Crossing the jagged mountains on the arduous zigzag of a Turkish road, 
the traveler reached the southernmost point of what would later be Yugoslav 
territory, namely the harbor of Bar, and a few miles farther inland, Lake 
Skadar, through which the Albanian border would run one day. Along this 
narrow coastline, the Mediterranean-Venetian flair returned. For centuries this 
area served as the most important and often the only link to western Europe.
Beyond Lake Skadar stretched those regions of the future Yugoslavia that 
belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 1912/1913 and were considered par-
ticularly backward and poor. The administrative district (vilayet) of Kosovo, 
created in 1879 with the capital city of Üsküb (Skopje), included a greater 
part of today’s Kosovo and Macedonia, over which Greece, Bulgaria, and 
the new nation state of Serbia have fought. More than 1.6 million inhabi-
tants created a unique ethnic and religious mixture. The population was fairly 
evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and was split into numerous 
language groups.
At the time, special status was given to the primarily Muslim-inhabited 
administrative district Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which separated Serbia from 
Montenegro. In 1878, the Congress of Berlin conceded to the Austrian em-
peror the right to occupy the strategically important area. In 1913, it was 
divided up between Montenegro and Serbia.
The Principality of Serbia gained de facto semi-independence from the 
Ottoman Empire as a result of two uprisings (1804–1813 and 1815–1817). 
Autonomy was legally granted in 1830, and independence was internationally 
recognized in 1878. In 1900, 2.5 million people lived here, of whom nine-
tenths were Serbs and the rest Vlachs, Roma, and other diverse groups.14 
Another two million or so Serbs lived in the Habsburg monarchy. In the 
north, at the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers, stood the originally 
oriental-Balkan capital city of Belgrade, which for most of its long history had 
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served as a strategically significant border town, military post, administrative 
city, and trade center. After the Ottomans left, it was completely reconstructed 
in the Western style typical of Vienna and Pest. From here it was just a small 
jump to the southern Hungarian province of Vojvodina, from which the Serb 
national movement had emerged during the Enlightenment. As a result of the 
Austro-Hungarian colonization, the population of 1.3 million then consisted of 
Magyars (32 percent), Serbs (29 percent), Germans (23 percent), and numerous 
other nationalities such as Croats, Romanians, and Ruthenians.15
Peoples, Nations, Identities
At the turn of the century, around twelve million people lived in the historic 
regions of the future Yugoslavia. The majority were South Slavs of Catholic, 
Orthodox, and Muslim faiths, and the rest created a conglomerate of various 
other ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, including Turks, Albanians, 
Germans, Magyars, Jews, Roma, Vlachs, and others.
Local intellectuals and writers, like so many other Europeans of the nine-
teenth century, believed that communities needed to be organized as “nations” 
to secure political participation, cultural rights, and social justice. Nationhood 
was mainly understood as a cultural and linguistic category out of which the 
proponents of nationalism thought to create an organic whole. Yet, in most 
regions, the composition of the population was confusing, to put it mildly. 
Over the course of decades, an elaborate history of migratory movements 
from various places, religious conversions, and different kinds of cultural 
hybridization had thoroughly and repeatedly jumbled and reset the pieces of 
the ethnic mosaic. For this reason, contacts, cultural transfers, and cultural 
interweaving on various levels always played a major role.
Around 1900, the idea of a “Yugoslav” nation was as obscure as was a 
well-defined notion of what it meant to call oneself “Slovene,” “Croat,” or 
“Serb.” For peasants, their local communities, language, culture, and religion 
were the references important to their world. Granted, the process of modern 
nation building had indeed begun during the first third of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and new and abstract forms of national awareness were emerging from 
the identities previously shaped by religion, cultural heritage, and regional 
affiliation. However, at this point none of the future Yugoslav peoples had 
yet formed an integrated community. The emergence of the modern nation 
involved protracted, often contradictory processes with a thoroughly open-
ended result. The idea of a transhistorical existence of peoples, objectified 
by language, culture, or origin, is still popular today. Yet it is an idea that is 
totally inapplicable historically.
Stated simply, the majority of people living at the turn of the century in 
the areas that would later be Yugoslavia were South Slavs, linked by their 
language and cultural kinship. According to today’s categories, these were 
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Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. 
According to the identification categories back then, these labels still oscil-
lated between ethnic, national, religious, and regional connotations, which 
would contribute significantly to the problem of a future Yugoslavia, as will 
be shown here.
Despite the extreme disparities among the political territories and cultural 
histories, Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim South Slavs all felt intuitively re-
lated. The reason was that they could communicate freely with one another. 
Most Croats and all Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians speak the same di-
alect, known as Štokavian (after the interrogative pronoun što for “what”).16 
The nineteenth-century language reformers selected this dialect in 1850 in the 
Vienna (Literary) Agreement to serve as the basis of a standardized Serbo-
Croatian language.17 The idioms of the Slovenes and the Macedonians were 
distinctly different and would later develop into their own literary languages. 
Since the early nineteenth century, intellectuals and societal elites thought 
that it would be possible to create (or rather revive) a united South Slavic 
nation based on a shared descent, language, and culture. They believed that 
South Slavs were a primordial and transhistorical people who had suffered 
the unfortunate fate of having been unnaturally torn apart. Their subsequent 
fragmentation into Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was considered superficial, 
which meant that it was possible and imperative that the South Slavic people 
reemerge as a single “Yugoslav” nation despite their present cultural and po-
litical differences.
The protagonists of the South Slavic idea were aided in their effort by 
a degree of conceptual vagueness: in this context, the vocabulary of local 
languages contained just the word narod, a word that made no semantic dis-
tinction between “people” and “nation.” Herein lay a creatively exploitable 
but also dangerous ambivalence. At the same time, the language lacked a term 
for that common idiom referred to then as “Slavic,” “Croatian,” “Serbian,” 
“Bosnian,” or simply “naški” (our language). There was no conceptual equiv-
alent to a label like “German” or “French” that would have vaulted local and 
regional variations, nor was there a common collective term for the advocates 
of South Slavic unity and thus no “positive predisposition” for South Slavic 
(Yugoslav) nation building.18
In all of the regions mentioned here, forms of linguistically and culturally 
determined awareness that could be called protonational existed already in 
the late nineteenth century.19 People identified themselves with certain groups 
that distinguished them from other communities by way of various factors 
like culture and language, sometimes also religion, social milieu, and regional 
origin. In each case, the respective environment determined which of these 
criteria stood at the forefront of such self-identification, as the following ex-
ample of Croatia illustrates.
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If a person traveling through Croatian regions at the turn of the century 
had asked peasants about their national affiliation, this individual would have 
been given a variety of answers.20 People were already identifying themselves 
as “Croats,” but sometimes the label was used to mean ethnicity and other 
times to mean regional affiliation. At the same time, people identified them-
selves — depending on where they lived — as “Slavonian” or “Dalmatian” or 
“Istrian.” “The work of unifying the Croats has not yet been completed,” 
complained the Croat scholar Julije Benešić in 1911. “The lads from Syrmia 
are still ashamed to call themselves Croats publicly.”21
People intuitively considered the Slavic language to be an important iden-
tity marker as long as they lived among Germans, Hungarians, or Italians 
and a clear language barrier existed. Only then did people identify them-
selves primarily as “Slav” or “Croat.” In multireligious milieus in which the 
language was homogenous, such as in Bosnia or Slovenia, faith became the 
main identity marker. Since a Croat could communicate in the same dialect 
as Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians, the language criterion alone was not 
enough to define who a Croat was. A Croat peasant saw himself primarily 
as “Catholic,” “Christian,” or as a “Latin.”22 However, the Croatian national 
identity and Catholicism were not yet identical; after all, Germans, Austrians, 
Italians, and Magyars were also Catholic. Not until much later, in the 1920s, 
would the activities of the Catholic clergy and the Peasants’ Party complete 
the integration of the Croatian nation under the recitals of Catholicism.
Unlike Catholicism, the Orthodox Christian Church was already a strong 
factor in creating the national identification and integration of the Serbs. There 
was a historical reason for this. During the Ottoman period, the religious 
communities were organized as quasi-legal entities with certain autono-
mous rights. These so-called millets had great administrative powers. The 
Orthodox Church could appoint church dignitaries and manage the property 
of the churches, monasteries, and charity institutions. Family and inheritance 
law as well as tax collection was also put in their hands. For an interim, the 
Turks granted the Serbian Orthodox Church sovereignty (autocephaly) to be 
exerted by the patriarch in Peć in Kosovo. The Serbian church thus became 
the sole guardian of the extinct medieval tradition of state. Serbian kings were 
worshiped as saints; hagiographic texts were evocative of the golden age and 
its demise; bishops acted as both spiritual and political leaders. Therefore, 
“Orthodox” was equivalent to “Serbian” both semantically and in meaning 
even before the nationalist period. Toward the end of the 1880s, the Serb ge-
ographer Vladimir Karić noted that, for the Serb, “it is very important to call 
himself ‘Christian,’ or more precisely, ‘Orthodox,’ and he even goes as far as 
not to distinguish between the faith and his nationality, so that he calls it the 
‘Serbian faith’ and consequently wants to call every person a ‘Serb,’ regard-
less the ethnicity, if this person is Orthodox.”23 Because of their Orthodox 
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religion, many Montenegrins understood themselves to be Serbs at the time. 
After all, both peoples had sprouted from the same ethnic soil of the medie-
val Serbian state, and these common origins and the shared religion are what 
exacerbated the split between them, the impact of which is felt still today, 
particularly in the hesitancy to affirm the existence of the Montenegrin nation. 
The merger of “Orthodox” and “Serbian” remained intact in many regions 
until the 1930s. Only later in the twentieth century did the religious meaning 
disappear, and “Serbian,” like “Montenegrin,” was recoded to fit into separate 
national categories.
Unique in European history has been the identity building of Bosnian 
Muslims.24 These people are the descendants of those Slavs of Orthodox, 
Catholic, and other faiths who converted — usually voluntarily — to Islam 
when the Ottomans conquered the territory. The motives for converting were 
manifold and may well have resulted from a mixture of fear and incentive. Non-
Muslims were confronted with fewer chances to advance, a greater tax burden, 
and legal discrimination in matters such as property ownership. Conversion 
to Islam occurred especially in places where the Christian churches had not 
yet firmly established themselves or competed fiercely among themselves for 
power and influence. Upon conversion to Islam, old folk customs were simply 
recast into new molds. Occasionally entire families split into a Muslim and a 
Christian branch, which served as a type of reinsurance to protect themselves 
should power shift again into other hands.25 Outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Slavs in Serbia, Sandžak, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia also con-
verted to Islam.
Islam was the decisive criterion separating Muslims from the others in 
Bosnia. It formed social identity, defined norms and values, and prescribed 
religious and cultural practices.26 At the turn of the century, the collective 
identity of the Bosnian Muslims was still primarily influenced by religion. 
They fought for religious and cultural autonomy, not national and political 
sovereignty. Only a minority argued for the secularization of the Muslim 
community in the modern era, meaning the separation of religion and civil 
society. However, a nonreligious, national consciousness did not consolidate 
until well into the twentieth century.
In Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, all of which still belonged to the 
Ottoman Empire, the confusion was the greatest, and national identity build-
ing had advanced the least. In the proverbial Macedonian fruit bowl (in French, 
macédoine) lived both Slavic- and Greek-speaking Christians, Turkish- and 
Albanian-speaking Muslims, Jews, Vlachs, and Roma. How large each of the 
communities actually was became the subject of heated ethnographic and 
political controversies.27
According to traditional Islamic order, religion took precedence over ethnic 
distinctions. Therefore, Slavs and Greeks living in the Orthodox millet found it 
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especially important to identify themselves as “Christian” vis-à-vis the ruling 
Turks. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century during a conflict 
within the Bulgarian church did the overarching Christian Orthodox community 
divide along linguistic lines into Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb sectors. It would 
still take several decades before people understood this new differentiation, let 
alone internalize it. Slavic-speaking peasants of Macedonia were quite indif-
ferent to their ethnic background until, with the emergence of the “Macedonian 
question,” they became the object of competing territorial claims and of ethno-
graphic classifications from Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.28 At the time only a 
hint of a future Slavic-Macedonian national identity could be discerned.
However, for the moment, it was common in Macedonia — as in many cul-
turally heterogeneous border regions like Vojvodina or Istria — for individuals 
to be opportunistic in stating their identity. In Skopska Crna Gora, peasants 
once admitted that sometimes they were Serbs, sometimes Bulgarians, de-
pending how the question was worded.29 This led the Swedish professor Rudolf 
Kjellén to view the population like a type of “flour from which you can bake 
any cake that you want, once the nationality has finally been decided.”30
As was true all over Europe, “imagining the nation” was essentially 
staged by intellectuals, scientists, politicians, and church authorities. On the 
microlevel, it just seemed to be some abstract entity. The coexistence with 
people of other faiths was a daily, socially structured, and usually conflict-free 
experience for many. Everyone always knew who belonged to which group, 
because this was communicated outwardly in names, clothing, religious 
practices, and social barriers such as the marriage ban between Christians 
and Muslims.
Likewise, mutual respect and good neighborly relations were part of 
village life. Birth, marriage, death, as well as house building and harvest-
ing provided occasions for public ritual and festivities through which people 
underscored their communality and mutual dependence. People supported 
each other beyond regional borders through neighborly help in harvesting and 
building (moba and pozajmica) and gathered in the evening to socialize and 
work, an activity known as sijelo.
As in many rural regions in Europe, traditional popular piety dominated 
over canonical stipulations in the population at large. This also offered many 
opportunities for the faiths to mingle. Although people observed the official 
holidays of their respective faith, often these were merely the Christian or 
Muslim adaptations of original customs. In Serbia, the clergy had learned to 
accept that people went to church more to meet each other than to attend the re-
ligious service. Priests tolerated the “freer interaction” that believers had with 
God and Church, including cults worshipping ancestors and house saints.31 As 
late as the 1930s, a study on the Belgrade suburb of Rakovica found that not 
one household there possessed a Bible or a New Testament, although everyone 
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believed in God: “We could not find these books anywhere or even a single 
person who would have known something about them. . . . All that everyone 
knows is that there are church books from which the Pope reads prayers.”32
Folk traditions built many bridges between the religious communities. 
A person seeking spiritual guidance or praying for a rapid recovery of health 
might visit the priest in the morning and, just to be on the safe side, the Islamic 
instructor (hodža) in the afternoon. Even today, August 2 is the day on which 
the Orthodox Christians celebrate Saint Elias, the Ilindan, and the Muslims 
the Alidun, a fact that has found its way into the expression “Do podne Ilija, 
od podne Alija” (mornings Elias, afternoons Ali).33
Around 1900, the nation-building process was fully underway through-
out the entire region, with a bit of time lag in certain places. However, the 
protonational communities (later the Serbs, Croats, Muslims, etc.) had not 
yet fully constituted themselves as modern nations. Originally, this was not a 
specifically South Slavic phenomenon. In France, Germany, and Italy, simple 
peasants also had to be transformed first into members of a nation.34 However, 
unlike these parts of Europe, centuries of foreign rule in the Balkans had 
enabled room for ambivalence to emerge, in which avenues for identification 
through language, religion, and political history overlapped. Among other 
factors, there was no clear understanding of what constituted a nation, be it 
a common language and culture (as in Germany and Italy) or the tradition of 
statehood (as in France). On the one hand, the idea of a Kulturnation — as it 
was posited by Johann Gottfried Herder and conveyed in the region — might 
have pointed to the integration of South Slavs into one single nation. On the 
other hand, the heritage left by the Ottoman era included the phenomenon of 
the Konfessionsnation, the confessional nation, which used religious affiliation 
as the basis for differentiating among populations who shared a common lan-
guage. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims spoke (and still speak) similar dialects, but 
they increasingly saw themselves as belonging to different peoples because of 
their faith. As important as the common cultural roots, shared language, and 
regional cohabitation were, the disparate historical-political traditions, espe-
cially those rooted in the different religious worldviews, created fissures too 
deep to allow the idea of a general Yugoslav identity to gain any ground with-
out having to resort to instrumentalization “from above.” Not until the creation 
in 1918 of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did a strong agency for 
socialization develop that actively advanced Yugoslav nation building.
Demographic Development and Family Structures
In the final thirty years of the nineteenth century, all South Slavic countries 
experienced far-reaching social and economic change. Population growth, 
agrarian and industrial development, and the transition to a monetary and 
market-based economy shook up the traditional social order of village life. The 
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economic dynamic that developed in the center and west of the European con-
tinent was no small contributing factor, one that appeared in the Balkans in the 
form of imperialism. Industrial goods needed new markets and accumulated 
capital needed new opportunities for investment. Railway construction, transre-
gional markets, and the advancement of the monetary economy changed earlier 
forms of economic and communal life, which in turn brought new experiences, 
mentalities, and types of awareness. Unlike western Europe, the outlines of a 
modern industrial society, however, were only vaguely recognizable.
New dynamics were also developing from within society. Between 
1880 and 1910 the population grew rapidly as the mortality rate sank. The 
highest demographic growth took place in Serbia (71.3 percent) and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (63.9 percent), followed by Croatia and Slovenia (38.6 percent), 
Dalmatia (35.7 percent), and Vojvodina (33.6 percent). The slowest population 
to grow was that of Slovenia (9.4 percent).35 Not until the period between the 
two world wars did the demographic discrepancy among the regions diminish. 
Along with Russia and Hungary, southeastern Europe experienced the highest 
birthrate in Europe.36 One of the reasons for the great demographic growth 
lay in the extended rural family, the zadruga (household commune). The ex-
tended family constituted — except in Slovenia — the core of traditional social 
order in the countryside of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania.37 Sons 
and grandsons remained in their parental homes, while daughters married 
into other zadrugas. Unlike in western Europe, where it was necessary first 
to own land or have a craft before setting up a household, which meant that 
many people married late or not at all, the socioeconomic net of the enlarged 
South Slavic family could always easily integrate additional family members. 
People married young and had many children. In eastern and southeastern 
Europe, the social order lacked an effective regulatory mechanism like that 
which safeguarded western Europe from extreme population growth.
Also unlike western Europe, it was not until this period that the traditional 
union of productive and reproductive functions within the family, of home 
and workplace, began to break apart. The zadruga represented a community 
of property, life, work and authority. Private property did not exist, not even 
money. The head of the household was the father, who derived his role as 
master from his natural authority. He represented the family in public, man-
aged family and economic business, and had the last word in all important 
matters. Women held a subordinate place within the family and had practically 
no rights. In this patriarchal society, strict rules of conduct dictated daily life 
and limited every individual’s personal freedom. In places where the state had 
never gained a foothold, like Montenegro and Kosovo, a strong archaic code 
of honor prevailed, one that included blood feuds.
Yet even in the regions of its historical origin, the zadruga began to fall 
away in a staggered fashion and at different rates of speed. Factors like the 
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growing size of the family, the gradual expansion of the market economy, new 
types of employment in industry and trade, and the dissipation of the patri-
archal order played a role. More and more households were splitting, usually 
when they reached a critical point of twenty to forty members.38 This occurred 
earlier and faster in the east and the south. However, around 1890, about a 
fifth of the population in Croatia and Serbia still lived in an extended family.
Social and Economic Change
Around the turn of the century, about 85 percent of the population in Croatia-
Slavonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina worked in agriculture, 
and only about 10 percent earned their living in industry, handcraft, and trade; 
the rest worked in independent professions. Only Slovenia differed in this 
respect. Here about two-thirds of the population still worked in the agrarian 
sector, while 11 percent were employed in mining and industry.39
The South Slavic region was divided into a number of distinct systems 
of agricultural law. The manorial system had been ended in 1848/1849 in 
Austria-Hungary, so that peasants were the owners of the land they farmed. 
This led to a differentiated structure of ownership and social life with several 
large modern agricultural enterprises, a wealthy farming middle class, but also 
increasing rural poverty. This lay the foundation for an — albeit modest — in-
dustrial development. The feudal system in Serbia was also abolished after 
the uprisings that occurred from 1815 to 1833. The principle prevailed here, 
too, that those who worked the land should own it. In the remaining regions, 
various forms of feudal dependency still existed. In Istria and Dalmatia the 
systems of colonate (težaština) and socage (kmetije) survived, which obliged 
farmers to turn over a portion of their harvest, anywhere from one-fifth to a 
half. These systems existed in many different variations. It is estimated that 
in 1925 as many as 100,000 peasant families were still working as coloni on 
land they didn’t own.40 Feudal relations in agriculture also remained intact in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina with the čiftlik system. More than half of the families, 
the majority being Orthodox and Catholic socagers, the kmets, were person-
ally unfree, although they did have the right to buy their freedom. They were 
heavily burdened with the obligation to turn over a portion (usually a third) of 
their harvest. In early 1914, a total of 93,336 kmet families were still working 
a third of all arable soil.41 Similar primeval dependencies also prevailed in 
Macedonia and Kosovo.
Where agrarian reforms were undertaken, the efforts were half-hearted 
and contradictory. Legislators in Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, and Montenegro 
tried to prevent the impoverishment of the peasants by upholding the princi-
ple of indivisible collective property and lifelong family solidarity. In Serbia, 
zadrugas were only permitted to be divided in exceptional cases, and by 
1889 in Croatia this was only permitted if the resulting amount of property 
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allotted each party did not fall short of a legally stipulated minimum. Efforts 
to protect the homesteads (okućje) followed similar ideas. In order to protect 
peasants against excessive indebtedness and forced liquidation, a minimum 
of 8.5 acres including dwellings, draft animals, and inventory were required 
to be mortgage-free and exempt from liquidation. These protective measures 
hindered the mobilization of land and labor, the spread of market-based eco-
nomic relations, and thus the segmentation of property and societal structures 
in rural areas.42
For these reasons, the potential surplus population in agriculture seriously 
encumbered society throughout the entire Balkan region at the turn of the 
century. As the large families split up, landholdings became more and more 
fragmented. Land was divided up into small, unproductive parcels; herds of 
livestock and machinery were torn apart; all too often an entire house was 
dismantled, beam for beam. At least a third of the peasants in the Yugoslav re-
gion worked less than five acres of land, another third only up to twelve acres. 
Landholdings of any considerable size were only found in central Croatia 
and in Vojvodina; they were practically nonexistent in Serbia, Dalmatia, and 
Carinthia.43
The result was indebtedness and poverty. Anyone with less than twelve 
acres to farm could just barely survive; those who owned less than five acres 
were in dire straits. In the period between 1910 and 1912, two-thirds of the 
farmers in Serbia could not earn the existential minimum. More than half 
of them did not own a yoke of oxen; a third had neither a plow nor even a 
bed.44 Poverty was also indescribable in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the similarity of these circumstances in which 
they lived and of the crises they had experienced that would later contribute 
considerably to the political merger of the South Slavic peoples.
Agrarian productivity was low, and many households persevered on sub-
sistence farming. Still, step by step, the market economy was making inroads 
into rural regions, first in southern Hungary, Syrmia, and Slavonia, later in 
Serbia, and finally in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. 
However, this left farming households at the mercy of cyclical fluctuations in 
the economy. The majority of them lacked the capital and the knowledge to 
intensify their agricultural production. Land use and cultivation techniques 
remained primitive with little diversification of produce; artificial fertilizers 
and modern farm machinery were unknown, as were root crops and industrial 
crops, and little changed in this regard until the interwar period.
The increase in agrarian productivity continued to lag far behind the 
dynamic growth in population. Instead of intensifying yields, peasants tended 
to increase arable farmland. They turned woods and meadows into grain 
fields, reduced livestock farming in favor of crop farming, and shifted their 
own eating habits from a meat-based diet to a vegetarian one. Despite these 
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efforts, food provision remained precarious. In 28 percent of the Serb farming 
households, the food shortages appeared each year by the end of October; in 
another 46 percent, the deficit appeared in January and February, all of which 
had serious consequences for the nutrition and state of health of the rural 
population.45 About a hundred years after much of Europe had been cursed 
with rural overpopulation, the South Slavic countries first found themselves 
smitten with it, at a point when the curse had long been broken elsewhere.
As in many European societies, people sought a way out of their predica-
ment by migrating in search of work. In doing so, they perpetuated traditional 
forms of periodic migratory labor known as pečalba. On the eve of the First 
World War, nearly 150,000 men from Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, 
and Macedonia made their way each year into the neighboring regions to hire 
themselves out as migratory artisans, wage laborers, or small businessmen. 
Istria and Dalmatia were also classic emigration regions.
Later than everywhere else in Europe, transcontinental labor migration 
did not take place to a significant degree until the 1880s. Then, between 1899 
and 1913, more than a half million South Slavs left for the New World, four-
fifths of whom were from the Habsburg monarchy.46 Due to cyclical economic 
fluctuations, countries overseas limited immigration starting at the turn of 
the century, which meant that emigration provided far less relief to the taxed 
job market than had been the case in earlier decades in places like Germany 
or Scandinavia. The majority of the structurally underemployed jobseekers 
remained in their own country.
The low level of agricultural productivity also hampered development 
in trade and industry. Agricultural exports did not generate profits that could 
have been invested in industry, nor did a greater domestic demand for finished 
goods emerge in rural areas. People were simply too poor to be able to afford 
things that they did not produce themselves. Therefore, industrialization in 
the South Slavic countries began later, progressed slower, and developed in 
other branches than it did in the rest of Europe. Whereas the latecomers, 
Sweden and Denmark, did manage to initiate viable industrialization in the 
nineteenth century, and Italy, Hungary, and Russia created at least regional 
industrial centers, the Balkan countries — as well as Spain and Portugal — did 
not experience any substantial industrial growth.47 Nor would there be any 
major impetus in industrialization until the 1930s; in fact, the rapid switch to 
advanced industrialization did not occur until 1945.
This was caused by a bundle of factors: the backward transportation 
infrastructure that hampered the development of transregional markets, the 
chronic lack of capital, the low level of education and training, and — last but 
not least — the powerful competition from developed regions of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Starting at the turn of the century, the number of factories 
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and employed workers increased and levels of production grew annually by 
more than 10 percent, albeit from a very low starting point. Unfortunately, at 
the same time, the discrepancy to the rest of Europe also grew.48 In Croatia-
Slavonia, the number of industrial workers rose from 9,832 to 23,604 in the 
years between 1890 and 1910. In Serbia, this number had only risen to 16,095 
by 1910, despite the efforts made by the government in its industrial policy. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than 65,000 industrial workers were employed in 
1912/1913 as a result of the Austro-Hungarian development policy.49
Since proto-industries had been weak in southeastern Europe during the 
early modern period, industry developed out of artisan crafts more than out 
of manufacturing. It was not textile manufacturing (as in England) or the coal, 
iron, and steel industry (as in Germany) that stood at the forefront in the be-
ginning, but agriculture (mills and breweries) and forestry (timber and wood 
processing). In 1910, food production generated 55 percent of the revenue of 
all factory production in Serbia, while the textile industry only generated 8 
percent. In Croatia, the leading branch of industry was timber, and industry 
would not start to diversify significantly until 1910.50 Due to the lower level of 
technological requirements in this sector, the demand for machinery did not 
intensify as a spin-off effect. At first, heavy industry only played a subordinate 
role, except in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Austro-Hungarian colonial 
regime had ignited a major thrust in industrialization.51
Life in the City
Until the interwar period, urbanization developed moderately and was greatly 
influenced by agriculture. Railroad construction, mining, and factories drew 
people from the countryside, and cities grew and changed the way they looked. 
However, some qualification is necessary here with regard to the use of the 
term “city.” On average, a city only had a few thousand inhabitants. In the 
thirty years prior to the First World War, the urban population increased 
threefold. Still, Belgrade only had 68,481 inhabitants in 1900; Zagreb 57,690; 
Sarajevo 38,035 (1895); and Ljubljana 46,000 (1910). The number of migrants 
to the cities was enormous, and yet in 1910 only 13.2 percent of the Serb pop-
ulation lived in cities. In Croatia the figure was just 8.5 percent. Only Russia 
and Finland had lower figures.52
The migration from the countryside also changed the look and structure of 
the (sub)urban areas. The more newcomers arrived, the greater the village way 
of life infiltrated daily city life. The mass of urbanites lived under appalling 
conditions in small, ground-level farm buildings, not in tenement blocks and 
rear buildings as in western Europe. Living space was excessively expensive, 
overcrowded, poorly ventilated, squalid, and without any sanitary facilities. 
In 1906, an inquiry survey reported among other things “that a close causal 
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connection existed between life in such dwellings and the three greatest en-
emies of public health — tuberculosis, alcoholism, and venereal disease.”53 
Only a small, wealthy elite could afford to live in comfortable townhouses.
The cityscape was not dominated by fuming smokestacks and proletarian 
hardship, but by the shabby dwellings of former rural inhabitants and small 
business dealers as well as the growing army of job-seeking day laborers.54 
Every other city dweller in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade still worked in 
agriculture. In the suburbs, many farmed plots of land and kept poultry, pigs, 
or a cow. Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of southeastern European 
urbanization before the Second World War is that many cities were actu-
ally nothing more than gigantic villages. The only places that underwent a 
“European” urban metamorphosis were Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and a 
few mid-sized cities.
In Serbia a great effort was made starting in the 1870s to remove all traces 
of the Ottoman past so that, as the city planner Emilijan Josimović expressed 
it, the “capital does not retain the form that barbarism gave it.”55 Belgrade’s 
reconstruction was modeled on Vienna and its grand circular boulevard, the 
Ringstrasse. The only structures that were left as reminders of the 350 years 
of Turkish rule were the citadel, two mosques, and a fountain with Arabic 
inscriptions.56 Almost simultaneously with western European metropolises, 
Belgrade was outfitted in the 1890s with electrical lighting and streetcars, 
and after 1900 with canalization and a water supply system.57 Irrespective of 
the modest conditions from which the reconstruction was starting, the city 
planners were driven by the desire to simply skip over the laborious catch-up 
process and to hitch up an “airplane motor to the oxen cart,” as an observer 
put it.58 Belgrade became a paradigm of modernity, a shop window displaying 
a culture that was more or less imitating the West.
About 1900, daily life and habits in the cities changed at a breathtaking 
pace, evident first in the spread of traditional costumes (građanski kostim). 
In Belgrade, hats and felt caps replaced the traditional fez. Instead of gath-
ering together in the evening, as was widely done in the villages, the elegant 
reception day žur ( jour de réception) became fashionable among the Belgrade 
upper class.59 Also in other cities of the South Slavic region, the upper esche-
lons of society began to adopt European forms of socializing and lifestyles, 
such as salons, leisure activity, and interior design.60 Bourgeois attitudes to-
ward romantic love and marriage ideals also began to take hold.
However, there were also interactions between the distant worlds of the 
townhouse and the farmhouse. Lifestyle, fashion, and etiquette gradually 
made inroads into everyday peasant life. “Where a wooden cup had once 
been enough, one now finds a glass; the petroleum lamp replaces kindling 
wood,” a foreign traveler observed in 1897. “European farm wagons with iron 
 The South Slavic Countries around 1900: The Dawn of a New Century  19
fittings are replacing the old prehistorical vehicle with the creaking wooden 
wheels.”61 Whereas the respective local folk costumes were still being worn in 
the countryside up to the end of the nineteenth century, the men and women in 
the cities were already wearing West European clothing. Changes in customs 
spread from the cities outward. People began to address each other with the 
formal form of “you” instead of the more commonly used familiar form and 
to greet each other with the words “dobar dan” (good day) — known as the 
“German form” of greeting.62
Progress and Uncertainty
The desire for national emancipation was generated not least by the awareness 
of how backward things were. Members of the elite considered liberation from 
foreign rule to be the prerequisite for a better future and an emancipatory 
strategy to further development that would finally enable the people of the 
region to participate in European civilization as members of equal standing. 
Yet the harbingers of the new European era, like technical progress, bourgeois 
culture, and liberal social morality, descended upon agrarian society in south-
eastern Europe so suddenly that the changes severely shook the long-standing 
mainstays of identity and uprooted traditional values and societal relations. In 
particular, the countries formerly under Ottoman rule experienced a profound 
break with the traditions of their Muslim heritage, which had shaped daily life 
and society for four hundred years. Radical societal change subdued people’s 
optimism about progress and caused anxious uncertainty about the future. The 
key question was how their own social-cultural identity was to be reconciled 
with the new challenges facing them.
Since the Enlightenment, the intellectual elite of southeastern Europe 
had cultivated the idea of societal progress, which they associated with words 
like “reason” and “science” and equated with “Europeanization.” 63 During the 
nineteenth century, the enthusiasts of this intellectual interaction with Europe 
were young students attending higher schools of learning and universities in 
Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and Austria. Over the course of 
the next few decades, a Europe-oriented intelligentsia emerged from their 
ranks, comprised of people familiar with the ideas of liberalism, socialism, 
and Russian populism.64 At the same time, Muslim educated classes were 
adopting Islamic ideologies and movements from the Arab world, Asia, and 
Russia.65 Islamic scholars also studied European philosophy intensely, es-
pecially rationalism. In view of the decline of the once powerful Ottoman 
Empire, they asked, how were the administrative, economic, military, and 
judiciary achievements of the West to be explained? 66
The younger generations thirsted after answers to the big questions of 
this new era. How could the curse of backwardness be overcome and the 
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intellectual and technical level of “Europe” achieved? Which means were best 
to fight the prevailing patriarchal mentality and to create a sense of national 
identity among the rural population? How could the interests of the great 
powers be confronted and a body politic organized?
The educated classes of southeastern Europe took all the major intellec-
tual and political movements of Europe (or of the Islamic world) with a grain 
of salt. However, this does not corroborate a popular stereotypical assumption 
that the absence of the Reformation and the Enlightenment caused the Balkans 
to harbor long-standing, specifically anti-Western attitudes hostile to modern-
ization.67 The decisive factor was not the fundamental differences between 
the civilizations of the Latin West and the Orthodox or Islamic East, but the 
fact that the reception of major ideas took place under thoroughly different 
societal circumstances. At the turn of the century, more than four-fifths of 
the population made their living from agriculture. Anyone seeking to gain 
widespread resonance for their ideas at a time when developments were only 
beginning to politicize the mass public still had to take into consideration the 
attitudes, values, and interests of the peasantry.
Up to that point, it had not been possible to develop an industrial soci-
ety modeled on the West, even though there were clear indications that the 
political system, public life, national cultures, lifestyles, and value orienta-
tions in the cities were undergoing a gradual process of embourgeoisement.68 
Conditions for this had been particularly favorable in Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Slavonia. In the nineteenth century, a small bourgeoisie had developed from 
the ranks of the traditional urban classes, wealthy farmers, the nobility, ar-
tisans, merchants, government bureaucrats, and military officers. What the 
newly emerging business circles increasingly yearned to see was the industrial 
production associated with smoke billowing from ever more factory chimneys. 
Their vocabulary was augmented by new words like “producers,” “compe-
tition,” “business cycles,” “capitalism,” and “working class.”69 The situation 
was quite different in the peasant societies formerly under Ottoman rule, 
because the majority of the urban Muslims had emigrated at the time when 
the Ottoman influence was being eradicated in these regions. The creation of 
a bourgeoisie here, as in Serbia, had to start literally from scratch. However, 
in less than three generations, a new social elite had developed that consisted 
of people from poor rural circumstances who had risen to higher posts in 
government service or established themselves in independent professions.
In all of the South Slavic countries, improved educational opportunities 
in rural communities and greater regional mobility among the well-schooled 
and university-educated youth proved to be a powerful motor for an intellec-
tual and national awakening. Back in the 1860s and 1870s, the first generation 
educated abroad had brought the ideas of liberalism to Serbia, which was also 
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reflected in the political system established in 1881. Both the ruling Progress 
Party and the Liberals favored the idea of imitating the Western path to devel-
opment as quickly as possible, in order to abolish the “limitations of outdated 
patriarchal Serbia.”70 But only a small elite were convinced of the feasibility to 
simply impose the European model of progress on their own country through 
a type of “revolution from above.” Serbia lacked the underlying support of 
the bourgeois classes, who could have anchored the Western type of mod-
ernization more firmly into local society. Besides the royal family, a total of 
six millionaires lived in Belgrade in 1900; in Zurich alone there were 500.71
It was not the economic sphere but the political one that provided the 
realm in which to develop all things new. Every party in Serbia took up the 
cause of political freedom, yet no party had worked out a clear economic re-
form program. This demonstrates a nearly unbridgeable gulf between political 
modernity and economic backwardness. The Serb newspaper Dnevni List 
(Daily Newspaper) illustrated it in the following way: “Nowhere else in the 
world can one see the miraculous and absurd situation that modern ideas of 
political and social progress are advocated in the parliament by village cash-
loan givers, former municipal cops, and illiterate bench-sitters and chicken 
sellers.”72
This entire debate over catch-up development and Europeanization oc-
curred against the backdrop of an intensifying competition between the major 
powers in the era of imperialism. Granted, the Balkans had been the object of 
hegemonic power projection for centuries.
However, advanced industrialization and economic global expansion cre-
ated hegemony of a new sort at the end of the nineteenth century. Increasingly 
the aim was to secure new markets and capital-intensive investments. Trade 
policy, lending policy, and railway construction created new economic de-
pendencies that the new Balkan states found hard if not impossible to avoid 
at first. After the Congress of Berlin, Serbia had been forced to sign disad-
vantageous trade contracts with Austria-Hungary and soon fell deeply into 
debt. Between 1880 and 1914, its liabilities grew from 16.5 million to 903.8 
million French francs.73 For this reason, the debate on Europeanization was 
always accompanied by a fear of foreign dependence, as is illustrated in the 
controversy of railroad construction.
At the beginning of the 1880s, Serbia and Montenegro were the only 
countries in Europe without a railway system. In parliament there was stiff 
resistance to the railroad construction stipulated by the Congress of Berlin. 
Was Serbian society even ready for the technological revolution, asked the 
members of parliament? Didn’t the imposed modernization intently create 
new dependencies on foreign lenders? Serbia would “suffer the same fate 
as the Indians following the discovery of America,” it was said. Think of 
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Columbus, who “brought European culture to America, but with it also the 
chains of slavery.”74
Broadly speaking, the elites in Serbia and Montenegro split into two 
main groups that roughly equated the distinction between “Liberals” and 
“Conservatives” in Europe or between “Westerners” and “Slavophiles” in 
Russia: namely, a European-modern and a Slavic-traditional group.75 While 
the liberal, state-oriented “Westerners” pushed for the separation of church 
and state and for institutional, legal, and constitutional reform, the conserva-
tive, community-oriented “traditionalists” tended to cultivate the autochthon 
roots of a meta-historical, natural, and organically perceived national iden-
tity. Although both movements envisioned a better future, the former greatly 
emphasized institutional change, while the latter stressed a distinct élan vital 
of the Slavs.76
Parallel to this and in a process observable throughout the entire Islamic 
world, the Muslim intelligentsia also developed two wings, a European-laicist 
and an Islamic-religious one.77 Members of the former group had been edu-
cated in secular schools and at European universities, opposed traditional, 
religious erudition, and favored a secular, politically determined concept of 
nation. However, the majority of the intelligentsia still adhered to the Islamic 
type of Bosnian Muslim collective identity. Muslims had been catapulted 
into a new world by the Austro-Hungarian project to impose European civi-
lization. The former political legitimacy of Islam, as it had been universally 
understood, had been forced to give way to a heteronomous and secular state 
legitimacy imported from the West, one that fundamentally rocked its social 
and cultural core. The challenge before them was to harmonize all that was 
new with that which was tried and tested, to conjoin the universal aim of 
modernization with the preservation of cultural-religious identity. But how?
During these years, the popularity of the reformist movement of Salafism, 
which reinterpreted ancient writings in pursuit of what the reformers con-
sidered true Islam, helped introduce two different strategies of adaptation. 
One strategy postulated the compatibility of Islam with Western rationalism 
and recommended the “modernization of Islam.” It was argued that faith and 
science had not been contradictory even in earlier eras. In his work Islam 
and Culture, published in 1894, Osman Nuri Hadžić, for example, proposed 
a rational-enlightened model for the future.78 The other, at first less popular 
strategy emphasized the universality and values of the religion and pushed for 
an “Islamization of modernity.” Pan-Islamism was also part of this tradition of 
thought, an idea that found a voice in the magazine Behar (Blossom) starting 
early in the twentieth century.79
All this discourse on modernity, progress, and the future appears closely 
connected to that on cultural identity, collective values, and national assertion 
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and dignity. As was the case throughout Europe, the new challenges prompted 
strong counterreactions. Anxiety about the future and antimodern reflexes 
were cloaked in egalitarian debate; rural traditions, local self-administration, 
and the extended family were adjured, in order to fight off the subversive trend 
of the new era. Wasn’t the contrived finery of the capital, Belgrade, which so 
flagrantly contradicted the poverty-ridden world of the masses, no more than a 
subversive attack against Serbia’s socially just, agrarian society? Why should 
the capital city lead the outside world to believe in its progress and high culture 
when in reality the countryside was plagued with poverty?80
It was against this backdrop around the turn of the century that the fun-
damental dichotomy between urban and rural emerged, a dichotomy between 
modern, Western-influenced urbanity, on the one hand, and village life with its 
traditional social culture, on the other. The city represented the condensation 
of all hopes and fears with regard to modernity; it was the metaphor both for 
progress and decline, the promise for a better future and the signal to return to 
the old social and moral order. What is more, the urban–rural dichotomy also 
symbolized the social dividing line between “rulers” and “people,” between 
the “city-coat wearers” (kaputaši) and those wearing peasant costume.
As was typical for all of Europe, this confrontation between the famil-
iar and the foreign, between the supposed security provided by patriarchal 
values and the attractions and adventures of urban progressivity served as 
a blueprint for numerous literary works.81 “Progress” was often perceived 
as culturally foreign and thus radicalized fears of a loss of identity and a de-
cline of morals — fears articulated in Serbian literature by Laza Kostić, Đura 
Jakšić, or Stevan Sremac and in Bosnian literature by Safet Beg Bašagić and 
Edhem Mulabdić.82 Urban and rural became symbolic representations for the 
contrary forces of change and persistence and for the contradictory fears of 
a return to atavism and barbarism, for some people, and of the irretrievable 
loss of the tried and true, for others. An entire legion of ethnographers, village 
researchers, and historians set out to trace the true roots of Serbian, Croatian, 
and Slovenian culture and to reconstruct the pastoral world of peasantry as a 
counterweight to the raw industrial present. Often modernity meant foreign-
ness, even alienation, “something that should be eliminated,” as a member of 
the Serbian parliament expressed it.83
Both the Liberals and the Radicals in Serbia tried to dissipate the tensions 
between traditional social structures and patriarchal values, on the one side, 
and the needs of modern constitutionality, economic management, and gover-
nance, on the other. As legislators, they thus repeatedly relied on established 
common law when reforming agrarian, family, and trade and commercial law 
in order to retain tested and trusted social institutions of village life and thus 
avoid the upheaval of capitalism.84 This was consistent with the thinking of 
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the socialist Svetozar Marković, one of Serbia’s most important intellectuals 
in the nineteenth century. Influenced by Russian revolutionaries, he advocated 
an agrarian socialism that was based on the societal order of the village and 
emphasized the self-administration (samouprava) of the traditional extended 
family (zadruga) and the community (opština). He considered collective 
ownership and collective production to be the more humane alternative to 
the exploitative capitalistic state.85 The following generation of politicians 
also thought technology and science should be advanced, but — according to 
Nikola Pašić, the leader of the Radical Party — they both were to be used in 
the “Slavic-Serbian spirit.”86 This was also very similar to the position of the 
founders of the Croatian Peoples’ Peasant Party.
The majority of Muslim intellectuals decided to favor a pragmatic strat-
egy that adopted a select number of European standards, just as Turkish and 
Egyptian authors had. Bosnian spiritual leaders found citations in classic 
writings to justify to their fellow countrymen why they should enter mili-
tary service in the hated Christian army. Compromise was recommended 
in other questions as well, such as in the matter of integrating the sharia 
into the Habsburg legal and justice system.87 The predominant paradigm was 
therefore not to fetishize the past or the religion, let alone some nebulous 
anti-Westernism, but to attempt to reconcile the imported ideas, values, and 
structures with the dominant societal conditions.
By the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the glorified view 
of the Balkans as an exotic and romantic region was no longer able to bear 
up against societal realities. Just as everywhere else in Europe, the emerging 
industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, and other fundamental 
processes of modernity had already shaken traditional agrarian society to 
the core, even though industrialized, urbanized society with its characteristic 
ways of life, aesthetics, and scientific-technological momentum would not 
fully develop until decades later. The socioeconomic upheavals in Europe’s 
southeast region became noticeable later than in western Europe and occurred 
slower, less dynamically, and in other directions. Compared with England, 
France, and Germany they appeared modest; even Russia and Italy were far 
more advanced. Still, measured against what had existed before, the change 
was indeed spectacular not only because it created younger, mobile, and ed-
ucated generations who carried forth the spirit of change, but also because 
it intensified tensions between social experiences and political realities and 
thus brought about nationalism. In this sense, an irreversible transformation 
process was forging ahead that not only thoroughly changed socioeconomic 
realities but also pushed the national question high up on the political agenda.
2.
The National Question across  
the Balkans (1875 to 1903)
The Great Eastern Crisis, 1875 to 1878
In the summer of 1875, Christian peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who 
had become infuriated by unbearable tax burdens, forced labor, and the ex-
cessive use of force against them, revolted against the feudal Ottoman rule, 
an uprising that was attentively and anxiously watched by the Great Powers 
of Europe. During his wanderings through both provinces, the Oxford archae-
ologist Arthur Evans was shocked by the inhumane conditions he witnessed: 
“The Christian ‘kmet,’ or tiller of the soil, is worse off than many a serf in our 
darkest ages, and lies as completely at the mercy of the Mahometan owner of 
the soil as if he were a slave.” In order to enforce socage tenure and collect 
levies, torture was used: “In the heat of summer men are stripped naked, and 
tied to a tree smeared over with honey or other sweet-stuff, and left to the 
tender mercies of the insect world. For winter extortion it is found convenient 
to bind people to stakes and leave them bare-footed to be frost-bitten.”1
Ottoman rule over the Balkans had begun to crumble at the end of the 
eighteenth century, a process of decline that was intermittently accelerated 
in the nineteenth century by major Eastern crises, in which the Great Powers 
rivaled for hegemony in “European Turkey.” This had been preceded by the 
Greek War of Independence (1821 to 1832) and the Crimean War (1853 to 
1856).2 At the time of the Great Eastern Crisis, only Greece was a sovereign 
state, while the Principality of Serbia was autonomous. The greater part of the 
Balkans remained under Ottoman rule, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Today’s Slovenia and Croatia were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The various national movements in the Balkans profited from the in-
creasing decline of the Sublime Porte. In June 1876, Serbia and Montenegro 
entered the war to support their Bosnian compatriots in the fight against the 
Ottomans. Serbia intended to annex Bosnia, and Montenegro was to take over 
Herzegovina, but both countries soon found themselves in trouble militarily.
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Russian pan-Slavic committees sent volunteers as reinforcements, thereby 
prompting Austria-Hungary and Great Britain to react. These revolts meant 
that the Eastern Question, resulting from the heralded collapse of Ottoman 
rule, had entered a new phase. Once again, the strategically and economically 
interesting Balkans were to become “the center of particularly difficult and 
above all course-setting crises of the European system.”3
As the power of the Ottoman Empire waned, Austria-Hungary and Russia 
became the main rivals for its territories on the Balkan Peninsula. The Russian 
czar was driven by strategic interests, above all by the opportunity to gain con-
trol of the Turkish Straits, but also by economic motives. In addition, he was 
motivated by a sense of pan-Slavic solidarity with the Orthodox Christians. 
For the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph, the chance to carve out a piece of 
Ottoman territory for his empire was more a question of restoring his personal 
honor, following the humiliating defeats in Italy (1859) and against Prussia 
(1866). Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be occupied not only to better protect the 
naval port in Dalmatia but also to facilitate advances farther south from there. 
The chief objective was to prevent the succession of the South Slavs in the 
wake of the successful independence movement of the Italians, who, led by 
Piedmont, had established the Kingdom of Italy in 1861.
At the time, both Austria-Hungary and Russia were still interested 
in supporting Ottoman power in the Balkans to a certain degree in order 
to keep national movements among the Balkan peoples in check.4 At the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878, which resolved the Great Eastern Crisis, Serbia 
and Montenegro were recognized as independent states and were somewhat 
enlarged territorially. However, the historic region of southern Serbia, Kosovo, 
and Macedonia still remained part of the Ottoman Empire, and the demands of 
the new Albanian national movement to create an autonomous administrative 
region (vilayet) within the Ottoman Empire fell on deaf ears.5
Austria-Hungary secured the right to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Sandžak. A secret protocol also assigned Serbia to the Habsburg sphere of in-
fluence while the eastern Balkan region including Bulgaria was left to Russia. 
Serbia was then forced to sign disadvantageous trade agreements and not 
only had to approve a railway connection to Hungary but also had to ac-
cept a strong Austro-Hungarian say on the control of the Danube, which was 
declared neutral territory below the Iron Gates. Although Serbia had been 
given full sovereignty, it had not achieved the important war aim of liber-
ating Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia and thus incorporating 
them into its national territory. This meant that more than half of all Serbs 
still lived outside the motherland. Furthermore, Austrian troops stationed in 
Sandžak blocked any chance of unification with Montenegro and thus the 
desired access to the sea.6
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The problems arising from the occupation and later annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina would significantly impact the rest of Austria-Hungary’s foreign 
policy agenda. The erosion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the inde-
pendence of Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and later Bulgaria intensified 
competition with Russia for hegemony over the region. At the same time, it 
was becoming clear that South Slavic nationalism would become a question 
of survival for the monarchy.7
The “South Slavic Question” in the Habsburg Monarchy
A closer look at Viennese politics starting in the mid-nineteenth century, 
which the Austrian prime minister Count Eduard Taaffe once accurately de-
scribed as “muddling along,” reveals that there is no justification for nostalgia 
of any kind regarding the Habsburg era. The ideal, supposedly harmonious 
world of the multiethnical “Kakania” (Robert Musil), posed as an alterna-
tive to war-torn and violence-ridden Yugoslavia, did not correspond at all 
with reality. Granted, the metaphor of the Völkerkerker (dungeon of peoples) 
appears exaggerated.8 At the same time, the albeit halting socioeconomic 
transformation process in the nineteenth century had produced all over the 
empire an educated and economic elite in the various nationalities, who were 
now demanding autonomy and democratic rights with ever-growing urgency. 
When faced with these demands, however, the Habsburg monarchy never once 
seriously considered granting political representation, economic participation, 
or linguistic and cultural autonomy.9 Rocked by its first major existential crisis 
caused by the revolution of 1848, the monarchy had concentrated since then 
solely on ensuring its very survival.10 For this reason, Emperor Franz Joseph 
was doomed to fail in his attempt to instill loyalty for the monarchical empire 
as a whole and against ethnic nationalisms. Austria-Hungary did not collapse 
because it “lost a decisive war” in 1918 or was the victim of Serbian agitation,11 
but because it never resolved the growing internal conflict between political 
and social dynamics of change and its poor ability to reform itself.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the South Slavic question 
became increasingly relevant. Like the Italians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and 
Romanians, the South Slavs had been demanding more political rights for 
decades. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established the dual mon-
archy and thereby satisfied the long-sought Magyar desire for self-government. 
However, no other nationality was granted substantial political, economic, 
and cultural autonomy, let alone self-rule. Budapest, in whose half of the 
empire the Croatian lands lay, treated the Slavs no differently than they had 
been formerly treated by the Austrians. In the Croatian-Hungarian Settlement 
of 1868 (nagodba), it granted the “Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia” au-
tonomy within Hungary, including its own bureaucracy, judicial system, 
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and cultural sovereignty, but no independent government. Even though this 
compromise promised the unification of Dalmatia with Croatia and Slavonia, 
which had been a central demand of the national movement since 1848, this 
was never realized.
The Croats were particularly annoyed by the Hungarian nationality law 
stipulating that Hungarian was not only the national language but also the 
language to be used in teaching. Moreover, under the absolutist regime of 
the Hungarian Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry (1883 to 1903), the Croatian 
opposition was subjected to political repression. Croats and Serbs were pit-
ted against one another through crude divide-and-conquer politics. Fifty-five 
percent of the country’s tax revenue had to be turned over to the Hungarian 
authorities. Press and election laws discriminated against non-Magyar na-
tionalities.12 Except for a small class of Croatian “Magyarons” loyal to the 
state, the Croats viewed the established system as corrupt and fraudulent and 
deeply despised it.13
The idea of the South Slavic peoples as a single Yugoslav nation devel-
oped concurrently with Croat political frustration and growing self-awareness. 
Its origins can be traced back to the 1830s and 1840s among proponents of the 
Illyrian movement. The idea adopted the arguments of early sixteenth-century 
Croat humanists who derived the origins of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes from 
an antique people, the Illyrians. Influenced by the ideas of Johann Gottfried 
Herder and Romanticism but caught in the pinch of Hungarian, German, and 
Italian hegemonic impulses, Croat intellectuals and aristocrats propagated the 
vision of all South Slavs as a single nation, since they spoke the same language.
The Illyrians called for an imaginary national “rebirth” (risorgimento, 
preporod) through linguistic unity. Ljudevit Gaj, a leading scholar, wanted to 
create a common “Illyrian” written and literary language and to disseminate 
it by way of cultural activities. Reading societies, newspapers, and publishing 
houses were founded, and literature was used to advance “our dear native 
tongue.” Gaj and his fellow activists decided deliberately to use the Štokavian 
dialect as the guide for standardizing the written language because many 
Croats shared this dialect with the Serbs.
It was clear to the pioneers of the Croatian national movement that they 
needed allies in order to ensure the success of their project for national self-rule 
against the resistance of Austrian centralism and Magyar cultural hegemony. 
Compared with the deep language gap that divided the South Slavs and the 
dominant nationalities (Germans, Magyars, Italians), the cultural and dialectal 
differences between Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, and Montenegrins appeared 
marginal. In the course of language reforms in the 1850s, this dialect was 
chosen as the basis for both Croatian and Serbian literary standards. Until 
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the late twentieth century, Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian) figured as the 
backbone of Yugoslav unity and identity
The Illyrianist idea represented the early stage of Croat national awaken-
ing. But it simultaneously addressed the issue of a common culture and identity 
of all South Slavs under the neutral name of an ancient people.14 Indeed, this 
idea also found supporters among the Slovenes in Carinthia and Styria — here 
as a defense strategy against Germanization — and among Croatian Serbs. The 
historical importance of Illyrianism lies in the fact that it created the basis 
of both the modern Croatian culture and a bourgeois political movement that 
fundamentally questioned the legitimacy of the Habsburg monarchy. At the 
same time it planted the seed for Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian cooperation and 
the idea of forming a unified South Slavic (that is, Yugoslav) state.
In the 1860s, South Slavic nationalism (or Yugoslavism) developed out 
of Illyrianism to become the core idea adopted by a large part of the Croat 
intelligentsia, because the belief in a single Yugoslav nation simultaneously 
legitimized the creation of either an independent nation state (Greater Croatia) 
or a unified Yugoslav state. However, both options presupposed either the 
dismemberment of the Habsburg monarchy or a “trialist” recomposition 
of Austria-Hungary, as well as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The 
chief political protagonist of the Yugoslavists was Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the 
bishop of Djakovo since 1849, who demanded the formation and autonomy 
of the “Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia” within — and 
eventually also outside — the Habsburg monarchy.
According to the manifesto Jugoslovjenstvo, written in 1860 by the then 
well-reputed historian Franjo Rački, Croats, Serbs and possibly Slovenes, de-
spite their historical particularities and different religions, were understood 
as “branches” of a single primordial nation, united by common descent and 
shared history.15 The Yugoslavists also believed in pre-schismatic religious 
unity, although they realized that church and religion were the two factors 
that chiefly conferred national identity, established differences, and — whether 
intended or not — thwarted a Croat–Serb symbiosis. They used the Cyril–
Methodius idea to encourage rapprochement between Roman Catholicism and 
Eastern Orthodoxy. They referred to the ninth-century Slavic apostles who 
had made it their mission to spread a supposedly authentic Slavic-Christian 
culture throughout Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and 
Bulgaria two centuries before the Great Schism of 1054. A vestige of this 
East–West ecclesial symbiosis is, for example, the Glagolitic alphabet (glagol-
ica), which was developed from the Greek alphabet and was still being used 
along the Croatian coast up to the nineteenth century. However, the return to 
pre-schismatic religious unity as propagated by Strossmayer and Rački had 
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already failed in the nineteenth century when it ran up against the historic 
realities of stronger, more institutionalized church hierarchies.
The enlightened elite who put their faith in progress, namely the liberal 
bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and Catholic clergy, believed in the obliteration 
of historical, cultural, and religious differences between Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes. For them, the unification of South Slavs seemed to be the only 
realistic strategy to ensure the survival of the Croat nation in light of Austro-
Hungarian supremacy. The idea of a primordial Yugoslav nation, although 
varied and controversial, greatly influenced the political discourse in the South 
Slavic lands in the decades preceding the First World War.
Among the Slovenian national movement, Yugoslavism also became 
popular across the entire political spectrum during the period of the dual 
monarchy. It appeared to be the only political idea that could bring about the 
realization of a United Slovenia, as had been propagated since 1848.16 In 1870, 
Croat, Serb, and Slovene representatives met in Ljubljana to hold a South 
Slavic conference, in which they vowed to combine “all their strength” in 
order “to use it for unification in the literary, economic, and political fields.”17
Competing against the Yugoslav idea was an irredentist and hegemonic 
nationalism that emerged in the last third of the century in the form of 
“Croatianism” as propagated by the aspiring petite bourgeoisie. Unlike the 
Yugoslavists, Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik from the “Party of Rights,” 
founded in 1861, called for the creation of an exclusively Croatian nation state 
outside the “treacherous” Habsburg monarchy. They based their legal claims 
for a Croatian state on the Pacta conventa (agreed accords) of 1102, in which 
the Croat nobility had acknowledged the supremacy of the Hungarian king but 
allegedly had never surrendered the autonomy of Croatia. They considered the 
Yugoslav idea to be a tragic mistake and rejected the argument that the other 
South Slavic peoples had a national identity of their own. Instead they claimed 
that Serbs and Slovenes were basically also Croats.18 Even if the importance of 
this ideology waned after the turn of the century, it contributed significantly to 
enhancing the awareness for Croatian nationalism and popularizing the idea 
of an independent Croatia.
Both of these national integration ideologies — the South Slavic and the 
pan-Croatian — invoked historic rights (of medieval Croatia) but at the same 
time natural law (language and culture) without ever clarifying in detail how 
these two elements concurred. Czech constitutionalists used similar argu-
ments to call for the unification of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.19 Time and 
again, both the integrative South Slavic model and the Croatian-exclusive 
model were debated as fundamental political alternatives throughout the en-
tire twentieth century, and at various times in history one and then the other 
temporarily prevailed.
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The Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Both inside and outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Slavs were extremely 
bitter when Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer 
of 1878 following the Congress of Berlin. As the troops marched into the 
country, they met with unexpectedly fierce resistance. The dual monarchy 
mobilized around 250,000 soldiers and lost more than 5,000 men in order 
to bring the situation under control militarily. It took months to pacify the 
country.20 The annexation of the two provinces invited more significant 
problems for the Austro-Hungarian dynasty. At the time, more than two 
million South Slavs lived in the Austrian part of the realm (7.8 percent of 
the total population) and another three million in Hungary (15 percent).21 
The annexation meant that the empire now included nearly two million 
more Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats, thus posing the question of why 
the greater percentage of South Slavs in the monarchy’s entire population 
shouldn’t be reflected in its political system. The specter loomed large not 
only of solidarity among Serbs and Croats but even of the founding a South 
Slavic state.
The efforts of Austria-Hungary to modernize the former Ottoman prov-
inces were dictated by strategic, economic, and power interests; the emperor’s 
aim was to integrate the occupied regions into the empire as extensively 
as possible.22 The crux of the problem was the primacy of politics over all 
other developmental objectives: Vienna and Budapest identified Bosnia-
Herzegovina as the key to containing the South Slavic nationalism that so 
threatened the existence of the dual monarchy. What needed to be prevented at 
all costs was the creation of a larger South Slavic state in the southern part of 
the monarchy, one that could become a focal point for Serbs and Croats within 
Austria-Hungary, a South Slavic “Piedmont.” A unified Yugoslav state would 
have blocked both Vienna and Budapest from having access to economically 
and strategically vital Adriatic ports.
There were indeed reformers in Austria who wanted to federalize the 
monarchy and create a Slavic entity as a third and equal pillar alongside 
Austria and Hungary, in order to accommodate the demands of the Slavs. 
However, the conservatives feared that this would only encourage the national-
ities to make ever more far-reaching demands. Among those opposing trialism 
was Emperor Franz Joseph’s nephew and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand. 
He was an avowed anti-Liberal, an opponent of universal suffrage, a militant 
Catholic, and an unabashed anti-Semite.23 Franz Ferdinand eventually had the 
entire idea of trialism struck from the program drawn up in preparation for 
his succession to the throne because, as was noted in internal instructions, 
“the Slavic part of the state will often side with Hungary, where certainly 
the interests of the Crown will never be found.”24 Then again, Hungary also 
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wanted to thwart any possible plans that would expand federalization, in the 
sense of establishing trialism.
Both the bureaucracy and the military saw themselves as being on a his-
torical mission to bring the achievements of Western civilization to this part 
of the Balkans and to instill in Bosnians the feeling of belonging to a great and 
powerful nation. The region was to be developed in three phases. In the first 
phase, the emphasis was on advancing the economy and the general welfare, 
if for no other reason than to tap additional resources in administering the 
provinces. The educational system would not be expanded until the second 
phase, long before any thought would be given — in a third phase sometime 
in the distant future — to the idea of granting any rights of political partici-
pation whatsoever. Economic growth and “Europeanization” were to curb 
nationalism.25
Governor Benjamin Kállay, who ruled the country from 1882 to 1903, 
chose to implement a combination of measures meant to conserve much of 
the status quo while gradually modernizing the region. Because the Austro-
Hungarian bureaucracy was fearful of alienating too greatly the almost 
exclusively Muslim class of gentry and landowners — the agas and beys — in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, it left the archaic agrarian system nearly intact. Instead, 
it advanced transportation, industry, and urban development and thus funda-
mentally reshaped the old order to fit the Central European model. By 1907, 
the occupation government had built more than 1,250 miles of roads and 630 
miles of railway lines. Forestry and the mining of coal, copper, chrome, and 
iron ore were intensified.26
In order to better acquaint the Muslims with the new order, the Habsburg 
bureaucracy decided to combine tradition and modernity. For this reason, the 
long-established religious and secular Ottoman schools and universities were 
not abolished, but at the same time new occupational training schools, teacher 
training colleges, and secondary education schools were established. In 1887, 
the governor opened a training institute for sharia judges, in which both 
Islamic and Austrian law were taught.27 As a result, the Austro-Hungarian 
government succeeded in instigating certain socioeconomic transformation 
processes but did not win the hearts and minds of the population.28 For all prac-
tical purposes, the local populace remained excluded from higher positions 
in bureaucracy and enterprise, and elementary schools were accessible only 
to a minority of 15 percent. The ethnically discriminatory agrarian system 
created a highly explosive situation right up to the First World War. In 1910, 
Muslims still accounted for 91.1 percent of all landowners, whereas only 6 
percent were Orthodox Christians and 2.5 percent Catholic Christians. The 
flip side of the coin was that the tenant crop farmers (kmets) were 73.9 percent 
Orthodox, 21.5 percent Catholic, and only 4.6 percent Muslim.29
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In an effort to neutralize the increasing nationalistic agitation coming 
from Serbia and — to a lesser degree — from Croatia, Kállay worked to push 
the historical individuality of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the limelight and to 
rope in nascent nationalism with the help of bošnjaštvo (Bosniakhood), an 
artificial construct depicted as a political nation with medieval historical 
roots.30 Except for a small minority of Muslims, the people found this idea 
foreign; too deep were the ingrained divisions between the religions and 
identities.31 The developmental policies of the Habsburg provincial govern-
ment also stalled. The lack of agrarian reform and consumer-goods industries 
brought about little improvement in people’s standard of living and hindered 
self-sustained economic growth. At the same time, the tax burden multiplied 
because the provinces had to cover the costs of the occupation themselves. 
All this fed the fires of social frustration. In 1906, a general strike took 
place on behalf of the nine-hour day; in 1910, there was a peasant revolt. 
For nationalists across the entire South Slavic region, it was clear that the 
conditions within Bosnia-Herzegovina were untenable and cried out for rad-
ical change.32
The Serb “Piedmont”
In Serbia and Montenegro, nationalism developed under completely dif-
ferent conditions than it did under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Serbia 
had attained autonomy in 1830 and independence in 1878. Here, nation- and 
state-building processes ran parallel, and the country had several decades to 
create and develop modern institutions and strong national self-confidence. 
Throughout the entire nineteenth century, especially after 1878, the state 
served as an energetic and resourceful agency for nation building.
Another structural difference was that, at the time, Serbia was to a large 
extent ethnically homogeneous. Unlike in Croatia, people in Serbia did not 
experience competitive coexistence in multiethnic regions on a daily basis, 
which is why the cooperation with other South Slavs was not seen as im-
mediately pressing. Still, nearly two million Serbs lived outside the young 
state, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, southern Hungary (Vojvodina), the 
former Military Frontier (krajina), and Dalmatia. Many of them perceived 
independent Serbia as their national-political focal point, their springboard 
for the ultimate independence of all Serbs — in other words, their “Piedmont.” 
But there were also cases in which the situation was more ambivalent, such 
as that of Montenegro and Macedonia. Belgrade considered Montenegro a 
(second) Serbian state, as did many Montenegrins themselves. Only a few saw 
themselves as members of a separate people. Furthermore, Serbian national 
politics viewed the Macedonians either as a mixture of Serbs and Bulgarians 
or simply as “South Serbs.”
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Against this backdrop, the leitmotiv of national-political thinking and 
action in Serbia was the liberation of its fellow countrymen and the annexation 
of what was believed to be Serbian lands. This had already been expressed 
quite clearly in Načertanije (The plan), written in 1844 by the statesman Ilija 
Garašanin, a work considered to be the earliest and an important statement 
on the “Serb question.” His thoughts strongly influenced Serbian national 
policy until 1914.33
Garašanin was himself greatly influenced by the Polish national move-
ment, whose homeland was divided between Prussia, Russia, and Austria. 
The Poles were in a situation very similar to that of the South Slavs, which 
is why they recommended to the Serb national movement that they create a 
unified South Slavic state in order to counter the predominance of the hege-
monic powers.34 From this Garašanin derived the fundamental principle of 
Serbia’s foreign policy: “That it does not limit itself to its current borders but 
strives to unify all Serb people surrounding it.”35 Like other European national 
movements, Garašanin invoked historical medieval law. He designated Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, northern Albania, and Vojvodina as Serbian 
lands, thereby influencing the mental map of a future (Greater) Serbia.36 As a 
result, Serb nationalism tended to be highly self-confident and to lean toward 
irredentism and expansionism, even if delusions of conquest to bring about a 
Greater Serbia cannot be inevitably derived from this.
During the decades after 1878, Serbia developed its state and parlia-
mentary system, further refined its national culture, standard language, 
and literature, and thus generally consolidated its national identity. Baron 
Benjamin von Kállay, at the time the Austro-Hungarian consul in Belgrade, 
warned as early as 1873 of the widely held opinion “that Serbia is called 
upon to play the role of Piedmont among the Slavs of Turkey.” The Balkan 
state did indeed want to model itself after the Italian province as the nucleus 
in the process of crystallizing a transregional movement of national Serb 
consolidation. These political ambitions were “so strongly rooted” in public 
opinion, Kállay noted, “that the Serbs can no longer understand that the Slavs 
of the different Turkish frontiers should seek aid and protection from any state 
except Serbia.”37 When the news of the Bosnian uprising of 1875 reached 
Belgrade, there were demonstrations, and Serbia’s Prince Milan would have 
risked a revolution had he not decided to intervene eventually on behalf of 
his fellow Serbs.38
The Serbs evaluated the outcome of the Great Eastern Crisis as a national 
tragedy, for it meant only a partial success for Serbian national politics. All 
sides, regardless of political affiliation, now put a solution of the national 
question prominently in their party programs. Opinion did not differ over 
the aim, only over strategy.39 In 1894, the Radical Party under Nikola Pašić, 
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which dominated politics during the 1890s, stated in its national program: 
“Serbia simply cannot abandon the interests of Serbdom. From the Serbian 
standpoint, there is no difference between the Serbian State interests and the 
interests of other Serbs. The question of Serbdom is ‘to be or not to be’ of the 
Serbian State. . . . Cut off from other Serbian lands, Serbia by itself means 
nothing and has no reason to exist at all.”40 In order to achieve his goal of “one 
nation — one state,” Pašić sought an alliance with Russia and a compromise 
with Bulgaria on Macedonia. The Radicals were open to, if still skeptical of, 
the South Slavic idea because Serbs and Croats differed in their religion and 
their historical-political traditions, which for them raised the question whether 
“we are the same people or not.” Therefore, the Radicals considered the union 
of all South Slavs as a possible and, under certain circumstances, a logical 
result of Serb unification, but not as an alternative to it. From their point of 
view, Yugoslavism did, however, possess the potential to place Serbian plans 
for fusion onto a broader platform.41
What at first was not attainable politically was shifted to the cultural 
realm. The intellectual elite in the various regions where Serbs lived created 
a cross-border cultural sphere through media, literature, travel, and youth 
meetings. In 1886, the new Kingdom of Serbia founded the Serbian Academy 
as the center for this activity.42
Like all new European nations, the South Slavs sought to legitimize their 
national existence with recourse to historic traditions and to strengthen social 
and emotional cohesion by attributing historic meaning to it in order to give 
the nation the appearance of a natural community, as opposed to a politically 
created one. During the Romantic era, the linguistic reformer Vuk Karadžić 
was second to none in helping shape the Serb national ideology by his collec-
tion of folk epics and folk songs.
During the course of the century, the Kosovo cycle, which celebrated in 
song the famous Battle of Kosovo that took place on Vidovdan (St.Vitus Day), 
28 June 1389, became the bedrock on which the identity-establishing national 
myth was founded.43 It tells the story of the fateful fight between the Serbian 
prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and the assailing Sultan Murat I, a confrontation 
that allegedly led to the fall of the medieval Serbian empire. Lazar was killed 
in battle and later canonized. In the national consciousness, 1389 is remem-
bered as a cataclysmic reference point, comparable to the Hundred Years’ War 
between England and France.
Throughout the centuries, the legend of the Battle of Kosovo evolved 
in hagiographic texts and epic poems to become a monumental story, albeit 
one in which the actual course of historical events was often downplayed or 
altered, such as the fact that the Serbian state did not completely disappear 
in 1389.44 Still, it had all the components of a great national myth. Lazar’s 
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son-in-law Vuk Branković appears in the role of a typical traitor who becomes 
a collaborator with the Ottomans and thereby helps bring about the fall of 
the Serbs. The nation’s rescuer in the tale is the fabulous Miloš Obilić, who 
murders the sultan and thus causes the Ottoman army to retreat. The basic 
motives portrayed here — discord and disloyalty, on the one hand, and courage, 
freedom, and justice, on the other — provided an elementary sense of meaning 
and purpose. With the help of biblical figurations of memory such as heroism, 
sacrifice, and betrayal, the Kosovo myth provided the ideological mortar to 
hold together an increasingly polarized Serbian society, one that found itself 
searching for a new self-image after the break with the oriental heritage of 
the Ottoman era.45
In the nineteenth century, national-minded elites transformed the orig-
inally religious Kosovo myth into a secular legend to be used for political 
purposes, particularly for the mobilization of resistance against both Ottoman 
and Austro-Hungarian rule. This historical narrative, based on a system of 
symbols, merged the past, present, and future into one; “nation,” “history,” and 
“freedom” constituted a whole. Thus, Kosovo represented not only Serbian 
identity but also the Serbian foreign policy program. Likewise, the messages 
of the Kosovo myth lent themselves to pictorial aggrandizement in histori-
cizing art forms, in painting and novels. In 1889, the 500th anniversary of the 
battle was celebrated as a highly symbolic, major national event.46 In all of 
Europe during the nineteenth century, emblematic meaning was attributed to 
the major battles of the past for the purpose of constructing national identity.47
Sagas and legends about the Battle of Kosovo were not just incorporated 
into Serb national mythology, they provided a rich source from which to create 
a common Yugoslav national culture. It was helpful that several of the historic 
epics were equally popular among Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, such as those 
about the heroic and universally revered Serbian prince Marko (Kraljević 
Marko) from the fourteenth century, the icon of justice in the fight against the 
Turks. Further inspiration was provided by contemporary national poetry, 
especially the immensely popular, monumental work The Mountain Wreath by 
Montenegrin prince-bishop Peter II Petrović Njegoš from 1846, who praised 
the sixteenth century. This epic poem and play represented one of the most 
important works of the time.
Similar importance was also given to the epic poem The Death of Smail-
aga Čengić written by the Croat poet, literary scholar, and politician Ivan 
Mažuranić. This epic poem depicts the struggle against the Ottomans and cod-
ifies the messages of freedom, betrayal, heroism, sacrifice, and martyrdom.
The celebratory mood surrounding the 1889 commemoration of the Battle 
of Kosovo thus reverberated euphorically among both Croats and Serbs liv-
ing under Habsburg rule. The Zagreb city government even discussed the 
 The National Question across the Balkans (1875 to 1903)  37
proposal of hosting its own celebration.48 The ancient folk epics and their 
modern adaptations created a universe of signs, metaphors, and myths, out of 
which any liberation ideology could derive meaning. They created cohesion, 
legitimated authority and rule, shaped norms and values, and offered concrete 
guidelines for action.
Yet the reception of national ideology occurred less smoothly than might 
be expected, because Yugoslavism simultaneously served two different, if 
not always clearly distinguishable concepts of identity: the Croatian and 
the South Slavic. Serbian intellectuals feared that their own culture would 
be undermined and influenced by a Croatian national ideology cloaked in 
Yugoslavism. Contrary to the South Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
the Serbs already enjoyed their own established cultural institutions, such 
as the cultural-scientific institute Matica srpska, founded in 1826. At first, 
Serb intellectuals wrote with verve against the idea of South Slavic unity 
imported from Croatia and polemicized against the term “Illyrian.” Following 
the Prussian victory of 1866, politicians from Croatia and Serbia contacted 
one another in order to deliberate how the South Slavs could be liberated 
from Ottoman rule and how the Yugoslav “tribes” could be later unified into 
a federated state. The situation changed following the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1878. The fact that almost all Croats now lived in the Habsburg 
monarchy turned the issue of Ottoman rule into an exclusively Serb problem 
and thus underscored, at least for the time being, the feasibility of pursuing 
two separate national strategies.
Perhaps the very disparate national ideologies and objectives caused more 
disagreement between peoples than the religious and language differences 
did. Croats and Slovenes were more willing to compromise with the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy than the Serbs were with the Ottoman Empire. After all, 
the Habsburgs had established their power by way of contractual relations (in 
the Pacta conventa), and not only through military subjugation. Catholicism 
also helped build a bridge between the rulers and those ruled, unlike Islam, 
which erected high religious, political, and social barriers against the Christian 
populations. Therefore, Slovenes and Croats first gave greater consideration to 
the possibility of federally restructuring the existing Habsburg order than to its 
overthrow. The Croatian concept of a Catholic-universalistic state, conceived 
as possessing constitutional continuity and territorial constancy throughout 
history, contrasted with the Serbian version of rather expansionist-oriented 
cultural nationalism, one that originated from an independent Serbia and its 
Serbian-Orthodox state church and which strove to fulfill its historic mission: 
namely, the unification of the South Slavic countries by the Kingdom of Serbia.
3.
Radicalization (1903 to 1912)
The South Slavic “Powder Keg”
In 1903, the entire region experienced dramatic domestic developments. In 
Serbia, army conspirators led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, known as 
Apis (“Holy Bull”), murdered the autocratic king Aleksandar Obrenović and 
his wife. His successor was Peter I Karadjordjević, who enacted the constitu-
tion, guaranteed freedom of the press, and thereby heralded a phase that would 
later be remembered as the “golden era” of Serbian democracy.1 Following the 
dynasty change, Belgrade took a self-confident course toward ridding itself of 
the economic and political hegemony established in 1878 by Austria-Hungary 
and approached Russia instead.
When negotiations with Austria-Hungary failed in 1906 over a trade 
agreement that proved unfavorable for Serbia, the dual monarchy closed 
its borders to Serbian goods. The trade war (“Pig War”) forced the Serbian 
government to reorient its foreign trade. Within a short period of time, it suc-
ceeded in liberating itself from its dependency on Vienna.2 Austro-Hungarian 
observers watched with concern as Serbia began, with Russia’s help, to be-
come actively involved in the neighboring regions inhabited by South Slavs. 
Chief of General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf, a representative of the “hawk” 
faction in Vienna, recommended an aggressive offensive strategy: Bosnia-
Herzegovina should be annexed and Serbia militarily defeated.3
Severe political turbulence developed also in the southern Balkans in 
1903 over the “Macedonian Question,” the problematic issue plaguing the 
area since 1878 about how to divide up the strategically and economically 
important historical region, including the port of Thessaloniki, between 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. In 1893, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO) was formed, a secret organization planning an insurrec-
tion against the Ottomans under the motto “Macedonia for the Macedonians.” 
On 2 August 1903, St. Elias Day, the rebels struck and “liberated” an area 
in the Republic of Kruševo. Although Ottoman troops quickly put down the 
revolt, the “Macedonian Question” thereby became internationalized. The 
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journalist Leon Trotsky noted perceptively that “before igniting the dooms-
day machine,” the conspirators had given “very felicitous thought about the 
type of echo this [would] have in the ‘relevant’ European press.”4 The unrest 
alarmed Austria and Russia because they feared the power vacuum being 
created by the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The Mürzsteg Agreement sug-
gested administrative, judicial, and security reforms, supervised by foreign 
representatives — an early international peacekeeping mission in the Balkans, 
one doomed to failure from the start.5 In light of the violent dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire, when the Great Powers competed openly for its for-
mer European possessions, perceptions developed that were strongly colored 
by imperialist interests. Clichés and stereotypes about the Orient, such as 
references to it as the “powder keg,” were also attributed to “the Balkans,” 
making the region appear overwhelmingly anarchic, violent, and backward 
and thereby compelling the Great Powers to intervene in order to reinstate 
order and civilize its inhabitants.
Meanwhile, the dualism of the Habsburg monarchy itself was headed for 
a new crisis. Vienna and Budapest were constantly quarreling over finances 
and shared institutions. In 1903, the Hungarian opposition demanded greater 
independence from Austria and its own army. The Croats exploited the mo-
ment to claim their own right to financial autonomy, which the Hungarian 
government denied with highly insulting arguments. Mass protests broke out 
in 1903, which spread rapidly from Zagreb throughout all of Croatia and lasted 
an entire year. Thousands demanded civil liberties, the end of both economic 
exploitation and cultural Magyarization. Weeks of demonstrations finally 
brought to an end the twenty-year rule of the acting governor, Ban Khuen-
Héderváry. His successor made no concessions to the protesters, but the new 
“people’s movement” had electrified the country and elevated the “South 
Slavic Question” to a topic of permanent public debate in the monarchy.6
An irrefutable realization was dawning on many groups in the Croat elite: 
not only did Austro-Hungarian dualism fundamentally violate the Croatian 
right to self-rule, but Croatian petitions put before the emperor were not be-
ing heard. A delegation from Dalmatia and Istria arrived at court, seeking to 
draw attention to the deplorable situation of their fellow countrymen; it was 
simply turned away. This marked a fundamental change of attitude. The highly 
praised, special loyalty of the Croats to the monarchy, still quite evident in 
1848, now disappeared.7
Against this backdrop, the seed of what would later lead to the founding 
of the Yugoslav state began to germinate in Dalmatia at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Under the leadership of the renowned politicians Frano 
Supilo and Ante Trumbić, the Croatian Party of Rights in Dalmatia switched 
to a “new course.” In their minds, it was now clear that the Habsburg monarchy 
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could not be reformed and that the Croats and Serbs could only effectively 
resist the German “push eastward” if they worked together. For this reason, 
they should found a common state.8 Inspired by the writing of the Czech phi-
losopher and later president Tomáš Masaryk, they saw their future as lying in 
the “liberation and unification of our peoples . . . from Tyrol to Macedonia.”9 
Supporters of the “new course” were politicians, lawyers, bankers, and entre-
preneurs, who also recognized the South Slavic cooperation as a springboard 
to better counter German-Austrian and Hungarian economic competition. 
Students were also enthusiastic about the project of unifying the South Slavs.
On 3 October 1905, Croat members of parliament in Rijeka (Fiume) drew 
up a precedent-setting resolution in which they condemned the “inacceptable 
parliamentary and administrative conditions” in the monarchy and demanded 
constitutional rights and liberties, as well as the unification of Dalmatia with 
Croatia-Slavonia.10 At the same time, they agreed to cooperate with the 
Hungarian opposition.
Shortly afterward, on 14 November 1905, Croat and Serb parties agreed 
to a close cooperation and a shared political program, which included the 
somewhat paradoxical statement that “Croats and Serbs are one people, each 
equal in relation to one another.”11 A month later in Zagreb, they sealed a 
broad coalition alliance that won the majority of votes in the 1906 and 1908 
elections to the diet.
Vienna and Budapest watched the developments in Croatia with growing 
concern and subsequently, in March 1909, tried fifty-three members of the 
Serbo-Croat coalition on charges of high treason. When the prosecution pre-
sented documents in court that were provably forged, the Habsburg monarchy 
lost its last shred of moral credibility in Croatia.12
Public Opinion and the Spread of Nationalism
Starting in the early years of the twentieth century, nationalism spread to 
include ever more segments of the population until it became a mass phenome-
non. There were two reasons for this. First, the creation of a new, politically and 
nationally conscious public was made possible by the vertical and horizontal 
mobilization of society, the emergence of new middle classes, and improved 
means of communication and educational opportunities. The proliferation of 
press, clubs, organizations, and even bold political actions like demonstrations 
and strikes underscored patriotic demands all the more. Further, the serious 
political, social, and moral crisis in which the Habsburg monarchy found itself 
kindled discontent that could seep down to the lower classes.
Second, clashing interests were being interpreted ever more explicitly as 
national conflicts, no longer social or political ones. Socioeconomic processes 
of change undermined existing ethnic hierarchies, and international tensions 
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such as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/1905 fueled pan-Slavic sentiments. 
Proof of how closely industrialization, urbanization, and “Slavication” were 
intertwined is evident in political life on the Croatian coast, where masses 
of jobseekers from the countryside migrated to what had been until then the 
German- and Italian-dominated cities of Slovenia, Istria, and Dalmatia. Once 
settled, they demanded more rights for political input on the communal level. 
As the Slovene and Croat parties began to win city council elections early in 
the century — be it in Ljubljana, Trieste, or Split — public life became “nation-
alized.” One indication of this was that Italian or German street names were 
replaced with Slovene and Croat ones.13
A new spirit reigned throughout the entire South Slavic region at the 
turn of the century. The spirit of optimism was reflected in newspaper names 
like “New Century,” “New Age,” “New World,” and “Change.” Others were 
called “Democracy,” “Public Life,” and “Republic,” or — with a nod to the pa-
triotic agenda — also “Fight,” “Victory,” and “Defense.” With the spread of the 
printed press throughout rural regions, the new means of mass communication 
and thus the nationalist idea reached more and more people. In 1912, several 
hundred print publications appeared in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, respec-
tively; some of these had remarkably large circulations. The Belgrade Narodne 
novine (National newspaper) printed about 32,000 copies every day, and even 
the Slovene Domoljub (Patriot) reached 30,000.14 The Bosnian Muslims also 
experienced, somewhat belatedly, their national “rebirth.” Intellectuals em-
phasized the cultural individuality of a Slavic Islam, and founded magazines 
like Behar (Blossom) and the cultural institution Gajret (Zeal).
It became increasingly popular to meet in one of the many bustling cafés 
to read through the newspapers and discuss politics. As Andrić describes life 
in Višegrad in the first years of the new century: “Till then the townspeople 
had concerned themselves exclusively with what was near to them and well 
known, with their gains, their pastimes and, in the main, only with questions 
of their family and their homes, their town or their religious community, but 
always directly and within definite limits. . . . Now, however, more and more 
frequently in conversation questions arose which lay farther away. Outside 
this narrow circle. . . . When reading speeches and articles, protests and mem-
oranda issued by party or religious organizations, each one of them had the 
feeling that he was casting off chains, that his horizon was widening, his 
thoughts freed and his forces linked with those of men more distant and with 
other forces never thought of until then.”15
Those who — like the majority of the peasant population — could not read 
were reached by way of a printed calendar or a small image of some histor-
ical icon with great nationalistic symbolism, like that of King Tomislav in 
Croatia or Saint Sava in Serbia. In the theater and in literature and art, new 
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heroes appeared on the cultural stage who represented the nation’s pursuit 
of freedom, such as the early modern Croat peasant leader Matija Gubec or 
the protagonists in the Serb Battle of Kosovo. The public discovered national 
flags, symbols, holidays, food dishes, and everything that contributed and 
encouraged a sense of community.
A good indicator of the ongoing societal mobilization was the rapid pro-
liferation of civil society organizations, parties and social societies, charities, 
reading groups, choirs, gymnastic clubs, and associations for professional 
groups, youths, or women. Modeled on the German example, gymnastic clubs 
were founded to associate physical fitness with an awakening of national con-
sciousness. By way of Czechia, the patriotic athletic club of the Sokol (hawk) 
movement was introduced into the region, which promoted the idea of pan-
Slavic unity. The expansive organizational structure and propaganda network 
of the Sokol movement helped turn it into the backbone of Yugoslavism in the 
South Slavic countries before the First World War.
Even the many branches of the volunteer firefighters developed a pre-
viously unknown feeling of community. For their part, choirs and singing 
societies that cultivated the folksong tradition contributed to the populariza-
tion and dissemination of the national idea, such as the associations Kolo and 
Merkur in Croatia or Gusle in Bosnia-Herzegovina.16 If we are to understand 
civil society as the space of social self-organization between the state, the 
economy, and the private sphere, in which societies and clubs, social move-
ments, and media created on their own a sphere of public discussion and 
pursued these interests, then the origins for these were also to be found in the 
South Slavic countries.
In the ethnically mixed regions, the public organized itself primarily 
along ethnic and religious lines. People attended the cultural societies, joined 
the associations, read the press, and even frequented the coffeehouses linked 
to their particular ethnic and religious community, which in turn gave rise to 
parallel and mutually exclusive communities of communication and special 
advocacy groups. For example, between 1906 and 1908, separate parties for 
Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were founded in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Athletic 
clubs, cooperatives, savings banks, and reading societies were also stratified. 
Except for the socialists and the youth movement, very few political organi-
zations existed that spanned all ethnic or religious groups.
Political agitation by parties also contributed to the gradual politization 
of rural society and to the spread of national consciousness in the country-
side. The opportunities to express one’s own interests through elections in the 
political decision-making process were unequally distributed in the region. 
Following the May 1903 overthrow, Serbia broadened the voting franchise 
to include at least 70 percent of the adult male peasantry. In contrast, the 
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Habsburg monarchy continued to enforce a stricter census, so that only 3.5 
percent of the (adult male) Croats and about 5 percent of the (adult male) 
Slovenes enjoyed the right to participate in the democratic process.17 Although 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was allowed to have a diet of its own in 1910, this body 
only had a consultative function and not a legislative one. Moreover, it was 
subject to the veto power of Austro-Hungarian institutions.18 From Slovenia 
to Serbia, nationality politics were almost the sole topic of debate in places 
where diets or parliaments existed; rarely were economic or social matters 
discussed. With each new foreign policy crisis, be it the Serbian–Austrian “Pig 
War” or the crisis of Bosnian annexation, nationalistic tunnel vision became 
increasingly prevalent.19
Starting in the 1880s, political Catholicism in Slovenia appeared as an en-
compassing movement to raise national consciousness. With a tight network of 
social, economic, and educational activities, the Catholic Church significantly 
helped “awaken” Slovene peasants, workers, and small bourgeoisie. In 1905, 
the Slovenian People’s Party was formed. It became the strongest and most 
significant democratic mass party existing, even after the First World War.
In Serbia it was the Radical Party, founded in 1882, that politicized the 
countryside for the first time with social egalitarian and emotionally charged 
nationalist rhetoric. Unlike the Liberal and Progressive parties of the bourgeois 
elites, the Radicals idealized Serbian village traditions and donned traditional 
folk costumes, quite literally, to mobilize the rural vote. By articulating peas-
ant interests (e.g., in broadening local self-administration) and aversions (e.g., 
against the modern tax-collecting state), they provided not only a political but 
also an emotional safe harbor for a peasantry threatened by the storm of social 
decline.20 Only a year after it appeared on the scene, the party had 60,000 
official members and just as many unofficial ones, quickly to be followed by 
many more.21 In 1903, the party won 88 percent of the parliamentary seats — a 
solid basis for a thorough reorientation of Serbia after the dynastic change.
In 1904, the brothers Stjepan and Antun Radić founded the Croatian 
Peoples’ Peasant Party, which would become the strongest political force in 
Croatia after the First World War. They also understood the culture of the rural 
population (puk) to be the most promising potential for the future, an antith-
esis to the ruling urban class.22 In place of a half-hearted industrialization of 
Croatia, the motor of progress was to be well-developed agriculture, improved 
by agrarian technology, expertise, and cooperatives.23 The Peasant Party railed 
against the growing tax burden, usury, and sinking market prices and declared 
that only a sovereign state could solve such pressing problems. They mobilized 
more and more supporters by circulating calendars and their magazine Dom 
(Home), staging election rallies and literacy campaigns, founding coopera-
tives, and providing credit. The decisive factor was that they transformed the 
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problems of rural society into issues of national importance and thus won over 
broader segments of the population for the goal of creating an independent 
Croatian or Yugoslav state. This was one reason why they were able to play a 
key role in the national integration of the Croats.
In comparison, the workers’ movement — essentially imported from 
Germany — remained weak for lack of a social basis. German, Austrian, and 
Hungarian artisan journeymen who were underway in the region, or local 
apprentices who had come into contact with socialist ideas while working 
abroad, acted as transmission belts for socialist ideas in what was still primar-
ily an agriculturally dominated world. In 1872, the first workers’ associations 
were founded in Croatia, followed by the emergence of the trade union move-
ment in 1890. In 1894, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia and Slavonia 
was founded, which merged two years later with their Slovenian comrades into 
the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party. Starting in 1902, they also cooperated 
with Serbian socialists.24
As elsewhere in Europe, the South Slavic socialists believed that the na-
tional question merely represented a side contradiction of capitalism, which 
would disappear once capitalism gave way to communism. Linguistic, cultural, 
and historic differences between the Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats were consid-
ered anachronistic or irrelevant. At the first pan-Yugoslav conference of the 
socialists, held in 1901 in Ljubljana, the existence of a South Slavic nation was 
declared. However, there was no consensus over the political consequences of 
such a declaration. Should a federal state be created within Austria-Hungary, 
or a larger Balkan federation, or a Yugoslav federal state? The party split over 
this issue. Those favoring an independent Yugoslavia, the founding of which 
required the destruction of the monarchy, found themselves in conflict with 
their Austrian comrades, who argued the case favoring a democratic, federal 
reform of Austria-Hungary. For the time being, the Austro-Marxists were in 
the majority.25
In the 1890s, a progressive, revolutionary youth movement emerged in 
the Balkans, as it did in many European countries. It rebelled against things 
time-honored, sought new concepts and models, and thereby linked criticism 
of civilization with nationalist ideals of freedom. Supporters of the Progressive 
Youth, the Young Croats, and the Young Bosnians were politically active pu-
pils from secondary schools. Most came from peasant families and believed in 
revolutionary ideals, heroism, and sacrifice. They did not have a coherent ideo-
logical concept but had recourse to populistic, anarchic, and socialist ideas.
Anticlericalism and social-revolutionary impetus blurred the religious 
and historical differences that originally defined ethnic identities among the 
South Slavic peoples. Therefore, most were committed Yugoslavists and 
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believed that Serbs and Croats formed “a nation with two names,” as could be 
read in the Croatian almanac Narodna misao (National idea).26 Consequently, 
nationalism was “the idea of unifying Serbs and Croats,” as one of the Sarajevo 
assassins later testified in court.27 These youths impatiently awaited the col-
lapse of the Habsburg monarchy and dreamed of founding a democratic South 
Slavic state. A new generation emerged from the youth movement that no 
longer merely supported Yugoslavism as an ideological standpoint, but in 
fact lived it. Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims conspired underground 
and formed a tightly knit community of shared experience. Several people 
who would eventually become very well-known names in Yugoslavia were 
politically socialized in this way, including the later Nobel laureate for litera-
ture, Ivo Andrić.28 In 1913, the organizations from the various regions in the 
monarchy consolidated into one.
The 1908 Annexation Crisis
When Emperor Franz Joseph announced, on 6 October 1908, the annexation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary had occupied since 1878, a 
serious crisis loomed once again. The occasion prompting this development 
was the revolution of the Young Turks, who introduced a constitution and 
a parliament in the Ottoman Empire. Vienna feared that now the Christian 
peoples in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were formally 
still under Ottoman rule, would convene a constitutional congress and de-
mand their independence. In August, Serb and Muslim politicians had already 
submitted a memorandum to the government and demanded a constitution.
The coup-like annexation contributed significantly to fanning the fires 
of nationalism among the South Slavs and radicalizing them. Whereas the 
Ottoman Empire accepted a compensation of 2.5 million pounds, the Serbs 
reacted angrily to the annexation. The king’s government saw that Serbia’s 
chances to fulfil its historic mission of liberation were dwindling, so it started 
an aggressive press campaign and mobilized the army. Public reaction ex-
ploded into anger in Belgrade, and enraged mobs burned Habsburg flags on the 
streets. Prominent citizens and intellectuals formed the organization Narodna 
odbrana (People’s Defense) to strengthen Serb resistance to the annexation. 
They modeled their efforts on the Difesa nazionale of the Italian resistance 
fighter Garibaldi. Within a short period of time, 223 chapters were set up and 
tens of thousands of people had been mobilized. At least 5,000 volunteers 
joined the ranks of the paramilitary “death squads.”29
Austria-Hungary mobilized several army units, threatened war, and pre-
sented Belgrade with an ultimatum on 19 March. The Serbian government 
had to declare that it would “abandon the stance of protest and resistance that 
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it had taken regarding the annexation since the previous October . . . and live 
in friendly and neighborly relations.”30 Starting in 1909, the Narodna obbrana 
discontinued its militant rhetoric and limited its activities from that point on 
to cultural ones.
The annexation crisis prompted Serbia to improve relations with 
Montenegro, whose head of state Nikola (who had himself crowned king in 
1910) had established close ties to Italy, Russia, and Serbia through clever 
marriages. Suddenly the tiny state, immortalized in Franz Lehár’s operetta 
The Merry Widow, became a factor in international politics that was hard 
to overlook. For one thing, its drive for expansion into the Albanian region 
of settlement posed a potential threat for Vienna’s Balkan policy. For an-
other, a political alliance with Serbia would give Belgrade the access to the 
Adriatic it had sought for so long. At first the Montenegrin political elite were 
divided over rapprochement with Serbia. While supporters of the “People’s 
Movement” considered the Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs and approved the 
fusion of the “two Serbian states,” the monarch and government insisted on the 
existence of separate historical and political identities — a conflict that would 
flare up time and again during the twentieth century.
The use of force had indeed enabled Austria-Hungary to consolidate its 
territorial gains from 1878, but this accomplishment came at the high price of 
angering the South Slavs, of strengthening the Yugoslav idea, and of intensify-
ing the growing rivalry with Russia. Serbia was humiliated; Slovenes, Croats, 
and Serbs living under the Habsburg rule were embittered. The annexation 
crisis reestablished the “South Slavic question” as a major foreign policy issue 
for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, what was new this time was that 
the matter was organically linked to the political reorientation of the entire 
region, thereby making it a very real “European question.”
In the meantime, a real obsession with war took hold of large sectors 
of Serbian society. As the ultima ratio of the annexation crisis, national-
ist passions were to be stilled by the liberation of the European part of the 
Ottoman Empire, namely Kosovo. Gymnastic, singing, and charitable asso-
ciations, as well as professional organizations, youth groups, and women’s 
leagues declared support for the war of liberation so fervently yearned for. 
Commemorations of and references to the Battle of Kosovo were popularized 
in calendars, almanacs, theater plays, poems, and songs. Even the simplest of 
peasants was imbued with the belief in a national mission and hungered for 
the day of revenge, noted a historian at the time, Slobodan Jovanović.31
One of the most decisive intellectual developments was the breakthrough 
in garnering support for Yugoslavism, meaning the idea that Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes were all part of one people. In Serbia, the earlier skepticism of 
a national merger of Croats and Serbs into a single nation gave way to a new 
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pragmatism. In 1910, Nikola Pašić convinced his fellow supporters in the 
Radical Party that it was “necessary to abandon the two-people theory. . . . 
The one-people theory, which corresponds to scientific findings and the ac-
tual situation, has all of the merits of a national unification idea and certainly 
does not prevent the components of this people from cultivating and further 
developing their respective particularities and historic memories.”32
In artistic and intellectual circles, support grew for the concept of a 
South Slavic unity of culture, language, and politics and for the founding 
of an all-Yugoslav nation in which each “tribe” was to make its own unique 
contribution. It seemed logical that the avant-garde for this movement was 
made up of intellectuals, artists, and the youth movement, including lead-
ing scholars and writers like the geographer Jovan Cvijić, the writer Jovan 
Skerlić, and the historian Stojan Novaković in Serbia; the sculptor Ivan 
Meštrović, the dramatist Ivo Vojnović, and the writer Antun Gustav Matoš 
in Croatia; the ethnologist Niko Županić and the literary scholar Ivan Cankar 
in Slovenia; as well as the writer Ivo Andrić in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Authors, 
journalists, and painters established close ties in order to advance the cultural 
unification.33 In 1909, the Yugoslav Academy in Zagreb, together with their 
partners in Serbia and Slovenia, initiated a project to produce a “Yugoslav 
Encyclopedia,” which was not published due to the outbreak of the First World 
War. “We are the generation of the great national synthesis . . . from Drniš 
to Niš,” that is, the South Slavic region in its entirety, summed up the Croat 
writer Tin Ujević in 1912.34
In literature, sculpture, and painting, intellectuals and artists discovered 
they could transpose the heroes and motifs of the Serb national epic to the 
genre of modern art and thereby use them as a cipher for a Yugoslav national 
ethos. In 1910 at the Viennese Secession Building, the Croatian sculptor Ivan 
Meštrović exhibited the model of a “Vidovdan temple” with a number of large 
caryatids representing figures from the epic Kosovo cycle in order to honor 
the Yugoslav idea.35 Architecture and sculpture were an ideal-type representa-
tion of the cultural imagination of primordial Yugoslavism, which was based 
on the idea of South Slavs as a single nation united by common origin and 
historical experience. At the same time, such artistic expression served as a 
catalyst in expressing discontent with the manner in which the national ques-
tion was being handled in Austria-Hungary.36 Meštrović’s decision to exhibit 
this model at the International Exhibition of Art in Rome in 1911 at the Serbian 
pavilion and not at the Austro-Hungarian one was a political statement that 
caused international furor. Years before the decisive moment arrived during 
the First World War to establish a state of Yugoslavia, the artistic and literary 
avant-garde of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia had formed a consensus on its 
cultural foundations.37
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Revolutionaries, Anarchists, Conspirators
Following the annexation crisis, South Slavs across the Balkans increasingly 
embraced the ideas of Clausewitz and Hegel, posited a century before, that 
national unification could only be achieved through a war of liberation. The 
Serb scholar Jovan Cvijić demanded as an ultimatum “that the Serb problem 
[had to be] resolved with force.” In Croatia, youth at demonstrations cried out 
“nulla redemptio sine sanguine” (there is no salvation without bloodshed). 
People wanted to take control of their own affairs. They cultivated a stronger 
sense of self-confidence and the “belief in oneself, the reliance on one’s own 
strengths,” as the Serbian writer, critic, and committed Yugoslavist Jovan 
Skerlić wrote.38
From the seedbed of the youth movement grew anarchistic and social 
revolutionary groups that resorted to various means of violence. In 1912, the 
Nationalist Youth was formed in Croatia. This group wanted to achieve the 
unification of Serbs and Croats with insurrectionist methods. In June of that 
year, a Croat student attempted to murder the hated Austro-Hungarian gov-
ernor in Croatia, Slavko Cuvaj, who had dissolved the diet and forbidden 
political gatherings in an effort to prevent a government coalition he did not 
favor from assuming power. As a result, demonstrations and street fighting 
with the police and the army occurred in many cities, and the Croat student 
body went on strike.39 In April 1912, the constitution was suspended, and 
Cuvaj was named royal commissioner, all of which led to a further radical-
ization and transregional solidarity among students.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina the pressure also grew to use violence to revolt 
against the foreign regime. In the heated atmosphere of the annexation crisis, 
more and more teachers and pupils turned to national revolutionary ideologies. 
According to the disciplinary rules of May 1908 for the middle school, pupils 
were forbidden to order political publications, to stroll down the street with 
girls, and to ride bikes.40 Since the authorities did not allow student organiza-
tions of any kind, secret societies formed similar to the Russian Narodniks, a 
social revolutionary, populist, and Slavophile movement.
The supporters of the Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna) were Yugoslav 
nationalists striving for the political union of Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and 
Slovenes. They wanted to shake off foreign rule, overcome the backwardness 
of their home, emancipate women, and create a thoroughly “new man,” a mor-
ally superior type of person. All this was to be achieved through revolutionary 
action. Literature played an extraordinary role. Nearly all tried their hand at 
being a literary critic or an author, or translated Kierkegaard, Strindberg, 
Ibsen, Wilde, or Poe. “If the Serb revolutionary wants to win, then he has to 
be both artist and conspirator,” summed up Vladimir Gaćinović.41
 Radicalization (1903 to 1912) 49
The records of one pupil’s trial in 1914 in the central Bosnian town of 
Tuzla reveal the sources of inspiration for young Bosnians. Tuzla was a small 
town that must have been considered a provincial backwater even by the 
standards of the time. However, the youth embracing nationalism were very 
familiar with Europe’s intellectual canon. For example, Mladen Stojanović, 
a pupil preparing for his secondary school graduation exams, had read Plato, 
Aristotle, Rousseau, Bakunin, Nietzsche, Jaurès, Le Bon, Ibsen, and Marinetti 
just to that end. Others were influenced by Mazzini’s Risorgimento and the 
movement Young Italy (Giovine Italia), the rationalism and anticlericalism 
of Tomáš Masaryk, and the writings of the Russian revolutionaries and an-
archists, especially those of Chernyshevsky and Bakunin. Folk mythology, 
particularly the Kosovo myth and the epics by Prince-Bishop Petrović Njegoš, 
had deeply impressed them.42 They saw their commitment to a better future 
as homage to modernity: a “modern person,” wrote their chief theoretician 
Dimitrije Mitrinović, “is one who sympathizes with the unrest of our times, 
who tries to find a solution to the misery. . . . Modern is the person who, in our 
epoch of democracy and liberalism, feels the full absurdity of an anachronistic 
system in our country, who senses the lack of justice for our poor masses and 
fights for bread and freedom for a naked and starved people.”43
In order to advance their revolutionary cause, the Young Bosnians es-
tablished contact in Serbia with the nationalistic secret society Unification or 
Death. In 1911, Serbian officers had founded this underground organization, 
also known as the Black Hand, out of their bitterness over the compliance of 
the Belgrade government toward Austria-Hungary. In this case, too, there 
were many instances in which these organizations were intertwined with 
European models, such as the Italian carbonari or the Freemasons. Similar 
rituals and symbols (skull and crossbones, dagger, bomb, poison) illustrate 
this. Their “constitution” borrowed wording from the Russian Catechism of 
a Revolutionary. The Black Hand, which the regicide Colonel Dimitrijević-
Apis also joined, supported anarchic-revolutionary activities abroad in order 
to unify all Serbs into a single state. Although both groups took up the cause 
of national liberation and later worked together in some areas, there were 
fundamental differences between Young Bosnia and Unification or Death. For 
one, the former sought to establish a South Slavic state, the latter a pan-Serbian 
or Serb-dominated Yugoslav one. For another, the former was made up of 
atheistic and republican-minded young people, while members of the latter 
embraced authoritarian, militaristic, and clerical worldviews.44
By the eve of the First World War, the basic constellations and dilem-
mas involving the various national questions had crystallized and would 
preoccupy the entire South Slavic region for the duration of the twentieth 
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century: the dispersion of the Serbs in various states; the unfulfilled right 
to self-determination for Croats and Slovenes; the unresolved questions of 
both Macedonia and Bosnia, complicated by the competing territorial claims 
of neighboring states; the ambivalence of the Montenegrins regarding Serb 
and Montenegrin national identity; and last but not least, the future Serbian-
Albanian conflict over Kosovo. At the start of the century, it was all but 
clear how these mutually influencing and sometimes competing “national 
questions” could be solved. Which national ideology should be pursued, an 
ethnically exclusive one or a South Slavic integrative one? What political 
framework should be established to guarantee the coexistence of all the peo-
ples of the Balkans?
Even though the Yugoslav idea was never supported by all relevant forces 
within society, it found more and more resonance in the population starting at 
the turn of the century. In addition to cultural and linguistic similarities, the 
large number of ethnically mixed settlements, shared folk traditions and ideals, 
and irrefutably practical political reasons spoke in favor of a common South 
Slavic state. Meanwhile, Yugoslavism was both open and inclusive and offered 
a great deal of interpretative leeway. Alternately it could guide Slovenian, 
Croatian, and Serbian identity and nation building, serve as a synthetic mul-
ticultural South Slavic national ideology, or function as a transethnic, political 
framework. Furthermore, Yugoslavism was anchored neither in one religion 
or political ideology, nor was it territorially determined. It is possible that it 
was precisely this vagueness that made it so highly attractive. In an age of 
ever-radicalizing nationalism, Yugoslavism created space for highly different 
ideological concepts, political objectives, and societal designs and, more im-
portantly, provided a backdrop against which to project every type of hope, 
illusion, and aspiration.
4.
The Three Balkan Wars 
(1912/1913 to 1914/1918)
The Balkan Wars 1912/1913
Following the dynastic change in Serbia in 1903, tensions with Austria-
Hungary began to rise slowly, not the least because of Russia’s growing 
influence in the Balkans. Emperor Franz Joseph was convinced that he could 
still curb Belgrade’s foreign policy ambitions even if it was no longer possible 
to control them. But the situation reached a turning point in 1912.
In March of that year, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, orches-
trated by Russia, formed the Balkan League, a system of bilateral, mutual 
assistance treaties that aimed to deprive the sultan of his remaining European 
possessions. From Vienna’s point of view, the patronage of the Russian czar 
toward these Christian states expanded his sphere of influence to a danger-
ous degree. Serbia turned itself into the gravitational center of South Slavic 
national movements by demanding outright the separation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Since Russia was also 
searching for allies in Galicia, Bohemia, and Bukovina, Austria-Hungary felt 
itself surrounded by hostile forces.
On 8 October 1912, Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. 
Ten days later, the other members of the Balkan League joined it. Their troops 
moved quickly to the southern Balkan region in the direction of Kosovo and 
Macedonia.1 That winter the Montenegrin army reached Shkodër, and the 
Serbs advanced down the Albanian coast to Durrës. However, Serbia’s grab 
for Kosovo and Macedonia was not only criticized by Bulgaria and Greece, 
which also harbored territorial claims to this region, it was also condemned, 
especially by the Albanian national movement. Founded in 1878, the League 
for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation, commonly known as 
the League of Prizren, had demanded autonomy within the Ottoman Empire 
for years without success and had even assumed power in Kosovo for a short 
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spell in 1881. In 1911, unrest erupted there, and in the spring of 1912, a revolt. 
Now the creation of an Albanian nation state was even being discussed.
The Balkan armies committed unfathomable atrocities against the civilian 
population as they conquered the Ottoman areas. They expelled, persecuted, 
and sometimes even annihilated unwanted minorities to usurp territory to 
which there were no legitimate claims. Such “ethnic cleansing,” a euphemistic 
term for mass atrocities, had occurred since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of 
modern nation-state building. Since the Serb uprisings in the early nineteenth 
century, hundreds of thousands of people had been uprooted, and violent poli-
cies of homogenization continued thereafter when ethnic homogeneity became 
the mantra of a strong and effective nation-state in Europe. In a nationalist age, 
the makeup of a population served to justify one group’s territorial claims over 
those of another.2 Leon Trotsky reported how “the Serbs in Old Serbia . . . are 
engaged quite simply in systematic extermination of the Muslim population” 
so as to correct the ethnographical statistics to their favor.3 The armed forces 
of the other countries also undertook “ethnic cleansing” in order to destroy 
any resistance. “Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and 
innocent populations massacred . . . with a view to the entire transformation 
of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians,” doc-
umented an independent commission of inquiry.4 Throughout the twentieth 
century, such acts of violence would reoccur whenever conquests brought 
regime change or empires and states fell apart, particularly during the Second 
World War and the Yugoslav wars of succession in the 1990s.
The Great Powers worked feverishly to come up with a containment 
strategy. However, by December 1912 it had become clear that the status quo 
could not be reinstated in the Balkans. Instead, a dangerous crisis developed 
in Austro–Russian relations. Ultimately, Vienna succeeded in blocking Serbia 
from gaining any access to the Adriatic and, for this purpose, recognized the 
independence of the new state of Albania, declared by the Albanian National 
Congress in November 1912 in Vlorë. On the basis of these developments, the 
warring sides signed the Treaty of London on 30 May 1913, through which the 
sultan lost most of his European possessions.5
Serbia refused to accept the situation and demanded parts of Macedonia as 
compensation for the loss of territorial claims in Albania, thereby destroying 
the Balkan League. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece 
on 29 June 1913, was defeated, and had to accept painful territorial losses in 
the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 1913.6 Albania was given the 
status of a sovereign principality under the control of the Great Powers and 
their governor, German Prince Wilhelm zu Wied. Still, about 50 percent of the 
Albanian population lived outside the boundaries of this new state.
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In light of Serbia’s successful expansion in the Balkan wars, encouraged 
by Russia, the view of the “hawk” faction at the Viennese court persevered: 
now Serbia was said to pose an existential threat to the dual monarchy that 
could only be eliminated by force.7 From this point on, the Serbian danger, 
supposedly initiated by Russia, became the leitmotif of Austro-Hungarian 
politics in the Balkans. For Serbia, however, the wars had established it as 
a regional hegemonic power, which thus immensely boosted its national 
self-confidence. Its territory had expanded by 81 percent with the annexation 
of Vardar-Macedonia, Kosovo, and Sandžak, its population by nearly 50 per-
cent to about 4.3 million. Belgrade had achieved a grandiose military triumph 
and reconquered the historic and emotionally significant “Old Serbia” with 
Kosovo and parts of Macedonia, where once the heart of the medieval Serbian 
empire lay. However, the victory had come at a high price. In both wars the 
country lost 14,000 combatants in battle. An additional 22,000 soldiers died 
from injuries and disease, and 54,000 were wounded. The costs equaled a sum 
three times greater than the national budget.8 Serbia was exhausted, financially 
drained, and confronted with new domestic problems caused by a half million 
new Albanian and Turkish citizens. Authorities settled about 12,000 Serb 
families in the new territories, and thousands of Muslims fled. The Serbs ruth-
lessly combated the active resistance put up by Albanian rebels, the Kachaks, 
starting in 1913. In addition, guerrilla warfare with the Macedonian irregular 
troops of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization started in 1914. 
War and uprising left the population destitute.9
Among the Serbs and Croats still living under Habsburg rule, the Balkan 
wars had an enormous mobilizing impact. “Not only in Serbia itself, but also 
in the Austro-Hungarian regions inhabited by South Slavs did people believe 
that the collapse of Austria-Hungary was imminent and that Yugoslavia could 
be created only from Belgrade with the help of the Serbian army and its allies,” 
concluded Alexander Hoyos, then the chef de cabinet at the Austrian Foreign 
Ministry.10 In March 1913, a confidential report submitted to the emperor and 
his government stated: “The South Slavic idea, meaning the idea of the Serbo-
Croatian fraternization . . . has now reached the highest leadership and . . . is 
not only the solution for all segments of the population in political matters, but 
also in cultural and economic ones as well. This is true not only for Croatia and 
Slavonia, but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly for Dalmatia, 
where a revolutionary, antimonarchical spirit has promptly gained ground.”11
Serbia’s national agitation and its drive for expansion endangered both the 
domestic stability and the foreign security of Austria-Hungary. In April 1913, 
negotiations commenced between the Serbian and Montenegrin governments 
on unification, which would have given Belgrade its long-sought access to the 
sea.12 Furthermore, Serbia took possession of Macedonia and hence acquired 
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parts of the Oriental Railway in 1912/1913. Since the Habsburgs owned 51 
percent of the railway, they suffered highly aggravating financial losses. 
However, what troubled them the most was Russia’s political patronage in the 
region, because this affected the power and alliances of the Habsburg Empire 
and curtailed its military discretion in handling defiant Balkan states. For 
Austria-Hungary, relations with Serbia were increasingly becoming a question 
of survival, and each success enjoyed by Serbia further reinforced this view.
The Balkan wars accelerated the militarization of Austria-Hungary’s 
Balkan policy. It was becoming increasingly clear that a military offensive 
was being taken into consideration as part of its strategy to prevent the further 
expansion of Serbia’s influence in the region. Vienna issued ultimatums both 
in the spring and fall of 1913 that forced Montenegrin and Serbian troops to 
retreat from Albanian territory, which then reconfirmed the Austrians’ view 
that force was the only language Belgrade understood.13 When control over the 
annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina threatened to slip from its grasp 
in the summer of 1914, Vienna resorted to the means of “surgical intervention 
against the pathogenic agent” Serbia.14 What was at stake seemed to be nothing 
less than the domestic stability of Austria-Hungary, if not the survival of the 
monarchy itself. In a memorandum dated 24 June 1914, the Foreign Ministry, 
encouraged by Germany, urged the emperor to take an aggressive foreign 
policy course. This memorandum shows that, even before Austria-Hungary 
faced the crisis that would unfold in July, the leadership had decided to use 
the aggressive strategy worked out back in 1906 by General Chief of Staff 
Conrad von Hötzendorf.15
Vienna’s policy was developed in the context of pressing considerations 
and concerns involving the Balkans and foreign alliances, the foremost of 
these being its troubled relations with Romania, a rivalry with Italy over 
Albania, the danger that the Balkan League would be revived to counter 
Austria-Hungary, a possible unification of Serbia and Montenegro, and the 
growing influence of Russia in the region. Several factors paved the way for 
a “great war”: the division of Europe into two hostile blocs; the arms race 
and imperial expansion in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; growing social 
and domestic conflicts; and finally, aggressive war plans, inaccurate military 
speculations, and diplomatic mismanagement. War would offer the chance 
to neutralize Serbia. All that was needed was the appropriate opportunity to 
spark a conflict,16 and that occurred on 28 June 1914 with the assassination of 
Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.
Assassination and the July Crisis
Shortly after 1:00 p.m. on 28 July 1914, the Serbian prime minister, Nikola 
Pašić, was eating lunch at the Café Evropa in Niš when a gendarme handed 
him a simple telegram containing Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war. 
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Tensions had been great and preparations for war had intensified in the weeks 
since the 19-year-old Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip had shot the Austrian 
crown prince, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, in 
Sarajevo. That spring, members of the Young Bosnia movement had felt deeply 
provoked by the announcement that the royal couple would visit the occupied 
provinces to observe military maneuver exercises precisely on the anniversary 
of the symbolic and emotionally charged Battle of Kosovo. On the morning 
of 28 June, seven young conspirators armed with bombs and weapons posi-
tioned themselves along the Appel Quay. It was due to pure coincidence and 
especially the bungling security measures of the police that this amateurish 
tyrannicide was successful.17
The assassins and their instigators were seized shortly afterward and later 
tried along with about 180 other sympathizers. Princip and his codefendants 
repeatedly asserted that they had planned the assassination all by themselves 
and had only been handed the weapons in Serbia. Yet apparently they had 
very different political and private motives. Princip confessed that he had 
been determined since 1912 to carry out an assassination of some person of 
high standing who represented power in Austria. “I am not a criminal, because 
I just eliminated an evildoer,” he claimed on 12 October 1914. He and his 
accomplices further stated that Franz Ferdinand was an “enemy of the South 
Slavs,” that the archduke was responsible for the state of emergency and all 
trials of high treason, and that poor people were becoming even poorer with 
every passing day. They all sought to free Bosnia from the Habsburg monar-
chy and unify all South Slavs into a single state, so that Yugoslavs would live 
together as one nation.18
The Austrian prosecutors refused to accept that the anti-Slavic politics 
of Austria-Hungary had motivated these members of the Young Bosnians to 
carry out the assassination. They attempted to prove that the Serbian govern-
ment had planned and assisted the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg 
monarchy because the crown prince allegedly wanted to reform the empire 
in a way that would have taken the wind out of the sails of Serb national-
ism.19 But nowhere in their testimonies do the assassins ever say that they 
murdered Franz Ferdinand because of his (actually nonexistent) plans to es-
tablish trialism. To date no evidence has been found to prove either that the 
assassination was the work of the Serbian government or that Russia was 
the real force behind Serbia’s politics.20 On the contrary, two weeks before 
the assassination, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić had pushed to halt the illegal 
smuggling of weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to scrutinize the activities 
of the Black Hand.21
On 28 October 1914, the Austrian court sentenced the three main per-
petrators to twenty years in a maximum security prison camp located in the 
Bohemian city of Theresienstadt. Their punishment was to be intensified by 
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a day of fasting each month and by confinement in a bare-bones, completely 
dark cell every 28 June. All three died in prison as a result of the inhuman 
conditions there.
The Serbian government in Belgrade attempted to de-escalate the situa-
tion since it had long been concerned that Vienna was looking for a pretext to 
attack.22 It expressed its deep regrets and condolences and assured Vienna that 
Serbia would immediately investigate the circumstances of the assassination. 
At the same time, it stated unequivocally that the Serbian government had 
nothing to do with the murder.23 The Russian envoy Strandtmann reported on 
23 July 1914 from Belgrade that an aggravation of Austrian-Serbian relations 
“was viewed in Belgrade as being not only unwanted, but also as dangerous 
for the survival of the kingdom itself.”24
Diplomats at Vienna’s Foreign Ministry on Ballhausplatz were indeed 
pondering “what demands could be made that would be thoroughly impos-
sible for Serbia to accept.”25 On 7 July, the Ministerrat für Gemeinsame 
Angelegenheiten (Council of Ministers for Common Affairs) urged the stip-
ulation of unfulfillable conditions, “so that a radical solution in the direction 
of military intervention could be initiated.” Twelve days later, it decided to 
prune Serbia to a rump state dependent economically on Austria-Hungary by 
partitioning as much of Serbian territory as possible with Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Albania.26 Even though it is accurate to say that the assassination of the 
Austrian heir to the throne on 28 June 1914 was but the trigger that discharged 
the full force of mounting international competition between the major pow-
ers, and that Emperor Franz Joseph would never have risked the attack on 
Serbia without the support and public encouragement of Germany, the conflict 
between Austria and Serbia that had been building since 1908 possessed its 
own explosive logic.27
On 23 July around 6:00 p.m., the Austrian envoy Baron Giesl delivered 
an alarming note in Belgrade. In it, Vienna accused the Serbian government 
of complicity in the assassination and issued a ten-point ultimatum in which it 
demanded that the propaganda aimed against Austria-Hungary be condemned 
and all irredentist activities be prosecuted. In addition, it demanded that Serbia 
“agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal 
Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against 
the integrity of the Monarchy.”28 Serbia was to answer within forty-eight hours.
In these forty-eight hours, Nikola Pašić composed — with the help of his 
minister of domestic affairs, Stojan Protić — a truly masterful answer that 
commanded quiet respect even in Vienna. He delivered the note personally to 
the Austrian ambassador shortly before the clock struck 6:00 p.m.29 The note 
was conciliatory, nearly apologetic, in all points except one: “As far as the 
cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and 
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R. [Imperial and Royal] Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as 
this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure.”30 The Serbian 
legal system did not permit any foreign intervention in domestic affairs, it was 
argued. The very same day, Vienna broke off its diplomatic relations with 
Serbia, and on 28 July, the Austro-Hungarian emperor declared war on Serbia. 
It was the culmination of a looming crisis long in the making.
War, Retreat, and Occupation
The Austrians harbored the illusion that the war would be short and therefore 
sent an underfinanced, poorly equipped, and rather unmotivated army into 
battle against Serbia. As a precautionary measure, martial law was declared 
already on 25 July in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia, pro-Yugoslav news-
papers were banned, and opposition leaders and “Serbian spies” were arrested, 
deported, or executed on a massive scale. Vienna made preparations to repress 
the predictable wave of solidarity with Serbia.31
On 11 August, General Oskar Potiorek crossed the Drina from Bosnia-
Herzegovina with three armies and headed into Serbia. Croats, Serbs, and 
Slovenes living under Habsburg rule were forced to fight; in some units they 
made up as much as 40 percent of the troops. One of them was the 21-year-
old locksmith Josip Broz, later known as Tito.32 The area of eastern Bosnia 
and the Drina valley was one in which much of the fighting took place. It was 
from here that the Austrians advanced toward Serbia. Serb volunteers led by 
Kosta Todorović took the provincial city of Srebrenica on 18 September 1914 
but were driven from there shortly afterward by the Austrians, who killed the 
commander and, together with Croat-Muslim legionnaires, committed hid-
eous atrocities against the civilian population. In Serbian historical memory, 
Todorović became a hero and is still commemorated today. His story serves 
as an early parable in the national discourse on sacrifice.33
The Austrians soon found themselves in difficulty because of poor strate-
gic planning, logistic problems, and the highly motivated Serbian army under 
the command of the elderly Serbian general chief of staff Radomir Putnik. 
Although the Balkan wars had exhausted the Serbs, militarily they were well 
trained and psychologically hardened for war. On the plateau of the mountain 
Cer, where the Drina and Kolubara rivers converge, they pulverized Potiorek’s 
soldiers. Nearly 274,000 Austrian troops were killed in the first year of the 
war. By the end of 1914, the Austro-Hungarian troops were trapped in the 
Balkans, the war virtually lost. The Serbs commemorate the important battle 
with the patriotic song “March on the Drina,” which praises their soldiers’ 
bravery and love of liberty.
The brutality and totality of the war in the Balkans was characteristic of 
the conflict from its very beginning in the summer of 1914 and not just the 
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result of the escalating dynamics of violence. The Austrians were convinced 
that the Serbs would conduct a bloody guerrilla war with the help of irregular 
fighters, the komitadži. Invoking “Kriegsnotwehrrecht,” the wartime right to 
self-defense, the Habsburg troops committed horrific devastation and mass 
atrocities that stood in clear violation to valid international laws of war and 
appalled foreign observers.34 A “Direktion für das Verhalten gegenüber der 
Bevölkerung in Serbien” (directorate for the behavior toward the population 
in Serbia) ordered: “The war leads us into an enemy country that is inhabited 
by a population filled with fanatical hatred toward us. Any form of human-
ity or tenderheartedness shown to such a people is not only misplaced but 
actually baneful, because such deference, which in wartime is otherwise pos-
sible now and then, would in this case seriously endanger the security of our 
own troops.” The Austro-Hungarian armies took civilians as hostages; killed 
thousands of men, women, and children “in reprisal” for partisan attacks; 
burned down villages; and plundered as much as they could carry. This was 
the case not only in Serbia but also on the other side of the Drina in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. “ ‘Our troops,’ one soldier serving with the Honved reported, 
‘have struck out terribly in all directions, like the Swedes in the Thirty Years 
War. Nothing, or almost nothing, is intact. In every house individuals are to 
be seen searching for things that are still usable.’ ”35
Rudolf Archibald Reiss, Professor for Criminalistics and Forensics in 
Lausanne, traveled to the Serbian front in 1914 and documented the horror 
for the rest of the world. Innumerable cities and villages were described as 
consisting only of ruins, such as Šabac: “Go into any house . . . everything is 
empty and plundered. Everything that could not be carried away was kaput, 
broken or in some way made unusable.”36 Wherever the Austrians moved in, 
men were viciously slaughtered, women raped, entire settlements destroyed 
beyond recognition. On 30 July they arrived in the village of Prnjavor and as-
sembled all the local men. Any man on whom they found a conscription order 
or even just a bullet was immediately shot. The 60-year-old Jovan Maletić, who 
witnessed the butchery along with forty hostages, described what he had seen:
By the time the Swabians [a commonly used name for Austrians] brought 
by the 109 inhabitants from Prnjavor, the soldiers had already dug the 
grave. They tied them together with rope and wrapped the entire group 
with barbed wire. Then the soldiers positioned themselves on the railway 
embankment about 15 meters [50 ft] away from the victims and fired 
off a round. The entire group tumbled into the grave, and other soldiers 
shoveled dirt over them without checking if all were dead or if there were 
still wounded among them. Certainly there were many who had not been 
fatally wounded, at least a few, but the others had pulled them all down 
into the grave. They were buried alive!
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“Anyone who has seen all that I have seen,” wrote Reiss, a native of 
Freiburg, “will never be able to forgive.”37
Serbia had successfully contended its victory at an enormous loss of hu-
man lives and property. The hardship suffered by the country at the outbreak 
of the war defied description. Soldiers and refugees in the hundreds of thou-
sands and war prisoners in the tens of thousands needed to be provided for. But 
the economy had come practically to a standstill. In the first war year alone, 
163,557 of the 250,000 soldiers and another 69,000 civilians died. Nearly 
600,000 refugees were on the move. In early 1915, a typhus epidemic broke 
out. International aid workers counted 400,000 sick and 100,000 dead. The 
catastrophe was not contained until five months later.38
In the meantime, Austria-Hungary was preparing a counteroffensive. 
This time the Central Powers were better prepared and had pulled Bulgaria 
to their side. In October 1915, ten German divisions crossed the Danube from 
the north, while the Bulgarians invaded from the east. In order to save his 
army from annihilation, General Putnik ordered a retreat on 26 November 
1915, over the mountains to the Albanian coast. The High Command, the 
elderly King Peter, and numerous members of the government, members of 
parliament, and intellectuals joined them. It was announced that Serbia would 
not surrender at any price, despite the superiority of the enemy forces. The 
men, women, and children left behind were armed.
The formerly proud Serbian army degenerated into a demoralized and 
internally dissolving force. Many soldiers simply went home. Only those who 
did not take to their heels started the long trek to the coast. Marching over 
hazardous paths, the starving, freezing, and deathly exhausted men fought 
their way through snow and ice at temperatures falling to –4oF/–20oC. “Slowly 
we crawl up the bare cliffs on the slopes of the Čakor. Step for step on the 
downtrodden snow we move forward,” wrote Josip Jeras in his diary. “On the 
sides of the path, exhausted refugees, trapped in the snow, their heads low-
ered. White snowflakes dance around them, and the mountain winds whistle 
the funeral dirge. The heads of fallen horses and oxen jut out of the snow.”39 
Caravans of civilian refugees followed the troops: “There were no houses by 
the way, no refuge of any kind. . . . If anyone became exhausted, what could 
be done? . . . The other members of the family were powerless. It was a case 
of the rest of the family pushing ahead or of all perishing together,” reported 
British rear admiral Ernest Troubridge, who accompanied the wretched trek.40 
The horrible, grueling march is often referred to as the Albanian Golgotha. It 
took the lives of about 150,000 and left another 77,000 missing. Only 140,000 
people made it to the Adriatic coast; from there the starved and ragged survi-
vors were shipped to Corfu and Thessaloniki by the Triple Entente.41 By the 
spring of 1916, Serbian troops were once again fighting on the frontlines, this 
time on foreign soil near Thessaloniki.
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The victors — Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Bulgaria — were convinced 
that Serbia had to disappear from the map as a political entity. However, there 
were differences of opinion on how to go about this. Should the entire coun-
try be annexed or should Serbia be extremely reduced to no more than an 
economically dependent rump state? At first they divided the country among 
themselves and set up a harsh occupational regime in the fall of 1915.
The objectives and practices of the occupation amounted to no more than 
the ruthless denationalization and plundering of the occupied regions, meant 
to ensure that the state of Serbia would vanish for good. The Austrians set up 
the Military Governorate of Serbia and introduced a rigid economic system of 
exploitation. In addition, political organizations and societies were forbidden, 
and schools were brought under their control.42 In March 1916, General Conrad 
ordered that all resistance be destroyed with ruthless severity, that the country 
be squeezed dry, and that no mercy be shown for the hardship this caused to 
the general population. Harvest yields and produced goods had to be turned 
over to authorities; food was rationed. Officials interned 16,500 men fit to bear 
arms until November 1916.43 That winter, starvation killed more than 8,000 
Serbs, according to Red Cross reports, while figures from the Habsburg High 
Command reported that 170,000 cattle, 190,000 sheep, and 50,000 pigs had 
been requisitioned and exported to Austria-Hungary by mid-May 1917.44
In late September 1916, the Serbian High Command flew in the guerrilla 
leader Kosta Milovanović Pećanac from Thessaloniki to organize resistance 
in Serbia. In February 1917, a force of 4,000 armed men and women managed 
to liberate an area in the Morava valley, but then the uprising was put down. 
The Austro-Hungarian military reported 20,000 dead and the escape of 2,600 
into the forests.45
Starting in November 1915, the Bulgarians established themselves in the 
eastern part of the country, where they had an old score to settle with Serbia. 
In 1912/1913, Serbia had ruthlessly “Serbianized” territories annexed from 
Bulgaria. The churches and schools of the Bulgarian Exarchate had been 
closed, Bulgarian newspapers banned, Greek and Bulgarian names translated 
into Serbian ones. When power changed hands at the end of October 1915, 
the situation reversed itself, and the Bulgarian military government in east-
ern Serbia, Macedonia, and parts of Kosovo began an unrelenting process of 
Bulgarianization, occupation, and economical exploitation.
Particularly hard hit were the Serbs. All former soldiers between the ages 
of 18 and 50, as well as teachers, doctors, journalists, civil servants, and other 
officials were interned, shot, or transported to Bulgaria as prisoners of war. 
Another 46,000 or so were deported there as forced laborers. Serb names, al-
phabet, and language were forbidden; books and maps were banned from the 
public.46 However, the occupiers did not treat the Muslims significantly better.
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Whereas Austria-Hungary conducted the war against Serbia out of its 
existential interests, Germany was pursuing primarily economic aims. Berlin 
took charge of exploiting the mines, controlling the railway in the Morava 
valley, and organizing a swath of territory behind the lines (Etappenzone) 
used to provision its troops on the Salonica Front. Germany incorporated 
Serbia into its planning of the war economy, since the Germans were ex-
periencing acute deficits in raw material and food as a result of the British 
trade blockade. To handle the exploitation of occupied Serbia, the Deutsch-
orientalische Gesellschaft (German Oriental Society) was created, based on 
the model of other German organizations working elsewhere to secure the 
supply of raw materials needed for the war. This exploitation drove Serbia 
so deeply into destitution that even Austrian representatives in Berlin filed 
complaints.47 Likewise in Bulgaria, the Germans had forced Sofia to let the 
War Raw Materials Department of the German Empire manage the mining 
of iron ore, so necessary for steel production.
The Salonica Front ran across all of Macedonia. It was a broad band of 
destruction, 80 to 95 miles long, that was repeatedly ploughed up by the ar-
tillery on both sides. By mid-1916, the fighting had reached such a stalemate 
that a crisis in provisioning the civilian population and the military reached 
catastrophic proportions. More and more of the Central Powers’ soldiers, in-
cluding many Bulgarians, refused to take orders, deserted, or defected to the 
other side.
Two years later, on 15 September 1918, the Serbian army launched a 
major offensive that finally broke through the front lines. Accompanied by its 
allies, it marched in the direction of the Danube and liberated Belgrade on 1 
November. From the outbreak of the Balkan wars in 1912 to the armistice in 
1918, Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo had suffered almost unceasingly from 
extreme violence, hunger, and disease. These experiences brought about deep-
seated material, societal, political, and sociocultural transformations.
Of all the countries involved in the First World War, Serbia had suffered 
the greatest loss of life with 1.2 million war dead by the end of the conflict. 
Fifty-three percent of the male population between 18 and 55 had been killed, 
and 264,000 were invalids. Almost all livestock had been either destroyed or 
requisitioned.48 For the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs, the experience of war 
had proven to be a decisive one. Part of the Isonzo Front ran across Slovenian 
soil, which resulted in tens of thousands of Slovenes being exiled or deported 
to Italy, Austria, and Hungary. Nearly 300,000 Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and 
Slovenes had lost their lives as frontline soldiers fighting on behalf of for-
eign powers.49
Millions of people had gone through life-threatening experiences, been 
forced to flee their homelands, and lost relatives and property. This unraveled 
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the old social order. As long as the men, at one point more than 700,000 of 
them, were off fighting, traditional gender roles had to be redefined. During 
the war years, women took the place of men as the head of households, per-
formed extremely hard labor for months at a time for the occupation forces, 
fought in the resistance, and lived a more liberal sexual morality.50
In exile on Corfu, where political life continued, the 26-year-old Serbian 
prince regent used the emergency situation to deal with the secret organization 
Black Hand, which was allegedly hatching plans for an overthrow in its aim 
to create a Greater Serbia or Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. In 1917, ten officers 
were tried for high treason in Thessaloniki, and their leader, Apis, was exe-
cuted along with two co-conspirators. This ended the rivalry that had existed 
since 1903 between military and civilian institutions of power and enabled 
the Serbian state to further consolidate itself.51
The trail of destruction and destitution left by the war, the years of trauma, 
and the massive loss of human life left the entire South Slavic region with a 
pressing need to justify and attribute meaning to the sacrifice rendered. The 
prospect of national resurrection and greatness fulfilled this need in Serbian 
public opinion. Historians, politicians, and intellectuals knew how to incor-
porate the experiences into the public culture of remembrance. They heroized, 
sacralized, and mythologized the history of the war by stylizing the Serbs as a 
nation of martyrs and victims in the monuments they erected and the veteran 
cult they created. To cultivate this war culture as a common framework of 
reference and orientation meant to create of a new understanding of national 
community and political legitimacy, one in which the war ascended to become 
the founding myth of the new Yugoslav state.
Yugoslav Unification and the Founding of the State
The First World War fundamentally radicalized the contrasting national 
ideas and opposing political ideologies about Yugoslavia’s domestic order 
that existed among the elite. Throughout the entire twentieth century, conflicts 
emerging from these contrasts would remain a dominant, recurring theme and 
would repeatedly flare up in critical moments of change, such as in the Second 
World War and in the 1990s. The South Slavic elite had entered the war with 
very different and in part irreconcilable expectations, objectives, and concepts 
of order. Were the Yugoslavs already a single people (with different names) or 
did such a unified people first have to be created? Should the future state be 
a federalist or a centralist one?
Serbia saw itself as having been blamelessly drawn into a struggle to 
survive, from which it had to emerge strengthened and territorially enlarged 
in order to permanently dispense with Great Power influence. To achieve 
this, the Yugoslav idea, although originally foreign to Serb national thinking, 
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was now adopted and turned into a specific war aim. In a circular note dated 
4 September 1914, the Serbian government announced the plan to create a 
“strong southwestern Slavic state to be joined by all Croats and all Serbs and 
all Slovenes.”52 Peace would be compromised should a political order emerge 
that created small, rival entities. Thus, Serb nationalism amalgamated with 
the ideas of South Slavic unification.
The idea that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were one people with different 
names became increasingly prominent. Politicians, diplomats, and scholars be-
gan to construct a theoretical and representational framework for the Yugoslav 
nation. Among these were Aleksandar Belić, a linguist, and the geographer 
Jovan Cvijić. Under the pseudonym “Dinaricus,” Cvijić published what he 
argued was anthropological proof of the common ethnic origin shared by 
South Slavs.53 By the end of September 1914, both the borders and the structure 
of the future state were taking on distinct contours. In October, the Serbian 
government was certain that Yugoslavia should be structured as a centralist 
state, yet one that also guaranteed the “national particularities of each tribe,” 
with equal treatment given to religions and alphabets and with consideration 
given to Croatian state symbols that documented its historic individuality.54
The struggle to establish a Yugoslav state had to be fought not only on 
the battlefield, but also on diplomatic fronts. In November 1914, exiled pol-
iticians from Serbia and Croatia agreed to create the Yugoslav Committee 
for the purpose of lobbying the Allies and winning public support for their 
undertaking. In May 1915, this committee assumed its work in London under 
the chairmanship of the Croat Ante Trumbić. It advocated a decidedly unitary 
“Southern Slav Programme” that declared Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to be 
“one and the same people, known under three different names.”55 This was 
important if the Slavs wanted to claim together the right to self-determination 
that U.S. president Woodrow Wilson had advocated early in 1918 as a principle 
on which the postwar order was to be built. Despite this effort, the various 
views did butt up against one another. Whereas the Croats announced the 
future state to be the creation of peoples of equal standing, the Serbs saw it 
more as the reward for their extremely hard-fought war of liberation. Yet it 
was agreed to negotiate constitutional details later.
Independent of these internal differences, the members of the committee 
began their campaign of tireless and emphatic wooing for the favor of the 
Great Powers, which were at first anything but enthusiastic about an indepen-
dent Yugoslav state. In London, the Croat Frano Supilo appeared as a “force of 
nature,” in the words of the former British prime minister Herbert Asquith, to 
convince the West of the South Slavic issue. Above all, they sought to thwart 
Italy’s claim to the coastal areas, which the Allies had offered it as the reward 
for entering the war.56 Franko Potočnjak, who lobbied in the United States, 
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admitted: “We pay great attention to the question of how it can be proven 
to the world that Slovenes, Serbs and Croats are one people, in order to thus 
justify the demand for unification. The world knows us under so many names: 
Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Dalmatians, etc., and each of these names 
means ‘people.’ And to tell the truth, we have not yet solved this problem 
even at home.”57
As for the structure of a future Yugoslav state, the question remained 
undecided. In 1917, three groups, each with a different agenda, stepped up 
to be heard. The first was the Serbian government in exile on Corfu, led by 
Nikola Pašić, which favored a Serb-dominated centralist state that Slovenes 
and Croats would merely join. The second was the Yugoslav Committee 
in London, which demanded a federal constitution based on the right to 
self-determination and thus equality among all three participating peoples. 
The third was the Yugoslav Club, an organization formed by Slovene, Croat, 
and Serb members of the Austrian parliament (Reichsrat) for the purpose of 
finding a solution within the framework of the Habsburg state. On 30 May 
1917, the club called for the “unification of all countries of the monarchy” 
in which “Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs live . . . on the basis of the national 
principle and the Croatian constitution.” The May declaration electrified the 
South Slavs of the monarchy, sparked public rallies, and inspired signature 
petitions for the national program. However, the declaration soon outlived its 
political relevance, and even the club abandoned its loyalty to the Habsburg 
emperor early in 1918.
In the meantime, representatives of the Serbian government had banded 
together with the Yugoslav Committee as equal partners. On 20 July 1917, 
they issued the Corfu Declaration, signed by the Croat Ante Trumbić on behalf 
of the Committee, and Nikola Pašić for the Serbian government. The Corfu 
Declaration announced the founding of the State of the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes, “also known by the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs,” under the 
Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty. While it was agreed that Yugoslavia would 
become a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy, the ques-
tion was left open whether the new state would be a centralized or federal one. 
In any event, it guaranteed universal male suffrage, territorial indivisibility, 
religious freedom, and full legal equality for the three national denominations, 
the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as well as for the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, 
and Muslim religions, and for the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets within the 
“united nation.”58
Austria-Hungary’s military defeats, the growing destitution, but also in-
ternational developments like the revolution in Russia and the U.S. entry into 
the war created a widespread and transregional consensus above party lines 
in favor of the creation of Yugoslavia. Support was strong in Slovenia and 
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Croatia, where the plan was opposed only by parts of the Catholic clergy. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Muslims expressed their reservations, and 
also in Macedonia and Montenegro there were doubts. However, the faster 
the war approached its end, the less often voices critical of the new state were 
to be heard.
Throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the press and cultural insti-
tutions were now propagating the “great aim” of creating a “unified people” 
comprised of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Little notice was taken of the 
helpless attempt by Austrian emperor Karl I to save the monarchy through a 
reform and by agreeing to a tripartite empire with a Croatian state. Instead, 
on 6 October 1918, seventy-three members of the Austrian parliament founded 
the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, with the aim of unifying 
their people living in Austria-Hungary and establishing a free, independent, 
and democratic state. They formed a provisional government on 17 October, 
which Belgrade preliminarily recognized as the official representation of the 
eight million South Slavs of the Habsburg monarchy.
By this point, Austria-Hungary’s military might was completely depleted. 
While the command headquarters of the Croatian-Slavonian gendarmerie re-
ported over 20,000 desertions in 1917, this number had reached 100,000 by 
the summer of 1918. Not even drumhead court martials could deter deserters. 
As soon as trains started to roll in the direction of the front, soldiers in full 
gear were jumping from the cars and hiding in the woods. Several thousands 
of them banded together into the “Green Cadre.”59 In September 1918, after 
Austro-Hungarian forces failed to hold the Salonica Front, the troops began 
to disband altogether.
With the collapse of its army, the days of the dual monarchy itself were 
numbered. Pressure from the streets in provincial capitals grew. Starting on 
21 October 1918, the flag flying from houses in Zagreb was the South Slavic 
blue-white-red tricolor. Later demonstrators marched in the direction of the 
diet waving Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, and red flags. The crowds cheered 
Wilson and Masaryk, the Green Cadre, and Nikola Pašić. The Marseillaise 
could be heard blaring from the coffeehouses, as well as the Croatian and 
Serbian national hymns. The national euphoria in Zagreb and Ljubljana turned 
into a gigantic festival when, on Tuesday, 29 October, the Croatian diet met 
at 10:00 a.m. for an extraordinary session, in which it ruled to dissolve “all 
constitutional relations and bands between the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, 
and Dalmatia, on the one side, and the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian 
Empire, on the other.” Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, including Rijeka, 
were proclaimed as the independent and sovereign nation state of “Slovenes, 
Croats, and Serbs covering the entire ethnographic region of this people.”60 
In Slovenia, the people’s assembly also voted to secede from the monarchy, 
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upon which Austro-Hungarian military and civilian institutions there abdi-
cated their power. On 24 November 1918, the National Council announced 
the unification with Serbia. “Our Austrian-Hungarian reality rumbles around 
drunkenly under the throne of the Karadjordjević like an empty beer bottle 
in the trash,” wrote the Croat novelist Miroslav Krleža.61
For Montenegro, which had fought alongside Serbia in the war, the fun-
damental question revolved around the survival of its own institutions and 
dynasty. From his exile, King Nikola spoke out in favor of a federalist solu-
tion, but on 26 November he was deposed by the National Assembly and 
the unification with Serbia was declared. In Macedonia, the political class 
was also divided. One side supported the Corfu Declaration on the condition 
that they retain their own representation outside of Serbia, while the other 
side called for a unified, independent state. However, neither the architects 
of Yugoslavia nor the Great Powers ever considered granting the right to 
self-determination to the Macedonian people, who were dispersed throughout 
three different states.62
On 1 December 1918, Prince Regent Alexander Karadjordjević pro-
claimed amid great pomp and ceremony the founding of the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS). This proclamation was met with armed 
resistance only in a few places in Croatia and Montenegro. The new state was 
recognized internationally at the Paris Peace Conference in May 1919. Prior 
to this, American observers had closely studied the situation in Croatia and 
Slavonia and had not discovered any noteworthy opposition there to unifica-
tion. A secret plebiscite in Dalmatia even resulted in 96 percent approval for 
the founding of the new state.63
Yugoslavia was therefore not an artificial state created out of ignorance 
or just to serve the interests of the Great Powers.64 Instead, support for the 
Yugoslav project had been emerging from a variety of sources for quite some 
time: from cultural similarities and shared experiences in the ethnically mixed 
areas, from thwarted and — at least since the turn of the century — enormously 
radicalized feelings of nationalism, from new types of socioeconomic chal-
lenges and consciousness, and, last but not least, from the anachronistic, 
arrogant, and reform-hostile rule of the Habsburg monarchy. The First World 
War catalyzed all the forces that had been pushing for self-determination since 
the end of the nineteenth century.
At the same time, the turbulent creation of this new state was neither 
inevitable nor unavoidable; certainly it would not have been launched without 
the radical political, social, and ideological changes caused by the First World 
War. Only the complete collapse of the Habsburg monarchy made obsolete 
all alternatives to solve the national question within the imperial framework 
of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the fear of becoming a pawn in the hands of 
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competing Great Power politics had an integrative impact, particularly since 
Italy was claiming Istria and Dalmatia and, in the words of Frano Supilo, thus 
threatened to “gobble us up like macaroni.”65 Due to Serbia’s spirit of resis-
tance, its readiness to make sacrifices, and its perseverance, all of which made 
it triumphant over the broken monarchial empire in 1918, it would have been 
very hard to deny Serbia the realization of its ultimate war aim, namely, the 
founding of a South Slavic state. Across all regional, national, and ideological 
borders, the military, economic, and humanitarian catastrophe brought about 
a change in attitude among the broader populace, including the rural popula-
tion. It was the long-suffered, painful experiences of social subordination and 
political marginalization, now condensed by the trauma of war, that exploded 
into boundless enthusiasm for a new start together at the historical turning 
point of 1918. For many, “Yugoslavia” became the code word for a better life 
in dignity, peace, freedom, and prosperity. Thus, the new state set out amid 
immense and euphoric hopes for the future.

PART II




The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes (1918 to 1929)
The Paris Peace Conference and Its Consequences
In January 1919, a delegation from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 
better known as the Kingdom of SHS, arrived in Paris to seek recognition of 
its state at the international peace conference. It had to be accredited as a 
Serbian delegation because the Great Powers were still hesitant about this 
new state entity. Could it even survive? In February 1919, it was recognized 
as a sovereign state by the United States, and finally in June also by Great 
Britain and France.1
The international system negotiated in the five Parisian treaties estab-
lished the right to self-determination as had been defined in January 1918 by 
President Wilson in his “Fourteen Points.” This right became a key criterion for 
the political order in both East-Central Europe and Southeast Europe. Every 
people was to be free to create a nation state of its own, provided that certain 
language and ethnographic criteria were met. Economic, historical, and stra-
tegic factors also played a role. With the peace agreements of 1919/1920, the 
Great Powers created a corridor stretching from the Baltics to the Balkans of 
nation states that had liberal democratic constitutions and welfare state sys-
tems. These were to act as a cordon sanitaire against revolutionary Bolshevik 
Russia, on the one side, and revisionist Germany, on the other.
Of all the states to appear on the political map of Europe in 1918, 
Yugoslavia was undoubtedly the most diverse and complicated. The titular 
nation of Slovenes and “Serbo-Croats,” which also included Montenegrins, 
Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians, represented around 83 percent of the 
Yugoslav population of roughly 12.5 million. In addition, about twenty other 
ethnic minorities lived within its borders. With respect to its socioeconomic 
composition, Yugoslavia also resembled a patchwork rug. The new borders 
divided and rearranged economic regions that had evolved over time. The mul-
tiethnic state inherited seven different historic entities with varying monetary, 
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taxation, infrastructural, and legal systems, and great disparities in the level of 
development. In this latter aspect it was not alone. Other successor states also 
struggled with considerable regional disparities, particularly Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, and Romania.
Among the most sensitive issues handled at the Paris conferences were 
those that determined borders in multiethnic areas. For the Yugoslavs, the 
relationship with Italy posed a particular problem. During the war, the Triple 
Entente had signed secret treaties with its allies that in part contradicted a 
people’s right to self-determination. In the 1915 Treaty of London, Rome had 
been promised, as compensation for entering the war, the regions of Trieste, 
Gorizia-Gradišća, Istria, and a large part of Dalmatia — all areas in which 
the majority of inhabitants were Slavs. In order to create a fait accompli, the 
Italians had quickly invaded the coastal areas in question in November 1918 
and then doggedly defended their claim to them. Even though the United States 
repudiated the secret treaties as undemocratic, the Yugoslav foreign minis-
ter eventually had to concede to Italy’s demands. Istria, Zadar, and several 
islands were ceded to Italy in the Rapallo Treaty of November 1920, while 
the Dalmatian coast went to the Kingdom of SHS. In Fiume (Rijeka), which 
had been invaded in September 1919 by the poet Gabriele d’Annunzio and 
his legionnaires, an independent free state was created but then revoked and 
awarded to Italy in 1924, much to the chagrin of the Croats. The Yugoslavs 
were at least partially successful in asserting their territorial claims at Austria’s 
expense. They received the Maribor Basin, which was inhabited by Slovenes, 
but then had to give up claims to southern Carinthia following the popular ref-
erendum in 1920. Whereas Hungary had to turn over the Vojvodina, Bulgaria 
remained essentially untouched by Yugoslav claims to its territory. All in all, 
the border-setting agreements were only a partial success from the standpoint 
of the South Slavic state. Nearly half a million Slovenes and Croats found 
themselves living as minorities under either Italian or Austrian rule.2
For the first time, the new European order included the protection of 
minorities, as guaranteed by the League of Nations. In treaties, the victori-
ous powers compelled the new states of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and Greece to protect their minorities against discrimination and to 
ensure them religious freedom, the right to form organizations, and the right 
to elementary school instruction in their native tongue. Similar stipulations 
were imposed on other East European states through the peace treaties or in 
other legally binding declarations.3 Yet it seemed to the East and Southeast 
Europeans that the peacemaking powers had applied a double standard here 
and excluded themselves from having to make the same guarantees to protect 
their minorities. How was one to understand the fact that Hungarians and 
Germans in Romania and Yugoslavia were entitled to minority rights, but 
Slovenes and Croats in Italy were not?
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The redrawing of borders and the issues connected to the various national-
ities fed the fires of revisionism in the vanquished countries, which attempted 
to leverage the existence of ethnic minorities to contest their territorial losses. 
Actively supported by Sofia and Tirana, Macedonian and Albanian rebels 
in the southern regions of the country fought for unification with Bulgaria 
and Albania, respectively. The Germans and Magyars in Vojvodina, num-
bering a half a million each, found it very hard to accept the painful change 
in their role from ruler to the ruled. Berlin and Budapest instrumentalized 
ethnic politics in order to dislodge the postwar political order with ever new 
accusations of repression. On France’s initiative, Yugoslavia, Romania, and 
Czechoslovakia created a system of bilateral treaties in 1920 and 1921, the 
Little Entente, in order to arm themselves against Hungarian, Bulgarian, and 
Austrian revisionism.4
Despite obvious structural weaknesses, the outcome of the five Parisian 
treaties cannot be simply dismissed a priori as artificial. It enabled most East 
and Southeast European peoples to be recognized for the first time as full-
fledged members of the international community. A more convincing concept 
than that of self-determination was not on the table, even if the complexity of 
ethnic settlement in many regions appeared to make it thoroughly impossible 
to create a territorial order that would satisfy all sides. The British, French, and 
Americans, guided by the ideal of Western individualism and representative 
liberal order, sought to create citizenship nations in which ethnic particularism 
would sooner or later cease to play a role and special minority rights would 
become obsolete. What was left unsaid was that assimilation policy was con-
sidered an effective means to achieve this end.5
Unitarism and Centralism
The Kingdom of SHS, the first Yugoslavia, understood itself as the nation 
state for a single South Slavic people, a state built on individual liberties 
and not on collective rights. However, this South Slavic state was not yet 
called Yugoslavia, because the Serbs refused to strike their name from that 
of the state.
At the heart of the Yugoslav problem in the interwar period was the 
conflict over the constitution of the new state, a battle between centralism 
and federalism, between the Serbian state tradition and the Croat national 
idea. Before 1914, each group had used Yugoslavism above all as a vehicle to 
achieve the liberation, national unification, and integration of their own peo-
ple, for which the South Slavic state also created the political prerequisites. 
Both the Serb and the Croat national ideologies were grounded in the idea of 
historical rights and political legitimacy derived from powerful empires in 
the Middle Ages. From the viewpoint of Zagreb, the compromise between 
Croatian autonomy and Yugoslav unity lay in federalism; only a minority of 
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Croats were calling for independence at the time. National-thinking Serbs, 
on the other hand, dismissed federalism as a Habsburg anachronism. In their 
minds, a strong, integrated Yugoslavia had to be built — like other states in 
Europe — on a centralized structure and on Serbian state tradition.
Starting with the Yugoslav Committee and the Corfu Declaration, the 
founders of Yugoslavia struggled over the constitution and then postponed the 
final decision to some point after peace was achieved. Prior to the election of a 
constitutional assembly, controversy broke out in 1919/1920 between central-
ists and federalists. Loosely speaking, politicians from the former Habsburg 
monarchy advocated a federalist solution, while Serbs, most Montenegrins, 
and all those committed to unitarism regardless of nationality wanted a strong 
central state. Croats and Slovenes had been particularly perturbed when the 
king, in the official act declaring the establishment of the new state and its 
provisional constitution on 1 December 1918, had preordained its unitary and 
centralist structure.
The ensuing realization that federal options were no longer being seriously 
considered and that the constitutional process was headed in the direction of 
an autocratic royal decision embittered a significant part of Croatia’s political 
class and undermined the credibility of the historic compromise reached by 
the elite during the world war. Based on a universal, equal, direct, and secret 
electoral franchise for men over the age of 21, a constitutional assembly was 
elected in the winter of 1920. At the time, women still did not have the right 
to vote in many countries, including France and Italy. Proportional repre-
sentation produced a political standoff between advocates and opponents of 
federalism. In absolute terms, the centralists had a slim majority, because 
the Croatian Republican Peasant Party had decided to boycott the assembly. 
The vote on the constitution was held on the very symbolic St. Vitus Day 
(Vidovdan), 28 June 1921. Following turbulent debate and discussions, the 
representatives of the Serbian, Muslim, and Turkish parties cast 223 votes out 
of 419, a total of 53 percent, in favor of the draft constitution establishing a 
highly centralized state that reflected the motto of “one nation, one king, one 
state.” The constitution also included strong elements of local and regional 
self-administration. The majority of the Slovenes, Croats, and communists 
boycotted the vote.6 This electoral procedure contradicted the spirit of the 
agreements that had been concluded before the end of the war. In order to 
protect minorities from simply being outvoted, the founders of Yugoslavia had 
postulated in the Corfu Declaration that the principle of a “qualified major-
ity” be adhered to, whatever that meant.7 In the end, the so-called Vidovdan 
Constitution was declared ratified. Yet from the start, these origins left the new 
state with a dangerous deficit in legitimacy that its opponents would condemn 
time and again from then on.
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In order to overcome internal divisions, the state propagated a unified, 
“tri-named” South Slavic nation. Unlike today, when the ethnic differences 
between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are no longer doubted, at that time the 
overwhelming majority of the intellectuals and the political elite believed 
these only to be the “tribes” of a single people. European experience inspired 
such views: the differences in cultures, religions, dialects, temperaments, and 
mentalities between Slovenes and Serbs did not seem any greater than those 
between Venetians and Neapolitans or between Bavarians and Prussians. If 
Italy and Germany had succeeded in creating a unified nation state with a high 
culture valid across regions and accepted by the populace, why shouldn’t this 
also be possible in Yugoslavia?
The theory of the “tri-named people” described the relationship between 
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs as being trinitarian, analogous to the biblical 
Trinity; certainly, it was thought, this would make things clear even to the 
uneducated classes. Notwithstanding what would later became political prac-
tice, the trinitarian idea implied at first that all three parts of the whole were of 
potentially equal standing; in fact, this was the original idea.8 A coat of arms 
for Yugoslavia represented this unitarism by combining national symbols from 
each of the historic regions and by stipulating the official state language to be 
“Serbo-Croato-Slovenian.” To demonstrate how deeply rooted the dynasty 
was in all parts of the country, King Alexander named his three sons Peter, 
Tomislav, and Andrej, each after a Serbian, a Croatian, and a Slovenian me-
dieval ruler, respectively. That it would not be easy to amalgamate the tribes 
into one Yugoslav nation was indeed obvious to the constitutional founders 
when they laid out plans in 1921 to promote a national consciousness in the 
spirit of national unity and religious tolerance.9
In reality, the situation was far more complicated than the new national 
ideology made it seem. Official statistics recorded only people’s native tongue 
and religious affiliation, not their nationality, which is why the composition of 
the population at the time is rather controversial. According to the calculations 
of the communists, who expressly opposed unitarism, about 39 percent of the 
population in 1924 were Serbs and Montenegrins, 24 percent Croats, 8.5 per-
cent Slovenes, 6.3 percent Bosnian Muslims, and 5.3 percent Macedonians or 
Bulgarians. In addition to these major nationalities were innumerable smaller 
ethnic groups. No one group was large enough to claim an obvious or even 
absolute majority.10
Even though the architects of this first Yugoslavia did acknowledge 
some measure of distinctiveness about Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims, and 
Macedonians, they did not accept them as “tribes” in their own right. No 
one represented their interests when the new state was constituted. Even the 
most ardent advocates of federalism from the Croatian Republican Peasant 
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Party at first only acknowledged Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, but considered 
Montenegrins, Muslims, and Macedonians to be “half-historical” entities 
whose affiliation to one of the three national peoples would have to be decided 
later.11 The communists were the only ones who recognized different nations 
and nationalities at the time.
The further course of events shows that at this point it was probably 
already too late to merge the various identities into a common Yugoslav one. 
Although the existing collective identities were varied and in part shifting, 
it was far from easy to simply give up long-standing affiliations with a com-
munity in favor of something new. Too dense were the networks of social 
communication and too diverse the interests and political cultures of these 
communities that this new construction of a nation, imposed on them “from 
above,” could have been met with widespread enthusiasm and acceptance. 
Apart from that, however, the concept of the three tribes left sufficient room 
for some measure of multiculturalism.
The Slovenes in particular proved to be dedicated supporters of the 
Kingdom of SHS, because they were allowed for the first time to cultivate and 
develop their own language and culture.12 Slovenian was finally recognized 
as an official state language; a university was founded in Ljubljana in 1919, 
followed by the Slovenian broadcasting system in 1928 and the Slovenian 
Academy for Arts and Sciences in 1938. Two of the state’s thirty-three ad-
ministrative districts (oblasti) covered the exact territory in which Slovenians 
lived. What is more, the Kingdom of SHS offered them protection against the 
overreaching territorial demands of Italy, which was pushing for hegemony 
in the Adriatic region. The clerical Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), by far the 
strongest Slovenian voice in the entire interwar period, opted for federalist 
solutions only in the early years. Under the charismatic leadership of Anton 
Korošec, who later became the prime minister of Yugoslavia, the party mu-
tated into a pillar of support for unitarism and centralism. Thus, it is a myth 
that the Slovenes always fought against being absorbed into Yugoslavia.13
The Bosnian Muslims also found a modus vivendi for coping with this 
new state, although they had been the people least committed to its founding. 
At this point no clear ethnic identity had yet evolved. Instead, people saw 
themselves primarily as part of a cultural and religious community. In 1920, 
the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) explicitly pledged its support of 
Yugoslavism in its program.14 The following year, it voted in favor of the 
constitution for a centralized state, once it had been assured that the autonomy 
of Muslim religious institutions would be guaranteed and that people would 
be compensated for the expropriation of their land in the course of agrarian 
reform. The ideology of a unified Yugoslavia shielded Muslim identity from 
the pressures of Serbian and Croatian assimilation and offered a niche in which 
to cultivate that specific historical and religious, prenational group identity 
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that — in the minds of Bosnian Muslims — only lacked a tribal label. This de-
veloped within a frame of reference, backed by Islam, which at the time did 
not inevitably imply either theological, ideological, or even an ethnonational 
affirmation. The Muslim elite were divided into four camps: pro-Croat, pro-
Serb, pro-Yugoslav, and pro-autonomy. No unified view of Muslim religious 
and ethnic identity yet existed. For the most part, the common folk remained 
unaffected by these political and intellectual debates.15
Far more problematic was the situation of the Macedonians, who already 
demonstrated a vivid awareness of their own clearly defined ethnic identity, de-
spite the fact that they were not acknowledged as being a tribe and had obviously 
been instrumentalized for Bulgaria’s revisionist aims. In the early 1920s, more 
than 1,600 armed rebels belonging to the extremely nationalist and pro-Bulgarian 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) carried out terrorist 
attacks against Serbian security forces and settlers. To counteract the irredenta, 
Yugoslav authorities started a ruthless policy of Serbianization. All things 
Bulgarian had to vanish from public life; the exarchal (Bulgarian) religious 
community was placed under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Thousands of political prisoners landed behind bars. Not until it was discovered 
that VMRO was planning a coup d’état in 1934 in Sofia did Bulgaria become 
willing to liquidate the underground organization and recognize the borders of 
Yugoslavia. The idea that Macedonians were a people in their own right, eligible 
for self-determination, and not merely an appendage of Bulgaria was a position 
embraced only by the leftists and communists in the mid-1920s and prompted 
them to call for a unified and independent Macedonia.16
Like the VMRO, armed Albanian rebels, the Kachaks, fought against 
annexation by Serbia in western Macedonia and in Kosovo. They were sup-
ported politically and militarily by the Kosovo Committee from Albania. In 
1918/1919, the Serbian army harshly suppressed rebels and civilians alike, 
and some of the fighters surrendered when an amnesty was granted in 1921. 
Yet things did not really quiet down until Albania ceased to back the rebels 
in 1923/1924. Even then, the Yugoslav state considered the approximately 
440,000 Albanians living within its borders as particularly unreliable citizens 
who needed to be assimilated. Entire libraries of pseudoscientific literature 
attempted to prove that the “Arnauts” were in fact Albanianized Serbs. Tens 
of thousands of Albanians and Turks emigrated.17
The “Croatian Question”
The icon of opposition against Serbian centralism was Stjepan Radić, the 
leader of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party and the spokesman for the 
Croat faction set up in parliament in 1921. During the phase of the country’s 
formation, he had railed against the unitary position of the Zagreb National 
Council, denounced the founding of the state as undemocratic, and boycotted 
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the constitutional assembly. His agitational stance was built on two pillars: 
the supposed illegitimacy of the Yugoslav state, as it had been founded, and 
the demand for a Croatian peasant republic, as he had already called for in 
November 1918. In May 1921, he submitted his own draft constitution in which 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were labeled as individual nations, each with its 
own claim to sovereignty. Once recognized as such, they would then found 
a federal state.18
The son of a peasant with a diploma from the Sorbonne and nostalgic for 
village life, Stjepan Radić was a man full of contradictions.19 Before 1918 he 
had preached the cause of unifying Serbs and Croats and even spent years 
in prison for his politics. Then he mutated into an unrelenting advocate of 
exclusively Croat interests. He raged against communism, only to beg for 
support shortly thereafter in Soviet Moscow. Although deeply religious, he 
hated the clergy and the church and was in the habit of starting off his ral-
lies by crying out: “Praised be Jesus and Mary — down with the priests!” 
Impulsive and charismatic, often demagogic, the gifted orator used his re-
markable whispery voice to enthuse the peasant masses for the Croatian cause. 
He dangerously enraged the Serbian political establishment and was viewed 
with skepticism abroad.
Once universal male suffrage was introduced in 1920, the extraordinary 
attractiveness of socially utopian agrarian ideology began to manifest itself. 
That year the Croatian Republican Peasant Party received the third largest 
mandate in the Kingdom of SHS with about 230,000 votes. Three years later 
the party garnered nearly a half million. Large-scale information and election 
campaigns mobilized thousands of new voters using catchwords like “peasant 
democracy,” “justice,” “sovereignty,” and “people.” The utopia of a unified, or-
ganic, and solidaristic national community bundled together all the aspirations 
and tribulations that worried the crisis-plagued peasants. Josip Smodlaka, a 
politician and lawyer, reported the following on the 1923 election in Zagora: 
“They even carried the gravely ill on stretchers for several hours in order not to 
lose a single vote. One saw something that had never been seen before: in the 
most remote and scattered mountain villages, 90 percent or more of the voters 
took part in the elections. . . . Never had these people ever been so enthusiastic 
and so unified at an election . . . as they were in this election for Radić.”20
Radić’s political program focused, for one, on the social problems of vil-
lage life and, for another, on the sovereignty of the Croat nation — topics that 
for him not only belonged together but were indivisibly linked. His argument 
was that only in a nationally unified, democratic peasant state would it be pos-
sible to ensure substantial participation by the third estate in state and society. 
Moreover, the vision of an egalitarian Croatian peasant republic made it easier 
for the rural population to identify with what they viewed as a bureaucratic 
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and exploitive state and its signum, urban embourgeoisement. It was only 
through the mass mobilization of the 1920s that Croatian national integration 
was achieved. Today Radić is revered as a pioneer for Croatian independence.
The national question, as expressed most stridently by the Croatian 
Republican Peasant Party, was driven by huge social, cultural, and economic 
disparities throughout the entire country. In 1921, the rural population made 
up 76 percent of the total population, but this figure varied from 63 percent 
in Slovenia to 86 percent in Montenegro. Every other person over the age of 
12 could not read or write, but in Slovenia this figure was less than 9 percent, 
while in Croatia and Slavonia it reached 32.2 percent, in Serbia 65.4 percent, 
and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia over 80 percent.21
Domestic politics were therefore inevitably overshadowed by tough, on-
going conflicts over the economy, monetary reform, and tax law, in which 
Croats and Slovenes felt they were being put at a structural disadvantage by 
Belgrade. The Croat economist Rudolf Bićanić complained that the former 
Austro-Hungarian region contributed more than 80 percent of the tax revenue 
while, at the same time, Serbia and Montenegro were awarded more than 70 
percent of the investments made in infrastructure.22
Serbs and Croats each harbored their own tacit arrogance. The Croat 
bourgeoisie indulged itself in a feeling of cultural superiority based on its 
affiliation with what was considered to be the superior Western civilization, 
compared with the barbaric East. The Serb political class derived what it be-
lieved to be unassailable claims to supremacy from its strong state tradition 
and its military successes in the First World War. Angered by the renitence 
of the Croats, who made demands alleged to be harmful if not hostile to the 
state and repeatedly boycotted parliamentary sessions, Serbs began in the 
mid-1920s to consider the idea of ridding themselves of the Croats through ter-
ritorial “amputation.” Wouldn’t a unified Greater Serbia be stronger in every 
way than the heterogeneous SHS state?23 King Alexander feared a bloodbath. 
Even Stjepan Radić recognized the danger: “We have intermingled to a degree 
that forces us to come to an agreement. . . . Not even through a civil war could 
we ‘cleanse’ every region if we do not want to mutually exterminate and fully 
annihilate one another.”24 Today his words sound like a grim prophecy.
The aspect that provoked the most acrimonious confrontations was the 
privileged position held by the Serbs in the government, military, bureaucracy, 
police, and many important societal areas. Of the 656 ministers who served 
the short-lived Yugoslav cabinets, 452 of them were Serbs, as opposed to only 
137 Croats, 49 Slovenes, and 18 Bosnian Muslims.25 In the army and govern-
ment administration, things did not look much different. Political practice 
discredited the concept of Yugoslav multicultural unity and alienated signif-
icant groups of people from their state.
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Domestically, the outcry expressed by the Peasant Party had a great im-
pact because the party further incited the national question by also referring 
to historical and cultural commonalities and socioeconomic interests shared 
by all Croat people. With such explosive topics as the unfair distribution of 
the tax burden, failed agrarian reform, and the Serb dominance throughout 
the entire country, it also jarred other population groups to feel collectively 
disadvantaged.26 “The Croatian question,” wrote Nova Evropa (New Europe) 
in 1936, represents “the symbol and synthesis of the fight against the overall 
unbearable situation (not only in a political and legal but also socioeconomic 
sense).”27 By referring to gravamens of a very principled nature, namely con-
stitutional order and justice, it posited the antithesis that the creation of the 
state was imperfect. Therein lay its legitimation and brisance.
The Structural Crisis of Parliamentarism
Before the First World War the protagonists of Yugoslavia had agreed on a 
constitutional monarchy as a compromise between the democratic premises 
of the emerging bourgeois intelligentsia and the traditionalism of conservative 
elites. The new order respected both the values of a liberal democracy and the 
rule of law. It guaranteed political pluralism, if only to a limited degree and 
for a certain period. Over time laws and regulations were passed that banned 
communist ideas and actvities, such as the so-called proclamation (Obznana) 
of 1920 and the Law for the Protection of the State of 1921.
Most political parties that participated in elections after 1918 could be 
classified as falling into the moderate bourgeois camp. With regard to their 
understanding of state and constitution, strange constellations resulted. The 
strongest party was the Democratic Party under the leadership of Svetozar 
Pribićević, a former Serb politician during the Habsburg rule who had cam-
paigned before 1918 for Serbo-Croatian cooperation. The party propagated 
an integral Yugoslav nation and a strong centralized democratic state. Its 
main competitor was the Radical Party led by Nikola Pašić, the long-serving 
prime minister of Serbia. The party leaned more toward the conservative na-
tional camp. The Yugoslav Muslim Organization and the Slovenian People’s 
Party also cultivated an ethnic veneer but were bourgeois and pro-Yugoslav. 
Only two political parties fundamentally opposed the system itself: the 
Croatian Republican Peasant Party, which was radical in its rejection of the 
monarchy, and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, founded in 1920 and 
dedicated to fighting for a democratic workers’ and peasants’ state based on 
the Soviet model.28
Similar to the situation in Germany and other countries, the election sys-
tem of proportional representation was conducive to the fragmentation of 
the political landscape. In 1925, there were forty-five parties, nearly all of 
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which represented specific ethnic and regional interests. They were known 
primarily by their leaders and only secondarily by their respective political 
programs. Publicly they usually took uncompromising stances toward their 
opponents or reluctantly formed instable coalitions. Changing alliances be-
tween parties, known as “blocs,” were formed time and again for elections, 
which resulted in chronically short-lived cabinets: by 1929, Belgrade had 
seen twenty-four cabinets come and go; by 1941 the number had risen to 
thirty-nine. Parliamentarism did not run in a smooth and orderly fashion but 
seemed instead to create instability and dysfunctional political structures, 
which undermined its acceptance.
For King Alexander the structural weaknesses of parliamentarism were 
all but inopportune because they provided him with far more leeway to make 
autocratic decisions and develop informal power relations outside the dem-
ocratic process. At the same time, the already precarious internal balance of 
power was also being undermined by the influential camarilla at court, the 
pro-dynastic secret army organization White Hand and a dense and clientelis-
tic entangled web of interests. In particular, the close relationship between the 
army and the king would hinder efficient parliamentary control.29
Nor did the civil rights and liberties guaranteed in the constitution count 
for much in practice since people could be brought to trial because of their po-
litical ideas and activities. Belgrade brandished an attitude of superiority and 
used police force to suppress certain oppositional activities. Time and again, 
leading functionaries and politicians of the democratic parties landed in prison 
on charges of alleged traitorous behavior. The dominant political culture was 
still one in which dissidents were seen as enemies and compromise was con-
sidered a weakness. It took the elites in the bureaucracy, military, church, 
and political parties a long time to understand that they could not govern the 
country simply at their own discretion and according to their self-made rules.
The system encouraged the existence and activities of nationalistic, even 
paramilitary and violence-prone groups. These included the athletic movement 
Sokol and the right-wing paramilitary Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists 
(ORJUNA) founded in Split, which worked to propagate the state ideology 
of a unitary state among the populace. Tens of thousands of veterans, both of 
the Austrian-Hungarian army and of the Serbian army, formed associations 
on the fault lines of the First World War. Old conflicts seemed to live on in 
their hearts and minds. Many could not be reconciled with the parliamentary 
system and would later, after the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, engage in 
ultranationalist organizations and resort to civil war.30
Much like the German free corps, organizations of Serb nationalist veter-
ans acted as the extended arm of the state security forces and violently attacked 
communists, separatists, and state enemies of all sorts. The ultraconservative 
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Chetniks (from četa, meaning band) were former fighters of irregular units 
that had battled since the nineteenth century for the liberation of Macedonia 
and in the First World War for Serbia. Their ranks were recruited from the 
Serb peasantry. The Chetniks did not cultivate an elaborate national ideology 
or run a stringent organization; instead they broke up into various, some-
times competing groups. The smallest common denominator among them 
was their view of themselves as patriots. They all cultivated typical symbols 
and rituals and commemorated the myth that the nation originated out of the 
wartime experiences on the front. Above all, they understood themselves to 
be a protective force against Serbian enemies, whatever the political color.31
In the eyes of the regime, the main enemies of the system were the com-
munists, who had become the third strongest faction in parliament after the 
first general election in November 1920 during the precarious socioeconomic 
postwar situation. In April 1919, the socialist and social democratic parties 
fused into the Socialist Workers’ Party of Yugoslavia, then in 1920 renamed 
themselves the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), in order to join the 
Communist International. Because it was very well organized and in many 
regions received help from the unions, the party succeeded in mobilizing 
about 200,000 voters from among the socially disenchanted and in winning 
12.4 percent of the votes.
The CPY denounced the SHS state as a product of Western imperialism, 
in which the Serb bourgeoisie took every liberty to repress the South Slavic 
peoples and exploit the working class.32 Obsessed with the “red peril,” the 
government banned all communist activities in December 1920 and annulled 
the mandates of all communist deputies. Following the assassination of inte-
rior minister Milorad Drašković in mid-1921, the Law for the Protection of 
the State forced the CPY deep into illegality. Party members were arrested, 
tortured, or driven out of the country, and the press was repressed. The polit-
buro fled into exile in Vienna, and party activities were transferred to the trade 
union movement or were organized underground. It is for this reason that the 
CPY played an insignificant role in domestic affairs during the 1920s. The size 
of its membership dwindled within three years to about 700 people. However, 
during this period communists set the main ideological course for the future 
takeover of power. The third party congress of the CPY in January 1924 ad-
dressed the national question for the first time by stating that Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes were three different peoples, just as the Bosnian Muslims, the 
Montenegrins, and the Macedonians each had their own individuality. The 
communists called for the right to self-determination for all peoples, including 
the Albanians in Kosovo. The founding of an independent republic for each 
nation was declared to be one of the aims of the revolutionary class conflict.33
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To sum up, the much-asserted fundamental ethnic conflict between Serbs 
and Croats as a result of allegedly deep-rooted historical, cultural, and atti-
tudinal differences does not adequately explain the Yugoslav problem in the 
interwar period.34 On the contrary, tactical calculations, ideological and po-
litical differences, and concrete economic interests contributed just as greatly 
to the internal destabilization of multiethnic Yugoslavia as did the national 
question. When it was politically opportune, then alliances between Serbs, 
Croats, and others, or between government and opposition worked very well. 
For example, Stjepan Radić underwent a spectacular change after he and other 
leaders from his party were arrested in January 1925. The occasion for the 
arrest was his trip to Moscow and his joining the Red Peasant International 
(Krest’intern), which the government interpreted as a treasonous act. Still, 
the Croatian Peasant Party was allowed to participate in the 1925 elections in 
exchange for its formal recognition of the constitution and the Serbian dynasty 
and its removal of the word “Republican” from its name. Radić decided to 
collaborate with the Radical Party and entered the government of Nikola Pašić 
as education minister in November 1925. At the same time, he still advocated 
the federalist reform of the state and publicly attacked his Serb colleagues in 
the cabinet, which led him to resign soon afterward in April 1926.
In November 1927, Radić changed course yet again. The Croatian Peasant 
Party and the Yugoslav Democratic Party, an oppositional party that sup-
ported an integral Yugoslavia and was led by the Serb Svetozar Pribićević, 
joined forces in what was called the Democratic Peasant Coalition against 
Belgrade centralism. After that, the government and the joint opposition were 
in constant and very antagonistic conflict. Peasant leader Radić resorted to a 
no-holds-barred polemic when condemning what he considered to be a police 
state and tax exploitation. “Heads will roll,” he once threw at the Serb radicals 
in one of the chaotic and aggressive sessions of parliament.
The streets also became enveloped in a climate of violence following 
the bloody police repression in May 1927 of demonstrations in Split, Zagreb, 
Ljubljana, and Belgrade against the ratification of the Treaty of Nettuno with 
Italy.35 The treaty had been signed in 1925, prompting a storm of outrage in 
parliament and from the public because, among other things, it regulated the 
rights of the Italian minority in the SHS state but not those of the Croat and 
Serb minorities in Italian Istria. It was attacked for abandoning Croat interests 
and for the concessions made to Italian fascism. Not until the summer of 1928 
was the treaty ratified.
Since his ascension to power in 1922, Mussolini had indeed been working 
to alter the postwar order and gradually to expand his sphere of influence in 
southeastern Europe and in the Adriatic region. However, Yugoslavia, France’s 
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protégé, stood in his way. In June 1927, he approved the shipment of arms and 
money to underground right-wing terrorist groups, on the condition that they 
fight against the South Slavic state, just as the Macedonian, Albanian, and 
Croat separatists were doing. Until the mid-1930s, Mussolini continued to sup-
port the idea of destroying Yugoslavia through subversive terrorist activity.36
In the early summer of 1928, parliamentarism in the Kingdom of SHS 
was on the verge of collapse. The domestic polemic, incited by the media, 
had become so virulent that parliament and the state apparatus were nearly 
paralyzed. The country found itself in a very serious national crisis, and the 
king feared that Radić would declare Croatia’s independence in July. It was 
apparent that the parliamentary system had failed to produce a basic consen-
sus on vital matters of domestic and foreign policy, which indicates that the 
national question was not the sole cause of the crisis.37 The SHS state suffered 
from symptoms similar to those of other democracies in the interwar period: 
instable political systems, authoritarian mindsets and the inability to com-
promise, precarious economic conditions, and aggressive revisionism with 
respect to the issue of national borders.38 However, one specifically Yugoslav 
problem was the chronic lack of legitimacy and a functional order in the cen-
trally governed, multiethnic state, which propelled and radicalized exclusive 
nationalisms. The crises and corruption permeating everyday political life 
and the climate of structural violence undermined trust in the transformative 
power of democracy and international law and discounted high-flying hopes 
for a just future. It was not a historical antagonism between Serbs and Croats 
that paralyzed the state, but a political system whose numerous weaknesses 
were the spark that enflamed this antagonism in the first place and then con-
tinued to fuel it.39
6.
The 1920s:  
Tradition and Change
“Extremes and contrasts are the most striking feature of Belgrade,” reported 
the journalist Lena Jovičić in the mid-1920s to her English readers. “You see 
opposing forces everywhere: in the streets, in the houses, in the lives of the 
people even. Side by side with the peasant in homespun clothes and sandaled 
feet walk smartly dressed people of the wealthier classes. The creaking ox-cart 
has the right of way alongside the luxurious limousine car. . . . Thus East meets 
West in a curious jumble, and in view of such extremes and contrasts you 
cannot but feel that there is a gap somewhere. The connecting link between 
the one and the other is missing, and so you constantly find that you suddenly 
drop into the gap.”1 No better description could be given of the contradictions 
found in the first decade after the war between tradition and change, back-
wardness and progress. While the larger cities were enjoying the amenities 
of the “golden twenties” and getting caught up the faster pace, transborder 
interconnections, and new mass culture of the times, large segments of the 
rural population continued to plod along in long-established ways and op-
pressive poverty. Although the “Janus-faced nature of modernity” manifested 
itself in all European societies, in the first Yugoslavia the two sides contrasted 
particularly sharply.
The Inflation Economy and the Postwar Economic Boom
Between the years 1912 and 1918, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia had 
found themselves, for all practical purposes, permanently at war. About one 
million people had been killed in the Yugoslav lands during the First World 
War, a fourth of whom died in Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia lost more than 
16 percent of its prewar population. In addition, hundreds of thousands were 
uprooted, crippled, or orphaned. The occupiers had plundered raw materials 
and livestock and destroyed infrastructure, factories, and mines. Once peace 
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had been achieved, the Yugoslav government demanded a stately sum of seven 
billion gold francs as reparations for the destruction done, the production and 
tax revenue lost, and for debt redemption — a sum that equaled about half of 
the total value of the Serbian economy before 1914.2
Like other European countries, the Yugoslav economy profited from the 
inflation economy that began in 1920. At first, things began to improve. As 
the country started to rebuild, demand and prices, as well as the public debt, 
increased. The reaction of the government was to print more and more money. 
By the end of 1923, the circulation of bank notes was eight times higher than 
it had been on the day of the currency reform in 1920. Monetary deprecia-
tion encouraged investment in tangibles and thus helped to spur investment. 
Thirty-one percent of all the factories that would be built in the interwar 
period and 40 percent of all the jobs that would be created appeared between 
1918 and 1923.3 However, this short boom went bust with the stabilization of 
the currency in 1925.
Soon afterward, the first signs of crisis in the agrarian sector became 
evident. Far more capacity had been created by the inflation economy than 
could be supported over the long run by the market economy in light of weak 
purchasing power. The economic upswing had only shortly camouflaged the 
more deep-seated problems of the agrarian society, and hopes for lasting re-
cuperation faded fast.
Thus the premise to modernize society and to catch up to Western Europe 
soon ran up against its inherent economic limitations. Due to growing fi-
nancial shortages, the young Yugoslav state was not able to master the curse 
of backwardness in a foreseeable future. Economic stagnation and the first 
signs of the major worldwide agrarian crisis considerably narrowed its policy 
options in the areas of taxation, investment, and development. Therefore, in 
addition to doubts about the political legitimacy of the new state came the fear 
that possibly it would not be in a position to fulfill the promises of progress 
and welfare it had made. This was one reason why visible cracks in the fragile 
political consensus began to show.
Population, Family, and Gender Relations
Few European countries entered the new era under such unfavorable condi-
tions as Yugoslavia did. The First World War had taken a toll on the population 
of about 1.9 million through death, fewer births, and migration — a severe set-
back for family, society, and the economy.4 However, the size of the population 
began to increase greatly starting in 1918, so that it had reached 15.6 million 
by the end of the 1930s from originally 12 million. In 1931, the birthrate in 
Yugoslavia was 34.6 babies per 1,000 inhabitants, whereas in Italy this figure 
only reached 25.8 and in Germany only 16.8 per 1,000 inhabitants.5 In the 
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patriarchal agrarian society, not only were children regarded as valuable labor, 
they also meant great personal fortune. This attitude did not change until the 
old social order broke down. Where the extended families fell apart, more 
people remained single, birth control was used, and there were more abortions.
The trends toward social change that had been evident in the nineteenth 
century now continued and accelerated. The extended family started to disap-
pear at a more rapid pace, and the types of family began to diversify greatly. 
There were villages in which the traditional zadruga and its strict regime of 
social relations remained primarily intact, and others in which the households 
split apart, and finally places where core families dominated. Households with 
sixty to eighty members coexisted with smaller ones of four to six members.6 
The expansion of the monetary and market economy, the shortage of land, and 
also new attitudes and values undermined the subsistence-oriented economy 
by which peasant families survived. As the zadruga disappeared throughout 
Yugoslavia, so too did the paramount authority of the father and the traditional 
solidarity with the group. New social relations geared toward economic benefit 
and individualist values prevailed. Generational and gender conflicts within 
families became quite common. Yet a number of extended families continued 
to exist even after the Second World War.
The new era offered both sexes more freedom, but also greater insecurity. 
Women were not on an equal footing with men either in the work world or 
before the law. They were not allowed to vote, for example, or become a judge. 
Common law, church law, and civil law withheld from women full contrac-
tual capability and subjected them to the authority of their fathers, spouses, 
brothers, or sons. Even as late as 1931, every second woman was illiterate.7 
A concept of the “new woman” similar to those found in industrial countries 
had not yet found acceptance overall. Only in the bigger cities like Ljubljana, 
Zagreb, and Belgrade did the image of the “modern girl” spread. The features 
of their emancipation and physical attractiveness — cosmetics, cigarettes, and 
fashion — came from the world of consumerism that was now popularized 
through advertising and film.
Therefore, the traditional role model did begin to change even outside the 
big cities. In the South Slavic countries as elsewhere in worn-torn societies, 
women had taken over important functions at home, on the farm, and in the 
urban working world, through which they enhanced their social status. In 
the urban environment, they retained their positions after the war, attended 
schools and universities, and fought for more political rights. With women 
making up 20 percent of the faculties, the academic milieu became a biotope 
for equality in gender relations and for a more liberal sexual morality, so much 
so that the use of the term “student marriage” gained currency.8 The emanci-
patory impetus manifested itself in external appearances: hairstyles, hemlines, 
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and marriages were becoming shorter, scoffed the comedian Branislav Nušić 
in jest.9 In the rural areas, however, the patriarchal order remained intact for 
a while. The war’s impact on demographics meant a shortage of marriageable 
men. In turn, this negatively affected the market value of young girls, who 
realized it was now imperative to have a dowry if they wanted to marry.
In no other aspect of life were the regional differences so great as in the 
relationship between men and women. In the villages of Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Macedonia, it was commonplace to treat women roughly and to humiliate 
them publicly. Such attitudes on female subordination to male authority and 
aggression were even reflected in commonplace expressions, such as that a 
man should “beat a woman and a horse every three days.”10 In places where the 
patriarchal authority was crumbling, females immediately gained greater re-
spect. There were areas in Yugoslavia where women lived in near enslavement 
and other areas where women, even though very poor, were shown respect and 
affectionate appreciation by men, as was the tradition in these communities. 
In certain regions, economic considerations stipulated exclusively who one 
would marry, while in others, such as among Bosnian Muslims, romantic 
and soulful love (sevdah) also counted in picking a partner. In many places, 
including villages, people even entered into “trial marriages.”11
Muslim men rarely had two or more wives, but the gender issue posed 
fundamental religious problems for the Islamic faithful. The writings of 
Bosnian scholar Dževad-beg Sulejmanpašić on the liberation of Muslim 
women prompted angry protest by traditionalists in 1918, and the publica-
tion was publicly burned in Sarajevo. At the end of the decade, modernizers 
founded the society “Reform” in order to work for the abolishment of the 
veil and the fez, which they saw as stigmatizing symbols of backwardness, 
while others revered them as an unchallengeable hallmark of their identity. In 
September 1928, a congress of Muslim intellectuals came up with a Solomonic 
solution: instead of insisting on banning the veil, people should press for 
school education for girls. It should be left to every woman to decide whether 
she wished to wear a veil or not. In Turkey, both the veil and the fez had been 
banned since 1922.12
Both in the cities and the villages, the decline of the traditional fam-
ily structure meant greater sexual freedom for those married and single, for 
women and men. Even divorce occurred more frequently and was now a topic 
in the press and publications. However, the new liberality was tolerated to 
different degrees across the country since, as the Croatian social anthropolo-
gist Vera Stein Ehrlich noted, “in one area a glance under the veil of a woman 
might prove so fateful that . . . [it could cause] a blood feud between tribes, 
while in another even the birth of an illegitimate child would be followed only 
by cynical remarks of . . . a chorus of malicious village voices.”13
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Housing, Nutrition, and Health in Rural Areas
Even though living circumstances differed from region to region, between 
the city and the countryside, and even among the various ethnic and religious 
milieus, one overarching fact was true everywhere: the great majority of the 
population spent their lives scraping by in indescribable poverty and under the 
most ghastly hygienic conditions. The situation was the worst in the so-called 
passive regions, meaning the poor and backward areas of Lika and Dalmatia, 
Herzegovina, western Bosnia, eastern and southern Serbia, and Montenegro. 
The crop harvests were so meager here that people starved in the winter of 
even the good years. No thought could be given to investing in agriculture or 
improving one’s house or farm in light of people’s precarious income situation.
One of the most severe problems in the Karst regions was a shortage of 
water. People often traveled for hours just to fill a canister at the next avail-
able well. The consequences of the water shortage were untenable hygienic 
conditions: “Washing clothes or scrubbing floors is of course quite out of the 
question. People stay dirty and houses unscrubbed as long as there is no water. 
Dirt breeds sickness. But what can be done? There is no water.”14
There were practically no baths to be found in villages and only rarely 
in the smaller cities.15 In addition to the water shortage, a government in-
quiry discovered a widespread ignorance among the populace concerning 
“the most elementary premises of hygiene.” The situation was the worst in 
the south, where the “cleanliness of one’s body and clothing . . . is not given 
any thought.” In fact, “there are women who last bathed just before their wed-
ding.” Therefore it should come as no surprise that there were many workers 
in the urban factory setting who also “are not at all familiar with cleanliness, 
washing themselves, sleeping in a bed, changing clothes regularly, who would 
rather lie on the floor or outside than in decent apartments.”16
Because they suffered from such oppressive poverty, the first area where 
peasants saved was their own nourishment. Their produce was sold at the 
market as much as possible in order to have money at least for taxes and the 
purchase of petroleum and salt. Corn porridge and bread were the mainstays of 
many peasants’ diets. “We are never full, we are always hungry,” said 40-year-
old Mujo from the Central Bosnian region of Bugojno to an ethnologist, who 
noted: “Nobody in the village is older than forty or fifty. Many people die in 
the spring when food is scarcest. The last time a physician visited them was 
23 years ago. The people cure themselves with various herbs and incantations. 
Many women die in childbirth, which takes place without any help whatso-
ever, often in the stable.”17
Preindustrial customs and traditions also hurt the general health of the 
population. Long periods of fasting of up to 194 days in a year alternated with 
phases of extreme overindulgence: “At the time when they are working the 
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fields . . . the peasants are the worst fed, eating usually bread or corn porridge 
with garlic, peppers, and vinegar. . . . In the winter months . . . [however] an 
alarmingly and unbelievably large amount is eaten. Nearly every dish is made 
with meat.”18 Once again the health experts complained about the prevailing 
ignorance: “Our peasant women . . . cannot cook . . . and often have no knowl-
edge about the most elementary rules of hygiene. Valuable parts of foodstuffs 
are wasted due to their ignorance.”19
Poverty, ignorance, and superstition were detrimental to the health of 
the general population. The mortality rate of mothers and infants was high; 
tuberculosis and alcoholism were widespread. Peasants distrusted doctors in 
order “not to agitate the illness.” They preferred to have a priest come by and 
quietly say a prayer, or, if that didn’t help, then to call the hodža — the Islamic 
instructor — or some herbwoman.20
In the 1920s and 1930s, living conditions gradually improved. In the 
poorer regions it was common that humans and livestock shared a single 
room. Only the wealthy built modern houses with floors and windows. More 
modern and more hygienic types of construction spread slowly. Stoves and 
beds began to furnish dwellings, but still conditions remained poor. In Croatia, 
three-fourths of the peasants in the 1930s still did not have their own bed, not 
even those better off. Instead, they slept on straw mats, sacks, or benches or 
on the bare floor. Everyone slept in the same room: men and women, old and 
young, married couples and singles. “Why have the peasants no beds of their 
own? . . . People have learned to live without beds; or, to be more exact, they 
have not yet learned to sleep in beds.”21
The low standard of living could not be attributed exclusively to poverty 
and ignorance. Often prosperous peasants did not live any better than their 
penniless neighbors. If someone had worked abroad, then “as soon as they 
return, local tradition overwhelms them so thoroughly that they are most re-
luctant to introduce any change for the better, even in small things, however 
intelligent they may be.”22
The Vicious Cycle of Poverty
Throughout the country, the market economy was expanding and thereby 
further spreading the new social and income structures. Property collectively 
owned by the villages was divided up. Starting in 1925, the prices for agricul-
tural produce fell as a consequence of a worldwide crisis in overproduction. 
Many families found themselves deep in debt and were forced to give up their 
property and work as wage laborers.23
Peasant families everywhere were caught in a vicious cycle of poverty 
because the increase in productivity did not keep in step with the demographic 
development. While the size of the population rose by 25 percent in the years 
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between 1920 and 1935, the amount of arable land increased by only 19 per-
cent during the same period. About 250 acres had to yield enough to feed 
52 people in Germany, 48 in France, 30 in England, and 114 in Yugoslavia. 
Measured against its productive farmland, the density of the country’s agrar-
ian population was the highest in all of Europe.24 In the early 1930s, yields 
and labor productivity were 31 percent and 57 percent, respectively, below 
the European average.25 The gap between population growth and economic 
growth continued to be wide.
These factors intensified a problem that was referred to at the time as 
“overpopulation” and today is described by social science with the more neu-
tral label of “underemployment.” In 1931, about 34 percent of Yugoslavia’s 
peasants owned less than five acres of land, another 34 percent owned five to 
twelve acres, 29 percent worked mid-size farms of up to fifty acres, and only 
a small minority of 3 percent had more than fifty acres.26 Compared with the 
European average of per capita production, over 61 percent of Yugoslavia’s 
agrarian population could not cover their daily expenses by working in agri-
culture. Apart from the size of the farms, what they lacked was knowledge, 
technology, and attitudes necessary to be able to use manpower efficiently.27 
The agrarian reform announced by the king on 6 January 1919 produced little 
relief. It dismantled the large estates, compensated the owners, and abolished 
all peasant dependencies on their former landlords. The reform was meant 
to satisfy certain national interests in addition to social ones. In Vojvodina, 
Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Slavic peasants and war veterans 
profited the most from the reform. Tens of thousands moved to the newly ac-
quired lands as colonists. More than five million acres were awarded to a total 
of nearly half a million families.28 In the postrevolutionary mood after the First 
World War, agrarian reform was politically unavoidable but economically not 
very successful. It strengthened the structure of small farm ownership and did 
little overall to increase agricultural productivity. In Kosovo and Macedonia, 
many colonists soon fled in fear of the recurring violent attacks by local rebels.29
Underemployment was evident in various ways. Since there was simply 
not enough to do on the many small farms that existed, people worked little 
and slowly, despite severe poverty. Researchers studying village life in the 
1930s discovered a glaring lack of useful work indoors and outdoors, so that 
“among peasants, most of the year passes in idleness or with unproductive 
activities ‘just to be doing something.’ ”30 In one household of four adults lo-
cated in the Serb community of Rakovica, they noted the following: “There 
were hardly any work days, 44.5 of 200, that is, a fifth. If we assume that 
household work and community work and trade also represent useful work, 
then it follows that, in 200 days, our household head only worked 75.7 [days] 
or a third of this time.”31 And this was certainly not the worst case.
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Approximately two-thirds of the agrarian population depended on supple-
mentary income from nonagricultural employment. By this time, there were 
actually more opportunities to earn money or wages. One could haul the (usu-
ally quite modest) surpluses with a donkey to the market or get hired as a side 
hand. “They will often travel a hundred kilometers or more . . . from Travnik 
to Jajce, from Bugojno to Split. . . . A peasant will go dozens of kilometers to 
sell the small quantity of maize or wool which his horse can carry.”32 Others 
walked for hours to earn a humiliatingly small but absolutely necessary extra 
income by working in a mine or factory.
Since an ever-growing number of peasant households supplemented their 
income with work away from their farm, a new type of dual agrarian-industrial 
family economy evolved and with it a new social class: the worker peasant. In 
1931, more than 90 percent of the agrarian population owned land, which is 
why few of them were willing to give up agriculture altogether, even though 
they earned extra income in industry and mining.33 The Yugoslav Social 
Ministry reported “that in Yugoslavia there is a constant stream of laborers 
coming and going from agriculture to industry and vice versa. What has 
developed from this is a new class of workers — we call them industrialized 
peasants — who are regularly employed in industry without having broken 
their ties to agriculture.”34 In 1929, more than half of the industrial workforce 
belonged to this agrarian-industrial hybrid.35 Throughout the entire interwar 
period, the industrial labor force remained deeply rooted in agriculture. Even 
in the 1950s few were in a position to say whether they identified themselves 
socially as peasants or as workers.36
Many people attempted to flee poverty by emigrating, especially the 
younger and better trained from the western parts of the country. Between 
1921 and 1939, approximately 200,000 men and women headed abroad.37 
However, emigration became increasingly difficult in the mid-1920s because 
the classic destinations, including the United States, issued rigid immigra-
tion quotas to protect their own labor market. For this reason, about 90,000 
migrants headed instead to continental Europe. At the same time, more and 
more countries sent foreign workers home again because of the economic 
crisis. Therefore, emigration brought little noticeable relief to the job market.
Industrialization and Social Change
Although the speed increased with which industrialization took place during 
the 1920s, Yugoslavia did not yet fully develop the typical characteristics of a 
modern society: the accelerated growth of the secondary and tertiary sectors, 
the dissemination of urban ways of life, and the self-propelling dynamics of 
science and technology. Even in 1931, only 11 percent of the population was 
employed in industry or artisan trades while 76 percent continued to live off 
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agriculture. From the days of the inflation economy until the year 1938, about 
145,000 industrial jobs were created — far too few to absorb the swelling army 
of jobseekers. Not until 1948 did Yugoslavia reach the point at which the size 
of the agrarian population began to shrink in absolute terms, something that 
had occurred in England already in 1820, in Germany in 1850, and in Italy in 
1920.38 There are a number of primarily structural reasons why industrializa-
tion did not advance faster than it did. Yugoslavia possessed rich deposits of 
coal and iron ore; significant reserves in copper, gold, silver, lead, and zinc; as 
well as chrome, manganese, and bauxite. However, it lacked the prerequisites 
to mine, transport, and further process these. For one thing, there was not 
enough electrical power. In 1934, the average energy consumption in Belgrade 
was 90 kilowatts per hour (kwh) per person, while in Budapest the figure was 
253 kwh and in Paris 367 kwh. The country had to export its raw materials for 
further processing, then turn around and reimport the resulting intermediate 
goods of iron and steel at high cost. Machines, tools, and technical plants 
were also imported at great expense to foreign currency reserves. Often buy-
ers would purchase used or outdated equipment because it was cheaper. Yet 
such outdated technology, combined with a shortage of skilled labor, a lack of 
credit, a high tax burden, and inefficient management contributed to the fact 
that Yugoslavia produced fewer and inferior goods at a greater expense than 
in western and central European countries.
Since Yugoslav goods were not competitive abroad, they had to be 
consumed at home. But demand in domestic markets was weak. For many 
peasants, industrial goods were simply unaffordable. Because the prices for 
agricultural products had been dropping since 1925 at a much faster rate than 
those for industrial products, the purchasing power of farmers shrank contin-
ually. So it proved illusionary to think of backwardness as a privilege, namely 
that developing countries could “spur” industrialism and accelerated growth 
by importing advanced scientific and industrial techniques.39
Despite it all, industry did begin to grow. Between 1919 and 1938, a total 
of 2,193 factories were built. The majority were erected in the first five years 
after unification: in Slovenia 47 percent, in Croatia and Slavonia 37 percent, in 
Serbia 24 percent, and in Macedonia and Kosovo 14 percent. These statistics 
also offer evidence of the disparity in regional development.40 The textile and 
food industries developed the best; they required little investment and needed 
low labor skills. At no point in the entire interwar period did Yugoslavia ex-
perience an industrial takeoff and structural change in industrial production 
from consumer to production goods.
What exactly was a factory? The commerce law of 1931 considered an 
industrial plant to be “any workshop or plant in which more than fifteen work-
ers are employed, if motor power is used, or twenty-five workers, if no motor 
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power is used,” which is why large artisan shops were included in the statis-
tics.41 Many industrial businesses were actually primitive workshops operating 
on little capital and with few machines. The majority of these were built “out 
of poor materials and do not conform to the most basic requirements of statics, 
hygiene, and fire protection,” complained the Ministry for Building. Others 
grew out of agriculture: “Very often the more prosperous peasants will erect 
a building or use one of their farm buildings, begin production with several 
workers who break hemp with wooden tools. Then they purchase an old lo-
comotive and a breaker, employ an ever-larger number of workers, and so 
emerges a factory step by step. Then comes machine after machine, the steam-
driven apparatus is replaced with a motorized machine, an ever-greater part of 
the work becomes mechanized . . . and suddenly the industrial plant exists.”42
Outside industry, new opportunities for wage employment were opening 
up, such as in agriculture and forestry, publishing, crafts, and household ser-
vice. In 1938, there were about 730,000 wage laborers, of whom only 240,000 
were employed in industry and 54,000 in mining.43 Until the end of the 1930s, 
this extreme heterogeneous Yugoslav workforce had not yet merged into a 
somewhat uniform proletarian class characterized by roughly similar inter-
ests, ways of life, customs, and values. A working class comparable to the 
industrialized West with its own organizations, forms of protest, and culture 
was just beginning to evolve.
At the start of the 1920s, every fifth person who was covered by national 
insurance was female. Ten years later it was every fourth. On average, women 
were younger, less qualified, and especially cheaper, which is why they pushed 
men out of the job market during periods of economic crisis. The same was 
true for children and youths, who found low-paid employment in factories, 
mines, workshops, cottage industries, and transport. In the mid-1920s, every 
tenth wage earner was under the age of 18. Although they were often officially 
taken on as apprentices, these minors were actually hired to do backbreaking 
work. It was common practice to work nights and Sundays and as many as 
sixteen hours a day.
As everywhere in Europe, the working class evolved out of migration 
and by acculturation to the new way of life dictated by the factory. Many 
jobseekers moved to the cities, where entire new neighborhoods sprang up 
in the 1920s. Between 1918 and 1941, Belgrade itself grew three times over 
from 110,000 to 350,000 inhabitants. “Overnight they hauled timber beams, 
pounded them into the ground, built a roof with cheap scrap wood, and covered 
it with old pieces of hole-punched tin pitchers, porcelain pots, billboards . . . 
instead of walls, wrapped [the dwelling] temporarily with tent canvases, [and 
then] carried in some battered oven.”44 Due to the acute lack of housing ev-
erywhere, even these huts were soon hopelessly overcrowded. Despite the 
crowdedness of the premises, every second worker household rent out places to 
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sleep to people who could not afford their own bed, often to several at a time. 
The wretched colonies of huts sprawled rampantly around all larger cities, and 
every morning a procession would commence from these huts into the city: 
“Hundreds of newspaper sellers, hawkers, washerwomen . . . leave their filthy 
and gloomy dwellings while it is still dark. Handymen, workers of all trades, 
day laborers, and the unskilled, the numerous doormen at law offices. . . . This 
entire army of workers . . . move daily in an early morning wave in the city.”45
Terrible living conditions prevailed in these miserable dwellings, where a 
mixture of the rural lower class, wandering petty traders, unskilled workers, 
and beggars were housed. In 1930, 48 percent of the working-class dwellings 
in Belgrade were damp, 69 percent had no sanitary facilities, and 87 percent 
were structurally unsafe. People lived with the smell of garbage and open 
sewers; children played amid trash and primitive outdoor toilets. Poverty and 
indescribable hygienic conditions greatly concerned city planners, but they 
lacked the financial means to extend the city’s systems of water pipes, canal-
ization, and street lighting.46
For quite a while, the urban newcomers ran their own clubs and societies 
and cultivated the traditional peasant lifestyle and customs. Only with a heavy 
heart did they part with these old habits and traditional peasant costumes. 
Gradually even the most sporadic factory work changed the way they lived 
and did business. Houses were not the only things to be modernized. Crop 
cultivation methods were intensified and more and more up-to-date equipment 
appeared. The hygiene, nourishment, and health of the population began to 
improve. Punctuality and discipline were accepted as virtues.
The Beginnings of the Social Welfare State
Like everywhere else in Europe, the state felt compelled to eradicate the worst 
social evils, and these were many. The costs to build drinking-water and sewage 
pipes, construct housing, and regulate the growth of cities seemed astronom-
ical, not to speak of the pending investment in education, medical care, and 
social insurance. Against this backdrop, one of the greatest achievements of this 
new state was the creation of a social welfare state. Prior to the First World War 
and under pressure from the labor movement, most European countries had al-
ready created the basis for insuring against illness, old-age poverty, and injury 
caused by workplace accidents. However, the South Slavic countries had only 
developed very rudimentary beginnings of public welfare and labor protection. 
Now, in this postwar era, the eight-hour day was introduced in Yugoslavia as 
elsewhere, child labor was forbidden, and a national social security system was 
developed. Between 1923 and 1939, the number of people covered by the social 
insurance scheme rose from 439,163 to 728,494 individuals.
The new social system was inadequate in many respects. As in most 
European countries, the Yugoslav social state limited itself at first to providing 
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health insurance strictly for industrial workers. The masses of those in 
need — rural laborers, servants, artisans, and domestic workers — were not 
covered. However, those who were insured received little more than symbolic 
medical and financial support. Other branches of social insurance like old-age, 
invalidity, and pensions for surviving dependents existed only on paper until 
the end of the 1930s.47 Despite such limited coverage, public budgets were 
utterly overwhelmed. As early as the mid-1920s, the insurance providers were 
already operating in the red, long before the Great Depression caused them 
nearly to fold completely.
The second pillar of the modern welfare state was legislation on indus-
trial safety. Yugoslavia adopted all of the relevant international conventions. 
Although the eight-hour workday had been law since 1919, in many regions 
people worked longer hours in unsuitable buildings and under unacceptable 
hygienic conditions, meaning no heat, light, fresh air, or sanitary facilities. 
Workshops operated without any safety precautions, were crammed with ma-
chinery, and were thoroughly overcrowded.
Why was the welfare state established belatedly in South Slavic countries, 
and why did it remain so deficient for so long? First, very few large industrial 
agglomerations existed, let alone a concentration of proletarian masses. So 
the social problem was not openly perceivable as such. Many people remained 
farmers and only worked in factories periodically or seasonally. The interests 
of this heterogeneous and fluctuating class were hard to organize and articulate 
through trade unions. For state welfare bureaucracies it was just as difficult to 
collect accurate statistics and to supervise this diffuse social class. Second, the 
low aggregate income of the population and the barely functioning taxation 
system limited the financial outlays that the national budget could afford. 
Third, the indigence existing in a predominantly rural environment was far 
less visible than in an industrial society. The village community and the ex-
tended family still provided for their elderly and sick. Therefore, at the time, 
proletarian poverty could hardly be distinguished from the needs of others, 
such as the rural lower classes. Fourth, outside of Slovenia and Croatia, the tra-
dition of church and communal welfare agencies was very weak, leaving little 
on which the state could have built. Not until the late 1930s when strikes were 
on the rise did the pressure significantly increase to improve the situation of 
workers. The statistics for 1937 listed 238 strikes involving 53,000 workers.48
International Exchange and the New Mass Culture
Those to profit from Yugoslavia’s entry into the international order after the 
First World War were educated urban dwellers. Cultural, scientific, and tech-
nological exchange rapidly developed and a number of innovations, cultural 
influences, and fashions swept across the country. Whereas those benefiting 
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from such transfer had been limited to a small circle of students, scientists, 
and politicians before the war, now more people were making contacts abroad. 
Cultural institutions and new networks of charitable, cultural, scientific, and 
bilateral friendship societies acted as the clearinghouses of exchange. The 
media — newspapers, radio, and the movies — opened up new worlds to a mass 
public. Modern role models changed taste preferences, lifestyles, fashions, 
consumption demand, and values.49
The elites had no doubts that Yugoslavia would be a part of European 
civilization, whereby they did not always look to the West. Intellectuals, sci-
entists, writers, musicians, and other artists located “Europe” anywhere they 
found interesting trends worth emulating. In addition to Paris, London, Berlin, 
and St. Petersburg/Leningrad, influences on style also emanated from Prague, 
Budapest, and Bucharest.50 This interaction is most obvious in modern ur-
ban architecture. Neobaroque, neorenaissance, neoclassical, and art nouveau 
buildings could be found next to those built in a historicizing Serbian national 
style, which was inspired by medieval Byzantine style. In the 1930s architec-
ture was further influenced by classic modernism, Bauhaus, and the Garden 
City movement. For this reason, the Italian writer Alberto Moravia thought of 
Belgrade after the Second World War as a synthesis of several metropolises.51
Urban cultural life was also cosmopolitan with strong inclinations to-
ward France, Great Britain, and Germany — in part the result of changing 
political alliances in the interwar period. American influences also had an 
impact. German and Austrian musicians, conductors, and directors often 
performed on the theater stages of Yugoslavia’s major cities, exhibitions of 
European art were shown, and foreign literature was translated and published. 
In turn, Yugoslav orchestras and artists performed abroad. The magazine 
Nova Literatura (New literature) impressively illustrates this multifaceted in-
terconnectedness. Among those on its editorial staff of thirty-five were Albert 
Einstein, Maxim Gorky, George Grosz, Sergei Eisenstein, Hugo Kersten, and 
Upton Sinclair.52
Czechoslovakia was particularly attractive. The writings of the country’s 
highly revered founder, Masaryk, had inspired the pioneers and protago-
nists of Yugoslavia. Not only architects, musicians, and artists viewed the 
avant-garde in Prague as an important cultural compass, conservative and 
nationalist-oriented circles also greatly admired the Slavic “brother country.” 
In bourgeois circles, Russia was no longer looked upon as the center of pan-
Slavic solidarity following the Bolshevik revolution. Travelers, students, and 
teachers now identified with an idealized “Slavic modernity,” in which emo-
tionality and rationality appeared to have organically coalesced.53
In particular, the literary and artistic avant-garde understood itself as 
part of a European and worldwide cultural scene. Preceded by the aesthetics 
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of impressionism, symbolism, and art nouveau, classic modernism devel-
oped new experimental and eccentric styles such as expressionism, cubism, 
Dadaism, and surrealism.54 As in other countries, the trauma of the war 
stimulated provocative art forms, which were offered a forum in magazines 
like Mladina (Youth), Svetokret (World-turn), Plamen (Flame), Zenit, and 
Dada Jazz. Writers developed societal utopias like The New Age (Dimitrije 
Mitrinović) or cosmopolitanism (Miroslav Krleža).55
Intellectuals sought to make an original contribution to European civ-
ilization that reflected their own identity, expressed in the form of popular, 
romantic, socially critical, and realistic literature.56 However, this contribution 
was also made in the form of experimental, provocative, subversive, and an-
archistic texts, manifestos, collages, and films. For example, the avant-garde 
Zenitism of Ljubomir Micić propagated the “Balkanization of Europe” in 
which the direction of the civilizing mission was reversed. Cultural prog-
ress was not to spread from West to East, but vice versa, from the Orient 
to the Occident. His utopian figure “Barbarogenius” embodied the Balkan 
“anti-Europe,” the opposite of that old and decadent continent that lacked an 
identity and had blanketed the world with unbounded force.57
While avant-garde art remained a noteworthy but elitist phenomenon, the 
broader public in the cities came into contact with modern Anglo-Saxon mass 
culture. The proliferation of newspapers and magazines alone from 1,245 to 
1,939 contributed greatly to this. Radio was also coming into its own, even 
though only 4 percent of the population could be reached by radio during this 
decade. Still, between the years 1929 and 1938, the number of radio receivers 
rose from 19,270 to 86,060 as more and more people were able to afford one. 
Television did not exist until after the Second World War.58
Like everywhere else in Europe, cinema established itself as an essen-
tial medium of entertainment; here the public watched American, German, 
and domestic productions. As of 1939, Yugoslavia had imported about 500 
American films.59 Not only were popular adventure, crime, romance, and en-
tertainment movies shown, but also artistic films by Ernst Lubitsch, Friedrich 
Wilhelm Murnau, Fritz Lang, Sergei Eisenstein, and Man Ray. Politics also 
made use of this new medium to disseminate information, election campaign 
rhetoric, and propaganda.60
Photos, posters, and advertisements contributed notably to the change in 
popular taste and dress. The styles from Vienna and Budapest, so widely worn 
before the war, now seemed old-fashioned. Smartly dressed women preferred 
the latest Paris collections, featuring short skirts and high heels, while elegant 
men wore English-style tweed suits and Anthony Eden hats. Special shops and 
department stores for ready-made clothing opened for business.61
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American and British influences on popular mass culture had the most 
lasting impact. Major sporting events, especially soccer, handball, and box-
ing, aroused new passions and shaped social identities. Following a visit to 
Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, a group of women students introduced the 
popular handball game hazena that they had discovered there. Soon it became 
the most popular women’s sport in the entire country.62
Movies, jazz, nightclubs, variety shows, and bars changed the way peo-
ple spent their leisure time. In addition to the polka and the waltz, people 
at parties now danced the Charleston, foxtrot, and tango. Comic series and 
films introduced Yugoslavs to Mickey Mouse, Felix the Cat, and Tim Taylor. 
Popular comics were adapted culturally to illustrate the life history of famous 
historical figures, such as Saint Sava or Tomáš Masaryk.63
Outside of the cities and larger towns, in which only a fifth of the popu-
lation then lived, foreign cultural influences were slow to reach people. Few 
individuals had ever even left their home region, many could not read or 
write, and unlike in other Western countries, travel was something under-
taken only by a very small educated class. At best, men became acquainted 
with other parts of the country through their military service. Modern mass 
tourism did not yet exist. Still, the first travel office, Putnik, opened in 
Belgrade in 1923.
Despite the increasing domestic and transnational contact and commu-
nication, the broad masses still considered the Western lifestyle an abstract 
entity. They remained faithful to their customs and religions, and the symbols, 
interpretive frames of reference, and values indelibly connected with them. 
These were the indisputable anchors of daily cultural life. The strength of 
these ties to community is demonstrated by the fact that in 1918 about 60 
percent of all Yugoslavs dressed in their respective traditional costumes, the 
cult, color, and ornamentation of which indicated their regional origin, marital 
status, religion, and ethnic group.64
The Politicization of Religious Milieus
Throughout the entire interwar period, religious affiliation played a major 
role in political, cultural, and social life. It constituted the most important 
milieu of people’s lives and was at the same time the most distinctive cri-
teria to demarcate between the various ethnic collectives. According to the 
1921 census, 46.67 percent of the Yugoslavs were Orthodox (especially Serbs, 
Macedonians, and Montenegrins), 39.29 percent were Catholic (Slovenes and 
Croats), 11.22 percent were Muslim (Bosniaks, Albanians, and Turks), 1.91 
percent were Protestant, and 0.54 percent were Jewish.65 No one religion 
clearly dominated.
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The liberal Vidovdan constitution from 1921 guaranteed the separation 
between church and state, freedom of conscience, and equality among all 
recognized religious communities. Inherent to Yugoslavism were religious 
neutrality and anticlericalism, not only a result of the Enlightenment-inspired 
ideas from which it had grown but also a result of its progressive focus on the 
future and its dictate of tolerance as strategic factors to ensure the survival 
of the multiethnic state.
Despite the formal equality within the Kingdom of SHS, the Catholic and 
Orthodox churches once again found themselves in different roles. For the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, the aim of the national and canonical unification 
of all Serbs into one state had been fulfilled. The patriarchate created in 1920 
combined the divergent Orthodox areas of jurisdiction into a single church 
hierarchy which was de facto subordinate to the state. Yet even though it was 
no longer the official state church, as it had been before the war, the Orthodox 
Church was still very closely linked to the monarchy.
Since Orthodox Yugoslavs made up the relative majority in the country, 
the Catholic Church feared for its position, not without reason. Catholicism 
was universal, not genuinely Slavic, and was subordinate hierarchically to 
the Vatican, which had spoken out in favor of an independent Slovenia and 
Croatia. For this reason, the church was under general suspicion in Serbia. 
Despite great reservations, the church had decided by and large in 1918 to be 
loyal to the new Yugoslav course. Unlike Archbishop of Sarajevo Josip Stadler, 
many did adopt a pro-Yugoslav stance, including the Zagreb archbishop, the 
Franciscans, and the ranks of political Catholicism.66
The secular Kingdom of SHS stipulated by law the legal position 
and self-administration of the four recognized religious communities of 
Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Islam, and Judaism. It prompted a storm of protest 
and resistance by church officials when it banned the misuse of clerical author-
ity for political aims, established civil marriage, and assumed supervision of 
school education. Starting with the state’s founding, a creeping politicization 
and radicalization of the religious communities became visible, which later, 
in the 1930s, led to a dangerous connection between the clergy and extremely 
nationalist parties and movements. Ivo Andrić described the precarious mul-
tireligious coexistence of 1920:
Anyone who spends one night in Sarajevo sleepless on his bed, can hear 
the strange voices of the Sarajevo night. Heavy but steady strikes the 
clock on the Catholic Cathedral: it is 2 a.m. More than one minute will 
pass (exactly seventy-five seconds, I counted) and only then will the 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church announce itself. It strikes its 2 a.m. 
A while after, with hoarse faraway voice the Sahat Tower near Beg’s 
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Mosque declares itself. It strikes eleven times, the eleven ghostly Turkish 
hours, according to some strange alien part of the world. . . . And thus 
even during the night, when everybody is asleep, in this counting of the 
hours in the dead part of the night, the difference which divides these 
sleeping beings has been emphasized. . . . And this difference, some-
times openly and visibly, sometimes invisibly and basely, approaches 
hatred, often identifying with it.67
For historical reasons, religious community officials saw themselves as 
the natural, God-given trustees guarding the interests of “their” faithful, which 
is why it was customary to use churches and mosques for political events.68 
In the minds of the greater part of the population, no distinction was made 
between nationality and religion: the majority of Serbs were Orthodox, Croats 
Catholic, and the Bosnian Muslims were just that, Muslims: “Everything that 
has to do with religion also simultaneously has to do with nationality, and 
everything national is simultaneously religious,” stated one observer in 1920.69
Although premodern attitudes toward church and religion survived in 
many regions, new links between groups had been evolving since the turn 
of the century because of increasing social transformation and the develop-
ment of a broader church infrastructure that included schools, societies, and 
publications. Religious communities functioned as both social and religious 
milieus, meaning that they were influenced not only by faith but also by shared 
socioeconomic interests, ethnic and cultural identities, values and attitudes, 
and the congruence of ethos and sentiment. It was in this framework that con-
tacts were made and networks created, that guidance was sought and spiritual 
comfort found. The community thus created a truly tangible alternative to 
the distant, foreign, and sometimes hostilely viewed state. With the portent 
of increasing politicization, more and more of the faithful viewed religion as 
an obvious ethnic attribute with which they could identify and distinguish 
themselves from others; this also influenced the direction of national politics 
and, in part, ideological convictions.70 The religious-social milieus cultivated 
their own symbols and rituals, holidays and commemorations, semantics and 
historical images that circumvented those of the state every day. This explains 
the persistent resistance to the Yugoslav national ideology and the phenomenal 
success of the ethnic-bloc parties as compared with supranational political 
movements.
The sociocultural practice of Yugoslavism was polyvalent and could 
evoke both a Yugoslav identity as well as exclusively national or regional tra-
ditions. Historical events, popular culture, and myths could be incorporated 
into either one of the constructions of identity. For example, the monumental 
sculpture erected in Split in 1929 of Bishop Gregory of Nin, the work of the 
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sculptor Meštrović, could have represented national Croat or all-Yugoslav his-
tory, depending on the perception of the observer. The churchman, who had 
defended the Slavic-Glagolitic liturgy in the tenth century against the pressure 
coming from Catholic Rome, could be commemorated as an early protagonist 
of Croatian independence as well as a symbol of South Slavic pre-schismatic 
unity. The depiction, interpretation, and perception of one’s own history, even 
of that of the nation itself, could serve thoroughly different needs.71
When all ethnic organizations were banned in 1929, the political confron-
tations over questions of nationality shifted all the more clearly to the religious 
communities. Popes and priests were considered to be people of authority in 
the village community, especially when they could read and write. They were 
opinion makers for a public that was still greatly influenced by verbal commu-
nication and personal relations, even though modern mass media was reaching 
them. In 1932, the pro-Yugoslav politician Svetozar Pribićević complained: 
“Since 1918 . . . one has never heard from the mouth of the Patriarch something 
about questions of faith and church, about the relationship of man to God, 
about brotherly love, . . . only ever about questions of a national or political 
nature. . . . He emphasizes the double-headed eagle, the powerful king, the 
blood spilled on battlefields, the war sacrifices — in a word, everything that 
serves extreme nationalism.”72 The more the semantics of religion became im-
bued with political agendas, the more outright became the solidarity between 
religious leaders and politics.
The question of religion was posed in a somewhat different light for 
Muslims. Until 1878, the two main pillars of Bosnian identity had been mu-
tually supportive: on the one side was the special administrative position of 
being an Ottoman province and on the other was the identification with a 
worldwide, religiously tolerant Islam. In the age of nationalism, however, mat-
ters involving territory, religion, and ethnicity became increasingly conflictual 
in regions inhabited by Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. How should, how could 
Bosnian Muslim identity be defined? The Bosnian elite remained divided. 
Some spoke out in favor of “nationalizing” Muslims. If certain old customs 
were to be abandoned, like the veiling of women and the religious schools, this 
would help the community embrace “healthy reason and the zeitgeist,” as one 
Bosnian scholar expressed it in a tract on Muslim progress.73 Others propa-
gated the laicistic, political bošnjaštvo (Bosniakhood) as proof of the historical 
individuality and ethnic identity of their people. Contrary to an older version 
from the Austro-Hungarian era, this concept was now reserved exclusively 
for Muslims, who were understood as a tribe of their own. Historical causes 
were said to be the only reason why this tribe was bestowed with a religious 
name instead of an ethnic one.
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To many others, the next logical step to solving religious-regional con-
flict over identity then seemed to be a clear conviction to supranational 
communism, that is, the transference of the trend toward secularization into 
fundamental atheist attitudes. The only ones to unequivocally presume the 
existence of a distinct Bosniak national identity were the Marxist intellectuals 
associated with the Zagreb magazine Putokaz (Signpost) in the late 1930s.
Regardless of the direction each proposed reform took, they shared one 
common feature: all strove to strengthen the ethnic spirit and national char-
acter of Slavic Muslims and an appreciation for their homeland.
7.
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia  
(1929 to 1941)
The Royal Dictatorship
On the morning of 20 June 1928, Stjepan Radić appeared at the opening 
session of parliament. Although public confrontations in the preceding days 
had escalated to the point of murder threats, this consummate politician threw 
caution to the wind. One of the first people to speak that morning was Puniša 
Račić, a member of parliament for the Radical Party from Montenegro. Quite 
unexpectedly he found himself in a heated debate with the colleagues from 
the opposition. The president of the parliament was trying valiantly but un-
successfully to restore order when Račić suddenly pulled out his pistol and 
shot in the direction of the Croatian Peasant Party faction. Two members 
of parliament died immediately; two others were wounded. Radić, who had 
been shot in the stomach, died in August of complications. The assassination 
marked the tragic culmination of the domestic crisis that had been fatefully 
escalating since 1927. It turned Radić into a martyr, welded together Croat 
national politics, and provided the Peasant Party with enormous political cap-
ital. However, Yugoslav democracy had shattered, and the king declared a 
state of emergency.
On 6 January 1929, King Alexander dissolved the parliament, abolished 
the constitution, and installed himself as a dictator in his effort to create 
Yugoslav unity. All ethnic or religious parties and organizations were banned 
and politicians from the opposition arrested. Ten months later, on 3 October, 
the country was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. A new administrative 
structure was introduced in which the country was divided into nine regions, 
similar to French départements, each of which was named after a river: Drava, 
Sava, Vrbas, Littoral, Drina, Zeta, Danube, Morava, and Vardar. In six of these 
nine administrative regions, known as banovine, the majority of the populace 
was Serb. The royal dictatorship aimed to unify the people and the state into 
one nation and thus finally create an integral Yugoslav identity.
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The new system of government reflected the trend toward powerful exec-
utives and authoritarian regimes that had been threatening parliamentarianism 
since Mussolini’s ascension to power in 1922. Of the twenty-eight European 
democracies existing after 1918, only eleven were still in existence in 1939.1 At 
the same time, the model of royal dictatorship that was established not only in 
Yugoslavia but also in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania differed qualitatively 
from that of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. First, Alexander’s regime did not 
resort to a totalitarian ideology, a one-party state, although it also used mass 
mobilization. Second, the king’s regime was supported by the older elites in 
the bureaucracy, church, and military and by traditional forms of legitimation, 
first and foremost the monarch’s charisma. Third, it sought to achieve national 
unity by restoring conservative values and a patriarchal culture, not through 
revolutionary social change. All things tried and true were to be upheld, not 
toppled. It was a pitiful attempt to overcome the internal fissures that had 
been created by parliamentarism and socioeconomic conflicts, especially by 
the lack of consensus over the constitution within the political class. However, 
instead of bestowing domestic peace and uniting the nation, the introduction 
of dictatorship ruptured the country all the more.2
During the royal dictatorship, the country’s unity became its chief pri-
ority. King Alexander juxtaposed “tribalism” with Yugoslav “nationalism” 
in order to overcome internal divisions of different kinds. The regime used 
draconian royal decrees and the state’s security apparatus to implement na-
tional and state unity by dictatorial means. Basic civil rights such as freedom 
of expression and freedom of association were suspended.3
The regime also undertook a great effort to standardize school curric-
ulums in order to establish integral Yugoslavism in the educational system. 
Similar efforts tried to infuse unity into the army and athletic clubs.4 Using new 
ways to disseminate information through the press, propaganda, film, science, 
and culture, the regime sought to reinforce the idea of a Yugoslav nation. The 
Belgrade magazine Pravda (Truth) started an inquiry on “creating a Yugoslav 
mentality”; as late as 1939, the publication “Characterology of Yugoslavs” 
tried to make a case that culturally the various tribes were truly one peo-
ple.5 In order to encourage patriotism, radio stations in Belgrade, Zagreb, and 
Ljubljana started in 1938 to broadcast programs called the “National Hour” 
about things to know from all parts of the country. These programs were mod-
eled after the German example. One-sided nationalistic material, including 
Serb, was forbidden. Despite it all, representations of national unity in a multi-
national state remained ambivalent, and the country’s internal diversity could 
never be made to disappear completely. This is illustrated by the monument 
dedicated to the unknown soldier, located atop Mount Avala near Belgrade. 
While Germania and Marianne serve as the sole allegory to represent their 
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respective countries of Germany and France, eight female figures depicted in 
various traditional folk costumes were necessary to symbolize multicultural 
Yugoslavia at this monument.6
It soon became clear that the king’s dictatorial rule would not be able 
to solve the multifaceted problems of the country. On 3 September 1931, the 
monarch imposed a new pseudodemocratic constitution on the country, in 
which he gave himself the right to appoint as many as half of the representa-
tives to one of the two chambers of parliament. That same year the Yugoslav 
Radical Peasants’ Democracy was founded (known as of 1933 as the Yugoslav 
National Party). This was a hodgepodge of various parties and politicians 
close to the regime who organized themselves under the banner of integral 
Yugoslavism. Associations and organizations of ethnic, regional, and religious 
nature remained banned.
The king’s attempt to win support for the Yugoslav Radical Peasants’ 
Democracy from members of the banned political parties failed. Instead, 
republican forces lashed out with a counterattack. In November 1932, the 
Democratic Peasant Coalition, an oppositional coalition of Serbs and Croats, 
demanded the reintroduction of parliamentarism and a federal restructuring 
of the state. A massive wave of protest engulfed the country. Leading politi-
cians from the opposition were arrested, including Svetozar Pribićević, a Serb 
from Croatia, the Croat Vladko Maček, the Muslim Mehmed Spaho, and the 
Slovene Anton Korošec. Amid this upheaval, it was only a matter of time 
before the dissimilar opponents of the regime agreed on a common platform. 
This did indeed occur in the elections of May 1935 and December 1938, when 
Serb, Slovene, Croat, and Muslim parties joined forces to present a joint list 
as the “unified opposition” against the government.
On 9 October 1934, the day that Alexander set sail for Marseille on an 
official visit to France, the king was fully aware that his imposed integration 
had failed. Yet his solution to the Serb-Croat problem that had been announced 
as forthcoming died with him on the streets of Marseille in the assassination 
attack that also killed his host, French foreign minister Louis Barthou. Since 
Alexander’s son and heir to the throne was underage, Prince Regent Paul 
governed the country during the minority of King Peter II.7
The Great Depression
As was happening all over Europe, Yugoslavia was impacted by the severe 
economic and social ruptures that cracked open when the Great Depression 
hit. The full force of the shockwaves did not reach Southeast Europe until 
mid-1930 and thus somewhat later than in the industrial nations. But when the 
depression reached Yugoslavia, the consequences were all the more disastrous. 
As a result of worldwide overproduction, grain prices on international markets 
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had already begun to fall in 1926. Now they dropped sharply, plunging first 
the agrarian sector into ruin and shortly thereafter the entire Yugoslav econ-
omy. Since the industrial nations used protectionism in an attempt to ward off 
cheap imports, Southeast Europe lost its most important markets. Within a 
few months, the foreign trade volume, wages and incomes, domestic demand, 
and industrial production had plummeted.
The Great Depression hit the agrarian countries of Southeast Europe 
harder and longer than it did the industrial nations, because it cumulatively 
intensified all of the structural problems that had continually plagued their 
economies. In 1932, the value of Yugoslavia’s foreign trade, which was based 
primarily on corn, wheat, and other agricultural products, fell by about 70 per-
cent from what it had been in 1929.8 At the same time, the terms of trade 
worsened because prices for agricultural products sank faster than those for 
industrial goods, which threw the balance of payment severely out of whack. 
Yugoslavia had to sell its agricultural goods and raw materials cheaply but 
purchase finished goods at disproportionately expensive prices. When more 
and more European banks called back their loans in 1931, the National Bank 
was threatened with insolvency. Out of its concern for inflation, Yugoslavia 
had pursued a strict stability course and refrained from credit-financed in-
vestments, as had many other countries. First private demand and then public 
demand stagnated, which paralyzed the economy and caused unemployment 
to rise. Not until years later did the government shift to an anticyclical fiscal 
policy. The depression did not bottom out until 1934, much later than in West 
European countries. By the time the Second World War broke out, the standard 
of living had still not reached that of 1920.
The biggest losers of the Great Depression were the peasants. Not only did 
they sell fewer and fewer goods on the markets, but the prices for their produce 
also sank. Despite the government’s intervention measures, poverty increased. 
Between 1925 and 1933, the income of an average peasant family dropped by 
two thirds. In 1934, wholesale agricultural products were only worth half of 
what they had been in 1926.9 The price gap between agricultural and industrial 
goods widened alarmingly. “There are hundreds of farmers for whom a cig-
arette has become a luxury, and the purchase of a liter [of] gas to light up the 
house is no less than a veritable sensation.”10 The only way for farmers to save 
themselves was to take out loans and thus to put themselves deeply into debt.
The hidden unemployment in rural areas now emerged from the shadows 
to become quite visible. An increasing number of people pushed their way into 
the cities in search of a way to earn what they needed to survive. But industry 
and trade did not grow fast enough to absorb all of the migrants. Between 1930 
and 1939, the number of registered jobseekers rose from 150,000 to 651,000. 
At the same time, short-term and seasonal work expanded. In order to lower 
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wage costs, it was becoming increasingly common for entrepreneurs to replace 
male workers with women and children, particularly girls. Between 1933 and 
1935 the number of socially insured adults rose by 8.5 percent, while that of 
minors increased by 28 percent. For skilled workers and academics, it was 
nearly impossible to find a job.11
Many entrepreneurs cut wages. Between 1930 and 1935 the average daily 
wage fell by about 20 percent. The cutbacks were the largest in those branches 
of industry in which many unskilled workers and peasants worked. At the 
same time, there were significant regional differences. In Slovenia wages fell 
by 18 percent between 1930 and 1934, in Croatia by 25 percent, and in Serbia 
by 41 percent, so that the depression also enhanced the existing socioeconomic 
disparities between the regions. All in all, the incomes of those employed in 
Yugoslavia shrank during the crisis by more than 70 percent.12
The fledgling Yugoslav welfare state was completely overtaxed by the 
aggravated social situation. Since only a small percentage of the unemployed 
were entitled to benefits, the government helped by distributing food. Yet 
with every passing day the army of poor, sick, and hungry grew larger. Many 
remained dependent on charity facilities or had to find some other way to earn 
a bit more. The poverty took on untold proportions during the crisis years. 
The majority of jobseekers survived only under the most pitiful conditions. 
They lived in huts amid catastrophic hygienic conditions. Many did not even 
have a roof over their heads, shared a bed with others, and wandered homeless 
through the city.13
More and more people took to the road. Rumors of possible opportunities 
for work spread quickly by word of mouth. Jobseekers moved in packs from 
place to place and hung around in waiting rooms of labor offices and on the 
streets. This mobile labor force was absolutely bereft of means: “Unkempt, 
filthy, tattered, and barefoot, they aroused distrust with ever step, and therefore 
it was very seldom that someone decided to hire them.”14 Belgrade had to cope 
not only with migrating masses from southern and eastern Serbia but also with 
the storm of destitute people arriving from Lika, Dalmatia, and Bosnia. Many 
became homeless: “They sleep in basements, attics, sheds in unfinished and 
half-deserted buildings. . . . Several sleep together in rooms that are not large 
enough for a single person,” reported the social agencies and organizations as 
early as 1929.15 As the crisis deepened, the number multiplied of those who had 
to resort to jobs that could barely keep them alive: “There is an entire army of 
a category of people who wander through the streets and cafes day and night 
and sell shoestrings, cigarettes, almonds, sugared fruit, razor blades, toys . . . 
postcards, and other snick-snack. They have to beg for twenty kilometers in 
order to earn five dinars (if even that).”16 Others drifted into petty crime like 
smuggling, known as šverc, or prostitution.
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In the 1930s, urban destitution on a massive scale was a daily experience 
for many people. Each day one saw “many children on the street, children 
living without a thought for tomorrow, children of whom no one can say what 
they live from or what they do, where they sleep or what they eat.”17 “We 
questioned several of these unlucky little things. . . . The majority only had 
one passionate desire — to be able to eat once to their heart’s content.”18
The Great Depression radicalized internal tensions — be they of a so-
cial or ethnopolitical nature — intensified the lack of prospects, narrowed the 
leeway for political action, and endangered what was already a precarious 
compromise among elites. The experience of crisis day in, day out, led many 
to question the credibility of a political system that, in the face of such exis-
tential concerns, was proving incapable to cope with the crisis and thus tried 
to compensate for its inadequacies by becoming more authoritarian.
The Stojadinović Era (1935 to 1939)
A new era began when the former finance minister Milan Stojadinović as-
sumed the office of prime minister in June 1935. Together with the former 
opposition politicians of the Slovene People’s Party and the Yugoslav Muslim 
Organization, he founded the Yugoslav Radical Union. The new regime 
party was still committed to unitarism and centralism but demonstrated 
greater flexibility regarding the national question. It spoke out in favor of 
self-administration and equality among tribes and religions. The authoritarian 
system was relaxed to allow a limited degree of party pluralism.19
Unlike the conservative regime of King Alexander, which cultivated 
traditional, patriarchal values, symbols, and culture, the financial expert 
Stojadinović presented himself as a modernizer. He took advantage of the 
palpable upswing in the global economy of 1935 to introduce a New Economic 
Policy. As in the United States and other European countries, government 
subsidy programs were to jump-start the economy. The government created 
state agencies and monopolies and set up an investment program based on job 
creation measures to stimulate heavy industry and the arms industry. In order 
to stabilize the agrarian sector, farmers’ debts were liquidated, and prices were 
subsidized by a state monopoly on foreign trade.20
Stojadinović’s semiauthoritarian regime adapted symbolic practices, 
political rituals, and semantics from Italian fascism and German National 
Socialism without adopting their ideologies, political content, and methods 
of ruling. New means of mass communication, particularly radio, film, bill-
boards, and flyers, were used to present the dynasty and the government in 
a positive light and to improve Yugoslavia’s image abroad. Traditional folk 
singers were hired to perform centuries-old epic songs on the gusla, an ancient 
single-string instrument. Instead of telling the tales of the age-old heroes of 
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Kosovo, their lyrics praised the good deeds of the current authoritarian head 
of state.21
Despite these efforts, the national ideology of Yugoslavism remained 
nothing more than a chimera of the politically established elite, a utopian 
promise for the future that never won the undivided approval of regional, 
political, church, and intellectual authorities, let alone the complete trust of 
the population at large. Societal and political realities had exposed the unified 
Yugoslav city on a hill to be no more than a Potemkin village, leaving even 
the most modest hopes for economic development dashed. The ongoing po-
litical and economic crisis created a climate of uncertainty in which people 
of all nationalities perceived themselves as the losers in a precarious state 
entity. Disappointed, many politically thinking people turned their backs on 
the Yugoslav model. In political rhetoric, in commemorative practices, and 
within clubs, societies, and other organizations, greater emphasis was placed 
once again on the historic heritage of one’s own people. Writers and scholars 
acted as the guardians of their respective communities by describing Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes as the original and true subjects of history, as peoples 
who were far more than merely a part of Yugoslav history.
Against the backdrop of dictatorship and depression, it appeared quite 
plausible to many people to attribute the obscure, conflicting economic and 
political interests to the seemingly obvious historical, linguistic, and religious 
differences between them. Pressing social problems — such as the half-hearted 
implementation of agrarian reform, the frightening decline of prices and 
incomes coupled with an increasing tax burden, and last but not least, the 
antimodern sentiments of rural society toward urban life and the diffuse fears 
of being overridden — were easily recycled into allegedly essential differences 
and conflicts between Serbs and Croats.
Ideologies and Paths of Development
In the period between the two world wars, all of Europe was affected by the 
rise of fascism and communism. The powerful dynamics of change that had 
been set in motion before the turn of the century and had culminated in the 
upheavals caused by the First World War now intensified the search for alter-
natives to the liberal-capitalist order and its painful failings. Both ideologies 
propagated radical if thoroughly different alternatives to the conservative, 
liberal, and social democratic models. While fascism claimed that the health 
of a people could be restored by its racial pureness, Bolshevism prophesized 
the elimination of class differences in a humane, egalitarian global order.22
In the countries of Southeast Europe, which were suffering more from 
the decline of agriculture than they were from the crises of the industrial so-
ciety, neither of these radically critical ideologies and their all-encompassing 
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explanations found many followers. Fascism remained a rather peripheral 
phenomenon. The most popular alternative to the bourgeois-capitalist model 
proved to be the agrarian ideology — quite unlike the case in the more indus-
trialized societies of Europe.
The agrarian movements, which were strong not only in Croatia but also 
in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania, strove to develop ways to counteract the 
crises of capitalism. Above all, they wanted to create a worthy and socially 
secure place in the modern world for the peasantry, which had been eco-
nomically neglected and politically ignored by bourgeois governments. They 
were under the illusion that, in the long run, agriculture would prove to be the 
leading economic sector, despite industrialization and the market economy. 
With the help of a comprehensive campaign for spreading literacy, credit, 
and cooperatives, the agrarian population was to be made fit for the capitalist 
era, and villages were to be empowered to assume greater responsibility for 
themselves. While the rhetoric of these movements was backward-looking, 
the program, strategies, and instruments of the peasants’ parties were well 
abreast with the times.
Even though the agrarian movement in Southeast European countries 
turned out to be the leading ideational, social, and political force in this period, 
its outreach to other parts of society was limited. Unlike communism and 
fascism, which attracted broad sectors of industrialized Europe in the twenti-
eth century, the agrarian movement did not offer a comprehensive, universal 
explanation of the world, coupled with the intent to enforce certain norms and 
claim absolute power. Instead, it concentrated solely on the matters vital to 
peasants and was neither interested in nor able to address the social problems 
of the middle classes and of industrial workers. Its natural and exclusive mi-
lieu was rural society, specifically the small independent farmer. There were 
villages in Croatia in which Radić’s people won over 90 percent of the vote, 
while failing to gain even 7 percent in bourgeois-proletarian Zagreb. Not until 
the late 1930s did the agrarian movement begin to propagate solutions to the 
national question beyond the framework of the agrarian social milieu.23
Ultimately, the agrarian movement lacked the cast-iron will to rule and 
the organizational prerequisites to make this happen. The Croatian Peasant’s 
Party acted as a populist movement that used all the instruments offered by 
modern mass politics. However, it never undertook an intensive effort to create 
a stringent party organization with rigid hierarchies, extensive training, and 
strict discipline among its cadres. It rejected violence as a political means, 
sought compromises instead, and thereby took surprising sidesteps from 
time to time.24
Contrary to Italy and Germany, the ultra-right and fascist movements 
remained powerless. Only in Croatia did the extreme right make a name 
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for itself at all in the form of the separatist but politically irrelevant Party 
of Rights. Often referred to by the name of their earlier party leader Josip 
Frank, the “Frankians” fought Yugoslavism and referred to historic rights 
stemming from the Middle Ages in justifying the creation of an indepen-
dent, ethnically homogenous Croatian nation state. After King Alexander 
banned nationalist Croat agitation in 1929, leading party members emigrated. 
Abroad they founded the fascist, separatist underground organization Ustasha 
(from ustaša, insurgents), whose spokesman became the lawyer Ante Pavelić. 
Support for their ideas came first and foremost from students, intellectuals, the 
self-employed, and former Austro-Hungarian military officers and veterans. 
The Ustasha ideology was militantly anti-Yugoslav, anti-Serb, antiliberal, and 
anticommunist. It stated aim was to use armed, terrorist actions to establish an 
independent, ethnically homogenous Greater Croatian state, to which Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Sandžak, Montenegro, and part of Vojvodina were to belong. 
The movement was based on the leader principle, glorified violence, and op-
erated paramilitary units. It propagated the overthrow of the old order and 
cultivated religious-like, mystic communal rituals. Its ideology, self-image, 
organization, and forms of representation were similar to those of Italian fas-
cism, and it took its inspiration from the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (VMRO), with which it cooperated closely.25
Although the extreme right found support among the urban petty bour-
geoisie and in some Catholic areas, rural Croatia proved quite resilient to the 
violence-laden activity of the Ustasha movement. Only in Lika, Dalmatia, 
and Herzegovina did some of the impoverished peasantry sympathize with 
the subversive, ethnic-populist slogans and the agitation against Serbs and 
communists. In September 1932, an attempted uprising in Lika against the 
local authorities, which had been orchestrated by Italy, failed miserably. The 
king’s security forces crushed the insurgency, and many of those involved 
landed in prison. Its base of support remained limited, even though the 
Ustasha movement was able later to operate openly following an amnesty in 
1937 brought about by the Axis powers and to expand its radius of activity to 
include Catholic high schools, academic organizations, and patriotic societies. 
Only a few Frankians, rightist supporters of the Croatian Peasant Party, and 
a part of the Catholic clergy ever joined their ranks, so that even in 1941 the 
movement only had 4,000 members.26
The picture was not much different in Serbia, where the counterpart to 
the Ustasha movement was formed in 1934/1935 as the Yugoslav National 
Movement Zbor. Its leader was Dimitrije Ljotić, a man with religious-clerical, 
anticommunist, and anti-Semitic leanings who admired National Socialist 
Germany. He combined race theory and blood-and-soil ideology with 
Orthodox mysticism and a romanticized Serb nationalism. No more than 5,000 
to 6,000 students, teachers, low-level employees, and a handful of priests 
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constituted his base of support.27 However, as in Croatia, there was a milieu 
of sympathizers, where radicalism and intolerance could potentially grow out 
of the deep-seated insecurity that existed. The pluralization of lifestyles and 
the advance of the modern state resulted sometimes in decidedly anti-Western 
stances. People were upset by the egoism, rationalism, materialism, and deca-
dence that the new era also brought with it in Yugoslavia and that, in the minds 
of critics, was tolerated far too much by some of the elite.28 In intellectual and 
church circles, visions of the future were nationally exclusive, ethnic, and re-
ligiously fundamentalist. For example, the writer Miloš Crnjanski moved 
away from his earlier cosmopolitan position and railed against liberalism and 
Marxism in his published contributions to newspapers. He put forth the case 
for corporatism and a “Jacobian nationalism” because “the new nation is not 
yet finished. Next to external enemies, a worm of emigrant cliques, strange 
‘cultivated’ ideals, foreign capital . . . national snobs and separatists eats away 
at us.”29 In other parts of the country, authors also complained about moral 
decline and the “decayed West,” and about godlessness and the gravediggers 
of the monarchy, namely the communists.
How do we explain the fact that a fascist mass movement never gained 
a foothold in Yugoslavia? Southeast Europe had certainly suffered the far- 
reaching consequences of various crises of modernization since the turn of the 
century: devastating world war experiences, an unfinished process of nation 
building, disruption in the operation of the political system, class conflicts, 
cultural pessimism, and criticism of civilization. What was missing were the 
relevant ideological and social milieus, the leadership cliques, and the follow-
ers on which the ultra-nationalist right thrived. Disoriented, status-threatened, 
or déclassé members of the middle classes, especially from the bourgeoisie, 
did not constitute the critical mass necessary for such movements, as they 
did in the highly industrialized countries. Revolutionary reactionaries sim-
ply did not have as many ways to penetrate the world of intact and steadfast 
religious, family, and social relations in which so many people still lived. 
Moreover, many citizens of Yugoslavia may not have felt that they were being 
personally spoken to by the rabble-rousing campaign of the ultra-nationalist 
right. Unlike in Italy, Germany, and Spain, the conservative and monarchist 
forces in Yugoslavia did not strike a compromise with the radical right on the 
power to rule. Without Hitler’s rise to power and his later intervention, these 
movements would have remained no more than a footnote in history.30
The Nascent Communist Movement
Conservative and extreme rightist circles considered communism to be the 
most dangerous thing imported from the decadent West. King Alexander also 
certainly would have liked to destroy it, had he been able. Unlike fascism, 
communism had been able to take root in the South Slavic countries starting 
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in the nineteenth century, despite the fact that the working class to which it 
appealed was never large. However, the bourgeois-capitalist economic order 
and its periodic crises had pushed a large number of landless peasants and those 
with tiny plots (“dwarf farmers”) into destitution, and the Great Depression had 
further swelled the ranks of the distraught and disappointed. In the Orthodox 
regions of the country, Russia had traditionally been considered a major role 
model, an attitude that was reinforced by a belief in the blessings brought about 
by the 1917 Bolshevist revolution. This explains why the communists won 12.5 
percent of the vote in Yugoslavia’s first postwar election in 1920. In Bulgaria 
they won 20.4 percent and thus clearly more than in Poland (7.9 percent), for 
example. With 200,000 votes, the communists joined the constitutional assem-
bly as the third largest delegation. In backward Macedonia, the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) garnered an astonishing 33 percent of the vote and 
in Montenegro even 36 percent.31
One of the factors contributing to the attractiveness of the illegal com-
munist movement was its approach to the national question. Since 1924, the 
underground CPY had taken a strong stand on the issue by being the only 
ones to recognize Macedonians and Montenegrins as distinct peoples and by 
claiming that all peoples should have the right to self-determination and sep-
aration. Faced with the growing danger of fascist aggression years later, they 
shifted their position in 1935 to support the continued existence of Yugoslavia 
and spoke out in favor of a federal state, modeled on that of the Soviet Union, 
in which all nations and nationalities were of equal standing.32 The German 
social democrat Hermann Wendel, whose South Slavic sister party had been 
pushed to the political sidelines by the communists, was disgusted: “The sub-
sistence farmers of Montenegro and the goat herders of Macedonia — people 
who live in a completely medieval world of imagination, have never seen a 
factory smokestack, and have never voted for a parliament — have abruptly 
metamorphosed into such ‘class conscience’ enthusiasts for the ‘Soviet 
idea.’ ”33 Actually, the communists were also surprisingly strong in Zagreb, 
Belgrade, and other big cities.
During the party’s years of illegality starting in 1921, the CPY had nu-
merous sympathizers, especially among the 300,000-member-strong trade 
unions and in the youth movement. The communists had a solid base of 
support in Croatia, where Josip Broz was born in 1892 as the offspring of 
a Slovene-Croat marriage. In search of employment, Broz, a locksmith and 
trade unionist, had traveled to Zagreb, Pilsen, Munich, and Mannheim, 
among other places, before he was sent to the Serbian front during the First 
World War and then into a Russian prisoner of war camp.34 As a communist, 
party functionary, and professional revolutionary, he was later imprisoned 
in Yugoslavia for nearly six years. In 1934, the CPY appointed Broz, who 
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now called himself Tito, to the Central Committee and sent him to the Soviet 
Union for training. Unlike many of his comrades, he survived the Stalinist 
Great Purge unharmed. Tito returned home in 1935 and became the party’s 
secretary general in 1939.35
For talented young men from lower-income backgrounds like Josip Broz, 
the trade unions and the party provided the only available avenue to education 
and social advancement. Since political work offered them the chance not 
only to pursue class-specific interests but also to develop individual abilities 
and careers, many skilled laborers and artisans joined the party. The CPY 
used cultural organizations, reading societies, and athletic clubs to spread 
its ideas in rural areas. Communist ideas were further disseminated by two 
new social groups: the young generation of village teachers who had been 
trained in the cities and the young class of worker-peasants, who moved back 
and forth between the worlds of urban libertarian cosmopolitism and rural 
traditionalism.36
In the 1930s, leftism was becoming increasingly attractive, not the least 
among intellectuals and the middle classes who rejected the antidemocratic, 
repressive Yugoslav regime. Marxism justified the necessity for a more just 
world in a quasi-scientific, theoretical way, and its vision of society offered 
an alternative to the stuffy patriarchal culture that was being rejected, par-
ticularly by the educated young. Concerned about the rise of militarism and 
fascism, they saw communism as the most outspoken and resolute opposition 
to Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini, from whom the political establishment did 
not seem to be sufficiently distancing itself. After the Comintern decided in 
1935 on a new Popular Front policy that directed communist parties to form 
alliances from that point on with social democrats, liberals, and all other 
antifascists, the communists in Yugoslavia were more accepted as a patriotic 
force by a broader, no longer exclusively leftist-oriented public.37 Increasingly 
the left gained a foothold in schools and at universities. For example, they 
thoroughly infiltrated the law faculty in Belgrade. The students became po-
liticized over the existing police state, the deficit in democratic participation, 
widespread social plight, and old-fashioned morals. In growing numbers they 
began to organize underground.38
Later, during the Second World War, the communists would be in a 
good position to take power because the CPY had been restructured into 
a disciplined Leninist cadre party during the thirties. Tito heralded a gen-
erational change at the leadership level through which the party became 
not only younger but more modern, convincing, and forceful. Three men 
who belonged to Tito’s innermost circle were the Montenegrin Milovan 
Djilas, the Serb Aleksandar Ranković, and the Slovene Edvard Kardelj; 
these men would later become the architects of the second Yugoslav state. 
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Such communists saw themselves as the political and social avant-garde and 
part of a worldwide movement that conferred its legitimacy and backing on 
them. They believed in a universally applicable, historical legitimacy and 
the development of a more humane society throughout the entire world in 
which revolutionary consciousness would triumph over ethnic aversions. 
They shared not only their ideological premises but also biographical expe-
riences and convictions, such as years of underground political work, faith 
in a just future, and a steadfast will to change the way things were. Many 
had volunteered to fight in the Spanish Civil War. Reminiscent of the Young 
Bosnians before the First World War, Yugoslavism for the communists was 
not just a vision but a way of life. The party enforced a strict code of values 
and behavior emphasizing ideological loyalty, willing sacrifice, familial soli-
darity, Spartan discipline, and somber Puritanism. By the end of the decade, 
the party was tightly organized, authoritatively led, and peacefully focused 
on a pro-Yugoslav aim.39
Radicalization, Religious Fundamentalism, and Political Violence
In the late 1930s, the radicalization and militarization of the political spec-
trum that was evident throughout Europe could also be found in Yugoslavia. 
The authoritarian rule of the royal dictatorship, the rise of fascism and 
National Socialism, and growing external pressure encouraged extremism 
and accelerated ideological polarization. State repression intensified and many 
communists and ultranationalists were jailed, tortured, or disappeared.40
In turn, this strengthened an antidemocratic discourse that aimed at over-
coming the internal fragmentation by creating a unified Yugoslav nation with 
authoritarian means. Political confrontations were carried out primarily on the 
streets and no longer in parliament or in the media.41 Militant political actions 
increasingly impacted public life, irrespective of ideology or nationality. The 
incidents of students from both the left and the right violently attacking each 
other became more frequent. In October 1940, a shootout in Belgrade between 
the supporters of the anti-Semitic Zbor and the communists left five dead and 
120 wounded.42
Every party had paramilitary units deployed to propagate and advance 
their cause. Yugoslav Action was a group founded in 1929 with close ties to 
the regime. It fought for a populist totalitarian Yugoslav ideology by stag-
ing mass marches, while the communists sent armed units of proletarian 
street fighters to disrupt the rallies of the fascists. Nationalist-minded Serbs 
joined the ultra-nationalistic Chetnik units, whose membership rose between 
1935 and 1938 from 200,000 to over a half million.43 Likewise, the Croatian 
Peasants’ Party formed peasant and citizen militias allegedly as a defense 
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against Chetniks, communists, and the “Green Shirts” from the camp of 
Stojadinović supporters. In 1940, this force comprised 200,000 men, which 
Yugoslav authorities were not completely wrong to view as the nucleus of a 
later Croatian army.44
With the rise of nationalism, antidemocratic thinking, and religious in-
tolerance, antagonism heightened not only among the political parties but 
also between the churches. One of the points of rivalrous contention was the 
education of children from mixed-religion marriages. The Concordat with the 
Vatican that resulted from long negotiations failed the ratification process in 
1937 because the Serbian Orthodox Church opposed it. The Orthodox Church 
feared the Catholic missionary zeal of converting believers of other faiths, 
and so it threated all members of parliament who ratified the Concordat with 
excommunication. In various cities violent demonstrations protested against 
the Concordat. Embittered, the Catholic Church subsequently adopted a con-
frontational stance toward the Yugoslav state. The fragile balance of religious 
coexistence broke apart.
Soon militancy manifested itself in the overall atmosphere, and also 
within the various religious communities. The lay organization Croatian 
Catholic Movement fought against liberalization and secularization, as did ul-
tranationalist and profascist groups with names like “Eagle” and “Crusader.”45 
In Serbia this fervor was channeled into an extremist Orthodox trend that 
celebrated religious cults, the Kosovo myth, nationalism, and antimodern-
ism in the guise of svetosavlje (the ideology of the Saint Sava). Influenced 
by the cultural theories of Russian Slavophilia and the reception of Oswald 
Spengler’s work, these ideas caught on among theologians, the peasant lay 
movement known as the Bogomoljci (literally, God-prayers), and on the far 
right end of the Serb elite, but never on a widespread basis.46
Radical militarism was also found among the Muslim population. The 
dissolution of their traditionally closed societal order in both their religious 
and secular worlds, the disappointment over the unfulfilled promises of prog-
ress, and especially a deep-seated identity crisis may have moved Bosnian 
intellectuals to retreat into the universal and ultimately justifying system of 
religious dogma and embrace the utopia of a pan-Islamic societal and world 
order. They concentrated their energies on the reform movements in the Arab 
world. Confronted by the alleged decline of human civilization in general 
and of Muslim culture in particular, the university-educated youth sought 
inspiration in the work of Islamic and Western authors who criticized civ-
ilization, like Oswald Spengler. They joined the pious societies Trezvenost 
(Sobriety) and Ihvan (Brotherhood) to revive Muslim customs and traditions 
like the study of the Koran and the observance of Ramadan. Modeled after the 
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Egyptian group Young Muslims, a handful of intellectuals founded a group 
of the same name in Sarajevo in 1941. It was the first militant organization in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina that propagated the “training and struggle” for a pan- 
Islamic state.47
A Reorientation in Foreign Policy
The ongoing rivalry since the nineteenth century among the major powers for 
dominance in Southeast Europe intensified in the 1930s. The region proved to 
be both a good supplier of agrarian products and raw materials vital to industry 
and a good market for finished industrial goods. For Germany in particular, the 
region became important for its war industry after the Nazi regime announced 
its New Plan in 1934.48
Since assuming power, the National Socialists had worked determinedly 
to bind the countries of Southeast Europe to Germany through trade agree-
ments. Intensive economic relations seemed an apt way to exert political 
influence and, where possible, to undermine French security interests. In 
March 1933, the undersecretary at the foreign ministry, von Bülow, under-
scored in a memorandum that Yugoslavia and Romania could “in this manner 
be significantly influenced regarding the direction of their foreign policy.” 49
In the bilateral trade agreement of 1 May 1934, Germany contracted to 
purchase Yugoslav agrarian products at prices higher than those on the global 
market, which would take place in exchange for German export goods in a 
clearing process.50 Unerringly, the Reich succeeded in becoming Yugoslavia’s 
most important trading partner. Whereas Germany received 14.1 percent of 
Yugoslav exports between 1931 and 1935, this figure had already risen to 25.44 
percent in 1936 and even 45.9 percent by 1939.51 Yugoslavia had made itself 
dangerously dependent on Germany economically and thus also politically.
The security system that France had put into place in 1918 in East and 
Southeast Europe began to erode when King Alexander and France’s foreign 
minister, Louis Barthou, were murdered in October 1934. French investigators 
uncovered close ties between the assassin and the Macedonian VMRO and 
the Croat Ustasha, which, in turn, could then be traced to Italy and Hungary. 
Belgrade later failed in its effort to get the League of Nations to condemn 
Italy unequivocally, in addition to Hungary, even though it had been proven 
that both countries tolerated the existence of Croat fascist training camps on 
their territory. However, no country was willing to publicly expose Mussolini, 
not even France.52
Faced with growing international tensions and the intervention practices 
of the Axis powers, Yugoslavia adopted neutrality as its strategy to sur-
vive. Prince Regent Paul, who governed the country during the years that 
Alexander’s heir, Peter, was a minor, attempted to keep his country out of 
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the looming international disputes by pursuing a policy of equidistance. This 
meant maintaining good neighborly relations in all directions without making 
any alliance commitments, which is why Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović 
established closer relations to Berlin and Rome. In 1937, Yugoslavia and Italy 
signed a friendship and nonaggression pact.
Hitler became more forceful in his dealings with Southeast Europe 
starting in 1938. In preparation for the war, he made Yugoslavia part of the 
“Greater German Economic Sphere — Southeast” and assigned it the task of 
supplying armament-relevant raw materials, like iron ore and copper, and 
food, for which the country received weapons and airplane technology in 
exchange.53 In order to ensure that the supply of resources would not be seized 
by enemy countries, Germany pressed the countries of Southeast Europe to 
enter the Tripartite Pact. When Prince Regent Paul paid an official visit to 
Germany in the early summer of 1939, the German government started an 
unexpected charm offensive, underlaid with intimidating demonstrations of 
military might. This visit led the prince to draw the long overdue conclusion 
that, if Yugoslavia was to repel foreign threats, his nation had little choice 
but to negotiate solutions to its internal conflicts in order to forge the much 
stronger unity it needed.54
The Serb-Croat Settlement (Sporazum)
In February 1939, domestic and foreign policy motives prompted Prince 
Regent Paul to dismiss the powerful prime minister Milan Stojadinović, a 
man who advocated a strong centralized state and thus stood in the way of 
solving the “Croatian question.” In the December 1938 elections, the “United 
Opposition” under the leadership of the Croatian Peasants’ Party had won an 
impressive 45 percent of the vote, while the governing party only garnered 
54 percent. So it had become quite apparent that Stojadinović’s politics were 
not sufficiently supported by the electorate.
Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (1935/1936), Germany’s annexation of 
Austria (1938), and the partitioning and eventual demise of Czechoslovakia 
(1938/1939) demonstrated dramatically that Great Britain and France would 
not defend their East European protégés against military aggression. It thus 
seemed essential that the small Balkan countries maintain good relations 
with the Axis as a defense against their own destruction. As the influence of 
London and Paris diminished in eastern Central Europe, so did the foreign 
backing of Yugoslavia and its centralist political system, which had been 
based on the model of the Western powers.55 The founding of an independent 
Slovakia by Nazi Germany aroused the fear that, sooner or later, the rebellious 
Croats might also seek Hitler’s help to achieve their demands for autonomy. 
Moreover, Rome secretly continued to try to incite the Ustasha movement 
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and the Peasants’ Party to an uprising that would bring about the demise of 
Yugoslavia and an intervention by Italy. Therefore, there was no choice but 
to give the leader of the Croatian Peasants’ Party, Vladko Maček, a role in 
government.
On 26 August 1939, Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković and Vladko 
Maček agreed on a settlement a few days before the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The Sporazum (Agreement) established for the first time an au-
tonomous Croatian administrative district within Yugoslavia with Zagreb as 
its capital. This so-called Banovina of Croatia covered the greater part of 
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and was inhabited by over four 
million people, of whom nearly 20 percent were Serbs and 4 percent Muslims. 
Economic affairs, domestic matters, the educational system, and the judicial 
system were now in the hands of the Croatian self-administration, led by Ivan 
Šubašić as the new governor. The agreement went into effect on 26 August 
1939 at the same time that the new “Government of National Agreement” was 
sworn into office. Cvetković remained prime minister, and Maček became 
his deputy.56
Although the agreement satisfied the Croats’ most tenacious demand, it 
created new problems. Both the Ustasha and the communists criticized it for 
not going far enough. Once the Second World War started, the economic situ-
ation was further aggravated by rising inflation, tax increases, and a shortage 
of goods. Dissatisfaction with the situation grew in Croatia, for which the 
former opposition leaders were held responsible. Due to the outbreak of war, 
most stipulations of the Sporazum were not fulfilled.
The new autonomy granted to the Croats made many in Yugoslavia 
nervous and triggered a domino effect for comparable demands by other 
peoples. Serbs, Slovenes, and Bosnian Muslims each called for their own 
banovina. The Muslims were particularly bitter over the fact that Croats and 
Serbs had — seemingly bilaterally — divided up their country among them-
selves, and in doing so they had not only trampled the historical borders of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina but had also treated with contempt the regional identity 
of the populace. Religious and secular elites banded together to submit sev-
eral resolutions demanding territorial autonomy. Particularly explosive in a 
political sense was the proposal put forth by the Serbian Culture Club led by 
the historian Slobodan Jovanović, one of the most important scholars in the 
interwar period. This proposal presented a plan to create a banovina of “Serb 
countries,” which was to include Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In 
other words, the banovina would closely embody the historical concept of 
a Greater Serbia.57 By the end of the decade, the ideology of unitarism and 
centralism was dead, and a great majority of Yugoslavs, including Serbs, now 
favored federalism.
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Operation Retribution
Whether the Sporazum would have been able to establish domestic peace on 
the long run will always remain an unanswered question. On 1 September 
1939, Hitler invaded Poland, thus further darkening the political skies over 
Europe. Mussolini seized the opportunity to still his appetite for Yugoslav 
territory. Following the dismantling of Czechoslovakia back in March 1939, 
Hitler had given his partner a free hand in the Mediterranean realm. The next 
month, in early April, Italian troops marched into Albania. In August of that 
same year, Hitler urged Mussolini — so as to appease his Axis partner before 
the German aggression against Poland commenced — to “deliver the coup de 
grâce [to Yugoslavia] as soon as possible.” In January 1940, Pavelić promised 
to provoke a revolution and then to call on Italy for help. Under the code name 
E, Rome began to prepare a military intervention that would create a Croatian 
state by the grace of Mussolini.58
Meanwhile, Hitler had changed his mind and wanted instead to maintain 
peace in the Balkans. Otherwise, the risk seemed too great that the British 
would engage them militarily in the Mediterranean or that Stalin might even 
be provoked to intervene. However, the Axis partners did agree that there 
would be no place for Yugoslavia in the “New Europe” they were planning.59
After Italian troops invaded Greece on 28 October 1940, the German lead-
ership modified its strategy. To come to the aid of the militarily hard-pressed 
Mussolini, Germany intended to invade Greece in its Operation Marita. At the 
same time, Hitler sought to protect his southern flank during the impending 
attack on the Soviet Union, to drive the British out of the Aegean mainland 
permanently, and to secure the exploitation of Southeast Europe for the war 
industry, especially Romania’s oil fields. To do this, the German army — the 
Wehrmacht — required a deployment zone.60
Yugoslavia found itself in a quandary. To support Germany’s aggression 
against Greece would have meant war with Great Britain sooner or later, 
maybe even with the United States and the Soviet Union. This is why Belgrade 
denied the Axis permission to transport their troops through Yugoslavia. At 
the same time, the General Staff knew very well that its army would not be 
able to effectively counter any German attack. So, how was Yugoslavia to 
maintain the neutrality so vital to its survival?
Once the Wehrmacht started marching through Bulgaria in the direction 
of the Greek and Yugoslav borders, these considerations became obsolete. 
Against the backdrop of domestic turmoil, growing social dissatisfaction, and 
massive threats from Germany with serious political consequences, Prince 
Regent Paul followed the path taken by his neighbors Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Romania, and joined the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact of 1940 on 
25 March 1941.61 Hitler assuaged Belgrade’s overriding concerns by assuring 
122 Part II: 1918 to 1941
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and, at least at first, forwent asking 
Yugoslavia for military support in the impending campaign against Greece.62
That very evening, major demonstrations occurred in various cities. 
Encouraged but probably not incited by the British, Serb generals toppled the 
government on 27 March 1941 in a bloodless coup and placed King Peter II, 
who was still a minor, on the throne. Air Force general Dušan Simović became 
prime minister, and following some initial hesitation, the Croatian Peasants’ 
Party leader Maček assumed a cabinet post. Simović was deeply committed to 
the Sporazum, and both men believed it would be possible to keep Yugoslavia 
as a whole out of the war if they acted quickly and offered Berlin a declaration 
of loyalty to the Tripartite Pact. The vast majority of the political class thought 
that even the worst of all possible Yugoslavias was a better alternative to no 
Yugoslavia at all. Thousands gathered on Belgrade’s streets to celebrate the 
return to neutrality.
That same day, Hitler convened a secret meeting in Berlin. The Germans 
viewed the coup both as a rebuff and as a potential risk. They feared Britain 
would be able to convince the Yugoslavs to switch their alliance and then to 
permit the British to use their air bases for attacks against the German troops 
amassing in preparation for the attack against the Soviet Union. Hitler ordered 
that Yugoslavia be “considered an enemy and crushed as quickly as possible.” 
As retribution, Belgrade was to be destroyed through a continual series of 
daytime and nighttime bombing raids by the German air force.63 Besides the 
strategic military motives, Hitler was also being driven by ideological ones, 
namely his desire to reverse the outcome of the First World War and to elim-
inate Serbian influence once and for all.64
In the early morning hours of 6 April 1941, German aircraft began without 
warning to bomb the defenseless capital, which the government had declared 
earlier, to no avail, as an “open city.” These attacks destroyed 9,000 houses 
and killed 3,000 people — more than in Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Coventry 
taken together.65 Eleven days after the completion of Operation Retribution, 
the Yugoslav army was forced to surrender. Thus, the first Yugoslav state met 
its demise through foreign aggression and not as a result of its own internal 
conflicts and contradictions.
PART III




Occupation, Collaboration,  
and Resistance
The New (Dis-)Order in the Balkans
Yugoslavia ceased to exist on 17 April 1941, the day it surrendered. Hitler and 
Mussolini plucked the country apart, turning it into a mosaic of annexed, occu-
pied, and quasi-independent territories. Germany annexed northern Slovenia 
and occupied Serbia and the Banat. Italy received southern Slovenia, Dalmatia, 
and Montenegro. In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Independent State 
of Croatia was formed under the control of the two Axis powers. Kosovo and 
western Macedonia were given to Albania, which had been an Italian pro-
tectorate since 1939. While Bulgaria grabbed eastern Macedonia, Hungary 
pushed into the region between the Tisza, Danube, and Mur rivers. These 
developments prompted State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker to ask, in some 
consternation, about who was now going “to tend to this bag of fleas during 
the war.”1
The new order in Southeast Europe worked as a system of graded de-
pendencies in which there were annexed areas (Slovenia), occupied countries 
(Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece), puppet states (Croatia and Slovakia), and 
allies (Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary). However, the various legal statuses 
of these countries were of little practical relevance. Aims, strategies, and 
politics were all very similar within the National Socialist “Greater Space” 
(Großraum), regardless whether a country was “independent” or “occupied.” 
In all of these countries, partners could be found who were willing to collab-
orate with the Axis powers in order to launch their own plans for the creation 
of homogeneous nation states.2
Germany and Italy had different motives for dividing up Yugoslavia. 
Hitler pursued political, military, and economic objectives in the Balkans. 
He sought to destroy the postwar order, secure transport lines and access to 
economic resources vital to the war effort, and thwart an Allied invasion. 
Shortly after occupying the Balkans, Himmler also incorporated them into his 
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megalomaniacal policies of resettlement and extermination. For its part, Italy 
considered Southeast Europe as its historically evolved sphere of influence and 
part of its natural living space (spazio vitale) stretching from the Adriatic to 
Africa and the Middle East. However, the equality between the two dictators 
was only a formal construct. Occupational practices later revealed permanent 
friction and serious conflicts of interest, in which Mussolini usually came out 
on the short end.3
The Independent State of Croatia
The Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was created from the territory of 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the attempt failed to get the popular 
peasant leader Vladko Maček to take over the reins of government under 
German protection, the SS-Standartenführer Edmund Veesenmayer put the 
fascist Ustasha movement in power. By this time he had already arranged 
the annexation of Austria and the independence of Slovakia.4 Ante Pavelić 
returned to Zagreb from his years-long exile to become Poglavnik (leader) 
with dictatorial authority. Croatia was organized as a leader state (Führerstaat) 
without any separation of powers, and the persecution of oppositional forces 
was legalized with the enactment of the Law for the Protection of the People 
and the State on 17 April 1941. The Ustasha government invoked the idea of a 
“people’s community” (Volksgemeinschaft), which it defined as “Aryan” like 
the German model. Also in April, Pavelić zealously enacted the anti-Semitic 
Nuremberg Laws. The pillars of support for his reign of violence were the 
militias, army, secret police, special courts, and more than twenty concen-
tration camps.5
Croatia’s long-sought sovereignty soon proved to be a chimera. Both 
Hitler and Mussolini treated the country as an occupied region and drew a de-
marcation line through its territory. Berlin used its immense diplomatic corps 
and the Plenipotentiary German General to exert great political influence on 
racial, economic, and military policy.6 In the Roman Protocols, Pavelić also 
had to surrender a wide strip of Dalmatian coastline and the Bay of Kotor to 
Italy on 18 May 1941, thus turning the decades-old collective nightmare of 
the Croats into reality.
In the wake of the German-Italian occupation, the Ustasha movement 
saw a historically unique opportunity to implement its original agenda, the 
creation of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Croatia. For decades, it had 
been preaching for the resurrection of medieval Croatia covering its “entire 
ethnic and historic territory.” The 6.3 million population of the Independent 
State of Croatia was extremely heterogeneous. Only a bare majority of 3.3 
million were Croats. The rest of the populace was made up of about two 
million Serbs, 700,000 Muslims, and 150,000 ethnic Germans and other mi-
norities.7 The Croat fascists now launched a systematic campaign against their 
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alleged archenemy, the Orthodox Christian population. Hundreds of thou-
sands were disenfranchised, dispossessed, driven out, herded into internment 
camps, or murdered in vicious attacks. The centralist government of Greater 
Croatia also did not permit Muslims to hold any special status, even though 
a number of them sympathized with the Ustasha government. The govern-
ment struck all references to “Bosnia-Herzegovina” from official language 
and declared the Muslims to be “Croats of Islamic Faith.” For this reason, the 
profascist Committee of National Rescue, based in Sarajevo, petitioned Hitler 
in November 1942 to bestow autonomy on Bosnia-Herzegovina under direct 
patronage of the Third Reich. Berlin turned down the request promptly.8
Support for the new regime remained sparse. Neither in domestic nor 
foreign policy did the government exercise full sovereignty. Approval came 
from the right wing of the Peasants’ Party, from parts of the Catholic Church, 
and from nationalist-thinking intellectuals and students, who celebrated the 
“resurrection” of Croatia and indulged in a missionary and chauvinist sense 
of purpose. Yet it only took a couple of months following the assumption of 
power before the already rather heterogeneous base of support for the Ustasha 
movement began to crack apart.9 Very few people identified unconditionally 
with the ideology and aims of the Croatian leadership, and whoever cooperated 
with it often acted out of pure opportunism. It “appears to prove little that 
houses in the villages hang flags and that a relatively large number of people 
participate” in Sunday rallies, warned a German informant in mid-1941. He 
sensed that the prevailing “indifference of broad segments of the population” 
could change “into active resistance.”10
In mid-February 1942, the plenipotentiary German general in Agram, 
Edmund von Glaise Horstenau, reported: “Hatred against it [Ustasha] is hard 
to beat anymore. Representatives of the movement make themselves unpopular 
time and again through their arrogance, despotism, greediness, and corrup-
tion. Furthermore, misdeeds, theft, and murder continue unabated. No week 
goes by in which some ‘cleansing action’ is not carried out in which entire 
villages including women and children bite the dust.”11 In early February 1943, 
German supreme commander of the southeast Alexander Löhr complained: 
“Government and bureaucracy have lost all support through mismanagement 
and the Ustasha course, not only among the Pravoslavs [the Serbs], but also 
among their own Croat population.”12
The German Occupation of Serbia
What little remained of Serbia fell under German occupation rule, a confusing 
jumble of various civilian and military offices that switched and altered their 
competencies time and again.13 Starting in June 1941, the highest authority 
in the occupied territories of Yugoslavia and Greece became the supreme 
army commander of Southeast Europe. Subordinate to him was the military 
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commander in Serbia (since September 1941, the plenipotentiary commanding 
general). This person, in turn, headed two staffs, one civilian and one military. 
As head of the civilian administration, SS-Group Leader Harald Turner su-
pervised the Serbian collaboration government. The military command staff 
oversaw police, army, and security tasks. Operating independently of these 
were two task forces of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD) 
whose mission it was to combat “emigrants, saboteurs, and terrorists.” The 
general plenipotentiary for the economy, Hermann Göring’s direct represen-
tative, completed the institutional jumble. While he was, institutionally, not 
part of the Military Administration, he was to exploit Serbia’s resources for 
the German war machine. Foreign policy matters were handled, in turn, by the 
German Foreign Office through their own plenipotentiary. However, in August 
1943, the powers of this office were transferred to the influential special pleni-
potentiary of the Foreign Office for the Southeast, Hermann Neubacher.14
In order to facilitate the administration of Serbia more easily, the SS offi-
cer Veesenmayer installed the ultraconservative and nationalist general Milan 
Nedić as prime minister of a puppet “Government of National Salvation” in 
August 1941. He was supported by parts of the officer corps, the Chetniks 
under Kosta Pećanac, and the fascist Zbor movement led by Dimitrije Ljotić. 
Nedić’s chief task was to smash resistance with indigenous troops and thereby 
relieve the German military from this work. Because Hitler viewed Serbs as 
characterless, disloyal, and dangerous, all government functions vital to power 
pertaining to the military, police, economy, and finances remained in German 
hands. Thus, the status of the Serbian collaboration government differed from 
that of Pétain’s regime in France, which was at least allowed to represent a sov-
ereign state that the Germans did not classify a priori as inferior. Nedić proved 
to be a willing implementer of German occupation policy. He “cleansed” the 
education system, established strict censorship, and set up trade corporations 
and a National Labor Service. He also commanded the Serbian State Guard 
and the Serbian Volunteer Corps, two military organizations set up to assist 
German troops.
Nedić viewed himself as a trustee of Serb interests, as a mediator between 
the foreign occupiers and his people, and he tried to alleviate the suffering of 
the Serbs while at the same time brutally combating communists. His ideology 
was a mixture of ultraconservatism and the chauvinism of the fascist Zbor 
movement, a strange conglomerate of heterogeneous, ideological elements 
creating an ethnic-racist, blood-and-soil cult and religious Orthodox messian-
ism, coupled with a fixation on an age-old Serb patriarchal family structure 
and village community.15 However, the Serb population did not prove very 
receptive to this train of thought. The nationalist-leaning middle class tended 
to remain loyal to the king and to favor the former and now exiled government, 
and the peasantry did not think much differently.
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As was the case everywhere in Eastern Europe, the ethnic German 
minority played a key role in establishing the new order. For one, the approx-
imately half a million Danube Swabians were expected to help further the 
“racial reordering” of the area. For another, they were to serve on the Eastern 
Front as “troops obligated to the Reich” and to fight in their own country 
against the partisans, no matter what the legal status of their home regions was. 
Even though Croatia was formally an independent state, the ethnic Germans 
there were given an autonomous legal status as “Volksgruppe” that ensured 
their total cooptation by the Reich.
Berlin treated the Banat Swabians in a similar fashion. This German 
minority in Serbia was given its own administrative region,16 where society 
was organized according to the Nazi model and the district received directives 
directly from the Reich. Berlin expected the Banat Swabians to do their part 
in the agricultural “production battle” and to engage in “total war.” Starting in 
the spring of 1942, practically all men fit for military service were conscripted 
into the Waffen-SS on the basis of “the iron law of their folkdom (Volkstum).” 
In 1943/1944, about 50,000 ethnic Germans from Croatia, Serbia, and the 
Banat were serving, and another 18,500 came from the territories occupied 
by Hungary.17
In all other parts of the former territory of Yugoslavia, the New Order 
was built on sand. In the summer of 1941, the Italians in Montenegro failed in 
their attempt to declare a pseudoindependent satellite state. Instead, they set 
up a military government. Slovenia, which Hitler and Mussolini had divided 
up between themselves, was subjected to a systematically implemented policy 
of Germanization and Italianization, respectively. The Provincia di Lubiana 
was headed by an Italian high commissioner, who was assisted by a local 
consultative council that, however, lacked any form of authority in its own 
country. After Italy surrendered in 1943, the region fell to the German occupi-
ers. With the help of General Leon Rupnik, who wanted to secure the Slovenes 
a place in “New Europe,” and with the blessing of Bishop Gregorij Rožman, a 
home guard (domobranci) was formed, an auxiliary of the Wehrmacht under 
German command. At the height of its power, this force was about 17,500 
men strong.18
Reprisal Actions
The plan to rule the country with little military deployment and with the help 
of local collaborators soon proved illusionary. All state institutions of gov-
ernment and authority had been destroyed, creating a power vacuum that was 
hard to control. While bourgeois groups, royalists, peasant-party supporters, 
social democrats, and communists were distraught and disillusioned, they 
were not without fight in them. In various parts of the country, opposition-
ists carried out attacks and acts of sabotage. The Germans decided to nip 
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this resistance in the bud by having SS-strike forces and Wehrmacht soldiers 
carry out hostage executions. On 28 April, Colonel-General von Weichs, 
the commander-in-chief of the Second Army, ordered that, in retribution for 
every German soldier harmed in an attack, one hundred civilians from all 
segments of society were to be shot “ruthlessly” and the corpses hung in 
public display. General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel instructed the High 
Command on 28 September 1941 to shoot one hundred people, “including 
known leaders of the community or their relatives,” for every German soldier 
killed and fifty people for every German soldier wounded.19 The Wehrmacht 
took prisoners referred to as “Sühnegefangene” [retribution prisoners], usually 
communists, Jews, gypsies, criminals, and “hostages . . . who play a role in 
public life.” They had to pay with their lives for attacks against members of 
the Wehrmacht, ethnic Germans, and — as of November 1942 — Serb collabo-
rators.20 For example, on a single November night in Belgrade, 149 professors, 
academy members, artists, doctors, and lawyers were arrested, including the 
intellectuals Aleksandar Belić, Tihomir Djordjević, Viktor Novak, and Vaša 
Ćubrilović.21 In particularly brutal acts of retribution, the German army shot 
4,000 to 5,000 civilians in Kraljevo and more than 2,300 in Kragujevac in 
mid-October 1941.22 German soldiers captured school pupils and teachers, 
workers and peasants, clerics and sextons, and any man they happened to 
come across. Later these people were executed in groups of thirty to fifty and 
dumped in mass graves. General Böhme’s “punitive actions” took the lives of 
more than 25,000 men and women just between October and December 1941.23 
Like elsewhere in the Eastern European realm, the measures undertaken 
by the occupiers to smash the resistance were combined with those to anni-
hilate the Jewish population. As early as 2 April 1941, the forces deployed by 
both the security police and the SD for “enemy combat” received the mission 
to crack down not only on “emigrants, saboteurs, terrorists, etc.” but explicitly 
on “communists and Jews.” Thus, the Balkan campaign exhibited the char-
acteristics of a war of ideology from the very beginning and not only after 
Germany invaded the Soviet Union.24
Due to a lack of personnel, there was no fundamental division of la-
bor between the Wehrmacht and the special unit execution squads in the 
Balkans, as was practiced in Poland. Hitler expected that the army would be 
able to handle the partisan problem on its own. He judiciously assigned former 
Austrian career officers with relevant experience from the First World War to 
the Balkans.25 The plenipotentiary German general in Agram, Edmund Glaise 
von Horstenau, had formerly been a staff officer in the imperial Austrian 
army. The plentipotentiary commanding general in Serbia, Franz Böhme, 
and the majority of the enlisted troops came from Austria. Such continuity 
in personnel may perhaps explain why the occupation rule in the First and 
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Second World Wars are so very similar. Many a brutal “cleansing action” 
was carried out in regions where, according to Böhme, “in 1914, streams of 
German blood flowed from those beguiled by Serbs, men and women.”26 The 
terror perpetrated against the Serbian civilian population in the First World 
War was significantly radicalized yet again by the National Socialists, who 
used it as means to the ends of their racial policy.
In their sphere of influence the Italians also resorted to brute force as a 
means to create an ordine nuovo in the Mediterranean region. Anti-Slavic 
sentiments and the colonial experience in Africa shaped the attitudes of the 
Italian officer corps toward the Balkan “subhumans.”27 In the circular memo 
3C from March 1942, General Mario Roatta instructed his army not to play 
the part of the “good Italian,” but to use the harshest reprisals to smash par-
tisan resistance. Villages were bombed and burned to the ground, masses of 
hostages were interned and shot, tens of thousands of civilians were taken 
to the concentration camps of Gonars, Ponza, Colfiorito, and Renicci.28 This 
reality thoroughly contradicted the decades-old, uncontested self-image of 
the “good Italian.”29
The Annihilation of Jews and Roma
Military operations to combat the resistance were inseparable from the mea-
sures taken by the National Socialists to implement their monstrous plans for 
displacement, resettlement, and extermination beginning all over Europe in 
mid-July 1941.30 Jews in Southeast Europe also lost their civil rights, jobs, 
and property. They were registered, badged, declared an “enemy within,” and 
targeted in police raids, hostage shootings, mass executions and — starting in 
October 1941 at the latest — systematic and complete annihilation.
In 1940, an estimated 72,000 Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews lived in 
Yugoslavia, primarily in the cities. Unlike the situation in most other Eastern 
European countries, the Jewish population here was highly assimilated, 
well integrated, and not stigmatized by social envy to the same degree as in 
Hungary and Romania. Although anti-Semitism did exist in Croatia and to a 
lesser extent in Serbia, it tended to be a peripheral social phenomenon. Mixed 
marriages were common. In the 1930s, propaganda financed by Nazi Germany 
had been seeping into the country well before the Yugoslav government finally 
succumbed to pressure from Berlin and passed anti-Jewish laws in 1940. First 
and foremost, these laws set quotas for Jews at higher schools and banned them 
from serving in the army. Thanks to what was still a comparatively liberal 
policy, thousands of German and Austrian Jews chose to flee to Yugoslavia 
in the 1930s.
The Jewish policy of the Ustasha government was also highly influenced 
by Nazi Germany. Like several of his colleagues, Ante Pavelić was married 
132 Part III: 1941 to 1945
to a woman with Jewish family roots. Not until the late 1930s was an explicit 
anti-Semitism documented in the party’s program.31 Berlin often doubted the 
assiduity of its Croat vassals, such as when they proposed to grant particularly 
well-deserved Jewish citizens the status of “honorary Aryans” despite the 
strict race laws.32 Nonetheless, Pavelić followed the Nazi example and had 
Jews registered, badged, and dispossessed. On 26 June 1941, the Poglavnik 
came out in favor of the principle of collective guilt: “Since the Jews spread 
bogus news to unsettle the populace and disrupt and aggravate the provision 
of the population with their known speculative practices, they will therefore 
be considered collectively responsible and . . . deported to outdoor detention 
camps.”33 The Ustasha murdered more than 25,000 Jews in these camps, most 
of them in the notorious Department III B of the Jasenovac concentration 
camp. German agencies deported another 5,000 Jews to Auschwitz. Tens of 
thousands were shipped to German extermination camps from regions occu-
pied by Bulgaria and Hungary.34 The only place where Jews were a bit safer 
was in the Italian zone. Authorities there treated German pressure to deport in 
a dilatory manner, so that thousands could escape to Italy or save themselves 
in partisan-held territory. Whereas the royalist and conservative Italian army 
conducted an arrogant and aggressive civilizing mission in the lands it occu-
pied, it did not carry out a race-based, ethnic extermination project.35
German involvement was more direct in occupied Serbia. As early as 
mid-April 1941, all Jews had to register with the police. The German High 
Command (OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) collectively branded them 
as enemies of the state within the context of “combatting banditry” and made 
it a priority to shoot them in “reprisal actions” (Sühneaktionen). By early 
December nearly all Jews and gypsies were detained in the Sajmište concen-
tration camp near Belgrade, where the SS deployed a gas van starting in the 
spring of 1942 to murder the remaining survivors, of which 7,000 were women 
and children. Harald Turner, an SS-Gruppenführer and head of the German 
military administration in Serbia, proudly reported in August 1942: “Serbia 
is the only country in which the Jewish question and the Gypsy question have 
been solved.”36
Of the approximately 72,000 Jews who originally lived in the entire 
Yugoslav region, about 55,000 to 60,000 fell victim to the genocide between 
1941 and 1945, about 28,000 of whom died in German concentration camps. 
Thousands emigrated to Israel after the war.37 As a result, the Jewish popu-
lation in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s had been decimated to about 6,500.38 
Likewise, the roughly 80,000 Yugoslav Roma were also stigmatized, disen-
franchised, and systematically murdered. In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
they were almost completely wiped out and managed to survive in larger 
numbers only in Serbia and Montenegro.
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The Serb Chetniks
In the spring and summer of 1941, the nationalist Chetniks presented them-
selves as the chief protagonists of Serb resistance. The Chetniks formed armed 
guerrilla units in parts of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia under the command 
of Colonel Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović. As assistant to the chief of staff in 
the Yugoslav army and an expert on guerrilla warfare, Mihailović had refused 
to surrender when the German Wehrmacht invaded and instead marched to 
western Serbia with fifty to sixty men, where he set up his headquarters in 
Ravna Gora in mid-May.
It was Mihailović’s aim to ride the wave of Serb patriotism to the top of a 
restored monarchical postwar order. He therefore avoided open confrontation 
with the occupiers, which he considered to be militarily superior, and planned 
to wait for the anticipated Allied landing before starting an uprising. He in-
vented military successes to report to London, while at the same time getting 
financial backing from the Serbian collaboration government and offering his 
services to the Germans and Italians. Fearing the communists above all else, 
the Yugoslav government in exile turned a deaf ear to rumors about any pos-
sible betrayal by their resistance hero. In January 1942, it named Mihailović 
to the post of war minister and commander-in-chief of the “Yugoslav Army in 
the Homeland.” As a recognized representative of the old system, he received 
military support from the British until mid-1943.
Mihailović’s Chetniks borrowed the famous name, emblems, and bearing 
of the historical partisan fighters from the First World War. They wore high 
fur caps on heads bearing long hair and unkempt beards and hung ammuni-
tion belts across their chests. Traditional symbols and codes evoked a sense 
of continuity that did not actually exist but triggered widespread recognition 
and favor among the rural population. Mihailović is thought to have recruited 
3,000 to 4,000 men, if not more, by September 1941. Many were former of-
ficers, noncommissioned officers, gendarmes, and policemen. By 1943, his 
following is said to have grown to a number ranging from 30,000 (the German 
estimate) to 180,000 (Mihailović’s claim). However, from the start, the slightly 
chaotic force suffered from internal rivalries, discipline problems, and a lack 
of clear organizational structure and central command.39
The Chetniks differed from region to region, and their supporters were 
driven by various motives: patriotism, self-protection, nationalism, or chau-
vinism. In Croatia and western Bosnia, they formed primarily as resistance to 
the Ustasha atrocities. Otherwise, their social base consisted of the populations 
found in Serb villages and the Montenegrin mountains, where customs, popu-
lar religion, and patriarchal values were dominant. Any search for a cohesive 
ideological program is fruitless. This explains why some collaborated with 
the occupiers, while others conducted guerrilla warfare, and still others later 
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defected to the partisans.40 A notable segment of the Serb bourgeoisie, the 
nationalist-oriented intelligentsia, and the Orthodox clergy also sympathized 
with the Chetniks, especially since those with more moderate political views 
found few alternatives to the communists.41
The popularity enjoyed by the Chetniks in Serbia and Montenegro in the 
rural areas can be attributed in no small measure to the protection they provided 
to the peasant population against Germans and Italians. For example, in con-
sultation with the Italian occupation authorities in Montenegro, Herzegovina, 
and Sandžak, they were able to establish local self-administrative bodies. With 
tacit approval and sometimes open support on the part of Nedić’s authorities, 
many communities in Serbia led a life of their own. The village Miokovce in 
the Šumadija region completely evaded the clutches of the state: “Now all state 
power has skipped over us,” the head of the village told a journalist in early 
1944. “Here we also have military, police, and court. . . . Now we make all 
our own laws. . . . Whoever does not listen, gets beaten. . . . Blows or a bullet 
to the head. . . . The village is . . . like a small state.” 42 The inhabitants paid no 
taxes and ignored military conscription orders. Instead, they provided food to 
the Chetnik fighters in the surrounding mountains, who in exchange protected 
the villagers from unwanted visits by the Wehrmacht.
Tito and the People’s Liberation War
In the meantime, the communists working underground were making military 
preparations for armed resistance. On 4 July 1941, shortly after Hitler’s inva-
sion of the Soviet Union, Tito declared the launching of armed insurgency and 
created partisan units. Preparations had been underway already for months. 
Yugoslavia was to be liberated and some pressure taken off the Red Army 
by creating a new front for the Germans. In August 1941, he proclaimed the 
“liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia from the occupiers and a fight against 
indigenous agents . . . who support the subjugation and terrorization of our 
people.”43 Although a change of political system was part of the plan from 
the very start, it sounded less adverse to refer to the struggle as a “people’s 
war of liberation” instead of a “socialist revolution.” Still, the iconography 
spoke volumes. As an emblem the partisans chose the five-pointed red star, 
and on Stalin’s birthday, 21 December 1941, they formed the First Proletarian 
Brigade in the eastern Bosnian town of Rudo. With 1,200 soldiers, it was the 
first larger all-Yugoslav combat unit operating offensively and transregionally 
that understood itself as the military arm of the Communist Party.
The emergence of Tito’s armed resistance presented the occupation forces 
with a serious challenger and the Chetniks with a dangerous rival. Although 
the partisans and the Chetniks had sometimes fought together against Ustasha 
and the Wehrmacht, a rift occurred in September 1941. The first military clash 
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in November 1941 escalated into civil war, an ideological battle to the death. 
Mihailović saw himself as the legitimate representative of the king and his 
government and strove to reinstate the old order under Serb leadership. In 
June 1941 a memorandum titled “Homogeneous Serbia” by political advisor 
Stevan Moljević outlined the large-scale, ethnic-based, forced displacement of 
Croats and Muslims on roughly 70 percent of Yugoslavia’s territory. His ideas 
about a Greater Serbia inspired a proposal by the Chetnik Central Committee 
that was presented to the government in exile in September 1941. For his part, 
Tito preached “brotherhood and unity” among all peoples and sought to bring 
about a socialist revolution and certainly his own rise to power.
Unlike the defensive military operations of the Chetniks, the partisans 
sought open offensive combat with the occupation forces. Next to their con-
trasting ideological and political objectives, this was another reason for the 
tension between them. The militarily trained party cadre, veterans from the 
Spanish Civil War, and former officers of the Yugoslav army assumed the 
command of the partisan fighters. Within a few months, they had built a tightly 
run armed force that quickly developed into a regular, centrally commanded 
people’s liberation army.
Before the war, the Communist Party had only been strong and well 
organized in several of the larger cities. In occupied Slovenia, they had al-
ready joined forces with Christian socialists, intellectuals, and segments of 
the Sokol organization to create a “Liberation Front” (Osvobodilna fronta) in 
April 1941. They became so powerful in Italian-occupied Ljubljana that they 
could establish a parallel state with illegal military hospitals, print shops, 
and so on, and practically governed the province from underground through 
a tightly meshed network that reached the highest levels of authority.44 In the 
rural regions, however, the CPY was considerably weaker and had not cared 
too much about the peasants. For example, when the war started, they only had 
830 members in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Four years later, 140,000 Bosnian 
partisans were fighting under Tito’s command.45
In addition to CPY members, youth organizations, trade unions, and 
an increasing number of noncommunists soon began to back the partisans. 
Besides a general sense of patriotism, the brutal persecution by the Ustasha 
and the rampant retribution measures by the Wehrmacht also drove more and 
more fighters underground. The unpredictability and omnipresence of the 
terror, the precarious supply situation, and the state of unending exhaustion 
and humiliation mobilized resistance, at first hesitantly and then at a rapidly 
accelerating pace. For the masses of simple rural dwellers, even the unpo-
litical ones, no conceivable way had been found to come to terms with the 
foreign rulers. Harald Turner, German military head of the administration 
in Serbia, noted as early as the fall of 1941: “These people, who in countless 
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cases witnessed themselves the bestial massacre of their relatives, had no 
more to lose . . . and thus consorted with the Communists in the forests and 
mountains.”46
The motives and modes of insurgency varied; rarely were they ideologi-
cal. There were organized forms of communist resistance in the cities, but also 
activities by irregular bands, militias, and village guards conducted strictly 
for self-protection. Often organized opposition developed out of social rebel-
liousness, proletarian protest, and small-town obstinacy. The uprising of Serb 
peasants in western Bosnia tended to resemble premodern agrarian revolts, in 
which the aim was to restore the old order, not to create a new one. In other 
places, insurgency flared up in urban working-class milieus, such as in the 
summer of 1941 when the workforce of the timber and cellulose factories in 
Drvar rebelled against layoffs and then declared the founding of the republic.47 
The Communist Party was successful because it managed to bundle these very 
different forms of protest and resistance under the motto of “people’s libera-
tion” and to forge the heterogeneous milieus into a unified command structure. 
In the firmly established social structure of a village community, a single 
part-time worker might have been all it took to draw first his large family clan 
and then all of his neighbors into the resistance. Tito’s comrade and chronicler 
Vladimir Dedijer was surprised how many simple, politically unexperienced, 
and unskilled men joined them, especially from quite poverty- stricken re-
gions. In the fall of 1941, the partisans had taken control of several areas 
located in Montenegro, in Croatian Lika, Banija, and Kordun, in Bosnian 
Krajina, in Herzegovina, and in western, southern, and eastern Serbia. In 
the first liberated territory the communists declared the establishment of the 
Republic of Užice in September. The short-lived mini-state in Western Serbia 
served as Tito’s headquarters.48
In light of the partisans’ military successes, Mihailović discovered that 
his strategy to wait out the war was causing him to fall more and more to the 
wayside. Not only was Tito challenging his title as the top resistance hero, but 
also his claim to be the future head of state. In November 1941, Mihailović 
ordered an attack on the partisan headquarters in Užice, an assault that ended 
in military disaster for the Chetniks.49 Mihailović, who still refused to sur-
render to the Germans, now offered to be a partner to the Wehrmacht. This 
was the beginning of an ever intensifying involvement in various forms of 
cooperation and collaboration with the declared enemy. However, the com-
manding general, Franz Böhme, rejected Mihailović’s offer, telling him that 
“the German Wehrmacht will deal with the communists by itself quite soon 
and . . . cannot trust you as an ally.”50
The seed for the rift between Tito and Stalin was planted during these 
early years. In the fall of 1941, the Soviet dictator was desperately depen-
dent on a second Allied front that would force the Germans to redirect more 
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divisions from the east. In order to calm Western suspicions that he was at-
tempting to Sovietize Southeast Europe, he needed to dissuade the Yugoslav 
communists from their plans to establish a socialist political system. Instead 
of the arms Tito urgently requested, Stalin sent him a long telegram lecturing 
the Yugoslavs to stop preaching revolution and instead to forge a popular front 
alliance with the man backed by the British, Draža Mihailović. To Tito’s ex-
treme frustration, the radio station Free Yugoslavia from Moscow continually 
broadcast Chetnik propaganda from London.
At the end of November, the Wehrmacht undertook a major offensive 
against all the areas controlled by the resistance in Serbia, during which the 
Republic of Užice also fell. More than 1,400 partisans died; hundreds were 
taken prisoner and then murdered. Not long after that, the Germans stormed 
the Chetnik headquarters in Ravna Gora. They also leveled further draconian 
measures against civilians. Whoever gave partisans food or shelter or refused 
to betray partisan whereabouts was “considered an insurgent himself and 
shot.”51 Tito and his stalwart followers managed to head south and eventually 
to reach Sandžak. In the borderlands between Montenegro, eastern Bosnia, 
and southern Serbia, they could at first control some territory but were soon 
also driven away from there.
By early December 1941, the insurgency in Serbia and Montenegro had 
been put down for all practical purposes. Granted, by then the partisans 
had about 80,000 men and women in arms, but the superior might of half a 
million German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian occupation troops plus 
120,000 soldiers from the Ustasha and Nedić regimes was crushing.52 Having 
been driven out of Serbia, where the peasant population tended to favor the 
Chetniks over the partisans, and under constant fire from the militarily far 
superior Germans and Italians, the partisans were faced with despair and 
demise. There was no help to be found far and wide. Eight painfully long and 
demoralizing months had passed since the Germans had stormed Užice when 
Tito decided in late June 1942 to move his high command westward to the 
heartland of the Independent State of Croatia. Only here were the partisans 
able to control larger areas with the support of Serbs threatened by persecu-
tion. The crusade by the Ustasha drove more and more men and women to join 
the resistance, so that the uprising in the Bosnian region of Krajina, in Lika, 
and in Slavonia promised to spread further.
Four brigades set out in June 1942 on a seemingly never-ending and very 
risky march full of deprivation through the summits and valleys of the Bosnian 
mountains. For months, the ragged figures lived in the forests and slept on the 
hard ground with only a tornister pack shoved under their heads. Food and 
medicine were notoriously scarce and ammunition was in acute shortage, just 
as it was everywhere. “The worst was that there was no salt. We also suffered 
from scurvy, for there was no fruit or green vegetables in the mountains. We 
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could only eat young beech leaves, or press the juice out of the beech bark 
and drink it.”53 Usually the partisans traveled with entire herds of sheep and 
goats that were slaughtered along the way. The herds were replenished by 
requisitions from peasants.
During the march through the ethnically heterogeneous areas in which 
the Ustasha, Chetniks, and occupational forces had raged and rampaged one 
after the other, more and more desperate people joined the people’s liberation 
army, first and foremost the persecuted Serbs. With the slogan “Brotherhood 
and Unity” (bratstvo i jedinstvo), Tito overcame the initial reservations of 
some of those Croats and Muslims who had originally felt drawn to the na-
tionalist parties and had distrusted the communists. The latter, however, now 
promised to solve the national question at the expense of Serbian hegemony 
so that the emphasis of national and religious feelings became decisive for 
the mobilization of the rural population. The communists explained that they 
did not just want to liberate Yugoslavia as a state, but also each of its peoples. 
At the end of 1942, Tito published an article on the “National Question” in 
which he promised: “The struggle for the peoples’ liberation and the national 
question in Yugoslavia are inseparably linked to one another. . . . The term 
peoples’ liberation struggle would only be an empty phrase, even deceit, if it 
would not . . . also have its own national meaning for every people, if it would 
not only mean the liberation of Yugoslavia but at the same time also the liber-
ation of the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians, Muslims, etc.”54 
The peoples’ liberation struggle presented itself as a national emancipatory 
movement for everyone and every nation and nationality. Eventually a large 
segment of the non-Serb peasantry became convinced of this.55
In early November 1942, the partisans captured the western Bosnian town 
of Bihać, formerly a Ustasha bastion, after a hard fight. From this victory 
emerged a large contiguous territory in the heart of Independent State of 
Croatia in western Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Lika. Roughly two million people 
inhabited this territory, now known as the Bihać Republic. In this new re-
public, the first all-Yugoslav assembly was held on 26–27 November 1942, 
attended by delegates from the various parts of the country, specifically the 
Antifascist Council of the Peoples’ Liberation Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) with its 
national committees from Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tito still did not dare to declare the founding of a 
new government, but the cornerstone for a socialist Yugoslavia had been laid.
1943: The Turning Point
In the fall of 1942, the military tide turned against Germany worldwide. In 
Africa, British and American troops were victorious, and the Western pow-
ers were preparing for the invasion of Sicily. All at once, the partisans in the 
Balkans played a key role as a potential partner for the Allies. In early 1943, 
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there was more and more evidence that the British would drop Mihailović. 
He had publicly declared that his main enemies were the partisans, Ustasha, 
and Muslims and that only the Italians were his pillar of support. A British 
military mission sent evidence back to London proving that the Chetniks were 
collaborating with the Axis and that partisan fighting power was “the most 
formidable.” Moreover, to switch sides would also help to establish a common 
line with the Soviets.56
Hitler undertook one more futile attempt to ward off his military defeat 
in the Balkans. He transferred the command of all Serbian and Croatian units 
to the supreme commander of the southeast and expanded the competencies 
of the SS in their campaign to “combat banditry.” Part of this project was to 
create national volunteer divisions in the occupied and allied lands to fight 
alongside the Waffen SS. In addition to the notorious “Prinz Eugen” Division 
of ethnic Germans, they formed the Muslim division Handžar (saber) in March 
1943 and the Kosovo-Albanian Skanderbeg in March 1944.57
Hitler ordered his generals to be “brutal” in their operations and to discard 
all “European inhibitions.” German troops liquidated insurgents and anyone 
considered suspicious, plundered and torched villages, and depopulated en-
tire tracts of the countryside in order “to drain the swamp.” Ahead of events, 
the Wehrmacht High Command had ensured its soldiers immunity for any 
criminal action “also against women and children.” With time, the German 
military leadership was reluctantly forced to admit that the arbitrary terror 
perpetrated against the civilian population tended to spark more resistance 
than to smother it.58
On 20 January 1943, the Wehrmacht launched “Operation White” to erad-
icate resistance once and for all. Unceasing air, tank, and artillery attacks were 
supposed to drive the partisans into the murderous clutches of the Italians 
and Chetniks and then thoroughly annihilate them. The German offensive, 
in which the Prinz Eugen Division took part, put Tito’s troops in an utterly 
hopeless situation. Thousands of wounded needed to be rescued from the 
enemy’s revenge. Despite ice and snow, more than 100,000 refugees set out 
on a march in which they found burned-down villages but no shelter. Tito 
sent a telegram to Moscow: “Am obliged once again to ask you if it is really 
quite impossible to send us some sort of assistance? Hundreds of thousands 
of refugees are menaced by death from starvation.”59 But even twenty months 
into the war, not even a token of support was in sight.
Josip Broz, whom his fellow partisans endearingly called stari (in effect, 
“old man” or “father”), engendered even in his toughest political opponents a 
bit of awestruck admiration.60 Over fifty years old, Tito possessed legendary 
leadership qualities and radiated self-confidence, determination, and natural 
authority. “He gave an impression of great strength held in reserve, the im-
pression of a tiger ready to spring,” reported the British liaison officer Fitzroy 
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Maclean in 1943 from Tito’s headquarters. “He was unusually ready to dis-
cuss any question on its merits and to take a decision there and then, without 
reference to a higher authority. He seemed perfectly sure of himself; he was 
a principal, not a subordinate.”61
Maybe Tito lacked the talent to be a great field marshal, but he was able 
to inspire his troops time and again and to lead them into the offensive by way 
of dubious military maneuvers. Despite enormous losses during the German 
offensive of early 1943, the Proletarian Brigades broke through the enemy 
circumvallation, finally defeated the Chetniks allied with the Italians in the 
Battle of the Neretva, and saved thousands of wounded and masses of peas-
ants seeking protection before advancing subsequently to Montenegro. In the 
following German-Italian offensive “Operation Black” in May, the partisans 
also suffered massive losses. As many as 7,500 fighters, nearly a third of their 
troops, and over 1,300 wounded and sick, were wiped out in the Battle of the 
Sutjeska. Yet once again the partisans succeeded in escaping the enemy’s 
clutches and the ranks filled with new volunteers. Even local alliances be-
tween Germans, Italians, Ustasha, and Chetniks were no longer in a position 
to turn the tide.
With each military victory, Tito’s stature grew. All power became con-
centrated in him. He was the head of the CPY, commander-in-chief of the 
army, and chairman of the government-like AVNOJ. Many people projected 
their hopes on him, and partisans were finding more and more backing in 
Croatia. “Hardly a village, hardly a wooded area, hardly a train trip that they 
[the Wehrmacht] do not become the victim of some larger or smaller measure 
of treacherous attack,” noted General Glaise von Horstenau in his diary.62 The 
German general Rudolf Lüters had to admit in July 1943: “The view that the 
German Wehrmacht serves in a friendly country [Croatia] is long obsolete. 
The majority of the population support the insurgents.”63
Italy’s surrender in September 1943 brought the final military break-
through. Large arsenals of weapons and munition fell into partisan hands. 
The insurgency had now engulfed Dalmatia and Montenegro, and victory was 
in sight. In 1943, the People’s Liberation Army numbered over 300,000 men 
and women, and the ranks kept swelling. At the start of the war Germany had 
only had 30,000 soldiers in the Balkans; by 1943/1944 the force had grown 
to include 18 divisions with 250,000 men in place to control the growing 
resistance.64
From 29 to 30 November 1943, Tito convened the second meeting of 
the AVNOJ in the central Bosnian town of Jajce. The 142 delegates from all 
parts of the country declared the body to be the country’s highest legislative 
and executive authority. The only delegates who could not make it were those 
from Macedonia; combat activity had blocked their trip to Bosnia. The council 
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decided to restructure Yugoslavia as a socialist federal state of constituent 
peoples and republics with equal rights. The parts of Slovenia and Croatia 
that had been lost in 1918 were to be handed back to the new Yugoslavia. The 
council forbade King Peter II to return and announced that war crimes would 
be prosecuted. Tito was awarded the honorary title of marshal. The Allies had 
signaled beforehand that they would officially recognize the partisans as allies. 
At the time, on 30 November to be exact, they too were meeting at a summit 
in Tehran. They were also of the opinion that Yugoslavia should be revived as 
a state, although the question of the eventual political order and the western 
border to Italy were left open for a while.
In May 1944, as the Allies prepared for the landing in Normandy, the 
Wehrmacht started its seventh and last offensive, known as “Rösselsprung” 
(a chess term for a knight’s move), this time with the objective being to capture 
Tito himself, dead or alive. At the very last minute, the partisan leader was 
able to escape the paratrooper attack on his hideout in a Bosnian cave. The 
British brought him and his staff to safety on the Adriatic island of Vis. From 
here he laid the tracks for his later takeover of power.
9.
The 1940s: Total War
If we are to understand why the partisans became so strong and the commu-
nists could later assume power, then it is imperative to view developments 
against the backdrop of the total war that Yugoslavia experienced. Inherent 
in this conflict were dimensions of an exploitative, racial, and civil war, a war 
that caused human tragedies and societal upheavals to an unimagined degree. 
Occupation, exploitation, terror against civilians, “ethnic cleansing,” persecu-
tion, and mass annihilation caused people to experience existential threat on a 
daily basis, which in turn rocked the foundations of institutions, social class, 
identity, roles, and hierarchies. All established values and moral categories 
were toppled. In this way the war became a laboratory for social utopias and an 
accelerator for a new revolutionary order. It bundled all those forces of social 
change that had been forging ahead since the turn of the century, if nothing 
else than by grinding away at the rotten fundament of the old political system.
Economic and Social Tremors
Back on 16 April 1941, Hitler ordered that the “economic prerogatives” and 
export quotas in Yugoslavia and Greece were to be secured for the Reich. He 
forced his allies to hand over resources that were vital to the German war ef-
fort. The Bulgarians had to relinquish ore and chrome mines, the Hungarians 
oilfields. Even Italy was bullied into delivering bauxite from Dalmatia, iron 
ore from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lead and zinc from Kosovo.1 In order to 
exploit the occupied countries, German authorities resorted to every means 
imaginable. Reich Finance Minister Schwerin von Krosigk explained that the 
objective was to “extract the maximum of economic advantage from these 
countries.”2 Between June 1941 and July 1944, Croatia and Serbia were forced 
to deliver industrial goods to Germany valued at 328.4 million and 91.2 million 
reichsmarks, respectively.3
The plenipotentiary for economic affairs in Serbia, Franz Neuhausen, 
organized the entire economy to coordinate with the German four-year plan. 
Infrastructure, mining, and plants relevant for armament were placed under 
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his supervision. Gold and securities from the vault of the Serbian national 
bank disappeared into the German treasury. In Croatia, Berlin used bilateral 
government committees and treaties to secure a monopoly on exploiting min-
eral deposits like antimony, copper, lead, zinc, bauxite, and iron ore. Labor 
was also exported: 200,000 workers from Croatia and 200,000 from Serbia 
were deported to the Reich, sometimes voluntarily, usually under force.4
Tens of thousands were also forced to work in factories and mines in their 
home countries. At the end of 1941, the Nedić government introduced compul-
sory labor duty for every person between the ages of 17 and 45. The authorities 
resorted to drastic measures in order to compile the workforce needed for 
mining and other war-relevant activities. In 1943, this workforce numbered 
40,000 and included compulsory laborers, refugees, political prisoners, and 
prisoners of war. In the mines and prison camps, “naked and barefoot people 
in rags” worked to the point of exhaustion, constantly undernourished and 
tormented by guards.5
Parallel to this, agriculture was also being aligned to the needs of the 
Reich. Newly created economic offices issued “target quotas” and strict rules 
on levying feed and industrial crops, sunflowers and seed, vegetables and 
grain. To the frustration of the authorities, peasants were very creative in 
finding ways to use, hide, or sell their produce on the black market. They did 
so because anyone who did indeed turn over the demanded quota soon found 
themselves starving. Should the quota be filled, this left only 57 kilograms of 
wheat per year to each Serb, while the normal bread consumption demanded 
four times as much on average.6 Only in the Banat, the region controlled by 
ethnic Germans, were the occupational authorities more successful in the 
“battle for production.” In the first three years of the war, this region sent 
900,000 tons of wheat, corn, sunflower seeds, and other produce, as well as 
305,000 pigs to the Reich.7
To top it off, the occupied lands were also required to finance the 
Wehrmacht and the occupation administration. For this purpose, Serbia spent 
well over 1.5 billion reichsmarks and Croatia more than a billion. In both coun-
tries this resulted in a horrendous devaluation of their currency.8 In Croatia, 
prices climbed until 1944 from 2,500 to 3,000 percent over the prewar level. 
On the black market, the figure was more than 9,000 percent. In Serbia, the 
costs of living rose by more than 2,700 percent between mid-1941 and the end 
of 1943. At the same time, real wages sank by more than half. This explains 
why Yugoslavs had lost about four-fifths of their income by the end of the war.9
The devastating impact of the war economy brought the social pyramid 
crashing to the ground. Galloping inflation caused a gigantic destruction of 
business values and leveled class and status differences. While peasants were 
freed of their debts overnight, the middle classes became poor because the 
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value of their wages, pensions, and savings melted away. The former advan-
tage of urban life over rural life now turned into a disadvantage. To secure 
food, city dwellers had to swap or sell everything they owned. Gold and jew-
elry, furniture and clothing now changed hands for a song.
In the poorer regions, namely in Dalmatia, Lika, and Herzegovina, star-
vation occurred in the very first war winter of 1941. Likewise, in the Serbian 
province “the population [was] . . . especially preoccupied with the concern 
to secure food, which is almost all gone. What the occupier has failed to 
plunder and ship to Germany is hidden by unscrupulous retailers or sold only 
at astronomical prices.”10
Despite it all, cultural life in Zagreb and Belgrade continued. Theater 
productions, exhibitions, literature readings, variety shows, concerts, and 
sport events were all subject to strict censure, as were radio broadcasts and 
printed press publications. Movie theaters primarily featured German films 
like Baron Münchhausen, and from the printing presses came Nazi propa-
ganda publications and works by authors sympathetic to the cause, like the 
Swedish geographer Sven Hedin.11 All in all, the situation was desolate. “No 
one ever leaves the house. We don’t light the oven, and there is no electricity 
during the day. . . . Meals are bad, there is no meat. . . . No one knows from 
what direction they will be hit next. One lives from one day to the next.”12 
In the provincial areas, daily life was even grimmer. For example, in Užice 
“bleakness and tension prevailed: the shops were empty, the market deserted; 
only the tailor shops and bakeries that worked for the army were very busy. 
The streets and the small parks were neglected, the shop windows dirty. All 
that was to be seen was misery and decay. In the streets, only a few people . . . 
shabbily dressed.”13
Those who had not been conscripted into the army or had not gone under-
ground to fight in the resistance either sat at home or hung out at the village 
pub. But soon even that was no longer permitted. In early March 1942, the 
Serbian minister for domestic affairs prohibited youth from spending their 
time by taking the traditional stroll, sauntering down streets and through 
squares, even going to pubs.14
Resignation and despair, apathy and fatalism spread particularly in places 
where there was constant fighting. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, people lived practi-
cally in a permanent state of psychological duress. When the partisans invaded 
eastern Bosnia in early 1942, they were met by eerie creatures: “Their faces 
expressed dull and inhuman indifference . . . all were dressed in rags and old 
stuff, their faces were yellow and haggard.”15
In spite of harsh sanctions, the exploitative strategy was only success-
ful to a degree. For one thing, the authorities no longer had access to an 
ever-increasing number of “liberated areas.” In 1943, they managed only to 
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secure barely a fourth of the harvest in Croatia.16 For another, industry did 
not produce the amount they expected. By dismembering Yugoslavia, the 
authorities also fragmented a functioning economic space and its division of 
labor, created small economic entities, and severed transregional chains of 
procurement and production. Given the starvation, shortages of manpower 
and fuel, and the constant attacks by the partisans, economic performance fell 
off sharply. In many sectors, Serbian production had already sunk by half by 
1942; in Croatia, 80 percent of industrial capacity was out of service in 1944.17
“Ethnic Cleansing”
As this first Yugoslavia perished, so too did the ideology of an integrated South 
Slavic state. In its place arose separate ethnic and sometimes even racist con-
cepts of identity that resorted to the idea of the cultural nation — a community 
linked by origin, history, language, and religion. In all parts of the country, 
nationalists implemented ruthless policies of assimilation, resettlement, and 
in some cases annihilation in order to remove those population groups they 
deemed undesirable. Since the early nineteenth century and certainly after 
the two Balkan Wars in 1912/1913, ethnically heterogeneous regions were 
“cleansed” of minority populations when empires broke apart or institutions 
failed, as was now occurring in occupied Yugoslavia. Creating ethnically ex-
clusive nation states also aimed at destroying potential opponents — a typical 
motive also in later “ethnic cleansing.” Millions of people now discovered 
that their fate was dependent solely on the purely accidental ascription of the 
“right” or the “wrong” nationality.
The Croat Ustasha government was driven by a complex mélange of 
anti-Serb sentiments and fascist ideology, old cravings for revenge and new en-
emy images, coupled with specific military, economic, and political interests.18 
Their overriding obsession was to drive the Serbs out of the regions northwest 
of the Drina and Sava rivers, those regions that the Turks had conquered in 
the fifteenth century. Only as a result of missionary work and religious con-
version as well as the colonization policy of the Habsburgs in the eighteenth 
century had Serb settlements of any importance emerged in Croatia, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. The objective of the Croat fascists was to 
restore the original ethnic state as they presumed it had existed in the period 
prior to the Ottoman conquest.
The Ustasha regime did not have a strong following, charismatic lead-
ership, or any other form of legitimacy to govern. Against this background, 
their radical anti-Serb sentiment became their “raison d’être and ceterum cen-
seo,” as one of their protagonists, Slavko Kvaternik, wrote.19 There were three 
reasons for this. First, the strong Serb presence contradicted their utopia of 
a homogeneous Greater Croatian nation state. Second, revenge needed to be 
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taken for the years of Serb hegemony, which was to be prevented from ever 
occurring again. Third, the elimination of the “eternal enemy” helped the 
Croat fascists justify their own rule and implement it locally. In a speech he 
gave on 2 May 1941, Minister Milovan Žanić declared: “This must be the land 
of the Croats, and no one else. No means exists that we, the Ustasha, will not 
use to make this land truly Croatian and to cleanse it of Serbs, who have long 
threatened us for centuries.”20
In order to homogenize the Greater Croatian state, the authorities im-
plemented ruthless policies of assimilation, displacement, and annihilation. 
They banned Serb organizations and the Cyrillic alphabet and “cleaned up” 
the Croatian language. Immediately after assuming power, they started mass 
expulsions. The first to be deported were the Serb colonists, who had received 
land in the course of the agrarian reform in 1919 that they now had to give 
up without any compensation. They were forced to leave for Serbia. The next 
ordered to leave were politically active individuals and clergy. Police woke 
up these people in the middle of the night, took away their house keys and 
valuables, and put them on a train headed for Serbia. Out of fear of reprisals, 
thousands of people then fled the country by foot and empty-handed, without 
cash or provisions. By the end of September 1941, nearly 120,000 Serbs had 
left the country, and a year later the number had risen to 200,000.21
Besides discrimination and segregation, Serbs were the victim also of 
physical annihilation. The larger massacres of Serbs since April 1941 are doc-
umented as having taken place in Bosnian Krajina, in Bihać, Cazin, Bosanska 
Krupa, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Ključ, then also in eastern Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for example in Zvornik, Višegrad, Bijeljina, Sarajevo, Foča, and 
Goražde. It was quite obvious that the aim was to create homogeneous Croat 
areas in the regions bordering Serbia and Montenegro.22 From up to 330,000 
Serbs killed in the four years of the war, 217,000 fell victim to the systematic 
persecution during killing sprees in villages, cities, and throughout the coun-
tryside, as well as in prisons and camps.23
The events of 1941 in western and central Bosnia illustrate the way in 
which the spiral of violence and counterviolence began. Following the Ustasha 
movement’s seizure of power, measures to disenfranchise and persecute Serbs 
were implemented in rapid succession: on 17 April, a ban of the Cyrillic al-
phabet; 23 April, the expulsion of all those born in Serbia and Montenegro; 
25 April, the annulment of mixed marriages; 4 May, hostage taking and the 
first killing sprees, plundering, and terror. The fear of further attacks prompted 
Serbs to organize local militias. On 7 May near Sanski Most, a group of about 
1,000 peasants armed with hayforks and shovels drove off a troop of Croatian 
and German soldiers. In reprisal, the Wehrmacht advanced with heavy artil-
lery, shelled the nest of resistance to smithereens, and shot numerous hostages. 
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On 27 May, Serbs and Jews were prohibited from using public transportation 
and baths. On 5 June came the order to gather all those fit for work in camps, 
and on 10 and 11 June the order to deport entire families on a massive scale 
to Serbia. The growing resistance at the local level, inspired by Tito’s beacon 
of hope regarding the people’s liberation, is what finally broke the dam: on 
23 July, all remaining Serbs were required to be registered, and thousands 
were brutally murdered with axes, knives, clubs, and other archaic methods 
of killing.24
Under Ustasha rule, the extreme right — similar to what occurred in 
Spain — entered an unholy alliance with Catholicism. Serbs and Croats spoke 
the same dialects, so that religion was the only remaining objective marker of 
distinction and paramount ethnic identification. Therefore, the representatives 
of the Orthodox Church, meaning the bishops, metropolitans, monks, and 
priests, were subject to particular fury. The Ustasha forces had hundreds of 
churches deliberately destroyed, monasteries plundered and sacked to their 
foundations, and church property expropriated. The Serbian Orthodox religion 
was renamed “Greek Eastern.” Approximately 250,000 Orthodox were forced 
to convert to Catholicism. In order to cut the spiritual, emotional, and national-
ist ties to Serbia, the Croatian government established a new, state-supervised 
Croatian Orthodox Church in April 1942; however, with little success.
Even today, the role of the Catholic Church and its leader, Archbishop 
Alojzije Stepinac, is highly controversial. Nationalist-oriented clergy sympa-
thized or even cooperated with the Ustasha regime, because they lauded the 
Croat nation and fought the communists. Stepinac was probably not a com-
mitted fascist, but he was certainly also not a decisive opponent of the new 
regime. In honor of the Independent State of Croatia, he had a Te Deum read 
in all churches in early May 1941 and had himself appointed to the post of 
head military vicar in Croatia. The state was the fulfilment of a “centuries-old 
and ardently desired dream”; it was “no longer the tongue . . . but the blood” 
that was speaking, he announced in a circular memorandum in April 1941.25 
The Vatican, which was informed about what was happening in Croatia, 
withheld its criticism.26 The Catholic press praised the Ustasha, and far more 
than a few clerics welcomed and supported the policy of forced conversion to 
Catholicism. One of them was Frater Vlado Bilobrk from Metković, who said 
in a sermon: “Everyone must convert to the Catholic faith because no other 
religion has a justified existence and no one will remain alive who has not 
accepted the Catholic faith.”27
Just as the Ustasha regime propagated an ethnically “pure” Greater Croatia, 
the Serb Chetniks boasted about Greater Serbia. Draža Mihailović relied on 
Stevan Moljević’s memorandum of June 1941 titled “Homogeneous Serbia,” 
which he claimed included northern Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, 
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Dalmatia, and large sections of Croatia. Had this absurd plan been implemented, 
more than four million people would have been resettled and expelled.28 With 
the political program they presented in September 1941, the Chetniks an-
nounced preparations in the “Serb countries” to ensure “that only the Serb 
population remains in them.” To do this it would be necessary “to have an eye 
particularly on the rapid and radical cleansing of the cities . . . [and] to develop 
a plan to cleanse and deport the rural population.” Moreover, it was also time 
“to solve the question of the Muslims as much as possible in this phase.”29 
Mihailović was even clearer about what he meant on 20 December 1941: he 
issued the directive “to cleanse [the national territory] of all national minorities 
and anational elements.” Muslims and Croats were also to be removed from 
Sandžak, Bosnia, and Croatia (up to the Karlovac-Knin-Šibenik line).30
“Ethnic cleansing” was also undertaken by the Germans, Italians, 
Hungarians, Albanians, and Bulgarians for the purpose of better incorpo-
rating annexed territory. The most extensive plans were drawn up by Hitler, 
who intended to transform all of Europe along racial lines. In a speech 
given in the Reichstag on 6 October 1939, he had announced the “ethnic 
consolidation” (völkische Flurbereinigung) of East and Southeast Europe; 
as the Reich commissar responsible for “German Nationhood,” Heinrich 
Himmler had designed a comprehensive European “master settlement plan” 
(Gesamtsiedlungsplanung). The Balkan countries were also to provide sev-
eral pieces to the overall mosaic of the “Greater Germanic Reich” that was 
to be created by systematically murdering Jews and gypsies, “Germanizing” 
annexed territory, and resettling millions of ethnic Germans.
Much like the Poles living under the General Government in the German 
zone of occupation, the Slovenes in the annexed regions of Lower Styria, south-
ern Carinthia, and Upper Carniola were viewed “basically as enemies of the 
state.”31 The entire population was racially profiled and “Germanized.” More 
than 220,000 Slovenes, primarily representatives of the clergy, intelligentsia, 
and economic elite, were to be “deported” and their property confiscated. 
Slovene organizations, press, and schools were forbidden. As early as 1941, 
authorities deported about 40,000 men and women to Croatia and Serbia, and 
another 33,000 were taken to camps as part of the campaign to “re-Germanize” 
the area. Ethnic Germans were then “appointed” to their farms. Within the 
framework of the “master settlement plan” for all of Europe designed in May 
and June of 1942, the SS sent another 43,000 ethnic Germans from Bosnia, 
Syrmia, and Slavonia into the Reich, put them through the official “sluicing” 
procedure (Durchschleusung), and later resettled them in Poland and Galicia.32
In Trieste, Gorizia, and Istria — those areas that Italy had acquired in 
1920 — a strict policy of assimilation had existed already before the war. 
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Mussolini considered the Slavic population to be an “inferior, barbaric race” 
that should be cast out of the region.33 Slovene and Croat personal names and 
city names were Italianized, while libraries, press publications, and societies 
were closed. It was forbidden to speak “Slavic” on the street. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, fascist authorities had already developed plans for the “ethnic 
cleansing” (bonifica nazionale) of the border regions. They now put these 
plans into practice “with great rigor,” in part by organizing mass deporta-
tions. Authorities interned 30,000 men, women, and children under inhumane 
conditions in concentration camps, such as those in Gonars and on the island 
of Rab. Ownership of their homes and landholdings was then transferred to 
the families of Italian soldiers.34 In occupied Dalmatia and in Montenegro, 
the Italian army played a rather ambivalent role in that, on the one hand, it 
furthered the Italianità, while on the other, it offered protection at the same 
time to thousands of Serbs escaping Ustasha units running amok and in some 
cases even took military steps to put the Croat militias in their place.35
The southern regions of the former Yugoslavia also witnessed “ethnic 
cleansing.” In Italian-controlled Kosovo and in western Macedonia, Albanians 
drove out the indigenous Serbs and Montenegrins, burned down their houses, 
and destroyed historically important churches and monasteries. After King 
Vittorio Emmanuele decreed the annexation of these areas to Albania, of 
which he had also been king since 1939, a policy of Albaniazation and colo-
nization was methodically carried out.36 For its part, eastern Macedonia was 
subject to a radical policy of Bulgarianization. More than 110,000 Serbs were 
forced to leave the country, and their property was confiscated. Bulgarian 
authorities closed schools and libraries, and destroyed cultural facilities, ar-
chives, cemeteries, and churches. Everything Serbian and Macedonian had 
to disappear, be it names, language, or national symbols; repression and des-
potism prevailed.37
Mass Atrocities and the Dynamics of Violence
Hostage shootings and reprisals, “ethnic cleansing,” and mass killings threat-
ened a large segment of society. Everyone could feel the omnipresent violence, 
and the longer the war continued, the more brutal, deadening, and barbaric 
everything became. Against this background, traditional religious cohabita-
tion, cosmopolitan culture, and civic consciousness were deeply challenged. 
This was evident in multiethnic Sarajevo and many other places.38
Fear, insecurity, onslaught, and killings created feelings of revenge and 
paranoia that prompted ordinary people to participate in collective violence. 
Sometimes economic and interpersonal conflicts or simple greed drove some 
neighbors to attack each other along ethnic lines. Contingent events and 
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specific instances of violence could thus crystalize and transform senses of 
collective identity that would result in ethnic conflict.39
Most people experienced the war as a rolling barrage that descended 
upon them unexpectedly and with great force. In many regions, nationalist 
sentiments may well have existed before the war, and in several others, like 
eastern Herzegovina, even open conflict. However, a fundamentally anti-Serb, 
anti-Croat, or anti-Muslim consensus did not exist. Neither regionally spe-
cific cultural traditions nor the nebulous category of self-perpetuating mass 
violence can explain the atrocities. As in every society, South Slavic popular 
culture did include traditions glorifying war and violence as expressed in 
gory folk epics, the cult of knives, or patriarchal imprinting. Yet, it is no more 
than popular legend that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims always hated each other 
and that the “Balkan ghosts” were only waiting for a signal to perpetrate 
genocide.40
“Ethnic cleansing” and mass atrocities did not occur spontaneously; 
they were ordered. In Serb-inhabited communities, the Croatian government 
installed loyal authorities who could be counted on to implement the homog-
enization program. For example, in May 1941, the Franciscan priest Velimir 
Šimić appeared in Knin to inform the appalled commander of the Italian troops 
of the new political line: “Kill all the Serbs in the shortest possible time.”41 As 
the new prefect, Ante Nikolić arrived in the company of Ustasha commander 
Juraj (Juco) Rukavina, one of the leaders of the failed uprising in Lika in 1932. 
Their mission was to form an ideologically indoctrinated, terror-trained mi-
litia and to carry out “acts of revenge.”42 Among other things, Ustasha troops 
were infamous for loading their victims in trucks and transporting them into 
the mountains, beating them with axes and wooden hammers, stabbing them 
with knives and daggers, or throwing them down canyons alive.43
Later, once the civil war was raging in full, special forces, militias, and 
paramilitary units also played a key role in atrocities. When a village was to 
be taken, troops schooled in terror were first sent in. Massacres helped intim-
idate the unwanted and potentially resistant population groups and sent them 
fleeing elsewhere. This is what happened not only when the new Ustasha ruler 
“cleansed” Herzegovina in the spring of 1941, but also when the Serb Chetniks 
overran eastern Bosnia in early 1942.44 There were always people who joined 
the rampages, be it out of opportunism, social pressure, jealousy, or greed. 
Witnesses reported time and again seeing peasants from the neighborhood 
stuffing their pockets during the plundering. A similar scenario occurred yet 
again in the 1990s. Targeted pogroms are the most effective means to throw 
a multiethnic society, regardless of how well it may function, out of kilter.
By the summer of 1941 at the latest, revenge was also playing a role. 
In eastern Bosnia, where Croat and Muslim Ustasha militias had murdered 
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hundreds of Serb families and burned down their homes that summer, Serb 
Chetniks launched a counterattack in the following winter. The reaction to 
the Greater Croatian racial craze took an open “anti-Turkish” turn. Thousands 
of Muslims in Foča, Goražde, Vlasenica, Srebrenica, and many other places 
became the victims of massacres. Men, women, and children fled to the cities 
in an attempt to save themselves from the terror. By the end of 1943, more 
than 230,000 people had abandoned their homes. “The tragedies taking place 
among these masses are not something any person can immediately describe,” 
reported a member of the SS.45 Refugees were vegetating away by the hun-
dreds in warehouses, sheds, stalls, and basements, without food or light.
The Chetniks were certainly no less barbaric than the Ustasha regime. 
People were treated ruthlessly. Men had their throats cut or were stabbed or 
impaled. Derviš Bačević was a man from Foča who, against all odds, escaped 
massacre. In early February 1942, he reported how a group of Chetniks, whom 
he knew by name, tied him up in his home and then led him and other men 
to a railroad bridge. “One of the Chetnik thieves got down on his knees and 
held a large knife in his left hand. Every victim had to place himself under the 
knife. . . . Every slaughtered victim was searched, robbed . . . and then kicked 
into the Drina.”46 Hundreds of bodies, some of them chained together, floated 
down the rivers as testimony to the terror. The permanent threat of violence 
became an effective resource of power because it acted as both deterrent and 
intimidation. Whoever stabbed people with a knife, dagger, or stiletto han-
dled their victims no better than animals, which magnified the humiliation 
and horror felt by the civilian population. The scenes these hangmen staged 
resembled human sacrifice and invoked sacral symbolic acts.47
In ethnically homogeneous Serbia and Montenegro, the wrath of the fa-
natic Chetniks focused on the political enemy. They drew up death lists so that 
their trained killers from the “Black Troika” could wipe out entire families. 
The commander of the Majevica Corps, for example, ordered the ruthless 
elimination of all those who sympathized with the communists. “Everything 
that has to be killed — kill it, that has to be set afire — set afire, that has to be 
plundered to the benefit of the Chetniks — plunder.”48 Nor were they any less 
cruel toward dissenters or traitors from their own ranks. Any person who 
broke the rules was liquidated immediately. Even Mihailović’s rival, Kosta 
Pećanac, became the victim of a clandestine murder.49
A report from eastern Bosnia, written by the commander in charge on 13 
February 1943, for Draža Mihailović proved the systematic implementation 
of the “cleansing.” “All Muslim villages . . . were completely burned down, so 
that not a single house remained intact. All property was destroyed. . . . During 
the operation, we proceeded to completely annihilate the Muslim population 
regardless of sex and age. Victims . . . among the Muslims were about 1,200 
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fighters and up to 8,000 other victims: women, elderly, and children.”50 Entire 
stretches of the countryside were depopulated in this manner. The picturesque 
valley of Sutjeska was also eerily empty when the partisans arrived: “Charred 
chimneys towered over grass-covered ruins. Nowhere a living soul. Here and 
there lay a broken barrel, a battered pot, or an old cup . . . not a living soul, 
not a single person, with whom one could talk.”51
As in many other situations of persecution, it is surprising the degree 
to which potential victims repressed and denied what was going on and sat 
quietly in their houses awaiting their fate. Those who survived reported that 
they had placed their faith in law and order, that later they had hoped — in fact, 
firmly believed — that aggression toward them could be diverted through con-
formism, even religious conversion and name changes. This was a dangerous 
mistake. Suddenly all certainty of an orderly coexistence vanished. Countless 
people were left defenseless against the unpredictability of terror and tyranny.
The insecurity grew because power changed hands time and again, leav-
ing no one safe from revenge. In June 1942, the military maps of the Bosnian 
Krajina region, to cite one example, showed a confusing mosaic of competing 
rule. Half of the territory was occupied by the partisans, interspersed with 
German-, Italian-, and Croat-held areas. Another four regions were controlled 
by rival Chetnik leaders.52 During the four and a half years of war, the small 
Montenegrin town of Kolašin experienced nineteen changes of power, the east 
Bosnian town of Foča, twenty-seven. It was here that the partisans discovered 
in 1942 the owner of a small shop who “kept several flags under his counter: 
a German flag, an Italian flag, and a Yugoslav flag with a star. Whenever he 
heard fighting going on around the town at night, he would listen intently and 
then pull out the appropriate flag.”53 The poor man was eventually shot by the 
Italians for being a communist.
As in every civil war, some who participated in the nationalistic murder 
sprees and revenge orgies were fanatic nationalists and sadists who acted out 
of a pure passion for torment and killing. Others seized the opportunity to take 
personal revenge on a neighbor or settle a long-standing communal conflict. 
However, moderate Croats and Muslims rejected the Ustasha atrocities, if for 
no other reason than the very justified fear of revenge.54 In a protest petition 
dated 2 December 1941, seventy Muslim notables from Bijeljina presented their 
view that the violence against Orthodox believers contradicted the prevailing 
concepts of morality, well-tested rules on coexistence, and the healthy tradition 
of religious tolerance.55 Authorities also received complaints from Prijedor, 
Banja Luka, and Sarajevo. Many sources tell how Croats, Serbs, and Muslims 
helped each other to safety when terror threatened.56 The fact that hundreds of 
thousands joined Tito’s supranational people’s liberation movement during the 
course of the war is indeed the best proof that within the population neither 
blind hate nor the desire for systematic annihilation dominated.
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Tradition and Transformation
Since the beginning of the war, the communists worked determinedly to bring 
about a system change. The popular liberation struggle was the vehicle and the 
basis for legitimizing a socialist revolution that would transform Yugoslavia 
into an egalitarian, free workers’ and peasants’ state and would guarantee 
the CPY absolute rule. The heart of the new order was the so-called People’s 
Committees, which temporarily assumed the role of state bodies in place of the 
earlier bureaucracy. In the “liberated areas” they issued regulations, organized 
supplies, and expropriated landholdings and possessions to distribute among 
the local peasantry. The communists thus resorted to a simple means by which 
to gain the support of the land-hungry peasantry and at the same time create 
irreversible facts with regard to the later social and political systems.57
The People’s Committees also took control of all other facets of public 
life. People’s courts made short shrift of alleged traitors, spies, and saboteurs. 
Dissenters, deserters, and collaborators were ruthlessly liquidated after they 
had been sentenced in mass trials.58 However, at the same time the partisans 
opened theaters and ballet companies, printed newspapers, and started up 
postal delivery and telephone connections. In Foča they even helped put on 
partisan Olympic Games.59
In February 1942, Edvard Kardelj drew up a complex set of rules, known 
as the “Regulations of Foča,” for these temporary administrative bodies. 
That summer it was eventually decided to establish the Antifascist Council 
for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia as an overarching political body, 
a quasi- government, to coordinate the work of the local committees. In 
November 1942, the first meeting of this council took place, and a year later 
the AVNOJ was established in Jajce as the highest executive body. It was also 
decided that Yugoslavia would be reestablished as a socialist federal state.
The communists filled all important positions with their supporters, usu-
ally peasants, which is why the takeover of power marked not only a new start 
politically, but also initiated an immense social mobilization. By the end of 
1943, approximately 12,000 people’s committees existed at the local level with 
over 120,000 elected members. The new bodies used very simple means to do 
their work, because very few of the new functionaries could read and write. 
These provisional institutions were therefore the genesis of a loyal, Yugoslav-
oriented political class that would become an important pillar of support for 
the new system in the immediate postwar decades.60
Yet even then, opinions differed throughout the country on what was 
the correct policy. For example, the “Liberation Front of the Slovene Nation” 
installed a Central Economic Commission, regulated the bank lending system 
in 1943/1944, reformed taxes and pricing practices, and issued a new currency. 
The economic and financial system established there became the model for all 
of the other partisan areas and later for Yugoslavia as a whole.
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However, it later became apparent that the modern Slovenian model was 
very difficult to implement in the poorer regions. The area around the eastern 
Bosnian city of Foča was plagued by starvation, refugee plight, and a shortage 
of land, which prompted those in charge to resort to a rigid steering policy. 
In other words, the seed of what would later become a perpetual conflict over 
the direction of economic policy between the developed north and the under-
developed south began to take root during the war.61
Contrary to all other parties, the communists explicitly campaigned for 
women’s issues and granted women active and passive electoral suffrage for 
the first time in the fall of 1942. Although the party leadership had initially 
seen the role of women primarily in the procurement and maintenance of 
weapons and medication, sabotage, propaganda, and messenger duties, by 
1942 women were allowed to be combat medics, doctors, and soldiers in the 
army. Military service gave about 100,000 women fighters social recognition 
and more rights.62
The body most important for the creation of a new order was the People’s 
Liberation Army, the “revolutionary educator for the masses,” as Tito’s fellow 
collaborater Moša Pijade expressed it.63 No institution of socialist Yugoslavia 
epitomized the ideal of “brotherhood and unity” in such a pure form as did 
this multinational volunteer army. During the entire course of the People’s 
Liberation Struggle, the force was made up of 53 percent Serbs, 18.6 per-
cent Croats, 9.2 percent Slovenes, 5.5 percent Montenegrins, 3.5 percent 
Bosnian Muslims, 2.7 percent Macedonians, and the remaining compilation 
of Albanians, Hungarians, “Yugoslavs,” and other ethnic groups.64 After 
Belgrade was taken in the fall of 1944, the partisans began to mobilize all 
men between the ages of 17 and 50 for the People’s Liberation Army, adding 
another 250,000 soldiers by the end of the war. All enemy soldiers were en-
couraged to desert to the partisan side and were granted amnesty as long as 
they had not committed any war crimes. By May 1945, the army had 800,000 
men and women in arms.65
The army served not only as the armed force of the party, but also 
as the earliest and most important instrument in socializing the populace of 
the future socialist state. During their military service, soldiers learned how 
to read and write. They were instructed in Marxist political economy and 
socialist- patriotic values. In addition to the ideological indoctrination, shared 
events, experiences, and emotions shaped new identities. Military rituals such 
as flag presentations and brigade baptisms created a unique popular and rev-
olutionary partisan culture. Elements of folklore were incorporated, such as 
the peasant circle dance kolo, popular throughout the South Slavic region. 
Partisans read the poems written by great national writers, sang battle songs, 
and printed calendars that listed the new holidays created during the war. After 
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the war, the song “Comrade Tito, we swear to you, from your path we will 
never depart!” refered to the time of the partisan struggle.66
Yugoslavia was the second country in Europe, after the Soviet Union, 
in which communism came to power of its own accord. In both countries, it 
would never have been possible without the war. However, this was not due 
to strategic mistakes made by the German high command of the militarily far 
superior Wehrmacht, to the partisans’ better knowledge of the lay of the land, 
to the Croats’ incompetence and loss of reputation, or to the failure of the allied 
Italians.67 It was the illegitimacy of the occupation itself that mobilized a major 
part of the population. Economic plight, the rule of terror, and the omnifarious 
and omnipresent experience with violence destroyed in a very short period of 
time nearly everything that had once constituted traditional society, leaving 
the political, social, economic, and psychological foundations of the old order 
in irrevocable ruins. The war accelerated basic social changes and created 
approaches with which to bridge the old rifts between the urban and rural 
populations. Unlike the old parties, the communists were well organized po-
litically and militarily and, most importantly, they were not compromised by 
their absence, as were the king and his government in exile. In this situation, 
the partisans promised the battered nation a magical vision of the future in 
that they combined in their ideology the three existential questions that had 
plagued the South Slavic countries for so long: resolution of the social prob-
lems of the peasants and workers, triumph over exploitation and foreign rule, 
and last but not least, reconciliation through “brotherhood and unity.” By the 
end of the war, this had led to the emergence of a truly revolutionary situation, 
one made possible by the total collapse of the old system and its irretrievable 
loss of repute, shaped by the radical upheaval of social relations, and facilitated 
by an international constellation pushing for change.
Burdensome Legacy
The attritional power of the war as an important prerequisite for the com-
munist takeover is illustrated in the compilation of the damage it caused. 
According to official statistics provided by the Yugoslav reparations com-
mission, more than 1.7 million people died between 1941 and 1945, which 
equals 11 percent of the Yugoslav population at the time. This figure is cer-
tainly greatly exaggerated. Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian scientists later 
calculated independently that there were about a million war dead, of whom 
500,000 were Serbs, 200,000 Croats, and up to 100,000 Muslims. Today it is 
no longer possible for anyone to reliably estimate how many of the dead were 
killed in fighting, in camps, in mass executions, or by starvation, disease, 
and the lack of medical provisions. The experts also agree that Yugoslavia 
indirectly lost another million people through the lack of births, emigration, 
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abduction, resettlement, and dislocation. All in all, Yugoslavia lost around 
two million inhabitants because of the Second World War.68 In addition to the 
dead, statistics documented about 400,000 prisoners, interned persons, and 
forced laborers; 530,000 people deported and displaced; and 320,000 forced 
recruitments. According to the figures, every fourth Yugoslav must have per-
sonally experienced the inhuman consequences of the war.69
The victory of the People’s Liberation Army came at an extremely high 
toll. About 305,000 fighters lost their lives and 425,000 were wounded. The 
Communist Party also paid a high price: of its original 12,000 members, about 
9,000 were lost. Nor were the communists the only ones to suffer heavy losses. 
Their political opponents and many simple soldiers from the government’s 
forces also died. About 350,000 fought on that side, and many members of 
the Croat Ustasha, the Serb Chetniks, and the Slovenian Home Guard did not 
survive the war.70
Those who did survive had a heavy burden to shoulder. The deaths of 
relatives, comrades, and neighbors and their own experiences with hunger 
and suffering deeply scarred their biographies and memories. The roots of 
many of Yugoslavia’s later problems lie in this period, because the experience 
of violence further reified and significantly radicalized competing ideological 
alternatives. Although the war came to an end, the ideological passions and 
feelings of revenge did not. The number of murdered, tortured, and expelled 
became a political issue. In the concentration camp at Jasenovac, the epitome 
of the fascist rule of terror, 700,000 people are said to have been killed accord-
ing to official depictions. However, within Croat exile circles, people spoke 
of 30,000 killed; within Serb circles, up to 1.1 million. Since the communists 
did not later permit any impartial research into the matter, events became 
framed in rival cultures of memory. For one side, Jasenovac became a site 
for collective repression and forgetting; for the other, a ghostly location to 
commemorate an inflated national myth of sacrifice. Probably a total of about 
200,000 people died in all of the Croatian concentration camps.71
PART IV




The Consolidation of Communist Rule  
(1943 to 1948)
Liberation
On 20 October 1944, at 6 a.m., the First Proletarian Brigade reported per 
telephone: “Kalemegdan is liberated. . . . The proletarians have taken the 
fortress by storm. The Germans fought over every stone, every bridge, every 
tunnel, every brick. As if for their Berlin.” 1 In this battle for Belgrade, 15,000 
Wehrmacht soldiers and 3,000 partisans lost their lives.
Commanding General Peko Dapčević was shaken by the result: “It looked 
horrible. . . . Everything was covered with the bodies of German soldiers and 
officers, amid destroyed equipment that was smoldering away with blistering 
heat. . . . The smell was revolting! . . . Near Boleč lay a whole mountain of 
corpses — a gigantic heap of corpses. Nearby yet another. And that’s what 
you saw everywhere you looked.”2 Yet soon life reawakened in the devastated 
city: people crawled out of their dwellings and celebrated that the war was 
finally over. Shortly afterward, Tito addressed the people from the former 
royal palace as their head of state. There was no question in his mind that the 
enormous sacrifice of the Second World War would inevitably have to lead to 
the development of socialism and the one-party rule of the CPY in Yugoslavia. 
He admired the Soviet Union, venerated Stalin, and firmly believed in the su-
periority of communism. Yet three hurdles blocked the path to this objective: 
the aggressor had to be decisively defeated, the political rivals neutralized, 
and recognition for the new regime obtained from the Allies.
Following the conquest of Belgrade, the Wehrmacht and its allies began 
their retreat. The Croat Ustasha, the Croatian Home Guard, and the Slovene 
Home Guard were disbanding. Ante Pavelić and Milan Nedić fled across the 
border. Mihailović’s Chetniks also retreated. Fiercely fought offensives fi-
nally secured victory for the People’s Liberation Army. By the end of 1944, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo were liberated; on 6 April 1945, the par-
tisans entered Sarajevo, and on 8 May of that year they marched into Zagreb. 
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Yugoslavia was able to end its occupation on 15 May 1945, without any sig-
nificant help from the Allies.
The communists had prepared well in every regard for the moment in 
which they took power. Back in May 1944, Tito had created the Department for 
the People’s Protection (OZNA, Odsjek za zaštitu naroda) under Aleksandar 
Ranković. This secret police, from which the State Security Administration 
(UDB) later evolved, compiled card files with the names of collaborators and 
war criminals. In Slovenia alone the number reached 17,000. They also cre-
ated commissions to prosecute war crimes that were punishable by death. 
So-called courts of honor were set up to try those who had aided and abetted 
the occupational forces. Those found guilty were punished with disfranchise-
ment, expropriation, or forced labor. By the end of the war, the partisans had 
condemned thousands in this way to imprisonment, forced labor, or death.3
Tito ordered the quick and complete destruction of all “bandits.” As the 
partisans advanced, it was therefore common to “cleanse” the conquered areas 
of those who had supported the occupational regime and enemy troops. On its 
own initiative, the OZNA executed whoever they could catch. An American 
liaison officer reported in the fall of 1944 from Dubrovnik: “The inhabitants 
were living in a state of mortal terror. . . . The Partisan attitude was that 
anybody who stayed in town during the occupation and didn t́ work in the 
Partisan underground was ipso facto a collaborator. The dreaded secret police 
was going to work and people were being taken from their homes to the old 
castle and shot every day.”4
In March 1945, an estimated 170,000 Croat Ustasha fighters and members 
of the Croatian Home Guard, 36,000 Serb and Montenegrin Chetniks, 18,000 
Slovene Home Guard troops, and 7,000 of Nedić’s Serb soldiers had not yet 
surrendered.5 Tens of thousands of these fighters tried to flee to Austria to 
save themselves. In May 1945, an approximately 38-mile-long trail of 25,000 
(British estimate) to 200,000 (Croatian statistic) soldiers and civilians moved 
toward the border, where their vanguard came up against British troops at 
Bleiburg and Viktring. Since Germany had surrendered on 7 May, the Allies 
felt that all ex-Yugoslav collaborators should be turned over to the partisans. 
Therefore, they were not permitted to advance into British-occupied territory. 
Anyone who did make it across was turned over by the British. The partisans 
issued an ultimatum for surrender to the forces stopped at the border, but the 
Ustasha commander let it elapse. So the People’s Liberation Army attacked. 
Just how many fighters and refugees then fled into the woods, were taken pris-
oner, died in rearguard battles, were executed or massacred can no longer be 
reliably reconstructed. Croat emigrants spoke later of hundreds of thousands 
of victims. Probably partisans executed up to 70,000 people through court 
martial. Another 60,000 died in the final battles.6
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During this phase the communists systematically and extensively liq-
uidated their military and political opponents — the “quislings” — out of 
conviction, embitterment, and revenge.7 “We are receiving terrible news,” 
reported a witness. “In Crnogrob there are mass graves. Trucks are bringing 
men with bound hands and feet every evening from the prison in Škofja Loka 
and no one ever returns. Every evening one hears shots from Crnogrob. . . . 
Officially and publicly no one knows anything about it. . . . At the same time, 
the OZNA goes about its own dirty business under the cover of night.”8 In 
early July 1945, Tito gave the strict order to free all imprisoned “quislings” 
over the age of 35 who had not committed an atrocity. However, this order 
was not implemented at first. Not until the end of 1945 did he definitely put 
an end to the rampage by expounding emphatically that “no one is afraid of 
capital punishment any longer!”9
Targeted “cleansing” actions were also carried out in the liberated areas 
once annexed by Italy. Immediately following Italy’s surrender in 1943, any-
where from 500 to 700 representatives of the fascist regime were executed. 
The partisans had the corpses of the murdered Italians dumped in the deep 
karst sinkholes of the region, where, as Jules Verne once wrote, “of that which 
is thrown in, certainly nothing ever comes out again.”10 In the spring of 1945, 
the bodies of hundreds, if not thousands of murdered victims followed. Named 
after the Istrian limestone sinkholes in which the murdered were thrown, these 
atrocities became known as foibe.11
The terror at the end of the war eliminated the remaining military resis-
tance on the ground, but it did not eradicate resistance in the heads of many. 
Instead, the violence provided grounds on which to fundamentally question 
the legitimacy of the new system, a system that apparently liquidated its en-
emies brutally and forced possible opposition to accept an unwanted state 
under the threat of force. In Slovenia and Croatia, the rift running through the 
society was particularly deep, where the re-establishment of Yugoslavia itself, 
regardless of its political system, found anything but consensual approval. 
Since the communist state neither acknowledged nor uncovered the injustice 
done in its name, commemoration of the atrocities near Bleiburg and the foibe 
became historical and political time bombs.12
Creating a People’s Democracy
From the standpoint of the Western powers, it was all but certain in the fall 
of 1944 that Yugoslavia would drift into the communist camp. Above all, 
they viewed the alliance with Tito as a pragmatic solution because their chief 
priority was to bring about Germany’s unconditional surrender. Churchill 
hoped that once Germany had been defeated in Yugoslavia, the monarchal 
regime would be restored or a bourgeois multiparty democracy would emerge. 
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However, King Peter and his government were in a weak position due to the 
rapid surrender of the Yugoslav army back in April 1941 and his hasty flight 
into exile. The reputation of this government was badly tarnished, especially 
since the partisans had just proven that military resistance would have indeed 
been worth the fight. Although the monarch headed a government representing 
all parties, ideas for a postwar order were amorphous. The first Yugoslavia 
had never been able to truly consolidate itself as a state, and now recognized 
institutions no longer existed. Several of the king’s cabinets had crumbled 
over internal quarrels between Serb and Croat national politics, and the gov-
ernment was also being condemned for its support of war criminals. In other 
words, it was rather unclear what this government actually stood for — except 
anticommunism.13
At Churchill’s behest, Ivan Šubašić, the former head of the Banovina of 
Croatia, became the leader of the exile regime in June 1944. The British and 
the Americans hoped that the bourgeois camp would thereby finally consoli-
date itself and be able to prevent a communist government at the last moment. 
Tito understood that international recognition of his power could only occur 
if he acknowledged his main legitimate rival, the royal government in exile. 
So he succumbed to Churchill’s urging to reach an agreement with Šubašić, 
which was signed on 16 June 1944 on the Adriatic island of Vis and expressed 
their mutual recognition and agreement on a procedure for moving forward. 
The decision about Yugoslavia’s future political system was to be postponed 
until after the war. The revolutionary leader was making a strictly tactical 
move when he publicly emphasized that he was primarily concerned with the 
liberation of his homeland and not the introduction of socialism. Back at home, 
he formed the Unified Popular Liberation Front (known as the Popular Front 
starting in August 1945), a broad alliance of communists, social democrats, 
monarchists, peasant-party members, and the bourgeoisie.
Tito’s primary aim was to neutralize his political competitors by affili-
ating them with him. His rivals hoped for a coalition of equal partners, but 
even then Tito considered such a coalition thoroughly absurd. In the end his 
strategy proved successful, not the least because the anticommunist opposi-
tion was hamstrung. The standing of the old parties had eroded during the 
war, and their leaders, like Vladko Maček, had long left the country. The 
government- in-exile did not return to Yugoslavia until late March 1945, so 
that not a single well-organized political force existed to counteract Tito’s 
influence, nor were there any credible alternatives to Tito’s federal-state solu-
tion for Yugoslavia. Many outstanding personalities, intellectuals, artists, and 
writers from all parts of the country began to publicly announce their support 
for the new state, which gave it the veneer of deeper legitimacy.14
Tito proved to be a clever foreign policy strategist in that he played the 
conflicting interests between Churchill and Stalin against one another in order 
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to limit the West’s influence on the postwar order. He duped the British when 
he secretly boarded a Soviet military plane on 21 September 1944 in Vis and 
flew to Moscow to convince Stalin to send Red Army units to help liberate 
Belgrade. In doing so he foiled the impending British invasion of Yugoslavia, 
which would have been the only thing able to prevent the communist take-
over. Stalin granted Tito this favor but then pursued his own realpolitik when 
he reached an agreement with Churchill in October of that same year at the 
Moscow Conference on dividing up Europe into spheres of influence. Romania 
was to be controlled to 90 percent and Bulgaria to 75 percent by the Soviets, 
while Greece would be to 90 percent under British control. The two major 
powers planned to equally divide control of both Yugoslavia and Hungary. 
Faced with this international constellation, Tito had no choice but to reach 
an agreement with Ivan Šubašić, the representative of the Yugoslav king, on 
1 November 1944, in Belgrade to create an interim coalition government. This 
was constituted under Tito’s leadership on 7 March 1945. Šubašić became 
foreign minister, and eleven of the twenty-one ministers in this government 
were also not communists. Shortly afterward the Allies formally recognized 
the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ).15
Ideologically, the communists hunkered down and waited. They declared 
Yugoslavia to be a people’s democracy in which they were willing to share 
power with other political forces. Pro forma, 118 bourgeois representatives 
from the former Skupština, the prewar National Assembly of the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, were allowed to be seated in the interim parliament next to 
members of the AVNOJ, the People’s Liberation Council formed during the 
war. The new leadership avoided using terms like “class struggle” or “dicta-
torship of the proletariat.” Instead they avowed their support for antifascism, 
“brotherhood and unity,” and even general humanistic values. Yugoslavia 
now had a hybrid political system in which elements of liberal parliamen-
tarianism were combined with the one-party state that had been established 
during the war. However, with the passage in the summer of 1945 of a law 
on crimes against the people and the state, civil rights were limited, as were 
the freedoms of association, assembly, and the press. Despite the impending 
elections, communists already held key offices in all bodies. In reality, this 
phase of the people’s democracy bridged the transition from the country’s 
former bourgeois-capitalist system to its future socialist one.
Also at the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy sat seasoned fight-
ers from the People’s Liberation Army, who had the regime alone to thank for 
the positions they held. At the beginning of the 1950s, two-thirds of the leading 
personnel came from the working and peasant classes. Every second low-level 
civil servant and employee had little or no schooling.16 What this meant is 
exemplified in a decree from the Ministry for Forestry, which apparently felt 
it necessary in October 1945 to inform its civil servants of a few basic rules of 
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behavior, specifically that leftover food, paper, and cigarettes were not to be 
simply thrown out the windows, that spitting was not allowed in the hallways 
or stairwells, and that there was a purpose for and a proper way to use toilets.17
The elections for the constituent assembly took place in November 1945, 
in a climate of considerable instability; they could not be called either free 
or fair. Approximately 200,000 people were prevented from voting because 
they had cooperated with the occupational regimes. Furthermore, there was 
a separate ballot box reserved only for those voters casting ballots against the 
People’s Front.18 One British diplomat reported that the trend toward estab-
lishing a dictatorship was growing not because the population at large was 
convinced of communism as a form of government, but because the wartime 
and postwar experiences had made the people more receptive to a regime 
that promised order and security, even at the price of losing personal lib-
erties and political decisions.19 Winning over 90 percent of the votes, the 
communist-dominated People’s Front list received a comfortable majority in 
the constituent assembly. When the bourgeois ministers pulled out of the 
coalition under protest in the late summer, they were in effect committing 
political suicide. On 29 November 1945, the parliament declared Yugoslavia 
to be a republic and banned King Peter from returning to the country.20 Thus, 
the transformation to a one-party state occurred here far earlier than in the 
eastern states of Central Europe.
Tito prohibited all discussion, pro and contra, on the introduction of a 
multiparty system, even though it had also been occurring in his own party. 
In accordance with the classic Bolshevik view, he placed monolithic ideology 
and the one-party system combined with social justice over political plural-
ism. He was convinced that a democracy based on the Western model would 
only lead to the restoration of the old order, to ethnopolitical polarization, 
and to the collapse of the state. “If these [democratic] parties wish to have the 
people behind them, then they have to conduct strictly local politics for each 
of the respective peoples, and that would prevent the creation of a unified 
state. . . . If such [a party] would form in Slovenia for the Slovene nation, 
another in Montenegro, a third in Serbia, then in Macedonia and Croatia, 
this would lead to the fragmentation of the state, which would immediately 
fall apart.”21 Furthermore, the egoistical party bickering would block devel-
opmental policy based on industrial progress and social justice. Therefore, in 
1946, the constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) 
institutionalized the system of “people’s rule” (narodna vlast) with hundreds 
of elected people’s committees in cities and rural communities. The commu-
nists advocated direct democracy and instructed communities to enable “the 
direct involvement of the citizens in administering state business,” to abolish 
all privileges, and particularly to eliminate all forms of national and religious 
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hate.22 This definitely precluded a revival of the democratic multiparty sys-
tem. Leading oppositional politicians were tried in court and their supporters 
threatened. All political power was concentrated in the Politburo of the CPY 
under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, who was simultaneously the head of 
the Yugoslav government.
As in other countries, the main war criminals were to be tried in court. 
However, Ante Pavelić escaped to Argentina, and General Nedić committed 
suicide in 1946 in pretrial detention following his extradition.23 Leading repre-
sentatives of the collaboration regime in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and 
Macedonia were charged, in a sense as surrogates for the old regime. Draža 
Mihailović, who had disappeared, was betrayed by one of his commanders, 
lured into a trap, and arrested in March 1946. He was executed on 17 July 1946 
and buried in an anonymous grave.24
Archbishop Aloizije Stepinac also had to answer to the court in the fall 
of 1946. The communists wanted not only to hold him accountable for his 
dubious role during the Second World War but also to use him to set an ex-
ample against the Catholic Church, around which the nationalist opposition 
in Croatia was grouping at the time. In the fall of 1945, the bishops had issued 
a pastoral letter opposing the communists. The court convicted Stepinac of 
collaboration and the cover-up of war crimes and sentenced him to sixteen 
years imprisonment, which he served as house arrest. In addition to the tens of 
thousands of political oppositionists and supporters of the old regime who had 
fled, hundreds of Catholic clerics now went into exile out of fear of repression.
Tito himself repeatedly argued that it was better not to wallow in the 
wounds of the past but to build a positive, commonly shared perspective for 
the future instead. Once the war criminals were convicted, he offered a type 
of armistice to his opponents. “We extend our hand to all the misled,” he said 
in 1946. “We extend our hand to them over the innumerable graves, over these 
ruins, we forgive them! But we demand that they become loyal citizens of 
the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.”25 From this point forward, the 
communists preached the need to forgive and forget. In reality, however, very 
little was forgiven and nothing forgotten.
Nationalities and Neighbors
From a Croat point of view, one of Tito’s most notable achievements was the 
liberation of Istria and Dalmatia from Italian rule, which thus finally brought 
about the unification of all Croats. In September 1943, after Italy had col-
lapsed, Slovene and Croat partisans declared “once and for all . . . that Istria 
is and remains Croatian territory.” Referring to President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points and the right to self-determination, they declared reunification with 
the motherland.26
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Tito was aware that he would not be able to clinch the annexation of 
Istria through diplomatic channels with the Allies. Therefore, shortly before 
the end of the war, he had his troops quickly move into the claimed territory 
and march to Trieste, which had been a point of contention between Italians 
and Slavs since 1870 and now lay directly on the border between the spheres 
of influence that the great powers had so painstakingly negotiated in Yalta in 
February 1945.
The Trieste crisis marked the first major dispute in the emerging East–
West conflict.27 The Western powers thought that Italy should be rewarded 
for its 1943 defection to their side, which is why they wanted the People’s 
Liberation Army to leave the region. Demonstrations of military strength in 
which Stalin eventually took the side of the British and Americans ended in 
June 1945 with a compromise. Yugoslav troops pulled out of Trieste while the 
surrounding territory was divided into Allied and Yugoslav zones of occu-
pation. The Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947 turned Trieste and northern 
Istria into a neutral “Free Territory” under the protection of the United Nations. 
Zone A (Trieste city) was administered by a British-American military gov-
ernment, while Zone B (surrounding territory) was placed under Yugoslav 
military control. This provisional solution lasted until 1954, when the Free 
Territory was dissolved. The contested territories were divided between Italy 
and Yugoslavia.28
The integration of Istria and Dalmatia into the Yugoslav state greatly 
concerned the Italians living there. The former rulers now became the ruled. 
Although they were not systematically driven off, as many as 200,000 Italian 
refugees left the area in several waves until the peace treaty with Italy was 
signed in 1947. Those who remained were given the status of a national mi-
nority with all the appertaining rights, including school instruction in Italian.29
Besides the Italians, many ethnic Germans also left the country, the ma-
jority of them before the end of the war and on order of evacuation issued by 
the Coordination Center for Ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) of 
the German Reich in the late summer of 1944. This sent hundreds of thousands 
of them out of the country. From the original population of half a million 
ethnic Germans, only about 200,000 remained by the end of the war.30 Many 
of these people became the victims of partisan retribution.
Because of their close collaboration with the occupational forces and es-
pecially because of the killing sprees perpetrated by the SS division “Prince 
Eugen” against partisans and civilians, the ethnic Germans were seen collec-
tively as war criminals. When the partisans marched into the region where 
ethnic Germans lived, many of them were therefore mistreated, interned in 
camps, or executed as war criminals. The Soviets, who crossed the Danube 
in October 1944, deported abound 30,000 German war prisoners and forced 
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laborers to Russia. Not until the end of 1949 did they release these deported 
people from the camps.31
On 21 November 1944, the provisional Yugoslav government of the 
AVNOJ decided to confiscate “all property belonging to persons of German 
ethnicity, except those Germans who fought in the ranks of the national lib-
eration army and in partisan units” as well as the property “of war criminals 
and their accomplices regardless of nationality.” Apparently the Yugoslav gov-
ernment had no specific plans to deport the Germans collectively; at least this 
was not an issue addressed during the Potsdam negotiations. A later attempt 
to have “the entire German minority” transferred to Germany was rejected 
by the Allies. The Yugoslav foreign ministry then concluded that deportation 
“will not be able to be solved in a legal manner in the foreseeable future.”32
The Germans who did not leave Yugoslavia were put into camps, such as 
in Rudolfsgnad (Knićanin), Gakowa (Gakovo), and Kruschiwl (Kruševlje), 
and subjected to forced labor. Tens of thousands of them died as a result of 
deliberate abuse and the conditions there. When the camps were disbanded in 
1948, the survivors were shipped off to Hungary and Austria. Roughly 62,000 
Yugoslav Germans immigrated to West Germany in the 1950s as part of the 
effort to reunite families.33 Hitler’s rule thus brutally ended the centuries-long 
presence of the Danube Swabians in the region.34
There were also open national questions in the southern regions of the 
country. The communists handled the old feud with Bulgaria and Greece over 
the “Macedonian question” by declaring the Macedonians in 1937 to be a 
people of equal standing and promising them in Jajce in 1943 that they would 
have their own republic. In other words, the communists conducted targeted 
nation building “from the top down,” in order to shape Macedonian national 
identity. Soon a standardized Macedonian language and orthography were 
established (on the basis of the dialect spoken in the Prilep-Veles region). 
Grammar books, dictionaries, and belletristic works were published. In the 
Bled treaty, Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian head of state, recognized the in-
dependence of the Macedonians in 1947. The province was meant as a bridge 
between the two friendly states.
The situation in Kosovo proved to be trickier. There the Kosovar com-
munists had declared at the Bujan Conference at the turn of 1943/1944 that 
Kosovo had “always wished . . . to be unified with Albania.” Early in 1945, 
an uprising was put down of nationalists known as Ballists (after the name of 
the organization founded in 1942, Balli kombëtar) who advocated a Greater 
Albania. During the war they had collaborated with the German military 
government, which discredited them with the Western powers. Because 
the communists in Kosovo were never strong and many Albanians favored 
a Greater Albanian state, Tito was forced to toe a more conciliatory line. 
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Retrospectively, he sanctioned the deportation of the Serb colonists, which 
helped significantly to appease the Kosovars. Tito decided to make Kosovo 
and Metohija an autonomous region of the Republic of Serbia, as a sort of 
compromise between Serbian claims over the territory and Albanian desires 
for independence. For a while he even played with the idea of uniting the 
southern province with Albania, should the country join a confederation of 
Balkan states.
State and Nations in Socialism
On the basis of decisions by the AVNOJ in 1943 and modeled after the Soviet 
example, the constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and 
the two-chamber parliament it created were established in January 1946. 
The constitution recognized five coequal constituent nations of the new 
multinational state, namely the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, and 
Montenegrins. Not until the 1960s did the Bosnian Muslims advance to be-
come the sixth such nation. Before that they had to declare themselves as being 
either ethnically undefined, Muslim Serb, or Muslim Croat. The negative ex-
periences of the interwar period prompted the communists to expressly reject 
the idea of merging all these coequal peoples into a supranational Yugoslav 
nation. At the same time, it appeared to Tito to be just as important to thwart 
the dominance of the most populous people, namely the Serbs.
Article I of the constitution defined Yugoslavia as “a community of 
peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, 
including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in 
a federative state.”35 Moša Pijade, a member of the Central Committee, coined 
the pedantic interpretation that the right of secession had been exhausted once 
and for all by the decision to reestablish Yugoslavia in 1943, since the partisan 
war represented a type of implicit referendum in favor of the new state.
Each of these peoples received their own state, something that was im-
portant to the communists. From then on, Yugoslavia comprised six republics: 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. 
Within Serbia, two autonomous regions existed, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The 
situation was somewhat different only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there 
was no clear ethnic majority. In November 1943, the Bosnian communists 
had decided that this republic was “neither Serb, nor Muslim, nor Croat, but 
Serb, Muslim, and Croat all at once.” All three groups were said to be equal. 
For one, this stance recognized the individuality of the Muslims; for another, 
it expressly emphasized the multiethnic character of the republic.36
Nor were the other republics ethnically homogeneous. For example, the 
Croats only made up 78 percent of that republic’s population, the Macedonians 
just 66 percent of theirs. As long as Yugoslavia remained intact politically, this 
was but a small problem. People were not faced with the decision of identifying 
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themselves either as the member of a certain ethnicity or as the inhabitant of 
one of the republics, because in Yugoslavia the two proved without any prob-
lem to be mutually compatible. In fact, federalism institutionalized multiple 
identities and loyalties: every person was the citizen of a republic and at the 
same time a Yugoslav citizen. Since all titular nations enjoyed the same rights 
across the entire territory of Yugoslavia, this put the importance of each repub-
lic’s borders into a different perspective. Tito hoped that this would connect 
people with one another instead of dividing them.
The alpha and omega of the Yugoslav system and its highest patriotic 
values were “brotherhood and unity” — solidarity among different yet re-
lated and coexisting peoples. Tito’s campaign slogan reflected the tradition of 
nineteenth-century pan-Slavic solidarity. The national anthem of Yugoslavia, 
“Hej, Sloveni” (Hey, Slavs), chosen in 1945, was an adaptation of the anthem of 
the pan-Slavic movement adopted at the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848. The 
concept of a federative democracy was also rooted in the nineteenth century 
in the thinking of the Serb socialists Svetozar Marković and Dimitrije Tucović, 
who in turn had been influenced by the Austro-Marxists.
Both the Enlightenment and Marxism taught that the social organiza-
tion of humanity progressed through a series of transformations from tribes 
and clans to peoples, then nations, and finally to supranational formations. 
Therefore, from the communist standpoint, national identities did not have 
to be repressed since they represented a historically necessary stage on the 
path to socialism. In addition to peoples (narodi), ethnic minorities also thus 
enjoyed the right to be treated equally, to further their own distinct cultural 
development, and to use their language freely. Magyars, Albanians, and eight 
other groups were officially recognized as nationalities (narodnosti). Although 
they were also represented in the political bodies, they had a different status 
than the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia. The right to self-determination was 
argued to have already been fulfilled for the Kosovars through the existence 
of Albania and for the Magyars through Hungary. Therefore, they were not 
given their own republics and the right to secession. Minorities without na-
tional homelands, such as the Roma, Jews, and the Vlachs, were considered to 
be ethnic groups. They also enjoyed special protective rights. The optimistic 
expectation was that ethnic differences would disappear of their own accord 
as socialism progressed.
Socialism served as the main unifying force and the most important ideo-
logical adhesive in a state made up of various peoples. Patriotic education and 
a pan-Yugoslav consciousness were to thwart strife and succession and thus 
prevent civil war and fratricide from breaking out anew. However, Yugoslavia’s 
nationality policy remained a harrowing balancing act. On the one side, it 
provided room for national, religious, and cultural activities; on the other, 
it attempted to rigorously combat all forms of intolerance and chauvinism. 
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Cultural organizations, clubs and foundations, publishing houses, and reli-
gious societies were banned if they exhibited an exclusive ethnic preference. 
Three examples of such organizations were the Muslim Preporod (Rebirth), 
the Croat Napredak (Progress), and the Serb Prosvjeta (Education). Instead, 
society was to organize itself along multiethnic and citizenship lines, starting 
in the youth brigades, the Communist Party, the Antifascist Women’s Front, 
and the People’s Army. Yet it did not prove easy at first to diminish national-
ism. Prejudices and the trauma of the war ran deep. Time and again passions 
rose to the surface, such as when a soccer game in Split in the early 1950s 
evolved into anti-Serb rioting. In Herzegovina, peasants demanded ethnically 
separate schools, and teachers refused to teach anything other than their “own” 
national history.37 Time and again, Tito had to implore his fellow countrymen 
to “keep brotherhood and unity as the apple of your eye.”38
The majority of intellectuals initially engaged in the new state proj-
ect. Important cultural and scientific institutions adopted the adjective 
“Yugoslav” in their names. The writer Miroslav Krleža founded the Institute 
of Lexicography and began the compilation of a Yugoslav encyclopedia in the 
early 1950s. Furthermore, all across the country publishing houses, movie 
theaters, and a writers association were formed.39 Building on the agreement 
reached back in the nineteenth century, linguists and writers worked out a 
shared standard language in December 1954 in Novi Sad. They concluded that 
Serbs, Croats, and Montenegrins spoke the same language in two variants, 
Ekavian and Ijekavian. Officially the language was called “Serbo-Croatian” 
or “Croato-Serbian.” Both ways of spelling, pronunciation, and alphabets, the 
Latin and the Cyrillic, were to be treated equally.
Universities and academies began to tackle the task of creating a com-
mon dictionary. Emblematic for the Yugoslav understanding of culture after 
1945 was Ivo Andrić’s novel The Bridge on the Drina, which he had written 
during the interwar period. Andrić was not a communist, but his chronic of a 
Bosnian microcosm of different religions and civilizations masterly histori-
cizes the longue durée of coexistence and conflict as the central experience 
shaping identity among Yugoslavs. In 1961, Andrić was awarded the Nobel 
Prize for Literature.
“No Rest While We’re Rebuilding!”
Tito’s communist system represented the most ambitious and encompassing 
attempt up to that point to combat the excesses of capitalism through indus-
trial progress and social justice and thereby to actually bring about modernity 
in Yugoslavia in the first place. It propagated the idea of a better world in 
which alienation and class conflict would be overcome in a modern societal 
order exhibiting great solidarity. In its pursuit of this ideal, the regime used 
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dictatorial means to accelerate the pace of modernization in the years imme-
diately following the war.
As a result of their analysis of bourgeois economy and society, the com-
munists undertook a massive project to promote progress that they developed 
as an antithesis to capitalist market economy. The core of the ideology con-
sisted of the socialist theory of growth and labor. It aimed to achieve three 
major objectives: first, to generate employment and wealth without creating 
any of the negative side effects in society that capitalism had been producing 
since the nineteenth century. Second, the vicious circle of economic and polit-
ical dependence on foreign powers was to be broken. Third, socialist society 
was to be better, happier, more just, and more humane. In order to achieve this, 
the political system resorted to classic Soviet means: substantial abolishment 
of private property, long-term economic planning and management by the 
state, and the dissemination of socialist attitudes, values, norms, and practices.
By the time the war ended, Yugoslavia faced immense demographic 
and material losses. More than a million people had died in the war; another 
3.5 million had no roof over their heads. The country lay in ruins; 289,000 
farms had been totally destroyed.40 Because the Wehrmacht had practiced a 
scorched-earth policy in which it systematically destroyed facilities, plants, 
businesses, and infrastructure as it retreated, one-third of Yugoslavia’s indus-
try was damaged in 1945. Not one mine remained intact, and most of the roads, 
railway tracks, and bridges lay in ruins.41 This intensified exponentially the 
old problem of Balkan backwardness. By the end of the war, only 43.8 percent 
of the peasant households in all of Yugoslavia had an iron plow; another 18.2 
only had a wooden one. The rest did not even own the most rudimentary ag-
ricultural machines. Large sections of the country did not have canalization 
or running water.42
Under the motto “No rest while we’re rebuilding!” (Nema odmora dok 
traje obnova!), Yugoslavia undertook the great task of cleaning up and re-
pairing. Until 1953, the country received $553.8 million in aid from various 
sources. Over $419 million came from the UN program for reconstruction and 
development alone, the highest amount awarded to any European recipient. 
Most of this aid was used to purchase food, clothing, and medicine.43
However, what had a greater impact than this money on Yugoslavia’s 
immediate postwar reconstruction was the people’s optimism and initial élan. 
Hundreds of work brigades labored diligently. Youth helped with the harvest 
and reforestation, collected firewood, repaired roads and bridges, and built 
soccer stadiums, schools, and dwellings. Reconstruction was not just one 
great toil; for the youth, at least, it was also a huge party and the first im-
portant Yugoslav ritual of integration. “They were constantly celebrating. . . . 
They played instruments and danced as though they’d not been hard at work,” 
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noted one amazed observer.44 A total of 1.3 million young men and women 
worked more than 60 million voluntary and involuntary hours. Between 1945 
and 1952, they built eleven railway lines, fourteen industrial plants, and the 
highway between Zagreb and Belgrade — the autoput — which was named 
“brotherhood and unity.”45
Back in November 1944, the AVNOJ had confiscated over 80 percent 
of all private property in key economic sectors. Now, in November 1946, 
industry, banking, and the wholesale trade were officially nationalized. What 
remained in private hands were peasant farms, artisan workshops, and dwell-
ings.46 At the same time, the expropriation of land holdings was sanctioned 
retroactively. The land reform and colonization law passed in August 1945 
legalized the confiscation, limited peasant farms to a size between roughly 62 
to 86 acres, and distributed land to small farmers and the landless poor. Those 
affected by the expropriation of about 39.5 million acres were, for one, banks, 
companies, churches, and monasteries, and for another, large landowners and 
ethnic Germans. The state gave nearly half of this expropriated land to about 
300,000 veterans and landless poor. The rest was allocated to state-run en-
terprises and cooperatives. A second major reform followed in 1953 in which 
individual ownership was restricted to twenty-five acres for peasants and to 
7.5 acres for people who farmed on the side. This reform put another 692,000 
acres in the state’s hands.47
Much like in the Soviet Union, the cornerstone of this new order was 
rapid industrialization advanced by the state. The secondary sector of the 
economy was to absorb the surplus labor from rural areas, satisfy the de-
mand for consumer goods, and initiate self-sustaining economic growth. It 
was to be the lever with which to pry Yugoslavia loose from its backward 
social structure.48 In mid-1949, the state launched a campaign to mobilize 
the peasantry. Loyal party agitators spread out across the countryside, called 
meetings, and attempted to convince the village youth of the amenities of in-
dustrial work. Often the militia helped with recruitment: men were threatened 
at gunpoint, and women and children were locked up in dark cellars. One way 
or another, the campaign soon proved successful. Between 1945 and 1953, 1.5 
million people left their villages and moved permanently to the cities. Another 
800,000 became part-time industrial laborers and commuters.49
Hand in hand with industrialization, the state sought to promote the so-
cialist transformation of village life. Backwardness was to be combated, loans 
and modern agricultural technology provided, the level of education raised, 
and productivity increased. Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union, over 90 
percent of the land was privately owned and change was to take place at a 
slower and especially at a voluntary pace.50
In order to combat food shortages and to finance industrialization, a cen-
tralized purchasing system for agricultural products (otkup) was created in 
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which farmers were to sell surplus production to state agencies at low fixed 
prices, yet there was nothing voluntary about the system. Farmers felt bur-
dened with an unacceptable hardship because, on the one hand, they had to sell 
their produce at disproportionally cheap prices but, on the other, could only 
buy industrial goods at high market prices. Numerous peasants circumvented 
the party dictate by withholding part of their harvest and selling it on the black 
market. Since the threat of arrest and severe sentences did not discourage this 
practice, the authorities were forced to issue an amnesty in the summer of 
1946. The otkup turned out to be one of the largest flops in postwar history 
because the amount of produce delivered sank, the black market flourished, 
and the frustration of the authorities and the population at large grew.51
Pragmatism, Propaganda, and Socialist Values
These years of reconstruction and development were marked by exuberant 
enthusiasm and optimism. The rationalism of the Enlightenment, technolog-
ical progress, and the ideology of socialism combined to generate the idea 
that humans could not only dominate nature but that entire societies could be 
thoroughly reformatted through rational criteria and aesthetic norms. State 
planning, scientific research, and expertise were to drive social transformation, 
as would the dissemination of modern values and norms. A major objective 
was to bring forth a new sort of person, one fitting the needs and requirements 
of industrial society. Health, education, prosperity, and social security were 
considered high aims worth working for and which required virtues such as 
a strong work ethic, discipline, punctuality, precision, and efficiency. These 
were core ideas of European industrial modernity stemming from intellectu-
als and social reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; they were 
not at all typical elements of communist ideology. In the early years, rhetoric 
consisted mainly of appeals to work more and harder.52
Although they harbored a strong belief in the power of the state to shape 
society, Yugoslavs remained fairly pragmatic. Contrary to the Soviet Union, 
the backward peasantry was not to be terrorized into entering this new age 
but rather persuaded of both short-term political and long-term transformative 
goals. Yet, communists had to take into account a variety of local cultures, 
value systems, and behavioral habits, and they were well aware that not all 
features of the Soviet example suited Yugoslavia’s conditions. Therefore, 
time-tested social practices were usually tolerated. At least at the top, the 
leadership relied on models and persuasion to advance their aims, but at the 
local level party functionaries still often resorted to coercion and the use of 
force. Education and socialist training were to help emancipate the people 
and to overcome all forms of idealism, mysticism, and religiosity. The new 
system thus rested on the supportive pillars of agitation and propaganda (agit-
prop). The people’s consciousness was to be pulled from the moorings of their 
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traditional-patriarchal or conservative-bourgeois life worlds; their hearts and 
minds were to be won for the social revolution.53
Never before had the state invested so much in public education as it 
did after 1945. The highest priority was to combat illiteracy in the villages, 
to teach new health standards and practices, to enforce compulsory school 
attendance everywhere, and to set up public adult education centers, librar-
ies, and cultural organizations. There are moving photographs of bright-eyed 
older men and women crowded onto the wooden benches of the village school 
in anticipation of learning to spell their first words. People were to be taught 
about health, hygiene, and women’s emancipation. Hundreds of new clubs 
for women, youth, sports, culture, leisure activities, and education suddenly 
sprouted up everywhere in the initial postwar years. They printed wall news-
papers, flyers, calendars, and books and organized lectures, training courses, 
and events of every sort. Even theater and cinema were now to be accessible 
to the broad masses.
In addition to the sociocultural norms of the industrial age, the commu-
nists propagated specific socialist values: the Marxist ideology, humanism, 
open-mindedness, solidarity, equality between the sexes, and the “correct” 
way to live with regard to family life and morality. High priority was also 
given to other patriotic virtues such as loyalty to one’s homeland, love of 
liberty, fighting spirit, heroism, and naturally “brotherhood and unity.” The 
highest maxim of agitprop was to convey optimism and the joy of life as the 
country marched forward into a better and more just future.54
The regime showed less tolerance when it came to handling the religious 
communities. They were a thorn in the governments’ side for three reasons: 
first, all religion was considered the source of popular ignorance, nationalism, 
and chauvinism. Second, the clergy were suspected of being the uncompro-
mising opponents of the communist order. Third, religiously based national 
identities hampered people from developing a feeling for a supranational 
Yugoslav state. For these reasons, the religious communities were given cer-
tain freedom to operate but remained under the close observation of the state.
Article 25 of the constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and the 
separation of church and state. Individual religious belief was tolerated but 
only as a private matter. The abuse of religion for political purposes and the 
incitement of ethnic hatred were unlawful. In their first few years in power, 
the communists took a hard line against the churches. Clergy were harassed, 
press censored, church property nationalized, congregational offerings to the 
church prohibited. Religious festivities such as Christmas, Easter, St. George, 
Passover, and Bayram remained holidays, but community activities were de-
liberately scheduled on these days, like school festivals, excursions, sports 
events, and volunteer work. While Jack Frost, St. Nicholas, and Santa Claus 
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were still allowed to thrive, the state was stricter about Islamic customs. It 
abolished the Sharia, closed religious foundations and schools, and banned 
the veiling of women, just as Turkey already had. Many communists were 
excluded from the party because they attended religious services at churches 
or mosques.55
At first the religious communities were not willing to surrender their in-
fluence on schools, family policy, and moral values to the secular state without 
a fight. They raised a storm over civil marriage and religious instruction on 
a voluntary basis. The Vatican took a particularly aggressive stance by issu-
ing a decree in 1949 that threatened excommunication to anyone who joined 
the Communist Party. When the pope took things a step further in 1952 and 
announced the appointment to cardinal of Archbishop Stepinac, who was a 
convicted war criminal and under house arrest, Belgrade broke off diplomatic 
relations with the Holy See.
The communists turned the old order on its head in ways other than 
secularization. Like the Soviet model, their dictatorship of development re-
lied on technological progress, social justice, and rationality in everyday life. 
Subsequently, the combination of a faith in progress, planning euphoria, and 
forced modernization catapulted the Yugoslavs into a thoroughly new era. 
Epochal sociocultural innovations got underway, as was evident in people’s 
working lives, in relations between the sexes, in regional and social mobility, 
and with regard to attitudes and values. Yet, while existing culture could be 
influenced to a very significant degree, it seemed impossible to transform it 
completely. Anyway, the price for change was the forced relinquishment of 
all political pluralism: one-party rule halted bourgeois-liberal traditions and 
prevented all possible alternative systems for many decades.
Many people wanted to believe in the advantages of this new system. The 
birth of the people’s liberation movement that Tito fathered sustained itself 
through the heroism it demonstrated during the war and ultimately established 
itself throughout Yugoslavia without Soviet intervention. Therefore, the re-
gime possessed an original legitimacy of its own, even if this was tarnished 
by the persecution of political enemies and tens of thousands of repudiated 
victims during the takeover of power. “Brotherhood and unity” built bridges 
in a country deeply torn by civil war, and without the energetic policy of in-
dustrialization that the communists enacted, many a region would have been 
left crawling at a snail’s pace toward European-level development. Still, the 
constitution was written in an attempt to reconcile diverging interests between 
distinct nations; individual civil rights did not count de facto. Direct democ-
racy and socialist Yugoslavism soon proved to be a chimera.
11.
Tito’s Socialism (1948 to 1964)
The Break with Stalin
The optimism of the early years came to an abrupt halt when a serious in-
ternational crisis evolved in 1948. Yugoslavia had been well on its way to 
becoming an independent center of communist power in Southeast Europe. 
Neither Churchill nor Stalin was happy about this.
The unabashedly self-confident President Tito worked single-mindedly to 
establish a Balkan federation that, besides Yugoslavia, would include Bulgaria, 
Albania, and possibly even Greece. When the Greek civil war broke out again 
in 1946, Yugoslavia openly supported the communists. This infuriated the 
British, who considered the Mediterranean region to be their very own sphere 
of influence and a strategic bridge to the economically vital Near East. Stalin 
had accepted this British position when the demarcation of East–West spheres 
of interest had been negotiated. For him, the Balkan countries were not worth 
the risk of sparking a confrontation with the Western powers.1
Moscow was far more annoyed by Tito’s proactive course toward Bulgaria 
and Albania. In mid-1947, at a point when Stalin was clamping down on his 
East European allies, Tito signed a series of treaties with Bulgarian prime 
minister Georgi Dimitrov in Bled that included a mutual assistance pact 
and a customs union. He also signed a friendship treaty with Enver Hoxha 
in Albania. At the end of 1947, just as Belgrade was preparing to send two 
army divisions to Albania in order to preempt the alleged aggression of Greek 
“monarcho-fascists,” Stalin’s patience finally snapped.2
In harsh language, the Soviet dictator demanded that his Balkan comrades 
fall into line and ordered Georgi Dimitrov and the chief Yugoslav ideologue 
Edvard Kardelj to report to the Kremlin in February 1948. He forced the 
Yugoslavs to sign an agreement in which all further foreign policy moves 
would first be approved by Moscow. Because Tito still continued unapologet-
ically to work toward a union with Albania, the Soviets pulled their military 
advisers from Yugoslavia in March. The tone of a series of “critical letters” 
heated up communication in April 1948. Stalin wrote that the CPY placed too 
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much emphasis on the originality of its experiences and politics, neglected 
collectivization, and hindered the work of Soviet representatives. In a threat-
ening tone he demanded a gesture of submission from Tito.3
In the meantime, even greater frustration had built up on the Yugoslav 
side toward the Soviet Union because of the help promised by the Soviets but 
never received during the Second World War, the lack of Soviet support in 
the Trieste question, attempts at espionage by Soviet advisers and diplomats, 
and the attempt to establish a monopoly on the raw materials market through 
Yugoslav-Soviet enterprises. Tito is said to have been seriously surprised and 
deeply upset over Moscow’s harsh reaction. Yet he had already fulminated 
publicly at the end of May 1945 in Ljubljana that Yugoslavia did not want “to 
become the pawn of any policy having to do with spheres of interest . . . [and] 
to be dependent on anyone any longer.” Moscow subsequently sent a protest 
note: “We view the speech by Comrade Tito as an aggressive act against the 
Soviet Union.”4 Now Tito upped the ante: “No matter how much each of us 
loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love his own country 
less.”5 In order to take the wind out of the Soviet dictator’s sails, the Yugoslav 
leadership decided in April 1948 to hastily collectivize agriculture. But Stalin 
was seething and decided to involve the Cominform, the organization of com-
munist parties. On 28 June 1948, the historically renowned St. Vitus Day, the 
CPY was expelled from the Cominform in absentia on suspicion of capitalism. 
A major media campaign was launched in the East European countries, calling 
for the removal of Tito as Yugoslav head of state and leader of the CPY. No 
one dared to declare solidarity with Belgrade. Even Albania and Bulgaria 
shrank back.
The break with the Soviet Union was a severe shock for Yugoslav com-
munists and soon caused a long-lasting war psychosis. With a single blow 
they had lost Stalin as their ideological mentor and now had to face the pos-
sibility that the powerful Soviet leader might even be preparing military 
interventions against them. Tito found himself isolated in the communist 
world. Furthermore, grave economic consequences threatened. Early in 1949, 
the Soviet Union and its East European allies excluded Yugoslavia from the 
founding of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and set up a hermet-
ically tight trade blockade. Inflexible planning, political isolation following 
the expulsion from the Cominform, and an extreme drought caused the mul-
tiethnic state to suffer a serious economic and psychological crisis in 1950. 
Production and consumption shrank, so that many goods were only available 
on voucher. In 1952, Yugoslavs consumed only two-thirds as much as they 
had before the war.6
With time, the conflict with Stalin proved to be a political blessing for the 
regime. Not only did Yugoslavia avoid the Sovietization and homogenization 
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experienced by the Eastern bloc, but the party was also able to overcome the 
internal divisions that it had suffered since the interwar period by conducting 
fundamental debates but also undergoing brutal political purges. In the end, 
it emerged from the conflict stronger than before. In July 1948, Tito had him-
self reelected by an overwhelming majority as head of the CPY at the fifth 
party congress. The People’s Front was disbanded, thereby discarding the last 
pretense that pluralism might be possible. Among the people, Tito’s defiant 
demeanor ensured him much goodwill for many years. “I don’t like him,” 
explained a librarian from a small town near Zagreb in the early 1970s, “but I 
guess we all respect him for having stood up to the Russians and having kept 
us out of their clutches.”7
In the meantime, the West fully misinterpreted the breach between Tito 
and Stalin. The Americans believed there was an ideological fissure running 
through the Soviet bloc that would allow them to drive deeper the wedge 
implanted by the Yugoslavs. President Truman offered general military and 
economic assistance, to “keep Tito afloat.”8 However, the ex-revolutionary was 
not about to renounce communism. He was primarily concerned with power 
politics, not ideological questions. Washington’s strategy did offer Belgrade 
distinct advantages for orienting its trade relations more toward the West and 
thereby liberating Yugoslavia from Soviet economic dependence. It took years 
before the U.S. administration understood that the Yugoslavs did not intend to 
concede to American claims to power, let alone encourage other Eastern bloc 
countries to imitate their rebelliousness against the Soviets. Tito relentlessly 
refused to make political concessions, with one decisive exception: in August 
1949, he cut off support for the communists fighting in the Greek civil war and 
in return received an urgently needed loan worth millions from the British. 
The uprising in the neighboring country collapsed soon afterward.9
At the same time, communists loyal to Moscow, the Cominform sympa-
thizers (ibeovci), were ostracized. Two leading party members, the Serb Sreten 
Žujović and the Croat Andrija Hebrang, were tried before a court and thou-
sands of rank-and-file members were expelled. About 5,000 Stalin supporters 
emigrated for political reasons. Over 55,600 were on record as Cominformists 
between 1948 and 1955, meaning every tenth party member.10 Approximately 
16,000 sympathizers, agents, and “suspicious” individuals were convicted and 
interned in the prison on the infamous island of Goli Otok and in the camp 
Sveti Grgur nearby for the purpose of undergoing “reeducation” through hard 
labor under a blistering sun. If the Soviet supporters were not isolated, noted 
Edvard Kardelj rather laconically, Stalin “would transform all of Yugoslavia 
into a terrible camp.”11 The prisoners, including some of the first partisans to 
fight with Tito, were severely mistreated. For example, every prisoner to arrive 
on the island had to undergo the cruel ritual of running the gauntlet. Then they 
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were subjected to hours of interrogation. It is possible that as many as 3,000 
torture victims may have died on Goli Otok.12 The situation did not improve 
until the writer Dobrica Ćosić reported on the untenable conditions and the 
maltreatment in the summer of 1953. At the end of the 1950s, the doors of the 
camp were closed for good.
Self-Management and Socialist Patriotism
The 1948 break with the Soviet Union deprived the Yugoslav leadership of 
what had been up to that point its ideological and political basis of legiti-
macy. The task now was to develop an alternative that radically departed 
from and rejected Stalin’s totalitarianism, without fundamentally questioning 
the socialist revolution as such in Yugoslavia. Party theoreticians found a 
handy phrase in the concept of the “withering state,” which Friedrich Engels 
had coined and Lenin had further developed. In order to achieve justice and 
freedom, the people had to directly control the means of production: “The 
interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one 
sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. . . . The state is not ‘abolished,’ 
it withers away.”13
In his 1949 article “On People’s Democracy,” chief ideologue Edvard 
Kardelj presented a fundamental criticism of Soviet statism, in which he ar-
gued that the party and state threatened to melt into one, to take on a life of 
its own, and to elevate itself over society. Together with Milovan Djilas, Boris 
Kidrič, Moša Pijade, and Vladimir Bakarić, he drafted in 1950 the “Basic Law 
on the Management of State Economic Enterprises” with the following key 
elements: debureaucratization through workers’ councils; decentralization 
of management, politics, and culture; and democratization of all aspects of 
life. The basic idea of the “three D’s,” as these elements were known, was to 
involve as large a section of the population as possible in economic and so-
cial procedures and thereby anchor the foundation of the system’s legitimacy 
all the more deeply.14 In more than 6,000 plants the labor force then elected 
councils to decide all business matters.
In the years that followed, self-management was further expanded. Step 
by step it was left to be more freely shaped by supply and demand. Even young 
Karl Marx had once called for the “association of free producers.” So why 
shouldn’t certain rules of the market economy not also be valid in socialism? 
The Yugoslavs thought that the state was only allowed to coordinate the econ-
omy but without any universal power of central planning. In 1952, the “new 
economic system” introduced the principle of business risks and certain rules 
of competition. The strict target quotas characteristic of the first five-year 
plan were replaced with a more general framework of orientation, the social 
development plan for Yugoslavia.
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At the high point of its reform activity, the CPY changed its name at 
the sixth party congress in November 1952, to League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia so as to communicate outwardly its democratic inclinations and 
multinational character more clearly. The aim was to initiate, advocate, and 
win support for reform, not merely impose it from above. It was the role of the 
party to educate and guide the masses, but as a sort of political and intellectual 
avant-garde and no longer as a hermetical cadre. “The working masses,” said 
Kidrič in an influential speech, had to “have their say directly and daily and 
not only by way of the vanguard of their political parties.”15
However, for all practical purposes, the monopoly of the Communist 
Party remained unchallenged. Its legitimacy was still derived from the peo-
ple’s liberation struggle. At the same time, it was the strongest guarantor of 
Tito’s personal power. Unlike Stalin, Tito repeatedly reassured himself of its 
support. He was able to settle factional strife through his personal authority 
and thereby constantly expand his power base. Throughout his entire lifetime, 
Tito was convinced of the leading role of the party, “which made me the per-
son I am today.” He thought of the party as the avant-garde of the working 
class, the guarantor of state unity, and a reliable base from which to rule. In 
his opinion, democratic rights had to take second place behind the axiom of 
social justice. He emphatically rejected the term “Titoism” that was widely 
used in the West “because we have not added anything new to the science of 
Marxism-Leninism. We have just succeeded in applying this science the most 
correctly. Because there is nothing new, there is also no [separate ideological] 
direction.”16
Nevertheless, the reform of the political system was linked to the gradual 
departure from the monolithic, Bolshevik-type, one-party state. Unlike in the 
Eastern bloc, a degree of pluralism was tolerated, at first in literature and the 
fine arts, but then also in political theory. At least different interpretations of 
Marxism were now permitted.17
The constitution enacted in January 1953 institutionalized the reforms 
and created the Federal Executive Council (Savezno izvršno vijeće, SIV) 
as the Yugoslav government. Tito was the head of government, the com-
mander in chief of the army, and the head of state. Leadership positions in 
the ministries were filled by state secretaries, all of whom were longtime 
communist comrades of Tito, men like Ranković, Kardelj, Djilas, Pijade, and 
Vukmanović-Tempo.18 The backbone of Tito’s rule was the People’s Army, 
the entity that had made Tito’s rise to power possible militarily and that had 
been the earliest and most typical embodiment of “brotherhood and unity.” 
Members of the army enjoyed numerous privileges, ranging from good wages 
to educational opportunities and government housing. The party carefully 
selected and closely controlled those entering the officer corps. For this reason, 
the military remained especially loyal to the state to the very end.
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The Yugoslav system was meant explicitly as the ideological alternative 
to the Soviet Union, as a real-existing disclaimer of state socialism, so to 
speak. Its entire legitimacy and internal cohesion was derived from being more 
democratic than the USSR and from its ability to withstand the superpower’s 
political pressure. In its party program of 1958, the seventh party congress 
resolutely opposed “bureaucratism and statism” and its personification: Stalin. 
“The aims of socialism are the same, but they are brought about — for a variety 
of different objective and subjective reasons — by the peoples in different ways 
and with different means.”19 As long as the Soviet Union existed, Belgrade 
feared an invasion, especially in light of the periodic border incidents with 
Hungary and Romania. This monumental threat acted as a major cohesive 
factor in Yugoslavia, but one that would become a problem in the long run, 
specifically at the point when this threatening scenario fell apart.
The idea of a renewed state identity in the form of “Yugoslav socialist 
patriotism” was also linked to this reformed system. “We are not talking 
about creating a new ‘Yugoslav nation’. . . but . . . affirming common interests 
on the basis of socialist relations. Such Yugoslavism [ jugoslovenstvo] does 
not inhibit the free development of languages and cultures; on the contrary, 
it requires these.”20 It was argued that the element unifying the peoples was 
not the state or an integral understanding of nation, but “membership in the 
Yugoslav self-managing socialist community.” However, for many people 
this was a rather abstract argument. A poll of 3,000 party members taken 
in 1967 revealed the perseverance of “old thinking.” Asked what bound the 
people of Yugoslavia together, only every other person gave the ideologi-
cally correct answer of “self-management.” A third named the — tabooed as 
too bourgeois — criteria of common origin and language; the rest expressed 
no opinion.21
One person to raise doubts about the earnestness of democratic com-
munism was Milovan Djilas, the head of the department for agitation and 
propaganda and a confidant of Tito.22 Following Stalin’s death in 1953 and the 
subsequent rapprochement with the Soviet Union, he feared Yugoslavia would 
relapse into state socialism. He grumbled about the influence of Aleksandar 
Ranković, his strongest rival as Tito’s successor, and accused him of statism. 
At the end of 1953, he published a series of articles in the party newspaper 
Borba (Struggle) in which he radically took to task “bureaucratism” and the 
communist monopoly over politics. In the book Anatomy of a Moral, a com-
pilation of essays, he attacked the national elite for the privileges they granted 
themselves and for their unethical behavior. Thousands of functionaries in-
terpreted this as an appalling provocation. At a special plenum in January 
1954, the leadership convicted Djilas of “revisionism” and expelled him from 
the Central Committee. Shortly after that he left the party on his own initia-
tive. An interview in the New York Times, in which he demanded multiparty 
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democracy, landed him in prison for the first time. While serving his sentence, 
he wrote the bestseller The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, 
a vigorous reckoning with communism, which he denounced as a form of 
totalitarianism.23 The book was translated into more than forty languages and 
established Djilas’s reputation as the most prominent dissident of the commu-
nist world. By the time he was finally pardoned in 1966, he had spent about 
nine years in prison. Curiously, he left few marks on the critical literary field 
in Yugoslavia, perhaps because of his own Stalinist past. The only person to 
speak up on his behalf was a young university professor, Mihajlo Mihajlov. 
He wrote an open letter to Tito in which he condemned the regime and an-
nounced the formation of a new party. The president’s reaction was harsh. A 
court subsequently convicted the young critic to four years imprisonment.24
Purges within the party did occur during Tito’s rule, but never with the 
same totality and brutality as they did under Stalin. In Moscow during the 
1930s, the Croat communist had experienced the Stalinist Great Terror in per-
son, and he was well aware of the high moral and political price that the Soviet 
system had paid for it.25 Following the purge of the 1948 crisis, Yugoslavia 
allowed itself to deal with political critics in a relatively liberal fashion, at least 
as long as they did not fundamentally question socialism and “brotherhood and 
unity.” The power apparatus preferred to use a combination of repression and 
cooptation, of carrot and stick. On the one hand, Article 133 of the criminal 
law code outlawed “enemy propaganda” and “verbal delicts.” Other offenses 
were “counterrevolution,” “terrorism,” and “conspiracy.” This meant that in-
tellectuals were permanently threatened with occupational or publication bans 
or — in serious cases — prison sentences. On the other hand, the regime permit-
ted contacts and trips abroad, did not operate a state censorship agency, and 
usually granted its defiers a second chance. The prominent Serb literary critic 
Borislav Mihajlović-Mihiz had to leave his work brigade in 1946 as an enemy 
of the state, only later to become the chief critic of the weekly magazine NIN. 
The young Croat poet Goran Babić, who was accused of nationalism on the 
basis of his poem “Croatia burns,” later became the publisher of the magazine 
Oko (Eye). However, three journalists who had published his poem at the time 
on the front page of Hrvatski tjednik (Croatian weekly) were sent to prison.26
Economic Miracle
Two years after the end of the war, the economy was back on its feet, by and 
large. Only now did long-term strategies of development make any sense. 
The first Five-Year Plan (1947–1952) targeted a fourfold increase in industrial 
production. Priority was to be given to the investment in machine manufac-
turing, shipyards, and electrical industries, and to the increased production 
of energy, iron, steel, and coal. Enormous resources were poured into the 
armament industry in the country’s interior, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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and Serbia. Yugoslavia strove for autarky in military defense and later even 
became a significant exporter of military equipment.
The highest objective of long-term economic planning was to level the 
regional disparities of development, because “the principle of brotherhood 
and unity . . . categorically demands elimination of this unevenness,” stated 
Boris Kidrič, the architect of the five-year plan.27 In 1947, the wealthiest 
region (Slovenia) produced about three times more than the poorest region 
(Kosovo) per capita. The small southern province barely reached 50 percent 
of the Yugoslav average, while Macedonia reached 70 percent and Bosnia-
Herzegovina 86 percent. Croatia and Serbia represented roughly 100 percent, 
and only Slovenia lay far ahead of all others with 163 percent.28
Like other Europeans, Yugoslavs in the 1950s delighted in the experience 
of an economic miracle made possible by an enormous increase in produc-
tivity, the shift of resources from the agrarian to the industrial sector, and the 
optimistic and ever-expanding global boom. Between 1947 and 1949, a third 
of the national income was invested in industry and the number of workers and 
employees in the secondary sector had increased fourfold to nearly two mil-
lion.29 Sarajevo and Belgrade had grown by about 18 percent by 1953, Skopje 
by more than 36 percent, and the new industrial centers like the Bosnian city 
of Zenica by 56 percent.30 Between 1953 and 1960, industrial production in-
creased yearly by an impressive 13.83 percent, which meant Yugoslavia held 
the world record, ahead of even Japan. During the 1960s, the rate was still high 
at 8.2 percent.31 Gradually, all of this also increased personal wealth. Incomes 
rose by 5.9 percent between 1953 and 1959. After the years of deprivation 
during the initial phase of reconstruction and development, priority was now 
given to improving consumption.32 The multiethnic state was on the threshold 
of becoming an industrial society, which brought the country great interna-
tional recognition. Many developing countries and international organizations 
extended invitations to Yugoslav economic experts in the hope of coaxing out 
of them the recipe for overcoming backwardness. As early as in the mid-1950s, 
a new transnational economic discussion was taking place between socialist 
Yugoslavia, developing countries, and the capitalist West, which resulted in 
fresh thinking about both competitive markets and central planning.33
In the course of this development, it was questioned whether the high 
rate of economic growth was perhaps being financed only by external loans 
and reconstruction aid and not at all by self-sustaining economic expansion. 
Between 1950 and 1953, Yugoslavia did indeed receive $553.8 million in in-
ternational financial assistance, of which $267 million were in loans. However, 
the bulk of the foreign funds went toward financing the importation of food, 
which was in short supply due to a disastrous drought and the failure of collec-
tivization. Belgrade only invested $158 million from these funds into financing 
industry, mining, and infrastructure, a figure that represented about 3 percent 
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of all investment. The larger share of Yugoslavia’s capital was created by its 
own economy, namely through indirect transfer payments from the agrarian 
sector to the industrial sector. Never before had the state invested so much in 
industry, electrification, and infrastructure.34
The Yugoslav project of creating a socialism in which democracy, plural-
ism, and the market economy were reconciled with the values of an egalitarian, 
autonomous society fascinated intellectuals and political activists throughout 
the world. The Yugoslavs wanted to overcome “alienation,” to distribute the 
surplus value among its workers, to introduce the principles of grassroots de-
mocracy, and to openly argue and settle conflicts of interest. Social democrats, 
Eurocommunists, and independent leftists placed great hope in Yugoslavia’s 
unique path to socialism.
Indeed, a degree of leeway in the economic sphere did develop in the 
1950s and 1960s as a result of the complex system of decentralized institu-
tions, bodies, and assemblies. The regime, for example, even tolerated strikes. 
Between 1958 and 1969, official statistics reported that nearly 80,000 employ-
ees participated in more than 1,900 labor conflicts. Probably in reality this 
figure was significantly larger. In Pula, Jesenice, and Rijeka, labor conflicts 
turned into violent clashes with security forces in 1968 and 1969.35
Not until the 1960s did it become evident that serious structural in-
equalities lingered in the shadows, hidden by the brightness of the Yugoslav 
economic miracle: the constrictions placed on farming by low prices for ag-
ricultural products and raw materials fixed by the state, the social decline of 
the peasantry due to its drop in income, a growing dependence on foreign 
loans despite all efforts to prevent this, and the structural disadvantages of the 
poorer, raw-material-producing regions of Yugoslavia, which thus led to grow-
ing regional disparities. However, the labor force recognized at first only the 
numerous material advantages of workers’ self-management, not its immanent 
weaknesses. Among other aspects, many social tasks were assumed by the 
plants. They provided housing and vacation dwellings, distributed fresh fruit 
and vegetables, and organized child care. Only the economists slowly began 
to realize that the system not only advanced prosperity, but also mismanage-
ment, bureaucratization, corruption, and bad investments, which in the end 
undermined the cohesiveness of Yugoslavia’s economic space.
The Cazin Peasant Uprising
Although the partisans had attempted during the war to win the peasants’ 
hearts and minds for communism, it was this rural setting in which social-
ist modernization ran up against its own limitations. The rural population 
remained essentially conservative in their values, bound to tradition, and re-
sistant to what they viewed as the impertinencies of the new era. A person who 
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had grown up in a village loved the farm and fields and worked at his or her 
own individual pace. As in other communist countries, socialist transforma-
tion was meant to change established institutions, socioeconomic relations, and 
everyday habits. Socialism shook the foundations of the peasant identity and 
way of life that had evolved over centuries. This unnerved and scared them.
The conflict came to a head when, in reaction to the accusations leveled 
by the Cominform, the Yugoslav leadership decided to introduce the collec-
tivization of agriculture as modeled on the Soviet Union’s policy. The plan, 
announced in July 1948, depended on the expansion of the collective farms 
system to bring about the socialist transformation and cultural improvement 
of village life. In 1947, roughly 200,000 farmers were organized in farming 
cooperatives (zadruge). By 1950, the figure had increased to 2.5 million, which 
contradicted the claims made during the war that the land should belong to 
those who worked it.36
As the chief ideologist for the regime, Edvard Kardelj understood that one 
could not force headstrong peasants to accept the socialist means of production 
from one day to the next. On his recommendation, the CPY pledged to en-
courage voluntary participation and to offer various transition options. What 
was to be avoided at all costs was a war against the peasantry similar to the 
annihilating one Stalin had conducted against the wealthy farmers (kulaks) in 
the 1930s. Instead, the peasants were to be gradually introduced to socialism. 
Nevertheless, the information campaign for collectivization nearly turned into 
a disaster in 1949. The rural party cadre had little use for the elaborate line 
of argumentation offered by their leadership. Instead they behaved with the 
high-handedness of local royalty, commonly using threats and repression to 
force peasants into the collectives. Peasants responsed in a variety of ways to 
communist agricultural policies, ranging from support to active resistance. 
The number of participating farmers multiplied, but so too did peasant dis-
content. All across the country, peasants were becoming increasingly unruly, 
and a few did not shy away from publicly threatening local party functionaries 
or throwing rocks at the police.37
The discontent erupted into an uprising in the Croatian-Bosnian border 
region between the towns of Cazin, Velika Kladuša, and Slunj. On St. George 
Day, 6 May 1950, more than 700 Muslim and Serb peasants, including former 
partisans and party members, rebelled in an effort to finally tear away the op-
pressive “yoke” they felt around their necks. Armed with shotguns, hayforks, 
and shovels, the rebels intended to take the provincial town of Cazin to assert 
their withdrawal from the collective and their exemption from the otkup, the 
centralized purchasing system for agricultural products. The impoverished, 
poorly educated, and naïve rebels barely managed to occupy a police station 
in the neighboring village before the police and military arrived. The security 
186 Part Iv: 1945 to 1980
forces blocked off the entire region. Hundreds of people were arrested, and 
later the leaders of the uprising were sentenced to death. The authorities 
thought they were fighting a reactionary plot to overthrow the government. 
Instead, it was the oppressive conditions of rural life and the high-handed 
actions of the apparatchiks that fired up the peasants to resist and transformed 
their discontent into open hostility against a state that viewed its rural pop-
ulation merely as an anachronistic relict of an era long past. It took a while 
before the CPY understood that the unrest among the peasantry was not truly 
caused by the misbehavior of a few individual party functionaries but by the 
party’s own politics.38 Because the open militancy in the rural areas threatened 
to seriously damage the credibility of socialist Yugoslavia, the CPY radically 
changed its agrarian policy in March 1953. Unproductive cooperatives were 
disbanded, and the land was returned to the peasants to be farmed privately. 
The otkup had already been abolished the year before. In the future, the state 
invested more in the agrarian sector, so that productivity began to increase 
once again and the population became more content.
Foreign Policy Balancing Act
The unusual historical constellation that evolved in the early phase of the Cold 
War offered Tito new foreign policy options. When the big powers began to 
divide Europe into their respective spheres of influence in 1943, they defined 
Yugoslavia as a sphere they shared. Because East and West now wished to 
gain Yugoslavia’s favor for strategic reasons, the regime found itself in a very 
advantageous position. It could gratefully accept assistance from all sides 
without having to do something in return. His people would prefer to go 
naked than make concessions in exchange for aid, Tito retorted angrily to the 
Americans when they protested in February 1950 against Yugoslavia’s recog-
nition of North Vietnam.39 As part of their “wedge strategy,” the Americans 
were still willing to transfer more than $1.5 billion into Belgrade’s coffers 
between 1948 and 1960; some estimates put the figure as high as $2.4 billion.40 
NATO also made blatant advances toward Belgrade within the context of the 
West’s containment policy, in which the aim was to encircle the Soviet bloc 
politically and militarily with a ring of allied countries.
The death of Stalin in 1953, however, offered a chance to mend Soviet-
Yugoslav relations. This was very important to Tito for ideological and 
political reasons. The only thing that could guarantee Yugoslavia’s indepen-
dence against Western influence was a strategy of equidistance to both blocs. 
The first Soviet-Yugoslav economic agreement was concluded in 1954, before 
Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade the following year to establish contact. He 
was interested first and foremost in preventing Yugoslavia from drifting into 
the Western camp. A year after his visit, he received Tito with a pompous 
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ceremony in Moscow. They issued a joint statement stating that each country 
had the right to travel its own path to socialism without external interven-
tion. In other words, the bottom line of this visit was that the small state of 
Yugoslavia had been able to assert itself against the giant USSR.
The de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav model en-
couraged the Eastern European satellites to push for political liberalization. 
When the uprising broke out in Hungary in the fall of 1956 and Moscow 
intervened militarily, Tito found himself in an awkward position. To stay the 
threat of a Soviet invasion into Yugoslavia, Tito called the rebellion’s suppres-
sion a necessary evil to save socialism, even though he had already publicly 
denounced the move earlier. However, Moscow did not intend to breach the 
agreement it had made with the Western powers on the respective European 
spheres of influence by intervening in Yugoslavia and thus possibly risking a 
war between the blocs. Therefore, Tito was also able to steer his independent 
course successfully, not least because he did so in the wake of the American 
nuclear threat.41
At first, Washington also seemed willing to accept the status quo as long 
as Yugoslavia did not drift into the Eastern bloc. The Americans continued 
to send money and military aid, until Tito halted this at the beginning of the 
1960s. Relations soured because Belgrade supported the Arabs in the Near 
East conflict, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, to the 
Soviets’ advantage. Although Tito acted arbitrarily and unpredictably, all sides 
found Yugoslavia’s neutrality to be more advantageous than disadvantageous.
The improved relations to Moscow prompted Belgrade to recognize East 
Germany formally in October 1957. As a consequence, the Federal Republic 
of Germany broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia as required by the 
Hallstein Doctrine, established in 1955, which threatened such action against 
any state that carried out this “hostile act” of recognizing the GDR. Yugoslavia 
was the first and (except Cuba) the only country against which the sanctions 
were then applied. Still, Tito succeeded in maintaining economic and cultural 
contacts to the Federal Republic until Willy Brandt rescinded the isolation 
in 1968 during the course of his new Ostpolitik. Besides, over the years, the 
doctrine had not been able to stop the flow of either Yugoslav guest workers 
to West Germany or West German tourists to the Adriatic coast.42
Tito’s most important and prestigious project was the politics of non-
alignment, through which he internationalized the Yugoslav approach and 
also made other options of development possible.43 Following a meeting with 
Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who first launched the basic concept 
of “active neutrality,” Tito became one of the most active advocates of this new 
policy. In this era of decolonialization, many allies could be found among the 
Asian and African countries that Tito frequently visited in the mid-1950s. In 
188 Part Iv: 1945 to 1980
1955, the Bandung Conference brought together twenty-nine states from the 
so-called Third World to speak out in favor of the politics of active peace-
ful coexistence and the surmounting of political blocs. The following year, 
Tito invited his Egyptian and Indian counterparts, Gamal Abdel Nasser and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, to the Brijuni Islands; later, in 1960, a much larger group 
including these three men would meet in New York. “Egypt is trying to be-
come another Yugoslavia,” a high-ranking Egyptian diplomat explained to the 
Yugoslav foreign minister. “Our situation is somewhat similar. While you are 
working to preserve your independence, we are trying to win ours.” Nasser, 
like other political leaders from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, viewed Tito 
as an outstanding role model because the struggle against colonial rule was 
also part of Yugoslav history, as the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs had freed 
themselves from imperial rule in an earlier era. Furthermore, Tito showed 
them “how to get help from both sides without joining.”44 In September 1961, 
under the shadow of the Berlin Crisis, twenty-five heads of state and gov-
ernment met in Belgrade and decided to formally establish the “Nonaligned 
Movement.” They pledged to maintain strict military neutrality and peaceful 
coexistence and to support national liberation movements.45
Tito traveled indefatigably around the world and often on a cadet boat 
called Galeb (The Seagull). From 1944 until 1980, he made 169 official visits 
to 92 countries, spending almost 1,000 days abroad. In addition, he hosted 
175 heads of the state, 110 prime ministers, as well as hundreds of ministers 
and heads of political movements.46 From the 1950s onward, he became an 
untiring ambassador of “active peaceful coexistence” and a mediator be-
tween the blocs.47 During the darkest moments of the Cold War, namely 
the Berlin Crisis and the Cuba Crisis, Tito preached tirelessly on behalf of 
solving conflicts peacefully. He lambasted the division of the world into 
political blocs as the fundamental evil of the international system. While 
Cold War tensions repeatedly flared, the nonaligned nations addressed topics 
pertinent to the future: disarmament, the abolishment of nuclear weapons, 
decolonialization, and a more just New International Economic Order. This 
movement was never politically neutral because it took a clear stand against 
Western imperialism and strongly supported the reform of the global eco-
nomic system, among other things. A child of the nonaligned movement is the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), founded 
in 1964. In 1970, on the initiative of Yugoslavia, the UN General Assembly 
passed a resolution on the principles of international law concerning “peace-
ful coexistence.”48
During the 1960s and 1970s, Tito acted as an unflagging ambassador for 
the movement and as its greatest hope. As such, he gained allies worldwide 
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for his independent course and internationally enhanced Yugoslavia’s image 
and his own reputation. At the same time, he opened up new markets for his 
country outside of Europe. Exports in the weapons, shipyard, and construc-
tion industries to Third World countries brought $1.5 billion into the country 
annually. Thousands of young people from developing countries arrived each 
year to study in Yugoslavia.49
Even though the extremely heterogeneous nonaligned movement re-
mained internally divided and was only able eventually to produce little more 
than a bare skeleton of a rhetorical program, it created vibrant and strong 
symbolism. Tito’s clever maneuvering between East and West brought great 
international prestige to his country and a foreign policy identity of its own, 
one that became an essential pillar supporting the Yugoslav understanding of 
state. Furthermore, the “third path” contributed to internal peace. The poli-
tics of equidistance reconciled conflicting foreign policy orientations within 
Yugoslavia, since the northern republics tended historically to lean toward the 
West, while the Orthodox eastern republics tended to look toward Russia. And 
the friendship with the Islamic world made Muslims inside Yugoslavia feel 
safer. The politics of nonalignment were extremely popular among Yugoslavs 
because it enhanced the country’s reputation, an aspect that played no small 
role in compensating for some of the frustration caused by the drawbacks of 
the socialist system. So, in many respects, nonalignment acted as an important 
stabilizing factor in this multiethnic state.
Yugoslav Identity, Tito Cult, and the Partisan Myth
Like every nation, socialist Yugoslavia created its own founding myth and rit-
uals after 1945. An important component in this process was to take recourse 
to popular culture and literature. Historical figures and folklore evoked emo-
tion and provided meaning in that they reconstructed the present in socialist 
Yugoslavia from the cultural values of the past.
Traditions were simply adapted to fit ideological specifications, which 
did indeed help win the sympathy of the masses and better come to terms 
psychologically with the far-reaching changes brought about by the new order. 
Among other things, the communists staged a modern propaganda event in 
1947 to celebrate the centennial of the publication of the monumental epic The 
Mountain Wreath, written by the Montenegrin national poet Njegoš, which 
had so greatly moved the South Slavic patriots in the nineteenth century. 
Throughout the country, new editions were published; the work was translated 
into Slovenian and, for the first time, into Macedonian. It vividly showcased 
the virtues of the people’s liberation struggle like self-sacrifice, heroism, and 
patriotism. At the same time, the statue of Ban Josip Jelačić, who fought on 
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the side of Austria against the 1848 Revolution, was removed from Zagreb’s 
central square in 1947.50
The central figure with which socialist Yugoslavia identified was Josip 
Broz Tito, and the regime used all the tricks of the trade to nurture a person-
ality cult with demonstrations, parades, speeches, and flag-waving, cheering 
crowds. Enthusiastic supporters yelled “We belong to Tito! Tito belongs to 
us!” or sang in unison “Comrade Tito, we swear to you that we will not devi-
ate from your path.” His image was that of an undefeatable commander with 
statesmanlike qualities. He appeared courageous, clever, generous, humorous, 
just, and infallible. Streets, squares, factories, and cities like Titovo Užice and 
Titograd were named after him. He had been awarded the Order of People’s 
Hero three times since the war, and his portrait hung in public buildings, 
banks, shops, restaurants, and many private homes.51
Tito was the personification of the new Yugoslavia, its father figure, and 
its god. Many people projected their very personal desires, hopes, and fanta-
sies onto their idol, whom they venerated, honored, and passionately adored. 
They sent baskets full of greeting cards and presents when Yugoslavia cele-
brated Tito’s official birthday as “Youth Day” with a nationwide relay race. 
Starting in 1953, young pioneers ran each year on 25 May from north to south 
in order to present Marshal Tito with a message of good tidings.52 Besides New 
Year’s, the other holidays celebrated were International Women’s Day, May 
Day, Fighters’ Day, and the celebrations for the founding of the republics and 
the Yugoslav federation.
Much like Stalin, Tito orchestrated contact to the masses in order to feign 
a sort of inherent legitimacy, but he never did it to mobilize support on the 
streets against critics in the party. He feared the inherent dynamics that could 
develop from ecstatic mass demonstrations. Whenever he felt control was 
slipping from his hands, he conjured the specter of the Soviet threat in order 
to produce unity. All important decision-making processes were to take place 
within the protected confines of the party and not in public.53
Josip Broz Tito was the main character in the founding myth of Yugoslavia 
and in its most important community-building narrative, the multinational 
partisan struggle. This was a story of David against Goliath, of the bloody ex-
istential fight between heroes and traitors, between good and evil. The enemy 
forces were coded politically, not ethnically, so that people from all nation-
alities could find themselves fighting on the right side. This myth featured 
all of the crucial elements needed to be successful: the explanation of the 
national origins (the Second World War), the founding father (Tito), the motif 
of martyrdom (fight for liberation), and the highly dramatic component of the 
miraculous rescue from the most dire of straits (e.g., the Battle at Neretva). The 
messages transported in this myth about national history were key political 
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ones: the credo of “brotherhood and unity,” the legitimacy of communist one-
party rule, and the justification for the distance to the Soviet Union.
A diverse topography of symbolic commemorative locations illustrated 
and represented this story of national origin: the battlefields on the Sutjeska 
and Neretva rivers; Jajce, the birthplace of the republic; the hills of Šumarice 
near Kragujevac, where the Germans carried out a bloodbath during the 
Second World War; the Croatian camp Jasenovac. Every city commemorated 
its heroes and victims with memorials and chronicles. One such monument 
stands in Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, where the Croat Ustasha regime ini-
tiated a massacre in 1943 against the civilian Serb population. Streets and 
squares, factories and department stores, movie theaters and soccer clubs 
were named Partizan. The state celebrated 4 July as “Fighters’ Day” and 
22 December as “Army Day,” honored those who were among the very first 
to fight (prvoborci) as folk heroes, and provided veterans with government 
pensions, housing, and other social privileges.54
The partisan plot served extraordinarily well as popular mass culture and 
inspired innumerable novels, pieces of music, western movies, and comics. 
The most popular and most widely found genre was the partisan movie. More 
than 200 films were produced, and some became box office hits, like Battle 
on the Neretva or Walter Defends Sarajevo. Several of these were interna-
tional co-productions, which is how Richard Burton and Curt Jurgens came 
to appear on the screen in dramatic poses against the backdrop of rustic and 
romantic landscapes. Besides their value as entertainment, these films also 
sent subliminal messages: heroic fates, tumultuous battles, and war romances 
illustrated patriotic virtues in general and transethnic solidarity in particular. 
They shaped images of history, a feeling of community, shared knowledge 
and values. Viewed in this context, it is clear that partisan films also served 
as important instruments in nation building.
12.
The 1960s: Transition to  
an Industrial Society
At no other time in its history did Yugoslavia change as much as it did in 
the twenty years following 1945. The socialist transformation completed the 
far-reaching industrial reshaping of social conditions that had started before 
the Second World War. It left no area untouched. Everything changed: so-
cial and occupational structures, urban environment and architecture, family 
structures and gender roles, attitudes, norms, and customs. The 1960s marked 
a phase of transition in which the society could no longer be characterized 
as a rural-traditional one, but at the same time it had not yet fully become 
urban- industrial. At this point, tradition and modernity neither ran parallel 
nor directly conflicted with each other. Instead, they mutually penetrated each 
other. All aspects of life that were age-old, well established, and customary 
no longer found socially relevant niches in which to flourish. The economic 
miracle, greater intellectual liberties, and international exchange sparked an 
impressive heyday in art, culture, and consumption and opened up unprece-
dented opportunities in the lives of a large segment of the population, which is 
why this period was later known as the “golden years.” Critical self-reflection 
and the desire for change and advancement grew from being an elite phe-
nomenon to a mass one — perhaps the decisive characteristic of this decade.
An Industrial Society, Finally!
The absolute size of the rural population in Yugoslavia did not begin to drop 
until 1948, decades later than in most European countries. Once it started to 
decline, it decreased at the annual rate of 1 to 2 percent on average. The for-
mer upper-middle classes and the large landowners vanished, while peasants 
and the landless became industrial workers and service providers. The share 
of those working in the agrarian sector fell from 75 to 57 percent in the years 
between 1945 and 1965. Twenty-one percent were employed in the industrial 
sector, 22 percent in the tertiary sector.1 Compared with 1947, industrial pro-
duction in 1965 had risen more than sixfold and now made up over a third of 
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the country’s gross national product.2 The number of men and women working 
in industry and mining totaled 1.375 million (rising to 2.625 million by 1986).3 
Still, the socialist modernization of the country had not been able to sweep 
aside all relics of traditional agrarian society. Every third industrial worker 
did not work on a conveyor belt or at a machine but produced goods by hand.4
The expansion of industry and mining ensured a continued influx into 
this class of peasant-workers, which had been forming even before the war. 
In many regions, such as Kranj, Zenica, Leskovac, and Trepča, thousands 
of peasants never fully abandoned farming. Instead they commuted daily or 
seasonally between farm and factory for years, often covering great distances 
on foot. “Throughout the entire country many men and women make their way 
each workday from the village to the factories and mines. Entire processions 
of people are underway who arrive by foot, cart, bus or train.”5 Many factories 
sent buses to pick up the so-called polutani — the name given to this “hybrid” 
type of worker — from collection points. The worker from the village “usually 
does not pay much heed to his appearance: he is dirty, dusty, and unshaven, 
and most of his clothing is locally produced and made out of wool, cotton, or 
hemp.” He carried his snack in a wrapped bundle to the factory, just as he had 
before the war. He owned no workwear.6
Even in Slovenia and Croatia, large extended families could still be found 
who worked together, now under industrial conditions. A peasant-worker 
from the area around Samobor near Zagreb talked about his nineteen-person 
zadruga, which owned five acres of land: “If we would split up, we would all 
certainly be worse off. . . . I would only get a couple of patches of land and 
no more. And how could the house be divided up? This way we manage to 
live somehow, thanks to the work in the factory. We all pay into the family 
coffer, according to how much a person earns, and don’t worry about each 
and every penny.”7
Those who moved close to the factories were quick to adopt the industrial 
lifestyle. This was particularly true for women, who were usually looked upon 
disapprovingly in the patriarchal village community if they worked as wage 
laborers. Once they started working in factories, they switched their peasant 
opanci for sandals, went to the movies, and took liberties previously unheard 
of. At home they were first viewed unfavorably, but only until their families 
learned to appreciate the advantages of female wage income.8
Life in the Village
The structural change brought about by industrialization eased but did not sat-
isfactorily solve one of the most pressing problems of this society in transition: 
agrarian underemployment. Because of inefficient methods of production, 
the Yugoslav peasant in 1960 still only worked 140 days a year on average. 
The different levels of productivity caused this figure to vary regionally: in 
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Slovenia it was 160 days, but in Kosovo it was only 108. Every third agrar-
ian laborer was redundant, statistically speaking. For this reason, farmers 
remained poor. Their income was only about half as much as the average 
incomes of the wage-earning population as a whole.9
Despite and even because of agrarian reform, land ownership remained 
primarily in the hands of peasants. This had a negative effect on agricultural 
yields. In 1960, the average farmstead consisted of about ten acres, leaving 
most peasants dependent on earning extra income outside of farming, just like 
before the war. As it was, nearly 40 percent of the farmers earned their living 
entirely or in part outside of their own farms.
In most rural regions, tending the fields was still bone-breaking work. 
Farm machinery made headway into peasants’ lives only at a slow pace. In the 
1960s, there were about 3,000 privately owned tractors in all of Yugoslavia. 
Men and women sowed, plowed, and harvested their crops by hand or tilled the 
soil with an antiquated span of oxen or horses. It was not until the next decade 
that a significant boom in mechanization occurred in agriculture. In 1971, 
statistics reported more than 52,000 tractors in the country, a number that 
rose to more than 200,000 by 1975. Only then were the majority of Yugoslav 
farmers using modern technology.10
The new era not only accelerated the use of technology and the intensifi-
cation of agriculture, it also gave the rural population access to education and 
mass media and increased their physical mobility by way of public transporta-
tion. Schools, cooperatives, sports clubs, cultural institutions, administration, 
and health services arrived in the villages, which caused them to lose their 
former sociocultural and economic self-sufficiency.
In places where industry provided jobs, people changed the ways in which 
they built and furnished their dwellings, and lived their daily lives. Ovens, 
beds, and other types of furniture were purchased, as were bicycles and alarm 
clocks so as to ensure the timely arrival at work each day. Suddenly, people 
had to work not only more than before, but on a regular basis and within 
clear hierarchies. Hygiene and health were more highly valued. New demands 
for individual qualifications and achievement became the vital categories for 
functionally defined social relations, but the formerly existential solidarity 
found in family networks was not eliminated completely. For example, every 
fifth migrant found his new workplace in the city with the help of a family 
member, and in the realm of public services nothing ever got done without the 
magically effective relations on a personal basis known as veze.11
All of this drew the village, the most robust bastion of traditional ways 
of life and social interaction, into the vortex of the dynamic processes of 
transformation. This became glaringly evident in social structure. The mas-
sive migration to the cities caused the village to experience feminization and 
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senilization, meaning that women and the elderly remained in the village, 
while the youth fled. The previous unification of production, reproduction, 
and lifeworld embodied by farming families dissipated, as did the traditional 
division of labor between the sexes.
One of the most far-reaching upheavals during these years of transfor-
mation was that even people in the most remote locations began to see their 
lives in a more critical light. Hard living conditions and backwardness were 
no longer accepted as fate. People talked at school, in the media, and with 
acquaintances about having a better future, one that the majority of the popu-
lation now claimed for themselves as a matter of course. Patriarchal attitudes, 
values, and social relations eroded, the first of these being the strong emotional 
tie to one’s own land, the socially paramount importance of family relation-
ships, the unwillingness to consider any form of innovation or risk, and the 
preindustrial attitude toward work with its lack of emphasis on efficiency, 
discipline, and profit.
In Orašac, a small village in the Serb region of Šumadija, ethnologists 
were surprised to find the inhabitants suddenly talking so much about educa-
tion, technological progress, and civilizing developments, as well as their own 
individual advancement and occupational success.12 In other places, too, the 
younger generation expressed no desire to follow in their fathers’ footsteps 
as farmers. Life in the village was thought to be too miserable, backward, 
boring, and depressing, whereas the city enticed them with its higher standard 
of life and greater freedoms. With the exception of a few elderly inhabitants, 
men and women strove to break the chains of tradition. Every second farmer 
declared that he would very gladly sell his land; most hoped that their daugh-
ters and sons would attend middle school and later work in an occupation not 
related to agriculture — preferably as a medical doctor, business manager, or 
engineer.13
Urbanization and Socialist Urban Culture
In no other European country did the cities grow faster after the Second World 
War than in Yugoslavia. Between 1945 and 1970, roughly 5.5 million people 
left the villages, half of them during the 1960s.14 Underemployment, poverty, 
the lack of educational and occupational opportunities, and the rigid social 
corset of rural life drove masses of jobseekers to the urban centers, causing the 
urban population to double. In Belgrade, whose population size surpassed the 
one million mark in 1969, two out of three inhabitants had migrated there from 
the countryside.15 Yet it should not be forgotten that this process started from a 
very low level of urbanization. Like Albania, Portugal, and Malta, Yugoslavia 
was one of the least urbanized countries in Europe. In 1960, less than 20 
percent of the population lived in places with more than 20,000 inhabitants.16
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In the minds of many, not just of communists, industrialization and urban-
ization were the cornerstones to building a modern society. The socialist city 
was not only the embodiment of the progressive socialist society, it also served 
as a showcase for Yugoslavia’s modernity. This introduced a new influential 
field after 1945: socialist city-planning modeled in a style of architectural 
modernity. One of the first projects was to build large-scale neighborhoods 
of functionally monotone apartment blocks in spacious environments sur-
rounded with large swaths of green space in order to provide the urban masses 
with hygienic and affordable dwellings. Monumental Stalinist buildings, long 
and expansive thoroughfares, and futuristic skyscrapers signaled cosmopol-
itan attitudes and an urbane lifestyle. This monumentality and generosity 
in the use of public space was thought to herald a new, progressive order. 
Architectural symbols of modernity and statehood sprang up in all regional 
centers: hospitals, universities, libraries, hotels, broadcasting stations, and 
sports arenas. Socialist urban development created a thoroughly new envi-
ronment for public life.
The symbol of this new Yugoslavia was its metropolis, Belgrade. Across 
the Sava River in the former Habsburg town of Zemun, the urbanists planned 
a model socialist city, a type of Yugoslav Washington, D.C. Artistically 
designed representational buildings, functionally Le Corbusier–style high-
rises, broad boulevards, and open green spaces were to make New Belgrade 
(Novi Beograd) the political and administrative center and the poster city 
of a progressive and cosmopolitan Yugoslavia. Prestigious building projects 
sprang up in the 1960s, including the parliament building, the Ušće Tower as 
the headquarters of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia, and the Hotel Jugoslavija.17
Visitors landing at the capital’s newly built airport in the late 1960s were 
amazed by its modern, even futuristic ambience. “Belgrade is a lively, frivo-
lous, noisy, jam-packed city compared with the one I remember from twenty 
years ago,” noted a correspondent from the Washington Post. The larger-than-
life images of Marx, Engels, and even Tito had disappeared. In their place, 
gigantic and colorful billboards lined the city’s new thruway with ads for 
Coca-Cola, Pan Am, Siemens, and Volkswagen. In the city center, the dingy 
Balkan provinciality of earlier years had given way to a Western European 
look. Belgraders were fashionably attired; women were seen with bleached 
blonde hair and a great deal of makeup. A vibrant hustle and bustle prevailed 
in the streets, squares, and numerous cafés.18
To walk down one of the broad boulevards from the center of the city to 
its outermost neighborhoods was to discover the growth rings marking the 
historical layers of the city’s history. Starting at Marx-Engels Square, designed 
in 1956, past imposing parliament and university buildings built during the 
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nineteenth-century Gründerzeit era, one would find artifacts of earlier times. 
Along the mighty boulevards huddled pathetic little stores selling cloth, metal 
goods, and dishware next to the dingy workshops of shoemakers, silversmiths, 
and candle makers. At the periphery of the city, the density of buildings di-
minished, giving it a rural appearance. Cows and chickens wandered along the 
unpaved streets, occasionally startled by the rattling of wooden horse-drawn 
carts.19 Since there was not yet enough work for everyone, people eked out a 
living by turning to the age-old occupations of traveling panhandler, peddler, 
wandering musician, scissors grinder, rag picker, shoe shiner, lottery ticket 
seller, corn cob roaster, and casual laborer for cash-in-hand work.20
Despite intensive construction activity, all of Yugoslavia was faced with 
a deplorable housing shortage well into the 1970s. This explains the major 
architectural sins of the immediate postwar years: the colorless, thoroughly 
bare-boned and cheap mass construction that gave so many cities their shabby 
gray, “real socialist” appearance. As early as 1950, Yugoslav architects were 
officially abandoning the “socialist realism” style and striving, especially 
in the 1960s, to create more individual and aesthetically ambitious build-
ings — with mixed results. At the same time, the historic neighborhoods of 
the city centers, such as the Ottoman baščaršija, the bazaar in Sarajevo, were 
reconstructed true to the originals.
Nevertheless, in 1961, the average number of people sharing a room was 
1.6; in Belgrade there were 2.5 people to a room. In addition, there were 
innumerable and statistically unrecorded subtenants. In 1965, there was a 
shortage of at least 50,000 housing units in the capital alone. Many dwellings 
were occupied by several families, which is why many people made make-
shift homes for themselves in shops, basements, laundry rooms, and even 
elevator shafts. In the outer districts, the migrants began to construct huts, 
barracks, and cottages. Sooner or later, communities were forced to give in to 
the rank architectural growth because they could no longer tear it down fast 
enough. “In the last seven or eight years, 20,000 to 30,000 people have come 
to Belgrade each year,” explained Mayor Branko Pešić in 1965. “That equals 
an entire small town. . . . And all of these people find shelter somewhere, hole 
up someplace. Some get an apartment, but that is the smallest percentage of 
them. A great number however are forced . . . to house in basements, in un-
hygienic apartments and barracks. And whoever has not yet seen this should 
definitely once examine what this looks like. . . . Something like this doesn’t 
even exist in Africa.”21
Long-time city residents viewed the onslaught of so many rural people 
with skepticism. They found it almost embarrassing when the newcomers 
celebrated their village festivals in the middle of the city and clasped hands for 
a round dance (kolo) to the music of accordions, basses, fiddles, clarinets, and 
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trumpets.22 There was endless joking about the problems of the backwoods vil-
lagers in adapting to contemporary city life. Generations of Yugoslavs laughed 
over the bumbling of “Haso and Mujo,” distant Yugoslav relatives of Laurel 
and Hardy, whose simplicity left them all too often defeated by the modern 
world. “ ‘Hey, Haso, what date do we have today’ — ‘No idea, Mujo!’ — ‘But 
you have a newspaper tucked under your arm!’ — Haso: ‘That’s no help, it’s 
from yesterday!’ ”
Media, Mobilization, Migration
By this time, Yugoslavs had become well interconnected through means of 
mass communication, even though the reach of print and electronic media 
differed greatly from region to region. In the early 1960s, only about three mil-
lion inhabitants living in remote locations still had no access to printed press.
Radio had been spreading rapidly throughout the country since the late 
1950s. While an average of 70 inhabitants shared a radio in 1947, this number 
had dropped to only seven by 1965. Likewise, circulation of print media grew 
exponentially.23 Domestic publishing houses introduced over 13,000 new book 
titles to the market each year, just under 2,000 different newspapers and mag-
azines, and 1,150 periodicals. In the early 1970s, there were nine television 
stations and 190 radio stations.24
Deficits in the technological infrastructure meant that television was still 
not widely available. Only every other person lived within the transmission 
reach of a television station in the early 1960s. Once again, the decade would 
witness a breakthrough in this respect: whereas about 30,000 television sets 
existed in all of Yugoslavia in 1960, that number had grown to over 440,000 
by 1964.25 On average there had been one television for every 618 people in 
1960, yet this ratio had dropped to one for every 6.2 Yugoslavs by 1976.26 In 
addition to broadcasting news, information, and cultural events, television 
programs also featured quiz shows, satire, and entertainment series.
Since the mid-1960s, Yugoslavs were allowed to watch foreign television 
broadcasts unimpeded, preferably programs from Italy and Austria. The new 
media habits also changed leisure time activities in the villages. People were 
now gathering at their neighbors’ homes in the evenings to watch television, 
while traditional social activities, such as the evening get-together of sijelo, 
faded out of existence.
Yugoslavia was the only socialist country to expressly forbid any advance 
censorship in 1960. Violations of the press laws could only be prosecuted fol-
lowing the appearance of a publication, and even this occurred fairly seldom, 
whether out of tolerance or overwork on the part of the public prosecutors. Far 
more widespread was preemptive self-censorship. In principle, the respective 
republic could confiscate a publication thought to be subversive, meaning 
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antisocialist or nationalistic. However, the publication could continue to be 
sold in all other parts of the country until it was also forbidden there. This 
protracted and bureaucratic process created some leeway in the media land-
scape that enabled the Yugoslav press to become colorful, multifaceted, and 
relatively outspoken.27 It was also possible to buy foreign press publications 
like the New York Times or the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung at the news-
paper stands.
Besides this more extensive access to information, the outstanding 
privilege that Yugoslavs had over other East Europeans was the unimpeded 
communication with the West and the East made possible by the freedom to 
travel. Starting in the early 1960s, nearly everyone was allowed to travel to 
the West without a visa. Each year, over 300,000 Yugoslavs took advantage 
of this opportunity, many as vacationers.28
Close ties to the West were created by way of the hundreds of thousands 
of guest workers who left the country starting in the 1960s during the phase 
of market-economy reform. Since the right to work was part of the canon of 
basic rights in socialism, the official language regime described migrants as 
“workers temporarily employed abroad.”29 However, many of them settled 
abroad permanently, and their children grew up identifying with their new 
homeland. In 1971, nearly 775,000 migrants (3.8 percent of the total popula-
tion) lived outside Yugoslavia, a large share of them in West Germany. Every 
third Yugoslav came from Croatia, every fifth from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Later the Yugoslav government realized what a loss of human capital this 
migration represented and tried to entice people to return. In fact, several 
hundred thousand Yugoslavs did answer the government’s call in the 1970s 
when jobs in their host countries again became scarce due to the global 
recession.30
Guest workers were lured by higher wages to the host countries, which 
enabled them to enjoy a higher standard of living and send part of what they 
earned back home. The industrious and frugal Yugoslavs dreamed of expen-
sive status symbols like cars, electrical appliances, and agricultural machinery. 
In places where neighbors were working abroad, one could often observe a 
domino effect. In the race for higher social prestige, no one wanted to be left 
behind, and so more and more people emigrated. The transfer of guest worker 
incomes back home changed hierarchies of respect in the village. It was no 
longer the wealthy peasant or the village schoolteacher who stood on the top 
rungs of the social ladder, but families with members working abroad. Many 
of them donated to the community and financed public buildings, fountains, 
and streets.31 However, in general, relatively little money flowed into areas of 
production; instead it was spent, quite obviously, on housing and private con-
sumption. The appearance of once destitute rural areas completely changed 
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as massive, flamboyantly decorated, and often thoroughly tasteless houses 
sprung up, with German cars parked in the garages.32
Far from their home, Yugoslavs abroad experienced the growing need to 
cultivate community among themselves, a need best met at the workplace, in 
clubs, and in pubs.33 The Yugoslavs in the “diaspora” thus developed their own 
culture, tastes, and political orientations. The Yugoslav state tried to maintain 
contact with its citizens abroad by way of a complicated bureaucratic struc-
ture. It brokered jobs, supported guest worker clubs and organizations, and 
financed language instruction in the schools. Because the connections of guest 
workers to their homeland remained strong, a dense network of interrelations 
and transfers developed, and the overwhelming majority of workers actually 
did intend to return some day. As a rule, the emigrants also maintained close 
personal ties and family contacts in their homeland. They transferred money, 
visited regularly, and at some point fulfilled a life dream by building their 
own home.34
Tourism and Transformation
Yugoslavs and other Europeans became acquainted with one another not only 
at the workplace but more and more often during vacations. Each year, the 
new, highly subsidized tourist trade attracted millions of foreign vacationers 
to Yugoslav beaches. The tourist resort business did not start in Yugoslavia 
until the 1950s, which is much later than in Spain and Italy. In 1966, the gov-
ernment recognized tourism to be a motor for development and social change 
and therefore designated it as a priority for investment. Tourism became a 
recognized discipline for research and study within economics. In 1967, the 
year declared by the United Nations as International Tourist Year, Belgrade 
unilaterally abolished visa requirements for all states worldwide.35
Yugoslavia’s attractions were its 745 miles of beautiful coastline, more 
than 1,000 islands, its Venetian heritage and Italian flair. It was not hard to 
reach the country, the people were friendly, and the campgrounds, accommo-
dations, and boarding were inexpensive. For Germans, the added attraction 
was that German was spoken nearly everywhere. In 1965, over three million 
foreign guests vacationed on the Adriatic; by 1970, the figure had risen to 4.75 
million and by the end of the 1980s to about ten million. Nearly every third 
tourist came from West Germany, many by car.36 Initial ideological reserva-
tions soon gave way to pure pragmatism: “The sea doesn’t care what political 
system rules on its coast,” said one of the first tourists from Austria. “We go 
to be at the sea and not to communism.”37
Huge hotel resorts and private bed and breakfasts also hosted tourists from 
the Eastern bloc countries, particularly from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
These tourists came not only to enjoy the scenery but also to take advantage 
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of the better shopping opportunities and sources of information. Although the 
quality standard was often low and the service somehow typically socialist, 
the Yugoslav tourist industry generally tried to serve foreigners well, an effort 
that was rewarded with return visits by their guests. In this way, Yugoslavia 
gained the reputation during this decade of being a friendly, inexpensive, and 
cosmopolitan tourist country.
Above all, the Yugoslav system sought to ensure that its people profited 
from the leisure and vacation opportunities of their own country.38 On the 
coastline and in the mountains, publicly financed lodges and guesthouses for 
workers and schoolchildren popped up everywhere. Thanks to subsidies, va-
cation spots received annually more than 6.6 million domestic guests for their 
annual vacation (godišnji odmor), one of the most important social achieve-
ments of workers’ self-management. The hiking, swimming, and grilling 
peasants and workers were considered pioneers of the leisure industry and 
the most exalted representatives of the new era.
At the end of the 1960s, the government was earning about $275 mil-
lion — 10 percent of all foreign currency — through tourism. The industry 
developed into the strongest branch in foreign trade and simultaneously ben-
efited numerous other economic sectors. The construction, hotel, and souvenir 
businesses and every possible service industry profited, and other sectors such 
as the food industry also geared their business toward providing for foreign 
guests vacationing on the Adriatic, where the climate made agriculture dif-
ficult anyway. Tourism had an especially welcoming effect on education and 
employment, which in turn enhanced greater domestic demand.39
Consequently, tourism acted as a catalyst for immense social change. 
Hotel building and management, road construction, private bed and breakfasts, 
shops, restaurants, and cafés generated above-average increases in income, 
especially in what had previously been the poorest regions of Yugoslavia: 
Istria, Dalmatia, and the Adriatic islands. Whereas these areas had experi-
enced waves of migration abroad caused by a lack of jobs before 1960, the 
trend suddenly reversed itself. Cities like Split began to grow significantly, 
more people were finding employment, the job structure changed, and the 
entrepreneurial middle class became larger. In the main centers of tourism, 
10 percent — in some places 30 percent — of the total labor force worked in the 
tourism industry, while at the same time, agriculture and fishing died out.40 
So “we saw the houses get bigger, the trees grow, and the dusty country road 
become asphalted over the course of a summer. Now even my small village 
Svib wanted to belong ‘to the world.’ . . . The road was to connect us again, 
the first travelers with foreign license plates arrived. . . . The church and the 
chapel of Saint Anthony were the places that were asked about most often 
in connection with Makarska Rivijera. ‘Yes, yes, straight ahead,’ the locals 
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would say, and it always sounded as if they were delighted anew, as if expe-
riencing a type of awakening by the description itself.”41
Yugoslav Double Identity
In the 1960s, socialist modernization, work and education, the freedom to 
travel and access to information, consumption and culture were the pillars 
supporting a sense of community and self-confidence pertaining to Yugoslavia 
as a whole, through which the social barriers between the nations and national-
ities melted away. This is not to say that ethnic identities and otherness were no 
longer present in everyday life. They certainly were, such as in the preference 
of a partner or in dealings with a neighbor. Especially in rural communities, 
less often in the city, ethnic-religious identities continued to affect social re-
lations, thus perpetuating social distance between different groups. Yet at the 
same time, the relations between the peoples had never been as amicable as 
they were then. In 1964, one poll reported that 73 percent of those questioned 
found relations to others as good, another 8 percent found them satisfactory. 
Only 5.3 percent expressed a negative opinion, and the rest were undecided.42 
In 1969, an empirical study showed that most people actually perceived them-
selves as having two identities and two loyalties: as citizens of the Yugoslav 
state and as members of their respective nation or nationality.43 As a rule, such 
dualism appeared thoroughly unproblematic.
In addition to this, some men and women were beginning to identify 
themselves only by their Yugoslav citizenship and no longer by their ethnic 
origin. These “Yugoslavs” represented 1.7 percent of the population in 1961, 
whereby the question arose whether these people actually represented a new 
nation in the ethnic sense, something the communists denied vehemently. 
They did not want to expose themselves to the politically sensitive accusation 
of creating an artificial nation, similar to the one of the interwar period. A 
poll taken among the readers of a weekly magazine in 1969 revealed who 
“Yugoslavs” were. They came from mixed marriages and listed their upbring-
ing, their political convictions, or even both as the motive for their perception 
of themselves. The question of whether a person could only be a citizen of 
the state of Yugoslavia or also a member of a newly created community of 
“Yugoslavs” was one that very few of them had ever considered. Their share 
of the population would continue to grow, up to 5.4 percent in the 1980s.44
As was the case all over Europe, the trend toward secularization acceler-
ated after 1945. Religious outlooks and practices receded into the background. 
While 12.6 percent claimed not to be religious in 1953, the figure had already 
risen to 51 percent by 1968.45 The youth in particular distanced themselves 
from the belief in God and had little use for church institutions and rituals. 
Yet all were free to worship as they wanted. Throughout Yugoslavia there 
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were over 14,000 active churches, monasteries, mosques, and synagogues in 
the 1960s.46
The regime had become so stable by the beginning of the 1960s that it 
no longer considered the churches a priori as enemies of the state. The state 
placed a great deal of emphasis on treating religious communities relatively 
liberally, because it was thought that repression would only evoke funda-
mental counterreactions. However, nationalism and any political ambition 
harbored by religious communities were not to be tolerated.47 In this new 
atmosphere of liberality, Cardinal Stepinac was allowed to be buried in the 
Zagreb cathedral in 1960 with full honors. In 1966, Yugoslav diplomats and 
representatives from the Holy See signed a protocol granting the Catholic 
Church in Yugoslavia the right to operate freely and placed its churches under 
the supervision of the Vatican. Full diplomatic relations were then established 
between Belgrade and the Vatican in 1970.48
Despite growing social mobilization and modernization and contrary 
to all socialist attempts at socialization, rural society maintained its ethno-
cultural stratifications and communal relations, as expressed in customs, 
clothing, language, house construction, eating habits, folk songs, and folk 
dances. While 60 percent accepted members of other ethnic groups without 
reservation as neighbors, colleagues, and friends, only 20 percent expressed 
strong alienation. At the same time, 88.5 percent of marriages were between 
members of the same people, while ethnically heterogeneous marriages re-
mained the exception, particularly in villages. In addition to class and level 
of education, the factors of language, religion, cultural tradition, and family 
structures were those affecting people’s willingness to accept a multicultural 
living community, and this acceptance was more prevalent the greater the 
similarity was among people. Those who intermingled the most were Croats 
and Serbs living in Slavonia; those who intermingled the least were Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo. Religious affiliation created high barriers: marriages 
between Christians and Muslims rarely occurred, even within the same ethnic 
community. It would have been more likely for a Muslim Albanian to have 
married a Bosnian Muslim than an Albanian of Orthodox faith.49
Outside of the cities, it was still quite easy to identify people’s ethnicity 
from their appearance. Men in the western Bosnian villages all dressed simi-
larly but wore characteristic hats: the Muslims wore the red-brown fez or beret, 
the Croats a black visored cap, and the Serbs the typical partisan side cap. 
Dialect also demarcated people. For example, the Christians did not pronounce 
the letter “h” and said only “odža,” instead of “hodža.” Each people had its 
own greeting. Serbs and Croats wished each other a good day with the Slavic 
“dobar dan” (good day), while the Muslims greeted each other in Turkish 
with “merhaba” (hello), They would say “inshallah” and the Christians “ako 
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bog da” for “God willing.”50 Each person understood and respected the es-
tablished cultural distinctions. Certainly a Croat could have donned a beret 
or a Muslim could have tied a red sash around his waist instead of a green 
one. But they didn’t.
Population, Family, and Gender Relations
No other identifiable group profited from so many changes brought about by 
socialist Yugoslavia than did women. The 1946 constitution guaranteed for the 
first time the full legal, economic, and societal equality of the sexes. Girls had 
to attend eight years of school, as did boys. Women could finally inherit and 
own private property, vote, and hold political office. Marriage and the family 
were placed under state protection, and the regime initiated a campaign to 
popularize female employment and fight against sex discrimination.51
Great progress was made in education. Whereas two-thirds of all women 
could neither read nor write on the eve of the Second World War, that figure 
was now only 25 percent.52 Women also began to catch up in higher education 
and employment statistics: a third of the student body and the labor force were 
now female.53
Compared to standards at the time in many countries, the Yugoslavs 
maintained a very liberal family policy. Already in the 1950s, the regime 
granted equal legal rights to legitimate and illegitimate children. Furthermore, 
it allowed people to keep their original family names after they married and 
introduced a liberal divorce law. Abortions on demand were permitted (in 
clinics) for a limited period at the start of a pregnancy. The Institute for Family 
Planning, established in 1961 in Ljubljana, started an information campaign 
and took the government at its word concerning birth control. In 1969, parlia-
ment passed a resolution on birth control and liberalized abortion law. Men 
and women were free to choose either for or against having a child without 
any governmental interference. In other words, every newborn was to be a 
desired child. In 1974, planned parenthood became a constitutionally guar-
anteed human right.54
At the start of the 1960s, 18.5 million people lived in Yugoslavia. Birth 
control led to a dramatic decline in natality, as it did throughout Europe. Life 
expectancy and the average marriage age increased, families became smaller, 
and there were more divorced couples and single parents. Between 1948 and 
1981, the rate of population growth was cut by half from 14.7 to 7.4 percent, 
whereby the rate only began to drop steeply in the 1960s. At the same time, 
life expectancy rose from 51 years (1948) to 70 years (1981).55
Sociocultural and economic factors continued to influence the different 
demographic patterns. Slovenia roughly resembled Western Europe with a low 
birthrate, higher life expectancy, and a strong involvement of the middle-aged 
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and older generations in the social pyramid. The opposite example was Kosovo, 
which had a record population growth and a very young age structure.56
With great verve, the state combated what it considered to be archaic 
relics in the Muslim culture: veiled women, polygamy, and the “sale” of girls 
and women, for whom a bride-price was paid. Women activists canvassed the 
countryside, attempting to convince other women of the advantages of gender 
equality and to educate the broader public. At village assemblies and in facto-
ries, many women became caught up in the revolutionary élan of the postwar 
years and tore away their veils in a show of defiance. In 1950, veiling was 
legally forbidden, and by the 1960s it was finally very normal for a woman to 
show her face openly in public. A young Muslim woman recollected: “Things 
used to be very different. Girls were not free. . . . Today a girl . . . can choose 
whom she wants to be with and where she wants to go. She can go to sijelo 
[evening gatherings] or teferica [picnic] with her friends. . . . When I cut off 
my braids and got a permanent wave there was a lot of disapproval and gossip. 
I was one of the first girls in the village to stop wearing dimija [harem pants] 
and put on a dress. . . . And today almost every girl . . . has modern clothes 
in addition to her dimija.”57 Antidiscrimination measures and the expansion 
of training and employment opportunities for women created the necessary 
framework for more self-determination and caused a slow but profound change 
of attitude regarding gender relations — among both women and men.
The socialist transformation of village life also brought about decisive 
changes that greatly diminished the importance of a major aspect: the pre-
vailing, male-dominated connotation of land ownership. The agricultural 
cooperatives calculated work in daily wages, making individual female con-
tributions both evident and measurable for the first time. Because more and 
more men were landing jobs in factories, women took over the full responsi-
bility for the farm. More than two-thirds of the entire rural labor force were 
female in the 1960s.
Female employment had been continually increasing since 1945 in 
other sectors as well at a rate of 7.3 percent and thus faster than in any other 
European country. In 1964, about 29 percent of all those employed were 
women. In Slovenia, 42 percent of the women were employed; in Kosovo, 
18 percent. For the first time, they could land positions that had been seen 
typically as men’s work, be it as ambassador, pilot, university dean, engineer, 
or bus driver. However, as was happening all over Europe, women still ran 
up against the glass ceilings of a still quite male-dominated society. Working 
women continued to be eyed disapprovingly by many. The higher one climbed 
up the social ladder, the lower the percentage of women became. Although the 
productivity of women was notably higher than that of men, they earned 10 
to 40 percent less. In 1968, sociologists ascertained that a clear majority still 
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preferred to have a son rather than a daughter, because males were thought 
to have greater social recognition and better chances in life. Men also domi-
nated the Communist Party, where only 5 percent of the seats on the Central 
Committee were occupied by women.58
Men were not the only ones who had difficulties accepting their female 
colleagues as equals. Women also hesitated because it was hard for them to 
abandon what had been for centuries their chief responsibility: the family. 
Working mothers paid for their double burden with extra-long workdays, lack 
of sleep, chronic fatigue, and nonexistent leisure time. Women read newspa-
pers less often, remained less well informed, and did not serve as often on 
political committees and self-management bodies,59 because they still had to 
do nearly all family and household chores. Only every seventh man helped 
clean house or cook.60 At the same time, change was within reach in pri-
vate life, even in the villages. Gender roles were no longer chiseled in stone. 
Absolute male authority in marital life ceased to exist as it had before the war, 
and marriage began to become more and more of a partnership.61
Westernization and commercialization contributed to the 1950s’ socialist 
ideal of femininity with new postulates of attractiveness. Women were no 
longer just workers, peasants, partisans, and mothers, but sexual beings meant 
to please men. The rigid puritanism of the immediate postwar period was fol-
lowed by more permissive and open attitudes toward the body and nakedness 
and the commercialization of these in erotic magazines, pinup titles, and juicy 
gossip in the yellow press. Yugoslavia also experienced a sexual revolution 
of its own in the 1960s. Whereas at the end of the 1950s the police had still 
cracked down on immoral behavior in public, now this seemed ridiculous. The 
Yugoslav sexologist Aleksandar Kostić gave curious teenagers scientifically 
coated advice. In 1965, on Student Day in Belgrad, there was even a public 
striptease.62
Educational Revolution, New Elites,  
and the “Socialist Bourgeoisie”
Socialist modernization caused a gradual replacement and transformation of 
elites, whose younger generation had little or no biographical connections to 
the partisan era. Another factor changing the social structure was the edu-
cational revolution. Whereas only every second person could read and write 
at war’s end, by 1961 the illiteracy rate had fallen below 20 percent.63 An 
ever-increasing percentage of children aged 7 to 14 completed the compul-
sory eight years of schooling: in 1953, 71 percent; by 1981, 97 percent. In the 
same time span, the number of pupils doubled, which meant immense costs 
for the state. Still, it successfully invested in teacher training, a fact that sub-
stantially improved the teacher–pupil ratio. In 1945, there was one teacher 
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for every fifty-nine pupils; in 1975, the ratio had improved to one for every 
twenty-two pupils.64
Although there were only three universities and two institutions of higher 
learning in all of Yugoslavia in 1945, three decades later there were 158. The 
new state had more students per capita than any other European country, with 
the exception of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. Starting in 
1945, it increased its university-trained population tenfold to about 500,000 
people by 1960 and to 650,000 people by 1970. At the same time, social mo-
bility increased. Many of those in the new technological class originated from 
peasant, worker, or craftsman families.65
Industrialization and modernization also increased the specialization 
and professionalization of occupations and thus produced a new and influ-
ential class: managers and experts. Because growing complexity needed 
special expertise, key positions could no longer be filled solely based on 
ideological aptitude. The influence of the party in recruiting elites declined, 
which particularly affected the middle and lower levels of administration 
and management.66
Since the Yugoslav system produced a proliferation of bureaucracy 
that was hard to control, administrative personnel grew. In 1960, more than 
410,000 positions existed for office employees, finance authorities, managers, 
and other civil servants. Decentralization strengthened the administration of 
the republics and communities and bloated this class even further. In 1970, 
a total of 530,000 civil servants worked at the lower and middle levels of 
public service.67
Just how greatly the elite changed in the first two decades after the war is 
illustrated by the social composition of the Communist Party. Of the original 
12,000 party members, only 3,000 survived the war, which meant that most 
of the 140,000 communists joined only at the end of the war or thereafter. 
Every second member after the war had a peasant background, every third 
belonged to the working class, and every tenth was a white-collar worker. 
Twenty years later, in 1966, the composition looked completely different. 
White-collar workers were the largest contingent, representing 39 percent of 
the party membership, while the number of peasants had shrunk to 7 percent.68 
It was in this decade that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia mutated 
into a middle-class party.69
During the economic miracle years, a new societal class evolved: the 
socialist bourgeoisie. In addition to educated elites, technological elites, and 
party functionaries, this new class included self-employed individuals, such as 
craftsmen, restaurant owners, construction and transportation entrepreneurs, 
and small retailers. Those who were not included in the statistics were people 
who lined their own pockets with profits earned in the “gray economy.”70
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This socialist bourgeoisie deliberately disassociated itself from the 
masses by way of occupational position, income, attitudes, and lifestyles.71 
It associated progress more with the Western-bourgeois ideal of prosperity 
and wealth than with socialist virtues. Status symbols like expensive brand-
name products, car ownership, and the inevitable weekend cottage — the 
vikendica — were the trappings of membership in a privileged class, one that 
became the subject of sociological research.72 “We go to Trieste about twice a 
year to buy clothes and cosmetics,” explained a contemporary. “Italian cloth-
ing is really not of a better quality than ours, but we want something others 
don’t have, even if it costs us a lot of money.”73
Economic Miracle, Leisure, and Consumption
Yugoslavs definitely had more money in their pockets in the 1960s than ever 
before. Between 1950 and 1965, real income grew by about 80 percent, and 
the wealth gap to the Western industrial nations narrowed. Whereas the na-
tional income per capita in West Germany, Great Britain, and France in 1955 
was still four to five times greater than in Yugoslavia, ten years later the gap 
had shrunk to being only three times greater. By the end of the 1970s, it had 
closed even further.74 This was incredibly significant both practically and psy-
chologically, for it meant that Yugoslavs no long lived in Europe’s poorhouse.
As early as the mid-1950s, the communists shifted the priorities of their 
economic planning. The highest priority was no longer given to investing in 
production goods, but to wealth and consumption, which were considered 
indicators of social progress.75 Contrary to the competition-driven greed of 
capitalism, they wanted to develop a democratic culture of consumption that 
would provide the population with modest, useful, and beautiful things. In 
the following decade a hybrid form of consumer society developed that em-
braced elements of both socialist and capitalist systems. Numerous foreign 
products were imported or produced under license, including Pepsi Cola and 
the sweet Italian chocolate-and-hazelnut spread Eurokrem. In the canon of 
typical Yugoslav products that became export hits were washing machines 
from Gorenje and especially the fabulous condiment Vegeta, popular through-
out the entire realm of real-existing socialism.76
The history of consumption in the 1960s reveals a lot about the needs, 
desires, preferences, and prestige in Yugoslav society. Growing wealth, more 
leisure time, and closer international ties created needs and influenced atti-
tudes in favor of a higher quality of life. Industrialization, urbanization, and 
the educational revolution also helped differentiate ways of life, manners, 
styles, and desirable objects of consumption. For example, the introduction 
of the forty-two-hour workweek in 1965 encouraged the development of a 
leisure industry, about which a person could learn in the magazine Vikend 
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(Weekend), among others.77 Consumerism created new identities that were 
predominantly defined by lifestyle, attitudes, values, feelings, and behavior 
linking it symbolically to the more advanced capitalist societies.
Fashion was the first area in which the economic miracle became evident. 
Yugoslavia’s opening up to the West pushed out the prudish and dully uniform 
socialist dress code that had dominated since 1945, when years of shortage 
encouraged clothing to be “uniform, practical, and modest.” Companies such 
as Kluz and Beko now produced affordable clothing that could be purchased 
in large department stores, and everyone could afford factory-made wear. 
Whereas the number of traditional leather sandals sold in 1958 (six million) 
was almost as high as the number of industrially produced shoes sold (seven 
million), ten years later only a small minority still wore the typical opanci. 
Urban wardrobes also began to be popular in rural areas, and if a woman did 
wear traditional dress, then she was most likely doing so as a concession to 
convenience rather than to tradition.78
Urban women kept themselves up-to-date on the latest fashions by read-
ing magazines like Praktična žena (Practical woman) or Bazar.79 The “New 
Look” by Dior even made it onto one of the covers in 1950. The student move-
ment fought against the last taboos while sporting Beatle haircuts, miniskirts, 
and blue jeans.80 Pero Jurić, a delegate from Bijelovar, once sought to mollify 
his comrades who were concerned about the decline of socialist etiquette. 
He bellowed out a reminder to his dumbfounded fellow delegates that Karl 
Marx’s rallying cry was “Workers of the world, unite!” not “Workers of the 
world, shave!”81
Like everywhere else in Europe, the automobile became the most prom-
inent symbol of the economic miracle. In the late 1950s, the manufacturer 
Zastava in Kragujevac began producing a small car, the Fiat 600, which the 
Yugoslavs affectionately called fićo. Entire families with bags and baggage 
crammed into this indestructible vehicle with 29 horsepower. After celebrat-
ing its acquisition, the car owner would proudly present it to the neighborhood 
and lovingly care for it for many years. The fićo, wrote the publicist Igor 
Mandić in his book Mitologija svakidašnjeg života (Mythology of daily life), 
was the mirror reflecting Yugoslav society, “the manifestation of the dreams 
of an entire nation,” a “worldview,” and “a psychological state.”82 Indeed, by 
holding the steering wheel of a fićo in one’s hands, a person could literally feel 
progress. In 1968, about 8 percent of all households owned a car.83
As in the West, advertisement and marketing agencies awakened un-
imagined desires for consumption. The magazine Savremena tehnologija 
(Contemporary technology) informed its readers about the latest electric 
stoves, mixers, sewing machines, telephones, electric toothbrushes, shav-
ers, televisions, and hi-fi equipment. Between 1962 and 1973, the number of 
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households equipped with an electric stove in Croatia increased from 19.1 
percent to 62.7 percent and those with a refrigerator from 13.4 percent to 58.6 
percent. In 1962, only 7.2 percent owned a television, but only eleven years 
later, in 1973, this figure was up to 55.8 percent. By the end of the 1980s, these 
useful appliances could be found in nearly every household.84
The freedom to travel and the availability of foreign currency tempted 
Yugoslavs with a new and nearly ritualistic cultural phenomenon: the shopping 
tour. Year after year, more and more shoppers set out in their search for fash-
ionable shoes, sweaters, suits, home textiles, and Vespa scooters. As a result, 
the number of Yugoslavs just crossing the border into Trieste increased tenfold 
between 1960 and 1969.85 The new consumer culture meant more pleasure and 
prestige and a measurable increase in the level of contentment. Since (nearly) 
all Yugoslavs participated in the economic miracle, the new mass consumption 
had a politically pacifying and socially integrating effect. It was possible to 
be a part of the modern European lifestyle and to disassociate oneself from 
the poorer Eastern bloc countries. At the time, everyone still believed that life 
could only keep getting better.
Cultural Openness
In the 1960s, Yugoslavia was a culturally open and friendly country. Artists, 
writers, and philosophers had been enjoying considerable artistic freedom ever 
since Miroslav Krleža had given a sensational speech, “On Cultural Freedom,” 
at the third congress of the Yugoslav Writers’ Union in 1952, in which he 
criticized Stalin’s negation of artistic freedom. In addition, the state invested 
heavily in the cultural sector. Roughly eight million people visited the 371 
state museums annually, and about 4.3 million attended the theater.86
Just as Stalinism was being questioned and criticized, so too was socialist 
realism in the arts, with its monumental, sometimes monstrous allegories of 
work, socialism, and progress. In 1950, the National Museum in Belgrade 
put on an exhibition featuring work by Van Gogh, Picasso, and other abstract 
artists who had been decried as decadent until then. Western influences could 
be found in film, theater, painting, and sculpture. Local and international 
aesthetic traditions mingled. In contemporary Yugoslav art, socialist realism 
and Western modernity existed side by side or intermingled, as the abstract 
sculptures of a Dušan Džamonija or the strikingly expressionistic large-scale 
work of Edo Murtić showed.87 In 1965, the Museum of Contemporary Art 
(Muzej savremene umetnosti) opened in Belgrade, modeled after the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York. The Belgrade International Theater Festival 
(BITEF) brought the most innovative international performances to the capi-
tal city every year. Since the regime was open to various avant-garde trends, 
lively art scenes developed in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Artists worked 
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on experimental, shocking, even destructive multimedia representations of 
modernity. Outside the country, they were called Neo-Dada, Fluxus, Junk 
Art, Arte Povera, and conceptual art.
Influences from the West also shaped popular music. One of the most 
popular Yugoslav singers at the time was Ivo Robić, whose hit “Morgen” 
(Tomorrow), written by the German songwriter Peter Moesser, sold millions 
in 1959. As “Mister Morgen,” Robić also pursued a successful international 
career as a recording artist. Pop icons like Djordje Marjanović attracted large 
audiences because they sang translations of catchy tunes by people like Gilbert 
Bécaud (“Nathalie”) or Chubby Checker (“Let’s Twist Again”). Others, like 
Karlo Metikoš, made rock ’n’ roll socially acceptable in concert halls across 
the country.
Yugoslav youth were enthusiastic about the music of the Beatles, the 
Rolling Stones, the Beach Boys, and Jimi Hendrix. Despite the potentially 
subversive quality of rock music with its critical texts and provocative poses, 
the state decided against repression. Soon an independent Yugoslav scene 
emerged, one that imitated Western models somewhat but increasingly de-
veloped its own style: YU rock.88
During the 1960s, the most popular form of entertainment was cinema. 
Theaters showed Soviet, American, French, Italian, and British movies, and 
the United States subsidized the import of Hollywood productions. In addition, 
considerable sums of state funds financed not only partisan epics but all sorts 
of mainstream entertainment movies and auteur films.89 Often Western com-
panies co-produced movies. In Split, Zagreb, and Belgrade, an internationally 
renowned avant-garde in filmmaking developed. It brought forth artists like 
Dušan Vukotić from Zagreb, the first non-American to win an Oscar for his 
animated movie Surogat in 1962. He credited the famous Zagreb animation 
school for his success. In 1969, Želimir Žilnik, soon the most famous exponent 
of the “Black Wave,” won the Golden Bear in Berlin for his film Early Works.90
During the 1960s, the majority of Yugoslavs finally arrived in the modern 
age. The rhythms, habits, and social practices of everyday life and generally 
the ways people lived demonstrated that the country had crossed the threshold 
from an agrarian society to an industrial one. This industrial society removed 
the yoke of traditional norms and legal restrictions and instilled a lively spirit 
of optimism everywhere. While the political system strove to enhance its 
legitimacy through more wealth, leisure, and consumption, socialist ideology 
became ever less important in people’s daily lives. Ideals like community, 
solidarity, and socialist asceticism faded into the shadows cast by bright ideas 
of competition and commodity fetishism. People’s plans for life became more 
individualized and values and habits were increasingly relativized, as was 
made evident by the more relaxed sexual morality and the advancement of 
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hedonism and a culture of fun. All this undermined the authority of a politi-
cal system that propagated, on the one hand, seemingly outdated social ideas 
about morality and, on the other, a utopian model of society. Because Tito 
opened the country to the Western world, he made the steady transfer of goods, 
knowledge, and values possible by way of labor migration and tourism, for 
example. He even tolerated the fact that some of his fellow citizens became 
guest workers abroad and thus subjected themselves to the laws of capitalist 
wage labor. In Yugoslavia, the social, psychological, and mental differences 
with the West never hardened into antipathies as they did in the Eastern bloc 
countries. On the contrary, behind the ideological façade, Yugoslav society 
was becoming more and more like Western Europe, and sooner or later this 
would inevitably influence political thought, just as it had already affected 
art and philosophy.
13.
Reforms and Rivalries  
(1964 to 1968)
In many respects, the 1960s were exceptional years. Political liberalization, 
prosperity, and an active foreign policy shaped this “golden era,” during which 
Yugoslavia definitely put the aftermath of the war behind it. A measure of plu-
ralism in literature, the arts, and political philosophy also appeared. However, 
the idyllic picture of “brotherhood and unity” began to show its first cracks. 
Forced modernization produced friction and frustration both within and be-
tween republics that centralism and a planned economy were no longer able 
to offset. This triggered an intensive and frank public debate about the very 
foundations of the political system, the nature of democracy, the future of 
socialism, and the merits of a multiparty system. For the first time, conflicts 
of interest and ideological debates were conducted openly.
Socialist Market Economy
Following the boom of the founding years, industrial growth slowed down 
in 1960 and dropped from 15 percent to 4 percent in the first half of 1962.1 
For that reason, the national parliament decided in March 1961 to remove the 
remaining state supervision in plants and to give companies the right to man-
age their profits themselves. The theoreticians of workers’ self-management 
believed that it lay in the natural interest of the workers to increase productiv-
ity. However, workers preferred to spend the surplus on private consumption 
and not to invest it in the company, which then skewed the economic balance 
between production and consumption. Whereas private income increased by 
about 23 percent in 1961, industrial production rose only by 3.4 percent. From 
this point forward, Yugoslavia was living beyond its means. Trade balance 
deficits and inflation increased; economic growth shrunk.2
Against this backdrop, discussions ensued over the distribution of means 
among the republics, reform of the banking sector, foreign exchange control, 
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and market liberalization, from which two extreme positions crystallized. 
Slovenes and Croats wanted to strengthen the republics at the expense of 
the national federation and to increase competition between republics. The 
catchword of the wealthier republics was “optimization” — the state should 
invest according to criteria of profitability and not opportunities to pursue 
development policy. The opposing position was advocated by Serbian cen-
tralists, who insisted that the state take on a greater role in managing an 
efficient macroeconomic policy and advancing the development of the poorer 
republics. The party theoretician Edvard Kardelj struggled to come up with a 
clever solution that would hold at bay the two antagonistic camps endangering 
the stability of Yugoslavia. On the one side, “localism” (meaning nationalism 
and separatism) threatened to tear apart the state from within. On the other, 
the unitarism and statism of the central authorities tended to encourage he-
gemony of the larger nationalities over the smaller ones. Both represented 
dangerous forms of nationalism. Kardelj, a Slovene, viewed Serbian efforts 
to dominate as the greater challenge to Yugoslavia’s stability. He was truly 
convinced that self-managing socialism would render the national question 
obsolete sooner or later. But until that time came, Yugoslavia should continue 
to exist as a federation of sovereign states without any claim to linguistic or 
cultural assimilation.3
Things came to a dramatic head at a meeting of the party leadership in 
March 1962, when representatives from Slovenia and Croatia demanded that 
the state become more of a federation. Tito must have already realized that 
this would subject the existence of the multiethnic state to renegotiation. In 
a rousing speech at a mass rally in Split in May 1962, he ranted against the 
egoism, localism, and nationalism of his party comrades. Tito was perfectly 
clear on the point that he would not allow anyone to destroy the fundamental 
values of “brotherhood and unity” for which so much blood had been spilled 
in the war.
In light of all this, the League of Communists decided to introduce two 
fundamental reforms at its eighth party congress in December 1964. First, 
it turned away from socialist Yugoslavism for good in favor of greater fed-
eralization within both the party and the state. Second, it decided to further 
liberalize the economy. Thus began a precedent-setting transformation of 
the political and economic systems. In 1965, the communists removed state 
controls on production, prices, and wages and ended state investments and 
subsidies. From now on, the Yugoslav system was to function according to the 
laws of capitalism. Smaller independent businesses with up to five employees 
were allowed. All enterprises would to be more competitive and thus make 
the Yugoslav national economy overall more resilient.4
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Furthermore, Yugoslavia was to become more democratic. Citizens were 
allowed to express their will in the factories, community councils, and all 
types of organizations, but not in political parties. “We are not about to permit 
a multiparty system into this country,” explained Prime Minister Mika Špiljak 
to a journalist. “But we want to have democracy. At the factory level every 
criticism is possible.”5 Innumerable new bodies of self-management sprang 
up. At the same time, a generational change among functionaries was taking 
place in the party. Because the former partisans stayed entrenched in their 
posts, reelection was forbidden, thus forcing more than 1,000 old warriors 
to give up their seats. The men and women who took their places knew the 
war only from stories, harbored more liberal attitudes, and emulated Western 
lifestyles. So, during the 1960s, the young socialist middle class reached mid-
level positions of political power.6
However, the grand hopes attached to the “socialist market economy” 
were not fulfilled. The balance of payments slid into a deficit, investment 
shriveled up, prices and the cost of living skyrocketed, so that inflation reached 
28 percent in 1966. Between 1964 and 1968, industrial production grew only 
by 18 percent, as opposed to 54 percent in the preceding four years, and agri-
culture fell even further behind.7
Recession and reforms made one disturbing phenomenon quite visible: 
unemployment. Between 1964 and 1968, the number of jobseekers rose by 
47 percent to 312,000, including an increasing number of well-qualified peo-
ple. As early as 1962, Yugoslav leaders were already working on a strategy to 
counter unemployment, namely “temporary employment abroad.” Yugoslavia 
signed treaties on the matter with France, Austria, Sweden, West Germany, 
and other countries. Willy Brandt, who was then West Germany’s foreign 
minister, recognized this as an important instrument in the strategy of “change 
through rapprochement,” when he concluded the West German–Yugoslav 
Guest Worker Agreement in 1968. In this year the number of Yugoslavs in 
West Germany rose to 300,000 and in the following five years to clearly more 
than 500,000. On the whole, 1.1 million Yugoslavs lived abroad as guest work-
ers.8 The communists hazarded the consequences that Yugoslav citizens were 
subjecting themselves to the capitalist dictate of wages — to their own and the 
state’s advantage. So the regime made a virtue out of a necessity. Migration 
was said to insure Yugoslavia’s participation in international exchange pro-
cesses and to support the socioeconomic development of the country. The 
state considered itself responsible for the well-being of its citizens and insisted 
that they return later to their homeland, a stance that the host countries wel-
comed because they balked at permanent immigration and feared communist 
infiltration.9
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Regional Disparities
The 1960s confirmed that the leveling of regional disparities was not only an 
economic priority but above all a political one. As economic problems became 
more severe, the chronic problem of the welfare gap among the republics 
intensified.10 Despite — or precisely due to — the economic miracle, the gap 
between rich and poor became greater. Although Slovenia and Croatia con-
tributed 6–10 percent of their gross social product to the national government 
for the purpose of subsidizing development in the structurally weaker regions, 
their economies and thus their developmental advantage grew the fastest. In 
1965, the poorer republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Kosovo only achieved 64.4 percent of the Yugoslav per capita income, as 
opposed to more than 71.3 percent a decade earlier. Topping the wealth list 
were the Slovenes with an index value of 177.3 percent (Yugoslavia = 100). 
Croatia achieved 120.7 percent and Serbia 94.9 percent. At the bottom of the 
list were Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo with 69.1 percent and 38.6 percent, 
respectively.11
There were various reasons why rich and poor were drifting apart. First, 
the industry-friendly pricing policy kept the market value of raw materials and 
agricultural goods artificially low, although these were the main economic 
products of the straggling regions. The industries of Slovenia and Croatia prof-
ited from the inner-Yugoslav terms of trade, leaving the less developed regions 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo at a structural disadvantage. Second, the 
more politically powerful republics strove to direct investment primarily to 
their own regions. Self-management made it possible to invest also in unprof-
itable enterprises instead of in those where the resources would produce the 
greatest profit.12
By this point, both the rich and poor republics were constantly leveling 
accusations at each other. The former accused the latter of parasitism and 
mismanagement, and the latter the former of neglect and exploitation. The 
Croatian party leader Vladimir Barkarić noted in 1964: “Each party now 
reports to the federation with a calculation of how much it lost in the latest 
period, and thus the question arises: Who actually profited at all in Yugoslavia 
if we were all ‘exploited’?”13 In the summer of 1969, a scandal arose when the 
national regime submitted two credit applications to the World Bank with-
out including Ljubljana’s request for funds to finance a larger infrastructural 
project for road building. The public was then rocked by the vehement protest 
that subsequently occurred in Slovenia, particularly by its ugly nationalist 
undertones suggesting alleged discrimination. The project had actually been 
included in a future application that was still being planned and not yet ready 
for submission. Two years later, the Slovenes did indeed get the credit they 
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sought, but after the “road affair” relations remained touchy for a while be-
tween the federation and the republic.14
In the following five-year plan for the period of 1966 to 1970, the na-
tional government decided to make greater strides toward economic quality by 
closing the wealth gap to at most 10 percent by 1970. The most important in-
strument to be used in this endeavor was the federal development fund created 
in 1965 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, where 
exactly a third of the Yugoslav population lived. From that point on, all busi-
nesses had to pay a solidarity contribution to this fund of about 1.85 percent 
of the gross national product. Additional state subsidies for the structurally 
disadvantaged regions were used to raise the living standard by improving 
people’s education and health, for example.15
Decentralization and Liberalization
At the urging of Kardelj and important proponents in the party, Tito decided to 
take the wind out of the sails of centrifugal tendencies in the country through 
decentralization and federalization. The prerequisite for such a move was to 
repress political resistance within the ranks of the leadership. In 1966, he took 
steps to deal with the most prominent opponent of constitutional reform and 
Kardelj’s chief rival for the position of crown prince: Aleksandar Ranković, 
head of the secret police agency. Not only did Ranković advocate a prostat-
ist line, he was known above all for his advocacy of discriminating against 
Albanians, Muslims, and Turks in Kosovo. As vice president he had made sure 
that Serbs predominated in the administration even in those republics where 
they were in the minority, and he was responsible for much of the state repres-
sion from the 1950s on. Even his Serbian party colleagues increasingly viewed 
him as a burden. To the satisfaction of communists in Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Kosovo, Ranković was personally accused by Tito in a bugging affair and 
removed from office; his supporters were also subsequently dismissed from 
the secret service.
Following Ranković’s fall from power, Kardelj pressed forward with the 
federalization that had been laid out in the constitution of 1963. It gave the 
republics more rights and transformed the Federal People’s Republic into the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).16 Further changes came 
after 1966. For example, in 1968 Kosovo and Vojvodina were each given the 
status of autonomous province in the federation with rights similar to those 
of a republic. They were even allowed to fly the Albanian and Hungarian 
flags there, respectively.17 The political leadership took great pains to ensure 
that all institutions were filled according to the principle of ethnic represen-
tation. Since upward social mobility was effectively affixed to nationality, the 
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Yugoslav system reproduced the ethnic stratification and competition that it 
actually aspired to transcend with a supranational state of Yugoslav citizens.
Through these reforms, the state altered the concept of itself fundamen-
tally. In 1963, the constitution still stated that the Yugoslav federal state was 
built on the free will of its nations and their right to self-determination and 
that it consisted of six republics. Now the language used was that the Yugoslav 
state was based on agreements and cooperation between the republics. The 
peoples exerted their sovereign rights in and through their respective re-
publics — which were almost independent states. Consequently, the federal 
government was left with only a few core competencies like defense, foreign 
policy, and cohesion policy. All federal institutions required equal represen-
tation, and the veto right of each republic guaranteed consensual decisions. In 
order to counter the creeping dissolution of central authority, Tito suggested a 
collective presidency, in which all entities would be represented equally: the 
republics with three representatives each, the autonomous provinces with two. 
This new presidency was to succeed Tito, who assumed lifelong chairmanship 
of it, as the highest governmental entity.
The Communist Party also gave up its supranational structure. The statute 
passed in 1969 strengthened the republics insofar as the regional parties be-
came independent organizations, and each one met before the Yugoslav federal 
party convened. In the place of the Central Committee, a new collective body 
was set up that consisted of 14 members that equally represented all of the 
federal states. The chair of this body rotated every two months and decisions 
were made based on the consensus principle. Each member had to state his or 
her personal affiliation to a nationality and a republic, even Tito (Croat). The 
functions of state and party were separated, and it was no longer possible for 
one person to hold several offices, as it had been for the former war generation.
Praxis Philosophy and the “Black Wave”
The more liberal climate of this reform period encouraged artists and in-
tellectuals to explore new ways to examine Yugoslav reality. Much like the 
politicians, Marxist philosophers sought a new direction following the historic 
conflict with the Soviet Union. They found it in the early writings of Karl Marx 
and thereby blazed a trail for pluralism in political thinking, one that no longer 
limited itself to the interpretation of Marxism.18
The Praxis group, founded in 1962, represented an undogmatic, creative 
Marxism, comparable roughly to critical theory originating in West Germany. 
Important proponents included Gajo Petrović, Milan Kangrga, Predrag 
Vranicki, Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić, Svetozar Stojanović, Veljko 
Rus, and Žarko Puhovski. At their summer school on the island of Korčula, 
which Western intellectuals also liked to attend, sociologist, philosophers, 
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and political scientists discussed topics such as “progress and culture,” “pur-
pose and perspectives of socialism,” “power and humanity,” or “freedom and 
unity.”19 The journal Praxis was established in 1964, and members of the 
advisory board included Jürgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch, Leszek Kołakowski, 
Henri Lefebvre, Georg Lukács, and Herbert Marcuse. In 1963, Erich Fromm 
confided “that, as a socialist and Marxist, it was a great experience for me 
to meet the Yugoslav philosophers, . . . who were so fruitful in developing 
Marxist humanism.”20
By adopting the term “praxis,” the intellectuals distanced themselves 
from the determinism of dialectical materialism and emphasized free human 
action instead. This offered a lever with which Yugoslav reality could be 
examined more critically. By reflecting on “alienation,” “emancipation,” and 
“humanity,” the members of the Praxis group bluntly exposed that the system 
of self-management had not enabled more self-determination at all but had 
only produced a camouflaged form of hierarchical and bureaucratic power 
structures, an oligarchy of party functionaries, and thus another type of alien-
ation. Quite publicly they published their reform proposals for more freedom 
in socialism, the introduction of the multiparty system, and the necessity of 
democratizing the communist federation. Important inspiration came from 
the New Left in Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States, from 
critical theory and the existential philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernst Bloch, 
Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer. This 
was accompanied by criticism of Stalinism leveled by Leo Trotsky, Victor 
Serge, and Isaac Deutscher.21
In literature, theater, and filmmaking, a subversive genre known as the 
“Black Wave” appeared that frankly depicted the dark side of socialism. In 
1968, Slobodan Selenić published the novel Memoari Pere Bogalja (Memoirs 
of Pera the Cripple), in which he portrayed the communist party elite as deca-
dent and permissive nouveau riche and pilloried the political persecutions after 
1948. For this work he received a prestigious Belgrade literary award. In his 
play When Pumpkins Blossomed (Kad su cvetale tikve), Dragoslav Mihailović 
described his imprisonment on the island Goli Otok. However, the play was 
not allowed to be performed because of the parallels Mihailović drew in it 
between the partisans and the National Socialists.
Nowhere was the dark side of socialism described so vividly as in film. 
In his film Early Works, Želimir Žilnik depicted the failure of the ideals of 
socialism including sexual liberation, when applied to Yugoslav reality. His 
female protagonist Yugoslava was an allegory for the entire state. Communists 
and conservatives alike were enraged by the “anarcho-liberal” plot,22 but in 
1969 the filmmaker was awarded the Golden Bear in Berlin for this work. In 
1971, the cineaste Dušan Makavejev won a prize in Cannes for W.R.: Mysteries 
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of the Organism (W.R. — Misterije organizma) about communist politics and 
sexuality and the work of Wilhelm Reich. The film was banned in Yugoslavia 
shortly thereafter on the grounds that it mocked the People’s Army. Despite 
such reactions, filmmakers were usually not banned from working in their 
profession as they were in the Soviet Union.23
Theater also played a prominent role in the self-reflective interpretation 
of societal conditions. The Zagreb theaters Teatar & TD, Atelje 212, and the 
Belgrade international theater festival BITEF made names for themselves as 
places of political and pedagogical provocation and consciousness-building. 
They abandoned not only petrified structures of thought and behavior but 
also traditional aesthetic rituals and argued instead in favor of overcoming 
societal constraints. On experimental stages and at festivals, both international 
and local productions were performed, including Samuel Beckett’s Waiting 
for Godot and Peter Handke’s Offending the Audience. Literary magazines 
like Krugovi (Circles), Književne novine (Journal for literature), and Polet 
(Enthusiasm) provided a forum for critical writers such as Bora Ćosić and 
Danilo Kiš. Ćosić, for example, satirized socialist development in his novel 
My Family’s Role in the World Revolution, for which he received a literary 
prize in 1970.24
By establishing a critical discourse on society, championing individu-
alistic works, creating alternative subcultures and networks, and advocating 
certain social practices, the Praxis philosophy and the cultural avant-garde 
sowed the seeds for a large-scale critical deliberation of contemporary 
socialism.
The Student Revolts of 1968
In many countries across Europe, the student movement of 1968 challenged 
established thinking and fossilized structures — so, too, in Yugoslavia, where 
a politicized younger generation sought to improve the world. Despite their 
transnational forms of expression, the ideas of ’68 were also overlaid every-
where with country-specific motives.
On the occasion of a pop concert held on the evening of 2 June 1968 in 
Novi Beograd, fighting broke out between youth and the police. This prompted 
thousands to demonstrate the next day and occupy university buildings, which 
they proclaimed as the “Red University Karl Marx.” One day later, protests 
were also taking place in Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Sarajevo. Numerous import-
ant intellectuals and artists expressed their solidarity with the angered youth.
Even though these revolts resembled the student protests in other national 
capitals, in Yugoslavia they expressed domestic grievances first and fore-
most. The demonstrators criticized the party oligarchy and “localism,” and 
demanded democratic rights, social justice, and the improvement of conditions 
at the universities. They chanted “Down with the Red bourgeoisie!” and then 
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“We don’t want capitalism!” This revealed with unmistakable clarity that a 
striking credibility gap existed in the system of self-managing socialism, and 
it was quite obvious that the protests directly addressed the reforms that began 
in 1965. The social underpinning for the unrest was undoubtedly the education 
revolution, since it had doubled the number of students within a period of only 
eight years and had led to untenable conditions at the universities. Capacities 
were limited and scholarships scarce. Moreover, young men and women were 
greatly worried about their future because of growing unemployment. More 
keenly than in the West, Yugoslav youth were confronted with the dissonance 
between the dogma of progress and the sad reality of an overtaxed educa-
tional system.25
At the same time, the young students had also been politicized by the 
Vietnam War, the hardships of the “Third World,” and all forms of restric-
tions to be found in the Yugoslav system. Undogmatic Marxism, praxis and 
existential philosophy, psychoanalysis, and cultural criticism formed the the-
oretical basis for revolt and directed attention to potentially subversive topics 
like democratization, participation, and transparency. As was the case all over 
Europe, youth hungered for new ways to live, self-determination, openness, 
self-reflection, and self-fulfillment.26
Tito proved to have the right political instinct when he addressed the 
strikers in a radio and television speech on 9 June 1968. He acknowledged that 
the unrest was a result of the regime’s neglect of youth, a failing that urgently 
needed to be corrected. He conceded that the students’ demands were justi-
fied. By doing so, he managed that very day to bring about a peaceful end to 
what had been the most serious political crisis until then.27 This shows that the 
demonstrators were indeed primarily protesting against social disadvantages 
and were less concerned with expressing a fundamental criticism of society.28
Still, the student movement marked a turn in the political development of 
Yugoslavia. For the very first time, the country had experienced open protest 
on a broad scale and by the younger generation no less. It was this generation 
with whom socialism had so strongly sought to curry favor because the young 
were allegedly the most important bearers of progress. It was clear to all that 
a system that alienated the next generation had no future. The revolt pointed 
with blatant candor to the system’s deficits of credibility and legitimacy, and 
the ’68 movement was important in another respect: the student movement 
was interpreted as a clarion call by politically thinking people of all stripes. It 
had proven that pressure from the street could achieve more than all the dis-
cussions ever held in the Central Committee. The mobilization of the masses 
thus became an important factor in the coming political confrontations, such 
as in the “Croatian Spring” of 1971.
At first the regime did not consider undertaking any far-reaching demo-
cratic reforms. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 
222 Part Iv: 1945 to 1980
to end the “Prague Spring” proved convenient to Tito. Once again, the danger 
of a Soviet invasion was underscored by events elsewhere in the East, at least 
from the Yugoslav standpoint. After Khrushchev fell from power in October 
1964, bilateral economic relations between the two countries were further de-
veloped. With regard to the Near East conflict and the Vietnam War, Tito and 
Brezhnev also repeatedly discovered that they held similar views. However, 
the far-reaching market economy reforms that Yugoslavia introduced in 1965 
created new ideological rifts because they required a measure of political 
liberalization. Tito sympathized with Alexander Dubček’s demands for more 
democratization in Czechoslovakia and even intervened with Moscow on his 
behalf. When Soviet troops marched into Prague in August 1968, the Yugoslav 
government issued a strong protest. Moscow’s immediate and severe condem-
nation of Tito prompted fears that this time Yugoslavia could indeed become 
the next victim of military aggression.
Had the Soviets invaded, the Yugoslav army could have done little to 
combat it. Thus, in the fall of 1968, preparations began for reforming the 
country’s national security doctrine. A law was passed in 1969 that spelled 
out the “all-peoples defense.” It took recourse to partisan warfare insofar as 
it attempted to include as much of the population as possible in the defense 
of the country. In accordance with decentralization, the armed forces were 
made up of two components: the national regular army of 250,000 soldiers 
plus 500,000 reservists, and the territorial defense of the republics, which 
could mobilize 900,000 men. A third component was the civil defense. In the 
case of a defense emergency, every individual who was 16 years or older had 
to help in evacuation, medical provision, and other tasks. Men were required 
to take part in military exercises on a regular basis, and even schoolchildren 
learned the basics of handling arms.29
Foreign observers at the time recognized the serious risk to domestic 
security that decentralization posed. Throughout the countryside and in the 
mountains, nearly every man owned a gun or carbine, and millions of ammu-
nition rounds were sold to private citizens annually. Each community had a 
committee responsible for training and armament. Sizable weapon arsenals 
were stored across the country. Thanks to the dual military structure, the 
republics practically maintained their own armies — in fact, who was to guar-
antee that they wouldn’t someday turn against each other? In a very literal 
sense, the new security doctrine was inherently quite explosive and contrib-
uted in large measure to the creeping militarization of Yugoslav society.
14.
The New Nationalism  
(1967 to 1971)
While Yugoslavs continued to enjoy the “golden years,” doubt intensified 
within leadership circles about the hitherto fairly unquestioned faith in prog-
ress that had dominated since the immediate postwar era. It was all too clear 
that the self-management system suffered from structural problems that were 
being camouflaged by apparent prosperity, if only rather poorly. The rate of 
economic growth was sinking; increasing regional disparities and rising un-
employment put pressure on the political system to act in the second half of the 
1960s. Furthermore, the dynamics of modernization had produced new social 
constellations. Competition within the market economy aggravated national 
sensitivities and intensified ethnopolitical rivalries. Politicians and intellec-
tuals in all of the republics were expressing their concerns that the leveling 
politics of “brotherhood and unity” threatened their own republic’s interests. 
Nationalist rhetoric resurfaced that was thought to be long gone, accompanied 
by new problems pushed to the forefront by the economic downturn.
Modernization and the National Question
Despite all the efforts made by the communists, nationalism had never com-
pletely vanished from Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, nearly 
350,000 men had not fought with the partisans, but against them as members 
of the collaboration troops. Many of them were later sentenced to prison terms 
or even liquidated. These men, together with their family members, repre-
sented a sizeable number of people who were perhaps able to live with the new 
regime but never fully identified with it or even opposed it in their hearts.1 The 
lines were blurred between forbidden nationalism and an encouraged patri-
otic love of one’s homeland. The patriotic nineteenth-century art song “Our 
Beautiful Homeland” (Lijepa naša) had been usurped by the Ustasha regime 
as their hymn. For this reason, certain versions of the song were banned after 
the war. Many Croats loved the melody, to which more or less politically 
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offensive texts could be sung. In order to avoid suspicion by their neighbors, 
people simply closed their windows at family celebrations when they sang. 
Clearly ambiguous were the old national symbols like the Croatian tricolor 
and the white-and-red chessboard crest, which the communists had adapted 
by adding a red star. When the older version of the flag appeared occasionally 
at private parties, sports events, and in church, the practice then fell into the 
tolerated gray zone of celebrating folklore. However, anyone who attached a 
political message to this was seen as violating “brotherhood and unity” and 
was punished.2
The regime also tolerated social niches in which national leanings (even in 
an undesirable form) could be expressed within certain limitations. This was 
also true for the churches, in which hardline critics of the regime were even 
able to rise to the position of bishop. The anti-Western, lay preacher movement 
of the Bogomoljci also remained intact.3
Although schools, universities, and research institutes had been purged 
of collaborators after 1945, they remained bastions of the old bourgeoisie, 
particularly the academies of science. Most professors and academy members 
retained their positions following the regime change. As long as they acted 
loyally, they were permitted to pursue their research interests with relatively 
few restrictions. Older traditions and schools of thought were maintained, 
particularly in the fields of philosophy, literary studies, and history, and these 
disciplines became conclaves for cultivating national identity. During the 
1960s, blatantly nationalistic discourses crept in. One contemporary at the 
time suspected that at the academies, “a generation of historians were being 
trained, who were worse [more nationalistic] than their teachers.”4
Intellectuals were the first to break the taboo of “brotherhood and unity” 
in the 1960s. The Slovene literary critic Dušan Pirjevec conducted a bitter 
controversy in 1961/1962 with the Serb writer Dobrica Ćosić over the re-
lationship of internationalism, Yugoslavism, and the rights of nations and 
nationalities. Shouldn’t the peoples of Yugoslavia exert their sovereignty first 
and foremost in and through the republics (Pirjevec), or didn’t a “vampire-like 
nationalism” lurk behind this demand (Ćosić)? Such cultural controversies 
constituted the intellectual discourse accompanying the political debate over 
constitutional reform.5
Velimir Terzić, a Serb historian and director of the Military History 
Institute in Belgrade, sparked a debate involving Franjo Tudjman over Croatia’s 
guilt in the fall of the first Yugoslavia. Tudjman had fought in the Second 
World War on the side of the partisans and made a military career for himself 
afterward. In 1961, he was appointed director and later became president of 
the Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement of Croatia in Zagreb. 
Tudjman felt provoked by Terzić and sought to prove that the Croats were the 
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chief victim of Greater Serbian efforts to establish hegemony in the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia. However, he considered it his most important mission to lower 
the official numbers on Serb victims of Ustasha crimes. He maintained that, 
in fascist Croatia, the total number of all those killed in camps and deported 
amounted to little more than 59,000 people of all nationalities, not just Serbs.6 
He suspected that the intent behind the official statistic listing 700,000 mur-
dered prisoners in the Jasenovac concentration camp alone was to stigmatize 
the Croat people collectively. As a matter of fact, there were 83,000 to 90,000 
people killed in Jasenovac, so that the data originally given do indeed appear 
exaggerated. Still, Tudjman’s actions reeked of revisionism and denial.7
The rapid modernization of Yugoslav society also produced a thor-
oughly new dynamic in ethnic relations. Wholly contrary to its original 
intent, the socialist politics of development acted as a catalyst for national 
consciousness-raising. Granted, industrialization, urban culture, higher edu-
cation, regional mobility, and modern mass communication did indeed further 
the spread of ethnic tolerance, cosmopolitan attitudes, and supranational iden-
tities, as had been predicted by both Western theories of modernization and by 
Marxism. However, simultaneously these same processes created new com-
petitiveness between peoples, particularly when institutions and power were 
being distributed according to the “national key,” namely criteria of ethnic 
proportionality.8
The communists propagated rationality and efficiency in daily socialist 
life, so that ethnicity and religion appeared only to be archaic relics of a dark 
past. Because this jarred old certainties, social networks, and constructions 
of identity, some people felt they had to react in defense of national culture. 
Within certain media, clubs, and educational facilities linguistic and cultural 
cohesion was cultivated, whereby a feeling of alienation toward Yugoslavia 
as a multinational state also then took hold.
In addition, the government’s forceful policy of modernization and devel-
opment accelerated social differentiation within society. Education, mobility, 
and high expectations of growing income and a better life helped intensify 
different kinds of conflict of interest, such as those between rich and poor 
republics and between majority and minority populations. Among the Bosnian 
Muslims and the Macedonians, as well as among Kosovo Albanians, a large 
class of people emerged for the first time who were geared to advancement 
and made a career in the party, bureaucracy, enterprises, and educational 
institutions. Before 1945, there had been but a very small bourgeois and in-
tellectual class in these societies that would have been able to propagate the 
national idea.9
Demographic changes also played a role. In light of the varying rates of 
population growth among the peoples of Yugoslavia, the ethnic composition 
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shifted. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the share of Muslims in the population rose 
from 31.3 to 39.5 percent between 1953 and 1981.10 In Kosovo, the Albanian 
share rose from 67 to 74 percent between 1961 and 1971, a fact that caused 
Serbs there to fear that they would eventually be crowded out.11 The situation 
was also aggravated by the increase in competition for an ever-dwindling 
number of jobs.
For all these reasons, socialist modernization and its emerging crisis in 
the 1960s raised fundamental questions concerning ethnic coexistence and 
the distribution of political power and prosperity. The party watched these 
developments with growing concern and produced hundreds of pages of secret 
reports on the deteriorating national relations. Not only was the competition 
between peoples for advancement, status, power, and resources becoming 
more clearly visible, but emerging economic problems also caused insecurity 
and irrational fears of the future. Social and economic interests were being 
discussed more and more in categories of ethnic differences, clothed in typical 
discourses on discrimination, and reminted into ethnopolitical demands. The 
dogma that socialism had solved the national question to the satisfaction of all 
could no longer be maintained. In 1964, Tito concluded: “If we do not want to 
be confronted with serious problems further down the road, then we have to 
keep our eyes open when examining the problems in ethnic relations that still 
exist.”12 From this point forward, there was no more talk of the healing impact 
of socialism. What was emphasized instead was the right of each group to 
freely develop its own cultural identity and economic evolvement. The ranking 
in the tandem of “brotherhood and unity” was switched. No longer was the 
greater emphasis placed on commonalities (unity) but diversity (brotherhood), 
and that, in turn, required a change in direction in constitutional politics.
Recognition of Bosnian Muslims
An important step in rebalancing ethnopolitical relations was the recog-
nition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth constituent people (or “nation”) of 
Yugoslavia. This concluded a process that had been underway for decades, 
meaning the transformation of this traditional religious community into a 
modern nation. By this time, to be Muslim meant especially to follow certain 
cultural practices and harbor certain forms of ethnic consciousness; it was 
less a profession of faith.
Although the communists had actually acknowledged the individuality 
of the Bosnian Muslims during the people’s liberation struggle, this specific 
group was not given the status of a nation after 1945. Instead, they were 
classified in 1948 according to the categories “undetermined nationality” or 
“Muslim Serb” or “Muslim Croat,” a state of affairs that was deemed unsat-
isfactory. The rubric “Muslim (ethnic affiliation)” slipped into the national 
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census taken in 1961, before the Bosnian Communist Party decided in 1965 
to upgrade Muslims officially to the sixth constituent people of Yugoslavia.13 
In 1971, the national census included for the first time the category “Muslim 
in an ethnic sense.” Muslim with a capital “M” referred to national affiliation, 
as opposed to a lowercase “m” when just religious affiliation was meant. This 
represented an enormous success for Bosniak national politics, which had 
been pushing for greater influence for years. The only reason why the sixth 
official nation in Yugoslavia went by a name with a religious connotation 
was that its members themselves used no other name. “Bosnian” referred to 
regional origins that included other nationalities. Not until 1993 was the his-
torical term “Bosniak” officially reintroduced as the name given exclusively to 
the people of Bosnian Muslims and — contrary to the nineteenth century — no 
longer to a specific citizenship regardless of ethnic origin.14 “In Europe, if you 
do not have a national name, you cannot have a state,” explained a politician.15
The Muslim nation was not an artificial product devised by the com-
munists, as opponents to the reform argued. Likewise, it is clear that the 
valuation of Muslims to a nation did indeed serve a strategic interest in 
neutralizing the growing ambitions of Croatia and Serbia by strengthening 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a buffer. The “heart of Yugoslavia” played a key role 
for the internal stability of the multiethnic state. In 1971, about four million 
people lived there, of whom 39.6 percent were Muslims, 37.2 percent Serbs, 
and 20.6 percent Croats. At the time, both Zagreb and Belgrade had begun 
to exert more influence in the republic.16 In reaction to these hegemonic ten-
dencies and the threat of being usurped as Islamicized Croats or Serbs, the 
new Muslim elites strove for full recognition and a greater say, not only in 
their home republic but also in Yugoslavia as a whole. Apart from this, they 
were still citizens of a republic that had fallen far behind the national level of 
development, and more lobbying was needed to correct this situation.
However, the wish to be recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent 
peoples did not emerge primarily out of a perceived need to defend oneself; in-
stead it reflected a widespread, deeply felt, and distinct ethnic consciousness. 
Back in the interwar period, there had been no consensus about the existence 
of a Bosnian Muslim nation among the elites, not to speak of the populace in 
general. In the meantime, this had changed, thanks in no small measure to 
the secular state and its strategy for socialist modernization. Just as the Serb 
national identity shed its ties to Christian Orthodoxy back in the nineteenth 
century, the identity of Bosnian Muslims increasingly emancipated itself from 
Islam after 1945.
Muslim identity was no longer identical with religious affiliation but still 
remained connected to it in different ways. This identity was constituted within 
a sociocultural sphere and lifestyle influenced by Islam into which one was 
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born and in which one was socialized via the family. It included old traditions 
and belief systems, religious practices and daily customs, and even symbols 
and values, all of which shaped community consciousness, regardless if a per-
son was religious or not. Fewer and fewer people were religious, and all were 
socialized in secular institutions. Still, it was not possible to completely define 
away the Ottoman cultural heritage for these people. The old customs, songs, 
special food dishes, and visits to the mosque had important sociocultural func-
tions, even if Allah had little to do with it all. Even communists often gave their 
children Muslim names and tolerated old customs like circumcision, which was 
outlawed.17 To the horror of the public health agencies, for example, they shied 
away from prohibiting outdated burial rituals, in which the dead were laid out in 
front of the mosque in the heart of the city. Religious practices were associated 
with national identity, which was permitted to be freely articulated. Apart from 
this, efforts were made to strengthen the nonreligious characteristics of Muslim 
national identity by concentrating more intensively on objective criteria of 
demarcation, such as language, literature, and history. Magazines like Odjek 
(Echo), Život (Life), and Pregled (Review) reflected various dimensions of 
Bosnian Muslim identity with the aim of shaping and standardizing it further.
The political and constitutional upgrade gave Muslims more influence in 
the various bodies of the republic and the federal government, more visibility 
in the public realm, and a significant increase in national self-confidence. The 
share of Muslims in the Bosnian Central Committee rose from 19 to 33 percent 
between 1965 and 1974.18 While only 15.8 percent of the assemblymen in the 
republic’s parliament were Muslim in 1969, by 1974 the figure had risen to 
33.4 percent.19 However, a greater voice in the leadership cadres also encour-
aged more targeted interest-driven politics, from which systemic problems 
arose. Were the Muslims to be treated as one of the three equal nations of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, or did they deserve a privileged status because Serbs 
and Croats each already had their own republics? How could the Muslim 
identity be protected from assimilation in a multicultural milieu? In 1971, the 
intellectual Salim Ćerić called for a Muslim cultural institute (Matica) and a 
flag and anthem of their own. The Communist Party rejected this immediately 
with the argument that this would lead to national segmentation, polarization, 
and finally civil war.20 While the tectonics of power strengthened the new 
Muslim nation, the “national key” felt threatening and prompted a fear of 
future discrimination among the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina.21
Contrary to the Bosnian Muslims, the Macedonians were recognized as 
a nation with their own republic even before the war ended. The Communist 
Party was conducting deliberate nation building “from above” in order to 
protect this numerically small people from Serb, Bulgarian, and Greek efforts 
to assimilate them. Soon afterward, a standard Macedonian language and 
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orthography was established that differed from the Bulgarian, with its own 
grammar books, dictionaries, and literature. As the other republics had done, 
Macedonia set up institutes dedicated to the study of its own history. Schools 
and media helped popularize the new idea of identity, which rapidly took root 
because it was being planted in a terrain where the people already cultivated 
a collective awareness of themselves. Therefore, it did not take long before 
the formation of a Macedonian nation was completed. After the separation of 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church from its historic archbishopric of Skopje-
Ohrid in 1958, it took until 1967 and a period of tough negotiations before the 
Serbian Orthodox Church finally recognized the Macedonian metropolitan. 
Macedonia now had its own national church.22
Islam and Pan-Islamism
In addition to the nearly 1.5 million Bosnian Muslims, other Islamic groups 
lived in Yugoslavia. In Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo lived a 
total of a quarter million so-called ethnic (meaning Slavic) Muslims. There 
were also another 1.4 million Albanians, Turks, and Roma who adhered to 
Islam.23 Yugoslav Muslims enjoyed particular state protection for political 
reasons: they represented an important link to the Islamic countries within 
the nonaligned movement.
Therefore, the state tolerated and even supported the Islamic religious 
community and other activities connected to the faith. In Sarajevo, the re-
nowned Oriental Institute and a chair for Oriental Studies at the university 
were established to study the Ottoman heritage. Between 1955 and 1972, the 
number of mosques doubled, and special magazines appeared like Preporod 
(Renaissance) and Islamska misao (Islamic thought). In Bosnia-Herzegovina 
alone there were 1,092 mosques, 569 prayer houses (mesdžid), and another 
394 smaller shrines. Around 1,000 more were to be found in Kosovo and 
Macedonia.24
Unlike the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox churches, the religious 
leader of the Muslims, the Reis-ul-ulema, was unconditionally pro-Yugoslav 
in his views, not least because of gratitude for the public support given to his 
own culture. In 1969, the Islamic Religious Community dropped the adjective 
“religious” from its name — an important signal that it saw itself not only as a 
representative of spiritual matters but also of ethnopolitical interests.25
However, the liberal atmosphere of the 1960s also encouraged followers 
of a politicized Islam to resume their activities. Under various pseudonyms, 
Islamists began to publish their views. In certain circles, such as among the 
students of the theological madrassa (Gazi Husrev-beg medrese) and of the 
Islamic Theological Faculty, such politicized ideas about religion fell on fertile 
soil. Led by the young imam Hasan Čengić, a loyal circle of tabački mesdžid 
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formed. It condemned discotheques and ethnically mixed marriages and called 
for the veiling of women and the prohibition of alcohol. Similar to the 1930s, 
the demands for an Islamization of society were linked to a comprehensive 
political and ideological reform project.26
This form of Islamism advocated the unification of religion and social 
order; it rejected the separation of Islam, the state, and society. Therefore, its 
followers were also against anything that limited the religious community to 
strictly religious functions. They attacked both the self-contented conservative 
theologians and imams, whom they claimed were unable to solve the current 
problems, and the nonreligious modernists of the new Muslim generation of 
politicians.27
In 1970, the year in which Tito’s political ally and friend, Egyptian pres-
ident Gamal Abdel Nasser, died and the Ayatollah Khomeini published his 
book Islamic Government, Alija Izetbegović, the future president of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, wrote his Islamic Declaration. As a member of the secret 
anticommunist organization Young Muslims, he had been sentenced to im-
prisonment in 1946 with several of his fellow fighters, because the group 
called for the unification of the Muslim world under one single Islamic state 
and demanded of its members an “iron will” and “surliness and fanaticism” 
for the psychological, political, and military struggle. Izetbegović, who was 
born in 1925, sat in prison until 1949 and afterward retreated into a private life 
of practicing law. Several of his fellow travelers, however, went into exile.28
The Islamic Declaration reiterated earlier demands calling for an “Islamic 
order and way of life” and a pan-Islamic state stretching “from Morocco to 
Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia.” The distant aim was to develop an 
Islamic order, although what this would be was never exactly defined. The 
key demand was the “Islamization of [secularized] Muslims” as based on the 
Pakistan model. It was argued that religious and political awakening went 
hand in hand, that Western culture and its concepts of societal order were to be 
rejected, and therefore public life and media should be controlled. Once again, 
this point was not to propagate crude antimodernism, but to safeguard identity: 
“Hence, the question is not whether we will or will not accept science and 
technology . . . but rather whether we will do this creatively or mechanically, 
with dignity or with inferiority. The question is thus whether in this inevitable 
development we will get lost, or whether we will preserve our individuality, 
our culture and our values.” The struggle for an Islamic order would be car-
ried forward by a select elite with clear ideological visions and moral criteria. 
Unlike many movements outside of Europe, the Declaration explicitly called 
for the creation of a pan-Islamic state, not a federation. Muslims should merge 
into a single community, in which Islam was the ideology and pan-Islamism 
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the politics. “OUR GOAL: Islamization of Moslems. OUR MOTTO: Believe 
and Fight.”29
The upswing of political Islam was linked to global developments. 
Everywhere in the Islamic world, and therefore also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
modernization had brought forth an urban class of intellectuals who oriented 
themselves on foreign Muslim brotherhoods and relevant authors like the 
Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb or the Pakistani Muhammad Iqbal. Unlike in 
Egypt, Pakistan, and Malaysia, Islamism in Yugoslavia only addressed a mi-
nority of the population. Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked both a pious bourgeoisie 
and an impoverished urban lower class among whom Islamism resonated so 
strongly in the Arab world. For this reason, Islamism was at first nothing more 
than intellectual wishful thinking.30
Unrest in Kosovo
All of the newly emerging problems intersected in Kosovo. In the 1960s, more 
than two-thirds of the roughly 1.3 million inhabitants were Albanians. The 
rate of population growth reached 27.6 percent annually, about three times 
as much as in the whole of Yugoslavia. Every second person was under the 
age of 20. This dynamic birth development caused many Serbs to fear that 
they would be completely pushed out of Kosovo in a few years’ time. They 
considered this region to be the “cradle of the Serb nation,” because Kosovo 
had been the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom and the setting of 
the myth-laden Battle of Kosovo, and the most important Orthodox cultural 
landmarks were located there. At the same time, Kosovo also held important 
national significance for the Albanians, whose majority status prompted them 
to insist on having a greater say in politics. In 1878, the League of Prizren, the 
modern-age Albanian national movement, had been formed here.
The predominantly Orthodox Serbs and the overwhelmingly Muslim 
Albanians essentially remained strangers to one another, even during the era 
of “brotherhood and unity.” No two peoples mistrusted each other as deeply 
as these two; rarely did marriages between members of these communities 
occur.31 Until Aleksandar Ranković fell from power, Albanians were greatly 
underrepresented in leadership positions within the party, the administration, 
the police, and the military. The Serb establishment thought of Albanians 
as chronically disloyal and separatist and arrogantly looked down on them. 
Kosovo did indeed suffer from a structural deficit of educated classes. It took a 
while for Albanians to gradually catch up. The Yugoslav state invested a great 
deal in the development of their province. Whereas only a third of all Albanian 
children attended school prior to the Second World War, by the mid-1960s, 
the figure had risen by 85 percent. The number of students also multiplied.
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Kosovo suffered from serious socioeconomic problems that painfully 
came to light with the challenges of the 1960s. The national income per capita 
was only 38 percent of that of Yugoslavia, and economic growth lagged far 
behind the annual influx of jobseekers. All other indicators also pointed to 
glaring underdevelopment: in 1968 there were 60 percent fewer medical doc-
tors, 70 percent fewer radios and television sets, and 75 percent fewer private 
automobiles per 1,000 inhabitants than in Yugoslavia as a whole.32
Liberalization opened the door in Kosovo for the far-reaching Albanization 
of the province. Šiptari, until then the official yet pejorative label for their 
people, was replaced with what they called themselves, namely Albanian. 
Enver Hoxha, the Albanian head of state, sent schoolbooks and more than 200 
teachers to Kosovo to accelerate instruction in their native language. Close 
collaboration on national policy developed in other areas. In March 1968, 
Kosovo adopted the Tosk version of the written language that had been devel-
oped in its neighboring state. New interpretations of history were embraced, 
especially on the autochthonous and Illyric origins of Albanians and the cult 
of the national hero Skanderbeg. All of this underscored the cross-border unity 
of the Albanian people that even the government sanctioned. New newspapers 
and magazines appeared and hundreds of books were published in Albanian. 
Radio and television spread rapidly. Even the Albanian flag was permitted to 
be flown in front of official buildings in Kosovo. In other words, Tito’s attempt 
to construct a distinct Kosovar national identity had failed.33
For nationalist-oriented Albanians in Kosovo, the concessions made since 
1966 did not go far enough. Their country still did not have the status of a 
republic, which would have included the right to secession. Growing tensions 
over this finally erupted into violent riots in October and November 1968 in 
Kosovo and western Macedonia. Demonstrators demanded a republic and a 
constitution; some went as far as to call for the unification of all regions set-
tled by Albanians into one nation state. Students celebrated Albania’s head of 
state, Enver Hoxha. Tito did not want to concede to demands for a republic 
because he feared the direction such separatist sentiments might take. The 
uprising was crushed.
In the 1960s, an elite evolved that was being socialized to adopt an ag-
gressively nationalist stance. These people were found at the university, the 
Albanological Institute, and the Academy of Sciences, where they eloquently 
presented their political demands at home and abroad. In 1969, the first 
Albanian university was opened in Prishtina and quickly became the center 
for nationalist activities. Within a short span of time, an upwardly mobile and 
autochthonous class of intellectuals emerged who advanced to key positions 
and emphatically demanded a fairer distribution of opportunities, even at the 
national level. Thanks to quotas and positive discrimination, this generation 
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made its way in the 1970s into important jobs and key positions in bureau-
cracy, the party, and the economy.34 An atmosphere of euphoria and triumph 
prevailed, which they increasingly rubbed in the face of local Serbs. Since 
the Serb language had been degraded to an elective subject in the schools, 
the two ethnic communities of Kosovo found that they literally no longer 
shared a common language. Thus, the consequent Albanization of Kosovo 
also caused deep-seated alienation and polarization between members of the 
two peoples.35
In Serbia the new course of greater federal and national rights was not met 
with absolute approval. In May 1968, the writer Dobrica Ćosić addressed the 
party in a passionate speech, using harsh words to uncover decentralization 
as a masquerade for nationalist machinations and to warn that the systematic 
discrimination of Serbs and Montenegrins could evoke a reaction of Greater 
Serbian irredentism. This speech by one of Yugoslavia’s most prominent and 
respected intellectuals hit like a bombshell. The party quickly condemned 
Ćosić’s stance. Two months later, he resigned his membership in the party 
and then took over the Serbian Literary Society. The chief focus of this circle 
of intellectuals was to defend the historic, national, and cultural unity of the 
Serb people with greater determination in the future.36
Meanwhile, the communist leadership was convinced that the situation 
in Kosovo could only be stabilized by giving the Albanians even more rights. 
Petar Stambolić, one of the most prominent Serb communists, called critics 
to task: “How can anyone today maintain that it is in the interests of the Serb 
people that . . . other peoples are not treated equally with us? I truly do not 
know how someone could be threatened by the nationalities. . . . It is in our 
own interest to decide in favor of [the rights of] Kosovo and Metohija.”37 Tito 
decided that Kosovo should not be granted the status of a republic. Instead, 
it remained a province, although it was allowed to exercise all the rights of a 
republic except the right to secession. It was simultaneously a federal compo-
nent of Serbia and a constituent entity of Yugoslavia, and as long as Tito was 
alive, nothing would change.
Linguistic Nationalism
The insidious process of alienation and politicizing ethnic identity can be fol-
lowed best in the area of culture. In the 1960s, the language question advanced 
prominently to the fore and served as a type of seismograph for the national 
sensitivities in the multiethnic state.
The question of whether Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians 
can be said to speak the same or different languages is one that dates back 
to the nineteenth century. It is actually not a linguistic problem but a po-
litical one, because three-fourths of Yugoslavs — the population speaking 
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Serbo-Croatian — communicate in language variations that differ from one 
another to a degree not much greater than the English spoken in Great Britain, 
the United States, and Australia. In 1954, the cultural institutions had agreed 
in Novi Sad that the language referred to as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian 
was to be understood as one language with two variants, one western and one 
eastern. Intellectuals in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina now questioned this. 
In Slovenia, there was an awakening of linguistic purism, and a semiofficial 
language tribunal was formed to guard the “purity” and the equal standing 
of the Slovenian language. The cultural ambitions in Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Serbia were closely and mutually interrelated, radicalized each other through 
ever more far-reaching demands, and eventually drew the remaining republics 
into the vortex of their struggles. However, what was decisive for the evolving 
controversy was not the communicative function of language, but its role as a 
marker of identity. Language disputes symbolized a deeper need for national 
recognition, appreciation, and distinction, and this was not least a reaction to 
the injury that socialism had inflicted on the national pride of its peoples.38
The catalyst for a deepening alienation among the republics was the 
“Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language” of 
March 1967. More than 140 intellectuals from eighteen cultural organizations 
in Croatia severely criticized what they saw as trends toward Serbification. 
They were explicit in their rejection of the compromise of Novi Sad and de-
manded instead that Croatian be recognized as one of four independent literary 
languages in the constitution, next to Serbian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. 
The fact that linguistic characteristics could also be found specific to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Montenegro interested the Croat experts little.
In reaction to the Croatian declaration, Serbian writers composed that 
same month a document signed by forty-two fellow writers entitled “A 
Proposal to Ponder,” in which they supported the idea that the Croatian and 
Serbian languages be officially separated. It was argued that Serbs and Croats 
should have the right to develop their national languages and culture inde-
pendently from one another. Starting in 1969, the Belgrade literary magazine 
Književne novine was no longer published using the Latin alphabet, but the 
Cyrillic one — over the protest of at least twelve Belgrade intellectuals.39
Croat communists were very concerned about such nationalist demands. 
Many renowned scientists and organizations had signed the language dec-
laration, and just as many had voiced their opposition to it. Rallies to save 
“brotherhood and unity” were held in many institutions and businesses.40 The 
communists decided to halt nationalistic machinations and expelled nine sign-
ers of the declaration from the party. In addition, they forced Franjo Tudjman, 
one of the key protagonists of Croat nationalism, into retirement as the director 
of the Historical Institute in Zagreb. Yet, in line with Yugoslav tradition, he 
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was allowed to continue researching and publishing his work. At the same time 
in Belgrade, the communist leadership also cracked down on Serb nationalist 
intellectuals.
Nevertheless, the Croats ended their participation in the common dic-
tionary in 1970 and declared the Novi Sad agreement to be obsolete. The 
language question had now become a political affair. The long-standing 
Zagreb cultural society Matica hrvatska and its Belgrade counterpart Matica 
srpska embroiled themselves in an endless and unpleasant dispute. Essentially 
this was a proxy conflict between Croatia and Serbia that was emblematic for 
the domestic struggle over identity and alterity, over distinction and openness, 
over self-assertion and hegemony — and the desire for more autonomy by some 
of the republics.41
In 1971, Muslim linguists in Bosnia-Herzegovina started an initiative to 
document the particularities of the regional “forms of literary expression,” 
meaning a Bosnian Muslim language. Even before the Second World War, 
Bosnian Muslim intellectuals were divided over this question. The magazine 
Gajret had appeared then in the Ekavian (Serbian) variant of the Serbo-
Croatian language and in the Cyrillic alphabet, while in other places Muslim 
authors published in the Ijekavian (Croatian) variant and in Latin alphabet. If 
the Muslims formed a separate people, argued those more nationally conscious 
intellectuals, then didn’t they also have the right to a distinct standardized 
Muslim language and literature? The three most famous Bosnian writers, 
Meša Selimović, Mak Dizdar, and Skender Kulenović, became the victims of 
a disconcerting cultural war over their affiliation with Serb, Croat, or Bosnian 
Muslim literature. Suddenly people wanted to sort out and divide up every-
thing that had constituted a unified entity for centuries. Selimović, who did not 
want to subordinate himself to the new cultural dictate, no longer felt welcome 
and moved to Belgrade.
During the 1970s, a “cultural rebirth among Muslims” (Mustafa 
Imamović) took place in many areas, supported by the work of philosophers, 
literary scholars, and historians, including Alija Iseković, Atif Purivatra, and 
Muhamed Filipović. The historian Mustafa Imamović advocated the inclu-
sion of “Muslim history and literature” in the curricula of the schools and 
universities in his republic, which the communists interpreted as an attack on 
the multiethnic nature of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to calm the waters, a 
compromise was reached and the subject “history of the nations and nation-
alities of Bosnia-Herzegovina” was introduced in the history department at 
Sarajevo’s university. However, emphasis was being placed ever more rarely 
on the historical unity of cultures in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ever more often 
on the ethnic individuality of its peoples.42 When the demand for a Muslim 
cultural organization was expressed in 1971 in order to check “intellectual 
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colonization,” the communists sensed the coming of a reactionary relapse 
into the nationalism of the interwar period. Their antidote was simple: they 
made the point that each of the three peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to 
kindly live out their cultural identity within the framework of the shared, 
supranational institutions.43 The three bodies responsible for language policy 
decided that both variants and alphabets were of equal standing and that the 
down-to-earth, everyday vocabulary was to be particularly esteemed.44
Even at the time this sounded like whistling in the dark, because nation-
ally conscious intellectuals and often religious communities were competing 
for visibility and influence. As a republic in which four religions were prac-
ticed, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the place where rivalries were played out 
in disputes such as those over the construction of churches and mosques. 
The century-old contestations of “whose Bosnia” reemerged with the rise of 
nationalist discourse and disputes.45 Each side solicited donations specifically 
from the generous guest-worker “diaspora” in order to outdo the other in 
building their respective places of worship, as the party publication Borba 
reported with some concern in 1972.46
The “Croatian Spring”
Resentments threatened to flare up again in early April 1971 when the Croatian 
Central Committee raised serious accusations against “unitarian-centralistic 
forces” in the League of Communists. The Zagreb leadership had already 
decided in early 1970 to pursue a course that would make it more indepen-
dent of Belgrade, even though the Croatian party was itself deeply divided 
over the issue. Tito called together the heads of party and state in order, as 
he said, to tackle unsolved problems. Essentially what was discussed was 
further constitutional reform. The Croatians demanded autonomy in financial 
affairs and a fundamental restructuring of the currency and foreign-trade sys-
tem. Serbia criticized the rights of the autonomous provinces. For their part, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia expressed their concern 
particularly over the critical state of inner-Yugoslav relations. Each side felt 
discriminated in its own way.47
Starting in the spring of 1971, the mass movement MASPOK spearheaded 
what it intended as a very public debate over constitutional reform in Croatia. 
A choir of voices called for more independence for their republic, including 
the top party leaders led by Savka Dabčević-Kučar, the cultural organization 
Matica hrvatska and its weekly magazine Hrvatski tjednik (Croatian weekly), 
student representatives, and the media. Some wanted Croatia to have its own 
army and foreign policy, even redraw the borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The Croats complained about a loss of culture and political status, discrimina-
tion, and economic exploitation — in other words, very typical grievances that 
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had already marked the national discourse in the first Yugoslavia.48 However, 
it would be too simple to explain the “Croatian Spring” as having evolved 
solely from a new nationalism; in reality, it was born out of a broad spectrum 
of political orientations and motivations.49
The first issue on the agenda was the language question, accompanied by 
the complaint that the nation was bleeding to death because 224,000 men and 
women had left the country to work elsewhere in Europe.50 Franjo Tudjman 
announced in Krapina that assimilation “under the banner of socialism” 
threatened the Croats since it placed into question “the very existence of 
the Croat people.”51 The Hrvatski tjednik heated up the debate further by 
claiming that the Yugoslav government was conducting a “genocidal type of 
denationalization.” 52
Additional topics were discrimination and outside infiltration. Already 
in 1970, party leader Savka Dabčević-Kučar expressed her “major concern 
that Croatia is becoming more the home of Serbs and other nationalities than 
the home of Croats themselves.” 53 Therefore, the constitution needed to be 
changed in a way that defined the republic in the future as a “sovereign na-
tion state of the Croat nation” (and no longer as a republic of peoples with 
equal standing). Moreover, Croats were said to be underrepresented among 
the police, officer corps, and higher administrative positions, a claim that 
was often made but was very hard to substantiate, because only in the case of 
the People’s Army and the news agency Tanjug does reliable evidence exist 
proving that Serbs and Montenegrins were overrepresented.54 Likewise the 
prominent theme of betrayal surfaced, as it did in all discourses on threat, 
as the economist Marko Veselica explained: “The main enemy of the Croat 
people is its own Croatian bureaucracy, which had to be non-national in order 
to cooperate with the centralistic forces of Greater Serbia.”55
Other core demands were focused on the topic of economic exploitation. 
Using all forms of media, Marko Veselica propagated the idea that Yugoslavia 
prospered at Croatia’s expense because the federation exploited his homeland 
and Serb dominance created colonial dependence. For this reason he de-
manded a radical revision of the currency system, an autonomous management 
of taxation and banking, and fewer contributions to the structural fund. In this 
line of argument, the fact was simply swept under the rug that Croatia profited 
from the common Yugoslav market and even developed faster than others.56
It was at this point that calls were first heard for more sovereignty, some-
times even for the republic’s independence. The purpose was to “complete 
the mental and territorial integrity” and “statehood.”57 If Yugoslavia wanted 
to survive, then only one path remained: to transform it into “a community 
of truly sovereign and thoroughly equal peoples.”58 Thus, the “Croatian ques-
tion” became the overall dominant obsession during the summer and autumn 
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of 1971, complained the British ambassador, and the centralists in Belgrade 
were being blamed for every little thing that went astray in Croatia, even the 
previous year’s poor potato harvest.59
In early July, Tito summoned the Croatian leadership: “I am very an-
gry. . . . Croatia is the key problem in our country when it comes to the frenzy 
of nationalism. It exists in all of the republics, but is now the worst in yours. . . . 
I expect from you . . . decisive action [against nationalism]. Anyone who can-
not decide to do this, for whatever reason, should resign their position,” he 
ranted.60 The crisis came to a head when Zagreb students under the leadership 
of Dražen Budiša occupied the university in November 1971 and called for a 
general strike. At the demonstrations, thousands of people yelled “Long live 
the independent state of Croatia!”
A highly enraged Tito ordered the Croatian leadership to Karadjordjevo in 
December 1971, where he made it absolutely clear that valid demands would 
indeed be discussed but that he would not tolerate any mobilization of nation-
alism to extort from him acceptance of these demands. He decided to strip 
the party leadership in Zagreb and Belgrade of power. The first people to be 
forced to resign were Savka Dabčević-Kučar and two other Croatian func-
tionaries. The Croatian party expelled 741 members, 511 lost their positions, 
and 189 people were arrested. The “Zagreb Eleven,” primarily members of 
the cultural institution Matica hrvatska, were tried in court, including Franjo 
Tudjman, who was charged with propagating Croatian independence, working 
to establish an illegal counterrevolutionary organization, and cooperating with 
fascist exile groups.
The second round of expulsions was directed against the liberal economic 
leadership in Belgrade, headed by Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović, be-
cause they had criticized the dominant role played by the Communist Party. 
They also backed calls for a greater degree of federalization in Yugoslavia as 
demanded by Croatia, which they believed would strengthen Serbia by ben-
efiting it economically. Their motto was “a modern Serbia” — by which they 
meant a strong state free from all Yugoslav ballast. The liberals in Belgrade 
were also forced to resign following Tito’s intervention.61 Last but not least, 
the “liberalistic” head of Slovenia’s government, Stane Kavčič, was forced 
to resign in 1972. Kavčič had been a protagonist for more Slovenian auton-
omy and a spokesperson in the previously mentioned “road affair.” Similar 
events occurred within the parties in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where people alleged to be nationalists were expelled from the 
party ranks.62
All this left the ideology of Yugoslavism quite tarnished by the early 
1970s. Not only was it suspected of disregarding the national interests of its 
peoples at the expense of an abstract supranational community or of cloaking 
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Serb hegemonic ambitions, but it was also being criticized in national-oriented 
circles in Serbia. The communist leadership made painstaking efforts to avert 
any suspicion of this type. Everyone should and had to identify themselves 
with a nation, nationality, or ethnic group, and whoever refused to do this ap-
peared shamefacedly in the 1971 national census in the very last category of 
“Yugoslav,” placed in quotation marks. More sovereignty was now transferred 
to the constituent entities, which revealed a new problem: the incongruence of 
ethnic and political boundaries. Only in Slovenia did they overlap for the most 
part. Otherwise pluralism hampered the simple equation of “nation = repub-
lic.” If people were to be given more latitude to express their national identity, 
then this also had to be true in the republics where they constituted a minority. 
This, in turn, programmed ethnic segregation within a multicultural society. 
Moreover, radical souls even questioned the territorial order. Mihailo Djurić, 
a philosophy professor and member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, was an adamant opponent of confederalization and criticized at a public 
event in March 1971 that the borders of socialist Serbia were “neither national 
nor historical.” If the reform process made it necessary to create one’s own 
nation state, then the fate of fellow countrymen in neighboring republics had 
to play a role as well, he argued.63 Djurić was sentenced to prison but was later 
permitted to return to the university.
15.
After the Boom Years  
(1971 to 1980)
In the 1970s, Yugoslavia entered an economic recession, as did all of Europe. 
The oil crisis triggered radical socioeconomic structural change throughout 
the Western world. Economic slumps and the competitive pressure from low-
wage countries brought not only the old European industrial system to its 
knees but also the societal model that had so definitively shaped the continent’s 
economy since the nineteenth century. Entire industrial sectors collapsed. 
Factory work, the leading harbinger of economic hope during the industrial 
era, gave way to the service sector. While the West lost its basic trust in per-
petual, unhampered industrial growth, Yugoslavia’s economy fell onto hard 
times. After the boom years, the socialist system faced its gravest problems 
of credibility.1
Turbulence in the Global Economy
Triggered by the 1973 oil crisis and the collapse of the international currency 
system, the global economy experienced serious turbulence that severely 
rocked traditional industrial sectors, such as mining and heavy industry, which 
were the foundation of the Yugoslav “economic miracle” and the raison d’être 
of the socialist system. While in the West the “third industrial revolution” 
heralded the transition to the information and service society, global struc-
tural change and the worldwide economic crisis put the planned economies of 
Eastern Europe under unrelenting pressure. In Yugoslavia, massive production 
losses and sales problems reduced the financial feasibility of importing con-
sumer goods. Amplified by bad planning, mismanagement, lack of investment, 
and technological gaps, the terms of trade worsened for Yugoslavia: imports 
became more expensive and the trade deficit grew. In the face of surging 
unemployment, it became increasingly difficult to fund the growing welfare 
expenditures.2 Also, consumerism had created expectations of continued eco-
nomic growth that, as now became clear, could not be satisfied indefinitely. 
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The downfall of the culture of plenty and pleasure resulted in the deep disap-
pointment and disillusionment of many. Hence, support for the system began 
to slip away.3 But no alternatives were immediately accessible to the relatively 
underdeveloped socialist country of Yugoslavia with its outmoded economic 
structure. Therefore, the demise of industrialism brought about an irreversible 
loss of legitimacy for the socialist regime.
As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavs attempted to compensate 
their loss of income with foreign loans. Since no one wanted take responsi-
bility for the economic slump, republics and provinces borrowed more and 
more money from abroad. Paradoxically, Yugoslavia experienced its all-time 
greatest surge of investment in this decade. Hundreds of new streets, hotels, 
sports arenas, and libraries sprang up, which caused the public to believe in 
the existence of a prosperity that did not at all correspond with the country’s 
economic performance. In this way, the republics led the state into a fatal debt 
trap. Between 1973 and 1981, the total sum of liabilities rose from $4.6 billion 
to $21 billion. In addition, between 1975 and 1981, the interest rates tripled, 
from 5.8 percent to 16.8 percent. Since the republics doggedly refused to cut 
back on expenditures, all the central government could do was to print ever 
more money.4 The Eastern bloc countries also attempted to stem the crisis 
with increasing foreign loans. As a result, the level of debt in the Eastern bloc 
states grew from $6 to $110 billion between 1970 and 1990.5
At the impressive rate of 8 percent, economic growth still remained 
high, while investments and mass consumption continued to expand and real 
incomes climbed to their highest levels. Between 1965 and 1975, beef con-
sumption rose from 6.2 to 14.7 kilograms per capita, while that of fish rose 
from 1.5 to 3 kilograms. Energy consumption increased more than threefold.6 
The warning signs of a serious crisis, such as increases in the trade deficit, 
inflation, the cost of living, and unemployment, were consistently ignored.7
The crisis intensified the tendencies toward societal disintegration in-
herent in the system, which had been allowing the republics and provinces to 
drift farther and farther apart since the 1970s. Whereas the state in Western 
industrial countries was taking on a greater role in governance, in Yugoslavia 
more economic responsibility was being shifted to the regions in the wake 
of decentralization, thus eroding the Yugoslav market and its infrastructure. 
From 1970 to 1980, the exchange of goods between the constituent republics 
dropped from 27.7 percent to 21.1 percent, and four-fifths of production ei-
ther remained in the place of origin or was shipped abroad. Railways, postal 
service, and foreign trade were divided de facto into eight subsystems that 
interacted less and less with one another.8 Wages and incomes also increas-
ingly diverged at a dramatic pace. The market mechanisms strengthened the 
competitive disadvantages of the less developed regions. By the mid-1970s, 
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the Slovene population was already seven times richer than the Kosovars. 
Despite the good intentions at the start, the government’s redistribution and 
structural policies were now facing a credibility crisis that endangered not 
only economic but also social and political cohesion.9
In the end, Yugoslavia, like all socialist states, was not sufficiently adapt-
able to master the global challenges of the secular transformation, namely, to 
understand the structural change evolving from the shift to an information and 
communication society or at least to tap into new technological niches. The 
consequences were drops in economic growth, unemployment, government 
debt, and hyperinflation — and a glaring loss of political legitimacy.10
Bonapartist Reactions
As the inner-Yugoslav disputes over politics and the economic problems in-
creased, Tito focused on cultivating international relations, as if to distract 
from the state of internal affairs. At the beginning of the 1970s, Yugoslavia’s 
international status was stronger than ever before. The government signed ad-
ditional agreements with the United States that ensured economic aid, exports, 
and investments, which complemented its bilateral trade relations with West 
European countries. Even the tense relations with Moscow since 1968 eased 
again, and in 1971 Leonid Brezhnev visited Belgrade. Tito sought neutral 
allies in advancing his proposal for a European security conference meant 
to lead to the recognition of the territorial status quo (meaning two German 
states) and eventually to the dissolution of the two political blocs dividing the 
continent. He was all too happy to assume the role of an impartial mediator 
between East and West in the early phase of détente. At the 1972 consulta-
tion meeting in Helsinki in preparation for the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Yugoslavia distinguished itself by making an 
innovative proposal to advance confidence-building measures between oppos-
ing militaries that set standards for the subsequent negotiation process. Tito 
excelled in his role as the European peacemaker and was even suggested as a 
possible nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Once the Helsinki Final 
Act was passed in 1975, he invited the conference participants to Belgrade for 
a follow-up meeting in 1977. At this point Yugoslavia also developed friendly 
relations with China.11
The demeanor of the Yugoslav leader on the international stage stood in 
strange contrast to his behavior at home. Following the shock of the “Croatian 
Spring,” Tito decided to grasp the reins of power tighter in his own hands and 
to allocate greater importance to centralism once again. A law passed in 1973 
stripped the media of some of its freedoms, and leading editors and cultural 
functionaries lost their jobs to people trusted to follow the regime’s policies. 
“The means of disseminating information, the press, radio, television, must 
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be in our hands and not in the hands of those who work against our unity,” 
declared Tito. “We were too hell-bent on democracy.”12 In 1975 a restrictive 
law was enacted that penalized hostile and counterrevolutionary activities, 
and by the mid-1970s roughly 4,000 political prisoners were behind bars in 
Yugoslavia. Only Albania and the Soviet Union imprisoned more people 
proportional to the size of the population.13 The regime resorted to political 
intimidation, monitored and locked up tens of thousands of people it found 
suspicious, while Marshal Tito continued to insist that “our revolution is not 
eating its children.”14 As it turned out, Tito’s system punished critics and 
nationalists but then adopted their main demands as its own. For example, 
the long-frowned-upon song “Our Beautiful Homeland” ascended to become 
the Croatian national anthem by way of a constitutional amendment in 1972.
In Serbia, artists and philosophers found themselves subjected to growing 
pressure from the regime. A series of “Black Wave” films were banned, as 
were books from Praxis philosophers, social critics, and writers like Dobrica 
Ćosić. Even the famous Korčula Summer School and the magazines Praxis 
and Filozofija were shut down. Professors from the University of Belgrade, 
such as Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić, and Dragoljub Mićunović, were 
suspended in 1975. Whereas most criticism of the system had been articulated 
within public institutions and structures up to that point, it was now voiced in 
the more open realm of civil society, as was occurring everywhere throughout 
Eastern Europe.
The “Basket 3” of the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 by the CSCE 
member countries, including Yugoslavia, guaranteed freedom of speech, 
which served as an irrefutable basis for the cause of the civil rights move-
ment. In petitions and open letters, the Yugoslav opposition protested against 
the occupational bans leveled against university faculty members. Following 
the example set in Poland and Czechoslovakia, so-called “flying universities” 
emerged in 1976. Critical intellectuals organized lectures and discussions in 
private dwellings and printed oppositional magazines like Časovnik (Clock) 
and Javnost (The public). Yet dissidence remained a rather peripheral phenom-
enon in Yugoslavia. Rock music illustrates how great the overall approval of 
the system was for most of the population. Djordje Balašević, a singer very 
popular throughout all of Yugoslavia, had a hit in 1978 titled “You Can Count 
on Us” (Računajte na nas). Speaking for his generation, Balašević swore his 
unconditional allegiance to Tito and his state. “In Yugoslavia’s relatively 
happy, consumerist, hedonist, megalomaniac ecstasy,” complained Dobrica 
Ćosić, “the public word was powerless.”15
The regime attempted to compensate for the lack of democratic liberties 
by further expanding self-management. The 1976 Law on Associated Labor 
helped advance decentralization. Free market competition was replaced with 
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the so-called negotiated economy. The self-managing councils in the fac-
tories, plants, and firms were to decide themselves about production levels 
and profits. New “Basic Organizations of Associated Labor” (OOUR) were 
established as the hub of the societal order. They were meant to help workers 
exercise more input, quite in keeping with Marxian “free producers.” Several 
OOURs banded together into “Complex Organizations” (SOUR). In addition, 
there emerged a complicated political system of delegates who, proceeding 
from the self-managing bodies, elected the district and provincial assemblies, 
which in turn elected the parliaments of the republics. In 1982, approximately 
71,000 delegations existed with a total of about 767,000 members.16
In practice, the reform did not lead to the foretold withering away of the 
state but to an even greater proliferation of bureaucracy. By the end of the 
1970s, 1.5 million new regulations had been adopted. The bureaucracy grew 
eight to eleven times the size of bureaucracies in countries of comparable 
size.17 This resulted in further systemic disintegration and institutional con-
fusion because a polycratic tangle of various self-management bodies evolved 
in nearly all institutions. For example, the Yugoslav postal and telephone com-
pany broke up into 291 basic organizations and the air traffic control authority 
into fifty-two. Countrywide, a total of 94,415 grassroots democratic entities 
of this type were operating in 1980.18
In the end, the idea proved illusory that the negotiated economy, 
self-management, and the frequent rotation of delegates could actually breathe 
more democratic life into the one-party state. The Yugoslav system repre-
sented merely a higher form of institutionalized ineffectiveness that placed 
political opportunism ahead of economic rationality, canceled the rules of a 
market economy and entrepreneurial professionalism, bloated the size of the 
bureaucracy, and invited irresponsibility, wastefulness, and abuse of office.
The Constitution of 1974
Another area that seemed to offer compensation for the democratic deficit 
was in the politics dealing with nations and nationalities. The reform process 
begun in 1967 in favor of greater decentralization culminated in the 1974 con-
stitution. A few core competencies remained centralized at the national level, 
such as the implementation and enforcement of federal law, the regulation 
of the economic order, and the defense of the country. Several confederative 
elements were added, such as the equal representation of the republics and 
their veto rights in federal bodies, and the collective head of state in the form 
of the nine-member presidency. Thus, Yugoslavia transformed itself into a 
“federation with several confederative characteristics.”19 The decentralization 
advocated by Kardelj had little to do with democratization, since state power 
was just transferred away from the federal level to the republics, without 
having created any real control mechanisms.
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Politically speaking, the greatest foreseeable point of contention in the 
constitutional reform was the status of Kosovo, for neither the Albanians nor 
the Serbs were satisfied with the way this issue had been settled. Prishtina 
resented that it had been denied the status of a republic. Although, for all 
practical purposes, being a republic would not have added significantly to 
the autonomy Kosovo already enjoyed, the decision left Albanians feeling 
degraded, both constitutionally and politically. What seemed too little to them 
was far too much to the Serbs. Belgrade was frustrated that Serbia was the only 
republic with a federal structure, like a miniature Yugoslavia. Its autonomous 
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo could vote on all key matters in Serbian 
politics, but they could forbid Belgrade from intervening to any degree in 
their affairs. For example, the provinces prevented the creation of a uniform 
economic development plan, the passage of a common defense law, and a 
centralized collection of statistical data in Serbia. In 1977, the Kosovars were 
enraged when it was discovered that the Serb leadership had listed the various 
problems in a “blue book.” An altercation was in the making until the wing 
of the party loyal to Tito intervened to rein in the adversaries. Tito decided 
simply to sweep the matter under the rug for the time being.20
The constitution of 1974 subjected politics at the national level to a com-
plicated negotiation process between the republics. Nearly every issue became 
automatically laden with national fervor. Federalism and proportional ethnic 
representation institutionalized competition and conflicts between peoples 
and republics, not between political and ideological ideas. This reinforced the 
trend toward affirming national affiliation over Yugoslav citizenship. In prac-
tice, the principle of equal representation in parliament meant that a delegate 
from Montenegro represented about 20,000 citizens, while one from Serbia 
represented 200,000 people. Because the communists had given priority to 
the management of diversity, meaning the equal standing of nations and na-
tionalities, they had neglected the main postulates of liberty and democracy. 
Tito’s Yugoslavia rested per definition on the consensus of its peoples and 
republics, meaning on collective, not individual, rights. With time, the elites 
of the republics showed an ever-stronger tendency to compensate the glaring 
democratic deficit with a “real-existing nationalism.”21
These same mechanisms to secure power were reproduced on a smaller 
scale in the republics themselves, with a striking lack of political participation 
and transparency. Once they were bestowed with more federal rights, the re-
publics and provinces possessed all of the insignias of statehood. This did not 
lead to democratic competition but to national polarization. Political careers 
were pursued nearly exclusively in the institutions and party organizations 
of each of the republics, where things were not run any more democratically 
than they were at the national level. Instead, the system encouraged ethnic 
pillarization. With the exception of the military, there were practically no 
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channels for advancement in an integral Yugoslav context and no institutions 
with a nationwide base of legitimacy. Opaque networks developed among re-
gional party leaders, bureaucracies, and major business firms. The communist 
“politocracy” created a polycentric system that was nearly unsurpassable in 
its inefficiency and lack of transparency.22
Science and culture illustrate the distance that had developed among the 
republics by the 1970s. Part of the doctrine of “brotherhood and unity” was to 
allow each people to cultivate its own culture of memory through such means 
as scientific research, school books, monuments, and publishing. This meant 
that the principle of federalism also dictated the political uses of history: each 
republic authored its own national narrative and created its own historical 
images, and no republic was allowed to interfere in the affairs of any other.23 
For this reason, the republics were free to devise school curricula on their own. 
This led to a situation in which pupils were taught little about Yugoslavia in 
their schools, but all the more about the history, literature, and geography of 
their nation and republic. In Macedonia, for example, middle school pupils 
spent twenty-one class hours learning about Macedonian literature and only 
five hours about the literature of the rest of the country. A person attending 
school in the 1970s learned very little about the other republics and peoples of 
Yugoslavia — an important step down the road to institutionalized alienation.24
Tito’s Charismatic Leadership
Although the 1974 constitution placed governmental power in the hands of a 
collective executive body, Tito’s epochal and almost unchallenged personal au-
thority still remained indispensable for the system. The constitution had made 
him president for life, thus putting him in a unique position in the hierarchy 
of power. The rotation principle that had been applied to leading positions in 
government thwarted all attempts of prospective successors to inherit the po-
litical throne of the aged autocrat during his lifetime. As the republics drifted 
farther and farther apart and all of the governance functions of the centralized 
state vanished in the vortex of the highly chaotic political system, Tito’s own 
power grew boundlessly.
Despite his eighty years, the Yugoslav head of state radiated amazing 
vitality and phenomenal self-confidence. He ingeniously mastered the art of 
symbolic communication that mattered so much to the man and woman on the 
street. A foreign observer once accurately described Tito’s political style as 
that of a communist king. His stockpile of honors, titles, and symbols of power 
included seventeen palaces, villas, and hunting lodges, a fleet of state-owned 
automobiles, yachts, and particularly the “Blue Train” in which he traveled 
all across the country. For the most part, Tito governed from the seclusion 
of his private quarters, surrounded by only a few advisers. Critics may have 
grumbled about his vanity, hedonism, and monarchial demeanor, but it did not 
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seem very advisable to express such objections openly in light of his immense 
popularity. “It’s far better to have a bon vivant type of dictator like Tito than 
an ascetic type like Stalin,” noted a historian. “Our man enjoys the good life 
and understands that we want to live better as well.”25 An elderly lady from 
Sarajevo said: “Honestly, the people have never had it so good. He lets them 
live and enjoy life.”26
Tito appeared in public sometimes as the beloved father of the nation, 
sometimes as the mentor of the common folk in their struggle with the bu-
reaucracy. Every year he received thousands of letters: “Dear Comrade Tito: 
We . . . employees of Zvezda supermarket no. 8 in Kisać, love you and respect 
you so much we cannot describe.” The villagers of Uzdolje, Knin, Croatia 
wrote: “May God bless you and care for you for the benefit of all of us, our 
dear comrade Tito.”27 Dobrica Ćosić, who scorned Tito as the “greatest enemy 
in this century of my [Serb] people,” noted in his diary his disappointment 
over the fact that the country’s youth in particular were so incredibly fond of 
the president. “I am almost completely alone with my anti-Titoist feelings. . . . 
I feel so lonely, completely isolated.”28
From Tito’s popularity radiated the nimbus of greater democratic consent. 
He was able to silence special national interests when he pointed out the threat 
to the common good. One example was the conflict, mentioned above, be-
tween Serbs and Kosovars over their respective criticism of the constitution of 
1974. At Tito’s request, they simply swept their differences under the rug. Tito 
glossed over the fact that this was not a solution to the problem by presenting 
himself as the fair-minded mediator of conflicting interests. He was always 
exceedingly careful to maintain ethnic symmetries when he intervened, so that 
his verdicts would not spawn any nationalist myths of victimization. When, 
in 1971/1972, he dismissed first the Croatian and then the Serbian leadership 
from office, he did this without any public humiliation. Above all else, his 
personal image was not to be damaged by his actions.29
Everyone knew that many decisions would have ended differently in the 
1970s without Tito, even long before the Five-Year Plan for 1976 to 1980 was 
passed by the respective governing body solely because Tito commanded it 
to happen. Yet looking at the situation the other way around, the autocratic 
system of unbridled authority continued to function without a hitch. As the 
Croatian politician Savka Dabčević-Kučar remembered: “Even when a res-
olution was finally more or less ready to be voted upon following arduous 
deliberations in the elected bodies of representation and then Tito suddenly 
appeared with a fully new and contrasting proposal, his was adopted without 
objection.”30
Anyone looking closely at the situation, however, could see how much 
things were already stirred up behind the scenes. Many were feeling restless. 
Leaders of the republics wanted even more power. The postwar generation 
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found it intolerable that anything could justify permanently excluding people 
with different opinions from political participation. Serbs and Albanians in 
particular, who rejected the constitution, waited impatiently for the moment 
when the last guarantor of the status quo stepped down, because the system 
would remain superficially intact only as long as Tito used his uncontested 
authority to ensure a fairly tolerable balance of interests.
In retrospect, the 1970s proved to be the profound turning point in which 
the tracks were laid for the collapse of the system in 1989/1990. The end of in-
dustrial modernity worldwide undermined the pillars supporting Yugoslavia’s 
postwar economic boom. The transition to a postindustrial society nullified 
the central paradigms of socialism: industrial progress and social justice. The 
system offered solutions to problems that no longer existed — its ideology had 
literally outlived itself in the poorly developed countries of Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, détente brought about a new international context. As outside 
pressure diminished, political-ideological solidarity dwindled and even the 
cohesion of the nonaligned bloc dissipated. All in all, the later loss of legiti-
macy for Tito’s societal model was now predestined, even if this was not yet 
fully evident. Progress was proving to be no longer plannable; the credo of 
socialism was turning into an illusion. With courage born of despair and a 
great deal of ignorance, the Yugoslav system stuck doggedly to its now un-
realistic promise of prosperity. It financed an overextended public sector on 
credit, refused to undergo fundamental reform, and thus acted as the guarantor 
of outdated industrial structures.
PART V




The Crisis of Socialist 
Modernity (1980 to 1989)
On the afternoon of 4 May 1980, in Split, the soccer game between two na-
tional league teams, the Croat Hajduk Split and the Serb Red Star (Crvena 
Zvezda) Belgrade, was interrupted early in the second half for an important 
announcement. The crowd learned from the stadium loudspeakers that Josip 
Broz Tito had died in Ljubljana after a long illness, shortly before his eighty-
eighth birthday.
Yugoslavia froze in its tracks. The country was fully unprepared for his 
death; many were deeply distraught. “I remember this day very well,” recalled 
the journalist Gordana. “People were running in all directions. . . . Some were 
crying. . . . It seemed to me that it was as if they had to go and look after their 
firm or office because the father was dead.”1 What was going to happen now 
that Tito was no longer there?
Tens of thousands gathered to say farewell when the famous Blue Train 
transported the coffin to Belgrade. The square in front of the central train 
station in Zagreb was “so packed with people that you could literally feel the 
breath of the people behind you on your neck. . . . Shock, sadness, and weariness 
about the unknown future were on people’s faces.”2 Spontaneously the crowd 
sung a traditional, moving, and melancholic tune, a ballad from Tito’s home-
land Zagorje that was well loved throughout Croatia: “Fala!” — Thank you!
Meanwhile, preparations were underway in Belgrade for the official state 
funeral. The attendance broke all existing records: 209 delegations from 128 
countries, including four kings, six princes, 31 presidents, 22 prime ministers, 
and 47 foreign ministers, paid their respects to the Yugoslav president. Never 
before had the multiethnic state received so much international recognition 
and attention.3
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Crisis
After Tito’s death, things got bad quickly. Before the year was out, the socialist 
state of Yugoslavia had already slid into the most serious economic, political, 
and social-psychological crisis of its existence. In the wake of the second oil 
crisis and the global recession that followed it, production and productivity 
began to fall in 1979. All of Europe struggled with economic problems, but no-
where were the problems as devastating as in the socialist countries. Like the 
entire Eastern bloc, Yugoslavia’s prosperity had been supported by the mas-
sive expansion of heavy industry in the early decades of the postwar era. The 
chase to catch up industrially had made growth and modernization possible, 
but it had also produced structures that had become outdated in the capital-
istic global economy. At this point, the degree of flexibility was the decisive 
factor in mastering new challenges, such as a switch to highly specialized 
sectors like electronics or telecommunications.4 Yugoslavia’s production was 
underfinanced and technically outdated. The bureaucratically cumbersome 
and privileged-based “negotiated economy” did not prove adaptable to the 
new global environment. Take the example of Zastava, once a very success-
ful car manufacturer that had produced the legendary fićo. The story of its 
attempt to introduce the small car Yugo 45 to the American market speaks 
volumes — quality, service, and marketing were simply not competitive. In 
1989 only eighteen cars were sold in the United States.5
Because demand for Yugoslav products shrank, the country’s foreign 
trade balance slipped into the red. Like Poland and Hungary, Yugoslavia was 
also forced to parry the blow of decreasing revenue and foreign credit with a 
strict austerity course. Less expenditure caused investment, income, demand, 
and turnover to plummet. In 1983, Yugoslavia experienced negative growth.6 
At the same time, inflation rose at an annual rate of 45 percent, even 100 per-
cent starting in 1985. That same year, people’s real income was only worth half 
of what it had been in 1980, so that the standard of living fell significantly.7 
Social problems followed on the heels of the economic ones. “The inflation . . . 
doesn’t care a whit about the official prognoses,” wrote Borba at the end of 
1985. “The majority have emptied their pockets, milked their household sav-
ings dry, put themselves on a diet . . . banned trips to the movies.”8
The exorbitant reliance on credit in earlier years now took its toll. The 
state had taken on 85 percent of its liabilities between 1976 and 1981 and 
thereby amassed debts amounting to $21 billion. The huge jump in interest 
rates on the international finance markets drained the country’s foreign cur-
rency reserves. In 1982 alone, the government had to come up with $1.8 billion 
just to service its debts.9 Budget deficits grew larger and larger, making it 
impossible to hide the fact that the borrowed funds had been squandered on 
major political projects, often with no consideration of efficiency. Gigantic 
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sums had simply vanished in the system: in 1988, only eight of the $19 billion 
in loans could be linked to a specific borrower.10
As the economy shrank, the ranks of the unemployed swelled and ex-
ceeded the million-person mark in 1984. The younger generation was hit 
particularly hard. Over 60 percent of jobseekers were under the age of 24, 
and 74 percent of them were female.11 Since the 1970s, it had become difficult 
to work abroad as a guest worker, so people from the poorer regions of the 
country now migrated to the more developed ones, especially to Slovenia 
and central Serbia. As incomes dropped, social unrest and strikes escalated. 
In January 1983, supply shortages sparked violent looting in Titograd and 
led, in 1987, to a widely publicized labor conflict in the Croatian town of 
Labin. A year later, in 1988, around four million people participated in na-
tionwide mass public protests; even physicians, teachers, and journalists went 
on strike.12
Faced with this dramatic economic situation, the republics developed 
fundamentally different ideas about the types of reform needed. Implementing 
more restrictive monetary, finance, and foreign trade policies, which the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded if it were to approve more loans 
to the country, meant handing back greater control to the central government 
over the expenditures and revenue of the republics and establishing a more 
unified and centralized economic policy. During the phase of decentralization 
in the 1970s, the governments and banks of the republics and provinces had 
amassed considerable competencies that now thwarted attempts at macro-
economic stabilization. The wealthier republics feared that federal regulation 
would be to their disadvantage; they argued instead that it was not the frag-
mentation of the domestic market that was responsible for the economic crisis 
but a misguided investment policy, the waste of funds through aid and sub-
sidies to the poorer republics, and the exorbitance of these same republics. 
Not only did they want to pay less into the federal development fund, they 
now wanted even more authority in order to protect their industries from the 
pressure of competition. In 1985 alone, they blocked the passage of three laws 
designed to regulate exports.13
The economic crisis also intensified the conflicts over redistribution be-
tween the wealthier and the poorer republics. Because Slovenia and Croatia 
refused to contribute about 10 percent of their investment revenue to the de-
velopment fund, the flow of capital and investments to the receiver republics 
diminished, which widened the gap even further between rich and poor. At 
222.9 points, the index value of Slovenia in 1989 ranked far ahead of the 
Yugoslav average (= 100), followed by Croatia with 128.4 points. At the other 
end of the scale, Bosnia-Herzegovina garnered only 66.3 and Kosovo just 
26.1 points, meaning that the Slovenians were nearly nine times richer than 
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the Albanians.14 Another crass difference existed even within Serbia. Since 
the Second World War, the level of prosperity had not improved in any other 
Yugoslav entity as greatly as it had in Vojvodina (about 29 percent) and had 
not worsened as drastically as in Kosovo (about 19 percent).15
Following Yugoslavia’s successful phase of catching up with the West 
in the initial decades of the postwar period, the economic crisis in the 1980s 
pushed the country back down to a level below that of 1970.16 In 1984, the 
annual per-capita income in Yugoslavia was $1,850. Poland and Hungary had 
similar averages, while the Soviet Union recorded an average of $4,300 and 
East Germany of $5,400.17 This was a hard blow to the Yugoslavs, both ma-
terially and psychologically.
While official statements at first assured people that the country was only 
undergoing a temporary setback in economic growth, by early 1983 even party 
functionaries were no longer mincing their words: the crisis was frighten-
ing, threatening, and bottomless. Party chairman Mitja Ribičič warned about 
“Polish conditions,” and Jure Bilić, a member of the presidency, declared that 
many principles and programs of this united Yugoslavia were based “on illu-
sions and sometimes even on fantasy.”18 It took quite a while until authorities 
finally admitted the full extent of the depression and, in 1983, launched a 
program aimed at stabilizing the economy. For experts the program offered 
too little and came far too late.
After Tito: Tito!
Many people in Yugoslavia believed that Tito’s greatest mistake — besides 
dying — was that he had not groomed a designated political heir. However, 
there is little evidence that another charismatic leader would have been able 
to perpetuate Tito’s model of governance. Yugoslav society had since become 
far too diversified and divided. Many sides were pushing for more pluralism 
and a system in which competing opinions and interests could be openly 
articulated and settled: intellectuals, bourgeois middle classes, civil society 
groups, and the media constituted the critical public that demanded more 
freedom of opinion, democracy, and civil rights. Journalists working at more 
than 3,000 newspapers and magazines and more than 200 radio and television 
broadcasting companies made it clear that they no longer wanted to simply 
parrot party positions. In 1982 and 1983 there were still several cases of 
censorship, and the editors of Danas and Politika were forced to resign their 
posts.19 Yet the difference was that the number of publicly critical voices had 
become very large, so large, in fact, that in 1983 the ideology commission of 
Croatia’s Communist Party abandoned its efforts to document comprehen-
sively in its White Book the flood of articles, podium discussions, dramas, 
poems, novels, films, and critiques that denigrated the achievements of the 
revolution, socialist values, and even Tito himself.20 The political leadership 
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in the republics also did not see the purpose of encouraging the emergence of 
a strong new integrative figure on the national level. The weaker the central 
government was, the more leeway the federal entities enjoyed to pursue their 
own interests.
The regime clung to the hope, against all odds, that Tito’s integrative in-
fluence would continue after his death. Undeterred, the traditional relay race 
was held on his birthday, posters and T-shirts were printed, and huge, highly 
visible slogans were posted across the Yugoslav landscape. But the motto of 
“After Tito: Tito” sounded more like whistling in the dark than a defiant and 
determined assertion. It would take a wave of political trials and a new media 
law to lock the ideological coordinates once again.
In 1981, a group of Croat “nationalists” stood trial, including Franjo 
Tudjman. Tudjman was sentenced to two years imprisonment for propagating 
abroad that the Croat people were being discriminated and exploited. Among 
other things, he had told an émigré newspaper in 1977 that the number of 
victims who died in the Jasenovac concentration camp had been greatly ex-
aggerated “for the sole purpose of creating some kind of collective and eternal 
guilt of the Croat people.”21 In Kosovo, Adem Demaqi, editor of Rilindja and a 
cofounder of the Revolutionary Movement for a United Albania, was charged 
along with other Albanian activists, including the prominent communist Azem 
Vllasi.22 In Sarajevo, a trial was held in 1983 of Alija Izetbegović and twelve 
others on the charge of Islamism. They were accused of spreading propaganda 
in favor of a pan-Islamic state and of maintaining contact with the Iranian 
ayatollah’s regime. The court found that the demands for the introduction of 
the sharia, the veiling of women, and the ban on mixed marriages represented 
attacks on the principle of “brotherhood and unity.” The accused were sen-
tenced to years of imprisonment.23
What actually sparked the fight for more democratic rights was an oper-
ation by Belgrade police. In 1984, they stormed a private dwelling in which 
the Flying University had gathered to hear a lecture by the dissident Milovan 
Djilas. Six of the professors attending were arrested and brought to trial. 
However, the sharp-tongued defendants succeeded in transforming the trial 
into a tribunal against the repression of freedom of speech and to sway public 
opinion against the regime.24 In a very similar way, the public was also mobi-
lized by the conviction of Vojislav Šešelj, Bosnian-Serb sociologist, to eight 
years in prison for his article “What Is to Be Done?” In this article, he called 
for the restructuring of Yugoslavia into only four republics: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Serbia, and Macedonia. In his opinion, there was no justification for the exis-
tence of the autonomous provinces and the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Montenegro.25
Although most of these sentences were significantly mitigated later, the 
political trials electrified the public and ignited a widespread mobilization 
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of the (at first primarily Serbian) intelligentsia for more democratic rights. 
A group led by Dobrica Ćosić formed the Committee for the Defense of 
Freedom of Thought and Expression in 1984, which drew up a “Proposal for 
the Establishment of Rule of Law” two years later. This proposal called for 
free elections, a free press, an independent judiciary, and the abolition of the 
one-party system. The committee also wrote a petition demanding the release 
of the Bosnian “Islamists.”26
So, as it turned out, the political trials did not even come close to having 
the impact desired by authorities. Instead of intimidating dissidents and indoc-
trinating the public, they only underscored the legitimacy of demanding more 
civil rights. Nationalistic émigré associations located in the United States, 
Canada, Argentina, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland intensified their pro-
paganda activities. Examples were the Croatian National Committee (Hrvatski 
narodni odbor), the terrorist group Otpor (Resistance), and the émigré maga-
zine associated with it, Nova Hrvatska (New Croatia). Macedonian, Albanian, 
Slovenian, and Montenegrin separatists were also active.27 By conducting 
these political trials, the regime inadvertently upgraded the status of these 
nationalists and other radical souls, turning them into champions for freedom 
of opinion and democracy. Politically, these groups profited considerably from 
this at the end of the decade.
The economic crisis was also accompanied by a serious political cri-
sis of legitimacy. It even threatened the heart of Titoism, namely, socialist 
self-management. This very characteristic element of Yugoslav socialism had 
originally been introduced by Edvard Kardelj, who died in 1979, a year before 
Tito. The early success of socialism had been built on the postulate of indus-
trial progress and social justice. However, the global crisis of industrialism 
and the transition to postindustrial society robbed socialism of its legitimacy 
and ideals. With unapologetic ruthlessness, scientists, entrepreneurs, jour-
nalists, and critical intellectuals began to deconstruct this key political myth. 
The crisis was addressed in the media and at countless public events held 
at universities, student associations, and institutes, where party function-
aries, managers, and prominent political figures came under fire for their 
incompetence and extravagance. The problems of nepotism, profiteering, and 
corruption were also highlighted.28 It now came to light that the system had 
brought about a “total bureaucratization of a socialist society” and produced 
new forms of alienation instead of leading to the withering away of the state.29 
Researchers proved that workers’ self-management was no more democratic 
than state socialism or capitalism: employees turned out to be quite poorly 
informed; very few were familiar with terms like inflation, budget, amortiza-
tion, and profitability; and only a minority had even a rudimentary knowledge 
about their own firms.30 Real power lay in the hands of a self-aggrandizing 
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political caste of functionaries, factory directors, managers, and experts, who 
used the workers’ collective only as a quasi-democratic guise for technocratic 
decision making. Eighty-six percent of all decisions in a firm were based on 
proposals put forth by its management.31
It was thought that economic decline was not the cause but the result 
of a far greater crisis in the social and political system.32 The League of 
Communists was accused of being the core of the problem since its eight 
provincial organizations had not been able to define and implement com-
mon policy in years. In 1983, the national parliament only passed eight of 
twenty-five important laws, while decisions on the rest were postponed for an 
indefinite period due to a lack of consensus. Federal decrees, where they ex-
isted, were simply ignored by the republics and provinces.33 Furthermore, the 
party had long given more priority to the interests of civil servants, managers, 
and professionals — who, with time, had come to comprise a high percentage 
of its membership — over the interests of workers and peasants. The League 
of Communists insisted on exerting its influence in state institutions and so-
cietal organizations as a sort of centralized counterweight to the republics. 
The circle of those who occupied key political functions was relatively small, 
but these people thus had even more influence and remained at their posts all 
the longer. The party had established oligarchic power structures, which en-
abled decisions to be made in informal ways instead of going through official 
institutional processes. The state and the party were closely, far too closely, 
intertwined, which is why many believed it would be impossible to undertake 
structural reform.34 Against this backdrop emerged a very serious problem of 
credibility: in 1986, surveys showed that 88 percent of young Slovenes and 
70 percent of young Croats did not wish to become members of the Communist 
Party. In Serbia the figure was 40 percent.35
In this charged atmosphere, an intense and amazingly frank public debate 
ensued about domestic reforms. It centered on three controversial questions: 
whether to have communist one-party rule or pluralist democracy, more or 
less centralism in the constitution, and a liberal market economy or socialist 
self-management. Wasn’t it evident, as the Zagreb professor Jovan Mirić stated 
in Borba in 1984, that the excessive federalization of the 1974 constitution 
was responsible for the fragmentation of the domestic market, for a grid-
locked system, and for reform coming to a standstill? Or was the opposite 
true, that perhaps the demands from Belgrade for an even greater centralized 
authority were the actual cause of all problems? In October 1984, Serbia pre-
sented proposals for reform that were to strengthen the federal government 
and curtail the veto rights of the autonomous provinces. Leaders in Kosovo, 
Vojvodina, Croatia, and Slovenia were incensed. The Slovenian central com-
mittee made it known immediately that any attempt to change the status quo 
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of the constitution would represent a serious threat to Yugoslav unity. This 
killed any further debate on long overdue reform.36
“Kosova Republika!”
One year after Tito’s death, violent demonstrations took place in all of Kosovo’s 
larger cities. For Albanians, it seemed as if the time had finally come to fulfill 
their desire for full equality. Political frustrations and the lack of occupational 
prospects conjoined to feed the fires of discontent that first ignited at the 
University of Prishtina and soon spread across the entire province. Rallying 
around the slogan of “Kosova Republika!” demonstrators demanded the found-
ing of an independent republic for all Albanians living in Yugoslavia, meaning 
those of Kosovo, West Macedonia, and Southern Serbia — not excluding the 
possibility of a later unification with Albania, as one of their leaders at the 
time, Bardhyl Mahmuti, explained. The radical-nationalist diaspora incited 
unrest to a dangerous degree, with the support of Enver Hoxha’s secret po-
lice.37 The cause was widely supported because the constitution of 1974 had 
guaranteed the province extensive autonomy and representation in all insti-
tutions, including the federal presidency, but had not raised its status to that 
of a republic of equal standing. Even more disconcerting was that the Serb 
leadership was contemplating at the time whether to abolish Kosovo’s existing 
autonomous rights.38
Nine people died in the unrest, more than 200 were injured, and the Serb 
patriarchate in Peć went up in flames. The party leadership condemned the 
irredentist-nationalist uprisings because they supported the idea of founding 
a Greater Albanian state. Following the unrest, the League of Communists 
and Kosovo’s educational system were purged, and martial law was imposed 
for a while. More than 1,600 men and women stood trial, 585 of whom were 
convicted. The League of Communists expelled over 1,000 members, many 
of whom then emigrated.39
The uprising revealed the deeper dimensions of a problem that neither 
communism nor federalism could have solved. In the forty years since the 
end of the Second World War, no region had made such great strides in its 
development as Kosovo and still remained so far behind all others. The federal 
government had invested billions in the impoverished province — far too much 
from the standpoint of the donors, far too little from the standpoint of the 
recipients. In any case, Kosovo had undergone a dynamic development since 
1945. The share of the farming population fell from 80 percent to 36 percent, 
and the situation in the education and health systems improved substantially. 
Nevertheless, the province continued to fall further behind. In 1947, the level 
of prosperity in Kosovo equaled 52 percent of the Yugoslav average; in 1980 
it only reached 28 percent.40 Social indicators also revealed discrepancies. The 
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illiteracy rate of people over the age of 10 was less than 1 percent in Slovenia 
but more than 17 percent in Kosovo.41 Kosovo became the code word for the 
failure of Yugoslavia’s policy of cohesion.
Another contributing factor for the backwardness stemmed from the high 
rate of demographic growth among Albanians, which lay at 2.5 percent an-
nually (compared to the Yugoslav average of 0.7 percent). On average, every 
Albanian woman bore seven children, causing Kosovo’s population to double 
in twenty years. Thousands of people did not have adequate employment, 
and the unemployment rate was more than three times as high as it was in 
Yugoslavia as a whole.42
Shocked by the riots, the Yugoslav government came up with a new plan 
to invest another $2.5 billion into the development of the southern province 
by 1985. Actually, the Kosovars had no reason to complain. In the 1970s more 
than 30 percent of the financial resources from the Yugoslav development 
fund flowed into their province; it the 1980s this figure was up to 42 percent. 
However, the relative backwardness and the immense problems caused by 
economic cycles intensified the feeling among Albanians that they were being 
treated unjustly and placed at a disadvantage.43
While the Kosovars believed that the status of a republic would finally 
free them from what they thought of as colonization and would increase their 
prosperity, local Serbs complained of discrimination and assaults. By then, 
Albanians constituted a clear majority of the population in the southern prov-
ince. Between 1948 and 1991 their share rose from 68 percent to 81 percent, 
whereas that of the Serbs fell from 14 percent to 10 percent.44 A third of the 
Serbs and Montenegrins left the region after the Second World War, a total 
of about 131,000 people. A real thrust in migration followed the 1981 unrest. 
Many non-Albanians saw no future for themselves in the province, and a “run 
for your lives” atmosphere grew. “You take your child to school, and she comes 
back saying that the teacher left Kosovo forever during the night. You go to 
the doctor and his cleaning woman tells you that the doctor moved to Serbia 
yesterday,” explained one Serb woman. “Do you know what it means when 
all around you is collapsing?”45 Every fourth Serb migrant cited economic 
motives for fleeing, while all the others feared insecurity, discrimination, or 
even physical assaults.46
Real problems, vague and diffuse fears, and other emotional factors in-
flamed national passions and phobias on both sides in what were almost perfect 
mirror images of each other. Even though it is true that the province repre-
sented a rather abstract entity to most Serbs, many others still felt a strong 
emotional tie to their “Serb Jerusalem,” the place that was home not only to the 
Orthodox patriarchate in Peć but also to the most important Serb churches and 
monasteries. Because of the myth-enshrouded Battle of Kosovo, this region 
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was and is a type of national shrine and “a question of the spiritual, cultural, 
and historical identity of the Serb people,” as was stated in an appeal issued 
by twenty-one priests in April 1982.47
In the early 1980s, Serbs began to see Kosovo as a metaphor for every-
thing going wrong in the country, given the all-encompassing crisis facing 
them. In 1985, Dimitrije Bogdanović, a historian of Serbian medieval litera-
ture, published a work titled The Book on Kosovo, with which he provoked an 
emotional controversy by arguing that the Albanians had been intentionally 
ousting the Serb population out of Kosovo since 1912/1913. Although the 
Serbian Communist Party condemned the book as destructive and national-
istic, emotions got heated.
Kosovo became a public obsession through the case of Djordje Martinović, 
a farmer from Gnjilane, who showed up at a hospital severally injured on 
1 May 1985. The brutally primitive and sexual mistreatment of this victim, 
which was drastically embellished with each retelling, became a metaphor 
for Serb suffering in Kosovo. One event then followed another. In September, 
Kosovo-Serb politicians submitted a petition with 60,000 signatures support-
ing the abolishment of the province’s autonomy and the removal of Albanian 
symbols of nationalism, such as flags and national coats of arms, from public 
life. In January 1986, 200 Belgrade intellectuals, artists, writers, church rep-
resentatives, academy members, and professors sent a petition to politicians 
and the media demanding that the rule of law be reestablished in Kosovo. 
Suddenly consensus prevailed across all political camps, including several 
people who would be critics of Serb nationalism in the 1990s. The earlier 
struggle for freedom of speech and civil rights now took on a clear nationalist 
tinge. Kosovo came to symbolize the collective discrimination, humilia-
tion, and victimization of Serbs by the Yugoslav state in general and by the 
Albanians in particular.48
“No one may beat you!”
While Serbia’s political class was inching its way to the conviction that noth-
ing could be expected out of Kosovo except trouble, the 44-year-old Belgrade 
party functionary Slobodan Milošević discovered that this was the topic that 
could further his own political career. During a trip to the southern province in 
April 1987, outraged Serbs told him that they had been beaten by police during 
a demonstration. His response — “No one may beat you!” — became the rally-
ing cry with which Milošević promoted himself from then on as the man to 
rescue the nation from the supposedly indifferent leadership of the older party 
establishment. Milošević, who had been the former director of Beogradska 
Banka, one of Yugoslavia’s largest banks, now enjoyed a meteoric political 
career. In 1987 he became party chairman, in 1989 the president of Serbia.
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Milošević presented himself as someone on whom both nationalists and 
communists alike could pin their hopes. He cultivated Serb national interests, 
opposed changes to the political system, and rejected multiparty democracy, 
while at the same time proposing liberal economic reforms. In his opinion, 
the key to overcoming the crisis lay in a unified, integrated, and liberalized 
Yugoslav market that would replace the autarkically operating mini-economies 
of each republic, a system in which each one could paralyze all the others. 
Therefore, he propagated the recentralization of Yugoslavia, starting with 
the abolition of the autonomous provinces within Serbia. With the help of 
mass demonstrations, he launched an “antibureaucratic revolution” against 
the caste of functionaries, the foteljaši, by which he was able to put his own 
coterie into place.49 In a surprising coup in October 1988, he stripped power 
away from the leadership of Vojvodina and installed those who supported 
his political line. What drove him was actually not nationalism as such, but 
his cold-blooded instinct for power. Many Serbs were enthusiastic about this 
dynamic politician, who not only offered practical solutions to problems but 
also soothed the battered Serb soul. Blessed with considerable political talent, 
Milošević was above all the typical product of a system on the verge of col-
lapse, a system that propelled a technocratic mover and shaker with the right 
instincts for the zeitgeist to the top. The consequences of his rise to power 
were so momentous because he mobilized and radicalized nationalistic moods, 
projected longings for a strong leader onto himself, and thereby neutralized 
democratic alternatives. More importantly, with his proposals for restructur-
ing the federation, Milošević bulldozed Serb interests over those of all others 
and gave the debate about the constitution a new quality, which other parts of 
the country perceived as threatening.50
The matter that overrode all else for the Serbs was that theirs was the only 
republic that was not completely sovereign since, for all practical purposes, 
it was a tripartite entity. The constitution of 1974 enabled the autonomous 
provinces within Serbia to block Serbian policies with their veto, but Belgrade 
was not allowed to interfere in their internal affairs. The Serbian leadership 
complained that their colleagues in Prishtina hindered almost every decision. 
Therefore, Belgrade was extremely interested in changing the legal framework 
and in centralizing all of Yugoslavia to a greater degree.
Among intellectuals, discontent was brewing. In September 1986, the 
widely read newspaper Večernje novosti (Evening news) published excerpts 
from a secret “memorandum” written by the Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts (SANU). Among its authors were such renowned intellectuals as the 
writer Antonije Isaković, the historian Vasilije Krestić, the economist Kosta 
Mihajlović, and the philosopher Mihajlo Marković. Dobrica Ćosić had only 
indirectly “inspired” the text. The memorandum caused a storm of indignation 
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within Serbia’s Communist Party and the broader Yugoslav public. In dramatic 
words, it conjured up long-familiar nationalistic scenarios of various threats 
to Serbia and propagated its main paradigm, the self-stylization of Serbs as 
a victimized nation.
One thread of argument running through the fifty-page memorandum was 
that the crisis at hand put Serbia and the Serbs in a precarious situation. It plau-
sibly described the economic setbacks, political disadvantages, and cultural 
humiliation resulting from a thirty-year history of exploitation and discrim-
ination. In Kosovo, the Serb nation had been experiencing “open and total 
warfare” since 1981 and “physical, political, legal, [and] cultural genocide.” 
Two new ideas were introduced: first, the Serbs in Croatia had been exposed 
to a clever and very effective policy of assimilation, which was hollowing out 
the unity of the nation. Second, a Slovenian-Croatian conspiracy for power, 
personified by the Croat Tito and the Slovene Kardelj, was responsible for all 
of this. In conclusion, the text called for the “full national and cultural integrity 
of the Serb people, regardless which republic or province they live in.” This 
implied that national — Serb — unity had to be restored.51
While Serbian president Ivan Stambolić called for personnel changes as a 
consequence of this obituary for Yugoslavia and the media leveled a barrage 
of accusations against the academy, the authors protested the “illegal removal 
and publication” of an unfinished and unauthorized text that was obviously 
addressed to the Serbian government.52 Contrary to what was reported later, 
the memorandum did not contain any specific plans for “ethnic cleansing,” let 
alone a finished and implementable war plan. The importance of this document 
lies in the dramatic depiction of the disadvantages and threats and the lament 
over the betrayal, conspiracy, and losses that Serbs had suffered, presented 
in emotionally stirring imagery. In a concise presentation, the text included 
all of the emotive, provocative, and controversial issues that the new Serb 
nationalism drew upon. To no small degree, the discourse mirrored the mood 
of nationalist intellectuals, who were sinking ever deeper into self-pity. The 
theories on victimization and conspiracy, presented always in the collective 
singular (“the Serb people”), showed the willful and intentional loss of any 
sort of capacity for empathy. They were implicitly antidemocratic and explic-
itly anti-Yugoslav.
A similar Slovenian document was published just a few months later in 
January 1987 as a special issue of the opposition literary journal Nova re-
vija (New magazine). The tenor of the publication was also directed against 
the Yugoslav state using similar nationalistic stylistic devices. It presented 
what it called “Contributions to the Slovenian National Program” drafted 
two years earlier, in 1985. Unlike the Serbian memorandum, this publica-
tion was expressly addressed to the public. It argued that the Slovene people 
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were threatened with extinction, its language was being repressed, its econ-
omy exploited. The republic was being handicapped, overrun by immigrants, 
and militarily “castrated.” 53 One of the contributing authors maintained that 
Yugoslavia was pushing Slovenia toward “national catastrophe” and “national 
erosion.” If the nation did not forcefully defend itself, then it was doomed.54
At this point, neither the leadership in Ljubljana nor the leadership in 
Belgrade adopted the standpoints of these nationalist intellectuals. Slobodan 
Milošević even started an “ideological offensive” against SANU and the 
Serbian writers’ guild.55 However, by then the seeds for national solidarity 
movements had been sown.
From Alienation to Disintegration
Throughout the 1980s, the republics continued to drift further apart at an 
ever-accelerating pace. They cut themselves almost completely off from one 
another, politically, culturally, and economically. In doing so, people’s lives 
and perceptions became estranged from one another, and their understanding 
of the realities and experiences of other peoples dwindled. Topics like identity, 
sovereignty, and national interests increasingly dominated public discourse.
There was a great outcry in 1983 when the central government proposed a 
compulsory core curriculum for the schools in all republics. The purpose had 
been to create a common base of knowledge and to facilitate the transfer from 
one school system to another should a pupil move to a different republic. The 
Slovenes found it thoroughly unacceptable that half of the lessons in the disci-
plines of language and literature be dedicated to Yugoslav topics and the other 
half to topics dealing strictly with their national culture. Writers in particular 
were quite outspoken against what they saw as an insubordinate interference 
in Slovenian cultural sovereignty.56 In the mid-1980s, when concerned histo-
rians commissioned a review of history books used throughout Yugoslavia, 
a surprising fact came to light: the curriculums of the six republics and two 
autonomous provinces shared no more than a minimum of common learning 
content. Topping the list of the nineteenth-century historical figures mentioned 
most often in all the curriculums was one man: Napoleon Bonaparte.57
Politically, the relations between the republics had become quite belea-
guered. A notorious example for the rocky basis of trust was the 1987 affair 
involving the food company Agrokomerc from the western Bosnian town 
of Velika Kladuša. The company’s director, Fikret Abdić, had accumulated 
a huge amount of capital by issuing promissory notes without coverage. He 
invested this capital in the firm and the local infrastructure and thus created 
an impressive political powerbase for himself in the region. In the end, the 
banks were left with unpaid debt equaling hundreds of millions of dollars, and 
the scandal forced leading Bosnian politicians to resign. Pars pro toto, the 
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scandal revealed the self-aggrandizement, self-indulgence, irresponsibility, 
and corruption of the leadership in the republics and exposed the entangled 
interests of politics and business. Many suspected that the Agrokomerc affair 
only represented the tip of the iceberg.
Against this backdrop, Slovenian leaders were no longer willing to make 
concessions to the welfare of Yugoslavia as a whole. Economic necessities 
and political divisions all spoke in favor of discarding the political ballast of 
Yugoslavia. This republic of two million represented 8 percent of the popula-
tion, but financed over 25 percent of the national budget and about 18 percent 
of the development fund. Leaders demanded more sovereignty, including more 
rights for the territorial defense of Slovenia at the expense of the Yugoslav 
People’s Army. The youth magazine Mladina started a campaign for military 
conscientious objectors and the right to do one’s military service in the repub-
lic’s own forces instead — a stab in the back for “brotherhood and unity.” When 
three journalists were arrested in June 1988 for their critical reporting on the 
federal army and the betrayal of state secrets, a massive wave of solidarity 
arose. In Slovenia, where traditions of democracy and civic activism were 
rather strong, a pluralistic civil society landscape had developed in the 1980s 
that consisted of intellectuals, peace movement activists, women’s groups, 
human rights advocates, and youth magazines, among others. These people 
now mobilized support. Over one thousand activist organizations, churches, 
newspapers, schools, and factories signed a letter of protest on behalf of the ac-
cused.58 Countless rallies aroused the public, and concerns about the Yugoslav 
state grew. In 1988, 59.5 percent of the population criticized the economic 
relations with Yugoslavia as being too close, and 72.6 percent felt federal 
politics had neglected Slovenian interests.59
As the political leadership in each republic grew more hostile toward the 
leaders of the other republics, popular solidarity with the nationalist cause 
gained momentum. The polarization between Slovenia and Serbia contin-
ued to widen, because both Milan Kučan and Slobodan Milošević used mass 
demonstrations as political stages. Over the course of 1988, intellectuals, the 
media, and civil society groups in both republics came out in support of the 
reform programs of their respective governments, which in Ljubljana was 
aimed at attaining a fuller degree of self-determination and democracy and 
in Belgrade at attaining more centralization and state control.
The fronts between the republics became increasingly entrenched. “It 
was clear to me there was absolutely no chance for Slovenia without serious 
reform,” Milan Kučan later explained, turning a blind eye to nationalist trends 
within intellectual circles and civil society, in particular the verbal attacks on 
the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). The JNA leadership, on the other hand, 
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were convinced they would have to draw the line and defend the unity of 
the country.60
Economic plight and the political incapacity to act perforated any will-
ingness among the elite to compromise, accelerated the demise of legitimacy, 
enhanced the sense of meaninglessness, and intensified the loss of trust, all 
of which, in turn, undermined the central government’s power to solve prob-
lems and produced reform gridlock. The pursuance of self-interest politics 
deprived the state of what little accountability it still had. The more complex 
and encompassing the crisis became, the more intransigently the adversaries 
behaved and the more improbable any strategies were to resolve it. Far more 
symptomatic for the situation was that all types of conflict were reinterpreted 
as genuine ethnopolitical antagonisms.
17. 
The 1980s: Anomie
From the mid-1980s onward, confidence in the functionality of the Yugoslav 
state vanished at an accelerated pace. The crisis filled people with uncer-
tainty, destroyed their faith in the capacity of institutions to manage the crisis, 
wrecked the relations between the republics, and eventually branded even 
colleagues and neighbors as traitors and enemies. Social and political changes 
were perceived as omens of looming downfall and destruction. Trepidation 
about the future unsettled and paralyzed people; their faith in the established 
rules of ethnic coexistence dissipated.
Social Inequality
In the 1980s, Yugoslavia had become an industrial society. The percentage 
of the population working in agriculture was only 29 percent in 1981, while 
the industrial and service sectors had grown to levels of 35 and 36 percent, 
respectively.1 Every second person lived in the city, the acute housing short-
age had been mastered, and even the supply of electricity and running water 
worked. Statistically, every tenth Yugoslav owned an automobile and a tele-
phone; every fifth, a television. In 1979, Yugoslavs went abroad 22 million 
times. People had become accustomed to prosperity, international exchange, 
and vacation trips.2
Seemingly all at once, the crisis revealed the dark aspects of rapid socialist 
modernization. In 1980, half a million students were matriculated at univer-
sities, a figure that represented one young graduate for every 50 inhabitants 
(as opposed to 1:1,000 in the interwar period).3 Since the economy not only 
failed to expand as quickly as the educational system but had even shrunk, a 
growing surplus of well-trained graduates flooded the job market, and young 
people thus had a hard time finding employment. In 1984, every second job-
seeker was professionally qualified and every third was under the age of 30.4 
At the same time, the system produced a large number of half-educated and 
semi-literate people: in 1981, 44 percent of the Yugoslav population had no 
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school diploma (as opposed to 80 percent in 1945). Every tenth Yugoslav still 
could not read or write.5
Among those who were hit particularly hard by the crisis were the millions 
of people who had been uprooted socially and emotionally by industrializa-
tion and rural exodus. In 1981, 41 percent of the population no longer lived in 
the place they had been born, and many of them made up the reservoir of a 
“nonagrarian, nonurbanized” class that now populated the peripheries of the 
cities.6 These people had become city dwellers only in a statistical sense, but 
not in their attitudes and lifestyles. For them, the job prospects also looked 
dim. This created fertile soil for simple explanations and radical ideas.
In the three decades of its existence, self-management had not produced 
less social inequality but more — a situation that was only made worse by the 
economic crisis.7 Income distribution in Yugoslavia corresponded with that 
of Western Europe in the 1980s. The 20 percent poorest households earned 
6.6 percent of the national income (in France, 5.3 percent; in Great Britain, 
7.3 percent). The middle classes, which made up 60 percent of the population, 
earned 54.7 percent, and the richest 20 percent earned over 38.7 percent — all 
very similar to the ratios of distribution found in capitalist countries on the 
continent. Blue-collar and white-collar workers no longer identified with their 
jobs any more than they did in France. Dissatisfaction and the degree of “alien-
ation” was equally great everywhere.8 The economic crisis facilitated this 
differentiation in income, because the slump did not affect all sectors and all 
of the employed equally. The 10 percent of the population at the wealthiest 
end of the income scale now owned more than the 40 percent at the lower end. 
These were proportions similar to those in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
the Scandinavian countries.9 However, the growing inequality raised questions 
about the credibility of the system in general and about the privileges enjoyed 
by the elites in particular.
The economic crisis and monetary devaluation hit a society in which 
status, prestige, personal satisfaction, and social identity were already being 
measured primarily by material wealth. The inflation rate not only eroded in-
comes, savings, and funds set aside for old age, it also posed a serious threat to 
the plans people had for their lives.10 As everywhere in Europe, individualism 
and materialism were becoming more prevalent — and such attitudes often 
slipped quickly into cynicism when times got hard.11
The crisis radicalized existing dissonances: for one, between the aspi-
rations for advancement harbored by the younger generation and the limited 
possibilities available to them in an economy that had long been stagnating; 
for another, between the status quo enjoyed by the older generation and the 
increasingly real threat of losing social and economic status. Social conflicts 
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between rich and poor, urban and rural, and particularly the nationalities be-
came all the more evident in the context of such gloomy prospects for the 
future. The pressure of inflation also made it clear that socialism could not 
fulfill what it had promised: to provide employment, affordable housing, food, 
health facilities, and education.12
Experiencing Crisis and the Loss of Values
Suddenly, the word “crisis” was on everyone’s tongue. It reduced the complex 
experiences of an entire decade to a single word, a code word for insecurity, 
trials and tribulations, and an uncertain future.13 Against this backdrop arose a 
new type of scientific expertise: “crisology.” While the symptoms of the coun-
try’s impending destruction were being debated in the newspapers, economists 
and political scientists were investigating its origins and consequences, and 
pollsters were tracking down the moods and opinions of the populace.14 All 
of this had great analytical value but very little prediction power and — more 
importantly — no practical impact on how to overcome the problems. If any-
thing remained unexplained, it was that the crisis, in all its manifestations, 
had been astutely identified but no effective antidote had been discovered. The 
unpredictability of the future and a loss of orientation undermined the popular 
understanding of society and security, authority and identity, meaning and mo-
rality. Growing fears threw doubt on the values, institutions, and functionality 
of the political system as a whole. In 1985, it was reported that 31 percent of 
the population was plagued with concerns and anxieties, 19 percent had mixed 
feeling with regard to the future, and 10 percent had given into resignation 
and apathy and wanted to see a “strong hand” intervene.15
The youth in particular found themselves in a desolate situation. They ei-
ther exhibited an especially aggressive and pessimistic attitude or, at the other 
extreme, succumbed to helplessness, indifference, and apathy. As one youth 
summarized, “you are young, but unemployed; educated, but feel superfluous; 
full of ideas, but can’t make any of them happen; just waiting around instead 
of having hope.”16 Three-fourths of this generation developed a fundamentally 
anomic attitude: “Often I think that everything our parents worked for is be-
ing destroyed before our eyes,” said one. “Today everything is so uncertain; 
anything, really anything could happen,” said another.17 These were indicators 
of a deep-seated identity crisis and a massive loss of purpose and orientation. 
They point to a mood that cried out for emotional release, for scapegoats, and 
for the eradication of the supposed cause of this entire malady.
People’s trust in the existing order was rapidly dwindling. In particular, the 
younger generation sought to question and rethink Yugoslav socialism and the 
very notion of Yugoslavism. A surge of debate erupted over the inability and 
irresponsibility of the political class and over the nepotism, highhandedness, 
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and corruption of the bureaucracy and technocracy. By the end of the 1980s, 
self-management, once the pride of the nation, had degenerated into an insult. 
Fundamental social values — those key virtues in the socialist codex of hero-
ism like equality, solidarity, and self-sacrifice — crumbled.18
Imaginative metaphors attempted to put into words that which seemed 
unexpected and inexplicable. This crisis vocabulary depicted inflation as a 
quasi-alien force by evoking the idea of divine punishment (“hell of inflation”) 
or of a fatal illness (“cancerous tumor”) or of an unstoppable natural catastro-
phe (“biblical flood”). Such metaphors for inflation depicted people as the 
plaything of higher powers, tossed about with no control over their own fate.19
The crisis was increasingly perceived as the epochal threshold, as a 
time of upheaval pushing toward radical change. More and more people felt 
a diffuse wish for transcendence in a social world that was not necessarily 
rationally understandable.
The Revival of Religion
As the bedrock of socialist ideological certainties crumbled, so too did the 
base for a rational world view and secular belief in progress. The emptiness 
was filled more often than not with religious interpretations — a typical human 
response when social order and patterns of identity suddenly collapse. The 
rediscovery of religion replaced former notions of socialization with commu-
nitization and reactivated faith as a constitutive element of identity formation. 
At the same time, each of the religious communities worked actively to glorify 
its own nation as being sacred.
In 1974, sociologists noted a gradual increase in religiousness, which by 
the mid-1980s had increased exponentially among the younger generation. 
In 1967, a third had called themselves religious; in 1987 it was already more 
than half. This figured neared those of Northern Ireland, Denmark, France, 
Great Britain, and West Germany. The personal search for meaning in life 
had since led every second individual back to church, if more for the purpose 
of cultivating national and cultural traditions than for reasons of faith. The 
values, orientation, and identities of religion filled the void that developed 
during the crisis.20
The clergy seized the opportunity to exploit the ever greater yearning 
for community, purpose, and transcendence and to regain at least part of 
their lost power to interpret and explain societal issues. After Belgrade rein-
stated full diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1970, the Catholic Church 
intensified its activities. For example, it held official commemorative days 
for Cardinal Stepinac, who was celebrated as a faithful servant to the pope, 
a bastion against the infidels, and a martyr for the rights of Croats. In 1960, 
the cardinal, who had been convicted as a war criminal, was buried with full 
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honors in the Zagreb cathedral.21 In 1971, the Catholic Church declared the 
town of Marija Bistrica a place of pilgrimage, for this is where the apotheosis 
of the nation, a “Black Madonna” similar to the one in Poland, was enshrined. 
An international congress consecrated the holy shrine as “Our Lady Queen of 
Croatia.” In honor of thirteen centuries of Croatian Christianity, the Catholic 
Church held a novena, in this case a nine-year cycle of jubilee celebrations 
known as the Great Novena between 1975 and 1984. It was the stated attempt 
to tackle the “phenomena of secularization, urbanization, industrialization, 
and atheism” by reawakening historical and religious awareness.22
Not only did the Catholic Church explicitly direct its crusade against the 
social consequences of modernization, it also worked to reinstitutionalize the 
place of religion in national politics and to reassociate church and nation. The 
Marian cult was particularly effective for intensifying the close connection 
between the Catholic Church and the Croat nation. It also openly declared an 
affiliation with the Western-Catholic Occident and a disassociation with the 
Orthodox East. In 1984, more than a half million believers traveled from all 
over Yugoslavia to attend the National Eucharistic Congress at the shrine in 
Marija Bistrica — a gigantic spectacle that called for unification of the nation 
under the auspices of the church.23
However, the yearning for religious fulfillment could not be contained 
by existing institutions and dogma. In 1981, a group of children in the im-
poverished village of Medjugorje in profoundly Catholic Herzegovina were 
reported to have seen apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Although the bishop of 
Mostar critically noted that “this is all merely mass delusion, euphoria, and a 
spectacle for tourists,” the provincial town became a powerful symbol of Croat 
national consciousness and grew into an important pilgrimage site within a 
short period of time.24 Suddenly 400 hotels, eighteen currency exchange shops, 
and five duty-free shops popped up out of nowhere to accommodate the ten 
million believers who visited annually.25
Tourism and anticommunism struck up a lucrative relationship. It was not 
by accident that the Madonna appeared close to the anniversary of the appa-
ritions of 1917 in the Portuguese village of Fatima, an event that at the time 
mobilized millions of people all across Europe against Bolshevism. Likewise, 
the Madonna cult in Croatia possessed not only religious and cultural con-
notations, but also ideological-political ones in that it sacralized the Croat 
nation. It also recalled the ill-fated alliance between the Catholic Church, 
Franciscans, and the Ustasha regime. During the Second World War, horrific 
atrocities against Serbs had taken place in the vicinity, for which sixty-seven 
Franciscan monks were sentenced to death after the war. At least seventeen 
mass graves were known to exist. The Orthodox Church decided this was 
a welcome opportunity to honor the Serb victims of Croat fascism with a 
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commemorative ceremony. In 1991 it erected a memorial chapel dedicated to 
the “New Serbian Martyrs.”26
The Orthodox Church also endeavored to attract more believers back 
to church, which prompted it to draw more public attention since the late 
1960s. For example, in May 1968, the patriarch put on a spectacular procession 
through the center of Belgrade with relics of the Serbian czar Stefan Dušan. 
A year later the church celebrated the 750th anniversary of its independence, 
and in 1975, the 800th anniversary of the birthday of Saint Sava, its founder. 
Enormous effort was expended to celebrate Vidovdan, the anniversary of the 
Battle of Kosovo. The overarching theme was always the self-assertion of the 
Serb nation — and its unification. Such activity caused the communist leader-
ship to become concerned about the possible revival of Greater Serbian ideas. 
As early as 1972, the Central Committee reported that a vision of Greater 
Serbia was indeed being idealized, that Serbs in Croatia were being instrumen-
talized, and that the Ustasha’s crimes were being exploited for propaganda.27
A new theological faculty was founded in 1984 in Belgrade, and a year 
later construction started in the middle of the city on the monumental cathedral 
of Saint Sava. When completed, the gigantic edifice would seat 12,000 believ-
ers and thus surpass the capacity of the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul. Hundreds of 
thousands heeded the church’s call to participate in anniversary celebrations 
of major national events, whether the breakthrough on the Salonica Front in 
the First World War, the founding of the monastery Studenica in the Middle 
Ages, or the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. In June 1989, the remains of 
Saint Great Martyr Prince Lazar were transferred to the Ravanica monastery 
in an elaborate celebration on the occasion of the 600-year anniversary of the 
battle that cost him his life. In 1990 and 1991, the Orthodox Church organized 
a series of commemorations of the outbreak of the Second World War and the 
persecution of the Serbs.
For Islamic theologians and politicians, the end of the 1980s also offered 
welcome opportunities to establish closer ties between religion and national 
identity. In the day-to-day life of a Bosnian Muslim, a sense of identity had 
not been determined primarily by religion for quite a while; and for many, not 
at all. In 1990, only 37 percent of the Bosnian Muslims considered themselves 
religious, compared with 60 percent of the Slovenes and 53 percent of the 
Croats. Over 60 percent of them never visited a mosque.28 However, national-
ism provided an effective means by which to transform secular identity back 
into religious affirmation. Between 1969 and 1980, about 800 new mosques 
were built. In 1976, around 40,000 copies of the Koran and 50,000 copies of the 
brochure How to Become Muslim were distributed. In the following year, an 
Islamic theological faculty was set up in Sarajevo, where the next generation 
of religious teachers, both men and women, studied. Because of Yugoslavia’s 
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good relations to other nonaligned countries, many students were awarded 
scholarships to study in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
or even Sudan.29
Generous donations from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya made it possible 
to build what would become Europe’s third-largest mosque in 1987 in Zagreb, 
one nearly as impressive as those in London and Rome. An increasing number 
of imams adopted radical stances, and more clerics called for the return to 
Muslim traditions in order to revive religious laws, rituals, and customs, such 
as the fasting month of Ramadan, study of the Koran, pilgrimage, and the 
veiling of women. A key component of re-Islamization was the adherence to 
rules of behavior that set the Islamic community apart from others: the strict 
ban on mixed marriages and the consumption of alcohol, the education of 
children in the faith, and the use of Muslim names. Such religious customs 
also mobilized political forces. The journal Muslimanski glas (Muslim voice) 
maintained that “an important message for all who fight for truth, justice, 
and freedom” could be found in the Battle of Badr, an improbable military 
victory described in the Koran, which the Prophet Muhammad is said to have 
won with Allah’s help in the year 624. Ramadan was the month of jihad and 
the defense of the faithful, wrote the magazine of the Ulema association. The 
“message” to the Islamic faithful was quite similar to that of the Kosovo myth, 
for it extolled important heroic values: faith in God, self-sacrifice, unity, and 
discipline.30 In 1990 and at great effort and expense, the Islamic commu-
nity commemorated the Islamization of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sixteenth 
century. Ajvatovica was dedicated as a holy pilgrimage site, and 100,000 
faithful attended the celebrations remembering the arrival of Islam. For the 
first time, one could see green flags with Arabic inscriptions and thoroughly 
veiled women. Not only the Serbs and Croats, but also the Muslims now had 
a holy place in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was meant to represent the enduring 
character of their nation.31
In the late 1980s, all sides applied the semantics of religious symbolism 
quite successfully to mobilize support from their respective ethnic commu-
nity for nationalist aims. While the economic-political crisis and its various 
contingencies undermined the established Yugoslav order, the resurgence of 
religious faith provided an alternative way to interpret time and history, to 
depict a complex and confusing reality simply, and to create a distant horizon 
of transcendence toward the greater ethnic community. The Madonna cult, the 
Kosovo myth, and the Battle of Badr sacralized each respective nation, sug-
gested a privileged place nearer to God, and cultivated a deeply felt emotional 
connection to others of the same ethnicity that transgressed political borders 
and legal distinctions. In this way, the national theology of each group exalted 
itself to the point of becoming an absolutely binding normative value, which 
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required from every individual an unconditional willingness to sacrifice in 
order for it to survive.32
Politics of Memory
Yugoslavia became obsessed with history. Historical topics flourished in 
academic research, popular publications, and memoirs. In the 1980s, the 
legitimacy of the League of Communists dwindled at the same rate that con-
troversy proliferated over fundamental questions focused on the country’s 
view of itself. Who are we in Europe? How did we become what we are? A 
contributing factor to this phenomenon was that many people who had lived 
through the Second World War a good forty years earlier were now reaching 
an age at which they felt the need to relate to posterity their own accounts 
and interpretations of events. The liberal atmosphere in the media also made 
it possible to address openly topics found in exile literature that had been 
previously taboo.
Two large and prominent projects reached an impasse already in the 
early 1970s because of outbursts of national antagonism: the History of the 
Communist Party/League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the multivolume 
publication History of the Yugoslav Peoples. Croat, Bosnian, and Serb histo-
rians became so mired in controversy over the nineteenth-century nationalist 
movements that the monumental historical overview ended with the year 
1800. The revision of the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia that had begun in 1975 
also resulted in a half-hearted compromise: it was to appear in six different 
languages and a condensed English edition. The fact that the precarious con-
sensus in historiography finally collapsed altogether in the mid-1980s reveals 
how serious the situation had become, not only in its ideological, economic, 
and regulatory dimensions, but also in the deepest regions of the collective 
subconscious.
The controversy over the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia had been simmering 
since the 1970s and finally boiled over into strong polemics at the end of the 
1980s when the first volume of the revised edition was published. Particularly 
controversial were the contributions on the origins of the Albanians and the 
Montenegrins, the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the sections on lan-
guage and literature in general. The project was discontinued in 1991.
The search for new identities, authorities, and political causes revived na-
tionalistic constructions of history and stereotypes of ethnic differences. The 
main topic of revision was Tito and the events of the Second World War.33 With 
the publication in 1980/1981 of a relatively moderate criticism of Tito in his 
book Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New contributions on the 
biography of Josip Broz Tito), Vladimir Dedijer opened the floodgates for the 
demystification of the great leader. Others subsequently dragged out into the 
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open the dark sides of Tito’s character, the personality cult, and piquant details 
from his private life until the former hero of the revolution had been reduced 
to no more than a power-hungry, vain, egotistic, and politically confused old 
man.34 The deconstruction of Tito served a twofold purpose. It made it pos-
sible to delegitimize both socialism as a political system and Yugoslavia as a 
multinational state. If Josip Broz had actually been just a decadent autocrat, 
then “brotherhood and unity” was only an illusion. After 1989/1990, Tito’s 
public presence was also removed. Streets, squares, and cities were renamed, 
and his mausoleum was temporarily closed.
The Second World War also underwent reinterpretation. As early as 
1983, Branko Petranović blurred the good-and-evil dichotomy between par-
tisans and Chetniks in Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941–1945 
(Revolution and counterrevolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945).35 His colleague 
Veselin Djuretić carried the revisionist iconoclasm too far in his 1985 publi-
cation Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama (The allies and the Yugoslav 
war drama) when he rehabilitated the Chetniks and General Nedić as saviors 
of the Serb nation and claimed that the Western powers shared the blame for 
the communist takeover of power.36 The Communist Party reacted by issuing 
toothless threats of sanctions against the apologia of the Chetniks but was not 
in a position to save even a sliver of consensus on the interpretation of war and 
revolution as its authority slipped rapidly away.
Even the circumstances leading to the communist takeover of power were 
critically reexamined when Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški denounced 
the Stalinist practices used between 1944 and 1948 and the destruction of the 
bourgeois multiparty system.37 The regime was hit by an immense wave of 
criticism from all sides in culture, art, and science. Novels, dramas, poems, 
songs, and films focused on topics that questioned what until then had been 
the rarely contested legitimacy of the system. The poet Gojko Djogo was ar-
rested in 1981 and later convicted because his book of poetry Vunena vremena 
(Woolen times) included metaphoric allusions to the tyrannical and ignorant 
regime of Tito. The banning of this book shook the cultural scene because 
it was the first time that the regime had come down so hard on a writer.38 
Emblematic of the awakening criticism by intellectuals was the genre of Goli 
otok literature, work that dealt with the persecution of Cominform sympathiz-
ers after 1948 on the infamous prison island of Goli otok. In 1982, Antonije 
Isaković’s novel Tren 2 was published; in 1985, Emir Kusturica caused a great 
deal of controversy with his film When Father Was Away on Business. That 
same year Slobodan Selenić published his socially critical novel Father and 
Forefathers.
The paradigm shift to nationalism manifested itself quite drastically in 
the debate on the victims of the Second World War, a topic that had raised 
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tempers for a long time and was also being exploited with relish in political 
publications. Few topics were as emotionally laden as the number of people 
who had been murdered, tortured, and displaced, and no other topic could be 
better used to celebrate the national myth of victimization that each national 
group thrived on. This debate discussed the ethnopolitical dimensions of the 
civil war and undermined the dogma of “brotherhood and unity” so funda-
mental to the Yugoslav order.
At the heart of the controversy was the concentration camp Jasenovac, 
one of the most prominent places in Yugoslavia’s collective memory and the 
signum for the politics of anti-Serb annihilation. Plausible sources calculate 
that about 83,000 people died in Jasenovac and another 120,000 in the other 
Croatian concentration camps.39 However, Serb and Croat historians outdid 
each other in their attempts to decrease or increase the estimated number of 
victims. In an article published in 1986 titled “On the Genesis of Genocide on 
Serbs in the NDH” [Independent State of Croatia], Vasilije Krestić developed 
the theory that genocidal intent was a constitutive component, both histor-
ically and religiously, of the Croatian idea of nationhood, while Radomir 
Bulatović spoke in 1990 of a record number of 1.1 million victims. Franjo 
Tudjman, who had been challenging the official party statistics since the 
1960s, repeated his well-known argument in an apologetic piece written in 
1989 titled “Fallacies of Historical Realities.” In it he argued that no more 
than 60,000 people died in the Independent State of Croatia. He also main-
tained that the dimensions of the Holocaust were greatly exaggerated. Citing 
dubious witnesses, he attempted to prove that the camp in Jasenovac had 
been run by Jews, who were the ones actually responsible for selection and 
liquidation. These were the people who were truly guilty of persecuting the 
Serbs, he argued with reference to another source of information: “A Jew is 
a Jew . . . egoism, cleverness, unreliability, greed, treachery, and acting as an 
informant” were in his mind their most important characteristics. Tudjman 
did not limit his remarks to the past but spoke out on current affairs, noting 
that after the war, Nazi fascism became “Judeo-Nazism” because Israel was 
conducting a “true Holocaust” against the Palestinians.40 A year after making 
those remarks, he warned that it should not be forgotten “that the NDH . . . 
was also the expression of the historical drive of the Croat people for an 
independent state.”41
Finally the time had arrived to create a myth of victimization for the Croat 
nation, something exile organizations had been cultivating for a long time. 
“Bleiburg,” the place where partisans had executed up to 70,000 collaborators 
at the end of the war, now became the metaphor of the anticommunist Croat 
resistance. The right-wing nationalist emigrant Ante Beljo blazed ahead on 
this path with his publication YU-Genocide. A flood of other studies, many 
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written by emigrants, spoke of up to a half million dead in order to show 
that the Croats had become the victims of a Serbo-communist “Holocaust” 
and had been forced into the “Yugoslav dungeon of peoples” only by armed 
force.42 Although the discourse on crimes committed by the partisans was 
long overdue, the Bleiburg discourse that took place was apologetic. Terms 
like “holocaust,” “death march,” “exodus,” and “genocide” transformed the 
Ustashas into patriots and martyrs and the Serbs into archenemies — certainly 
not people to share a country with. In “Fallacies,” Tudjman also supported the 
claim of victimization. In 1997, the Croatian government even held a religious 
mass to honor those who died at Bleiburg.43
The academic field of history was not the only battlefield in the struggle 
to construct and deconstruct national icons. At least as influential were his-
torical novels, films, and political publications that provided a public hungry 
for history with great tales of the past. Unlike scholarly work, fiction enjoys 
the unbeatable advantage that it can simply invent a master narrative — irre-
spective of actual historical events. Literarily sophisticated and emotionally 
stirring, the monumental three-volume A Time of Death and A Time of Evil 
by Dobrica Ćosić or Knife by Vuk Drašković transplanted the narrative of 
the Serbs’ suffering, embodied by the protagonists, to the historical settings 
of the First World War or the Ottoman Empire. About the same time, Mića 
Popović produced his Serbian Scenes Paintings that would come to represent 
the iconography of a new Serbian self-image. These and many other literary 
and artistic works conveyed the message that ultimate salvation lay in a revival 
of Serbian national consciousness.44
It was clear by the end of the 1980s that the communist regime’s attempt 
to filter out the civil war and nationalistically driven persecution from mem-
ory had failed, because the generation who had lived through it still had vivid 
memories, and their recollections of the most recent past and their own per-
sonal experiences were passed down through the collective memories of their 
family. The failure to deal with traumatic experiences in the past seriously 
hampered efforts to move beyond them. In fact, it benefited the nationalists’ 
efforts to mobilize public support for their cause. Their rhetoric appealed to 
repressed feelings of powerlessness, mourning, bitterness, and anger in people 
who had lost relatives during the war or had heard the stories of atrocity, and 
such feelings provided the perfect justification for taking preemptive measures 
of self-defense.
Yet it would be wrong to argue that the identity crisis of the 1980s simply 
revived the old conflicts. The experience of war is not a given with invariable 
influence; it changes in the process of remembering and with the language 
used retrospectively to describe it. The Yugoslav example shows how ideas 
about the past and the creation of historical consciousness are continuously 
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being filtered and reshaped into something new by existing social conditions.45 
In political confrontations it was rarely important what people and their fore-
fathers had actually experienced. What counted was that interpretations of 
the past produced new perspectives of the present, which gave people a new 
orientation and generated ostensible legitimacy. The conflicts of the 1980s 
were not predestined to occur because of the bloody history of the Second 
World War, but because certain images of the past triggered fears that then 
affected and influenced people’s thinking, feelings, and actions. To a degree 
they were instrumentalized deliberately by politics.
Political Communication and Populism
By the mid-1980s, the old concept of a state-controlled public realm had be-
come obsolete. Pluralism in the media and the lively cultural scene, featuring 
events and discussions in the larger cities, involved broader sectors of the 
population, so that debates on reform and alternatives to the system were 
no longer limited to smaller circles of intellectuals and dissidents. Whoever 
sought to speak to the ordinary urbanite or rural inhabitant needed to adopt a 
new language style and a new form of communication.
Spectacular political actions like mass marches and meetings drew 
hundreds of thousands into the streets. Those who could not attend watched 
broadcasts of the events for hours on television, which had meanwhile become 
the country’s most important and favorite medium. Euphoric masses waved 
Croatian, Albanian, or Serbian flags, cheered the speakers, and chanted ag-
gressive populistic slogans. Slobodan Milošević was the first to mobilize the 
masses with such events, starting in 1987. During his “antibureaucratic revo-
lution,” so-called “truth rallies” were held even in the deepest backwaters of 
the land. Thousands of demonstrators held banners high that read “Only Unity 
will save the Serbs!” or “Czar Lazar, so unlucky you were, if only Slobo had 
been at your side awhile!” or “Mother Serbia, save us from the Autonomists!” 
or “Down with the Bureaucrats!”46 In such settings, people came together as an 
ethnic collective, and the political messages drew on historical and folkloric 
slogans because economic deprivation, vulnerability, and fear of loss drove 
people to seek what they felt was familiar, ageless, and constant. Milošević 
successfully gave the distraught nation new hope after a decade of doubt and 
uncertainty and revived buried feelings of pride and unity.
At the heart of Serbia’s political message in the late 1980s was the Kosovo 
myth, the source of the sacred allegories as applied to the Serb nation. It was 
the hinge between the spiritual, national, and political awakening and pro-
vided the historical underpinning for the widespread belief, common to many 
religions, that theirs was a chosen people. According to legend, Prince Lazar 
took his vows on the evening before the fateful battle and thereby prepared 
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himself for the “Kingdom of Heaven” for eternity. The religiously laden myth 
supported the Serbs in that it bestowed legitimacy on their cause that far 
surpassed all political arguments and justifications. In this decade, the Serbs 
were often referred to as a “heavenly people,” and this image became a pivotal 
figure in their discourse. The fateful battle between their heroes and traitors 
served exceedingly well as a metaphor for the times at hand. The narrative of 
the eternal battle for freedom and self-determination communicated a hope for 
salvation, encouraged Serbs to reassert their own identity, and helped mobilize 
and emotionalize the masses. Moreover, the religious overtones distinguished 
the Serbs from the Albanians, their rivals for what was seen as the embattled 
holy land Kosovo.
In 1989, Slobodan Milošević cleverly played up the Kosovo myth when 
he addressed the Serb people in a highly publicized speech celebrating the 
600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. He spoke of the past, but he meant 
the present and vowed that Serbia would return to its former greatness. Back 
then, like today, he said, “tragic disunity” was the cause of the malady to 
befall Serbia. At the same time, he also pointed to the future: new battles 
were ahead that would demand determination, bravery, and self-sacrifice. 
Milošević condemned the older generation of communists for their conces-
sions to the Yugoslav state and led the crowd in cheers for freedom, justice, 
and brotherhood. The use of rhetoric imbued with cultural symbolism helped 
generate a common sense of identity, establish moral commitment, and sug-
gest superiority over the stereotyped enemies of the people. “Kosovo” was the 
perfect metaphor to cloak political messages in universal and transhistorical 
validity and to link the present and the past by placing them side by side in a 
quasi-timeless context.47
Subsequent political movements and parties that formed starting in the 
late 1980s used similar communication strategies. For example, Slobodan 
Milošević was celebrated in Serbia as Tito’s heir, while in Croatia those 
campaigning for Tudjman praised him as the figurative descendent of the 
seventeenth-century conspirators and freedom fighters Petar and Nikola 
Zrinski and Fran Krsto Frankopan.48 Banks and firms also used folk epics 
in their advertising. The Chetniks emerged in the 1980s as the modern ver-
sion of the Serb resistance movement from the Second World War. An entire 
commemorative industry produced magazines, pennants, emblems, postcards, 
CDs, and other memorabilia linked to the long-tabooed guerrilla fighters. 
They now became the protagonists in pop and rock music, in cartoons, and 
in other forums of youth culture. Other heroes reemerged from the national-
ist pantheon: Prince Lazar and Miloš Obilić as the martyrs of the Battle of 
Kosovo, the Madonna of Medjugorje and Saint Sava, the Serb revolutionary 
Karadjordje and the Croatian Ban Josip Jelačić. Folkloric accessories, crests, 
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flags, iconic images of the saints, and insignias became important props of 
this commercialized mass culture.
Popular folk music set the emotional tone for the euphoria over all things 
ethnic. In the age of modern mass communication, it experienced renewed 
recognition and a political transformation. In the past, partisans and Chetniks 
had once fought bitterly to appropriate folksongs to their cause. These na-
tionalistic versions were banned after 1945, but now enjoyed a revival.49 The 
traditional folksingers — the gusle players — did their best at singing political 
ballads with contemporary references in the pedestrian zone of Belgrade. For 
centuries, such bards had traveled throughout the countryside with a simple 
type of single-string violin that they held vertically between their knees while 
singing about historical times and events in a lamenting, monotone voice. The 
old songs were the key to the microcosm of longings, fears, and fantasies that 
kept the oral traditions and tales alive from generation to generation.
The so-called “newly composed music” was a contemporary genre that 
became an important instrument in political communication. It adapted 
elements of folk music, supplemented with components of pop music and po-
litical messages. Cassette tapes were found everywhere with songs like “The 
Twentieth-Century Man,” which celebrated the birth of Slobodan Milošević 
as the birth of a new era.50
Not everyone was captivated by customs, epics, and myths. All over 
Yugoslavia, a new political generation, a cohort that had been socialized in 
the 1960s and 1970s, aimed at rethinking Yugoslav socialist federalism with-
out necessarily negotiating its dissolution. Their main concern was bringing 
about greater freedoms and a new sense of civic identity and Europeanness 
rather than promoting a nationalist agenda.51 Thus the constant exposure to the 
same stylized historical figures had an adverse effect on some, like the school 
pupil who found the required reading of the Montenegrin national epos The 
Mountain Wreath to be “ludicrous, exaggerated, rural, macho,” and simply 
“repulsive.”52 However, for many others, such folklore developed an incredi-
bly emotional and motivational power filled with new meaning. Like religion 
and history, it merged ideas about the past, present, and future; intensified 
deep and binding feelings of community; and created reservoirs of powerful, 
politically relevant trust.53
Multicultural Symbiosis and Ethnic Distancing
Nationalist propaganda obscured the less spectacular realities of Yugoslav 
life. Most people lived with a twofold identity, being Croat, Serb, Macedonian, 
and so on, on one side and Yugoslav on the other. In a survey taken of 6,200 
young adults in 1985, the majority said that they considered themselves to be 
Yugoslav citizens first and members of one of the constituent nations only 
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second. This opinion was held to a particularly large degree by Muslims, 
Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs (76 to 80 percent) and less so by 
Croats (61 percent) and Slovenes (49 percent).54 At the end of the 1980s, the 
large majority of those polled were still of the opinion that every community 
did not necessarily have to establish a nation state of its own.55
The Yugoslav census also revealed another interesting phenomenon: the 
massive increase of “Yugoslavs.” Between 1961 and 1981, the percentage of 
those who no longer claimed to belong to any nation or nationality but consid-
ered themselves only to be citizens of Yugoslavia increased from 1.7 percent 
to 5.4 percent, representing more than 1.2 million people. Because the number 
of “Yugoslavs” clearly increased faster than that of mixed marriages, it could 
be concluded that a gradual change was occurring in the attitude of the more 
mobile, better educated, and occupationally skilled younger generation.56 Only 
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Albanians emphasized their ethnicity for reasons 
linked to language differences.57 Because the political system did not provide 
for the representation of “Yugoslavs” and the central state was doing nothing 
in the way of active nation building, a full-scale discussion began on questions 
like: were Yugoslavs experiencing a stronger sense of community as politi-
cal citizens or was this a new type of ethnicity? Was there only one form of 
(socialist) patriotism or could the love of country consist of two components 
(loyalty to the state and to the respective ethnic community)? 58
Compared to the 1960s, however, the relations between the nationalities 
had worsened measurably. In 1985, most people described the ethnic relations 
in their neighborhood, republic, and in all of Yugoslavia as acceptable or 
good. The further people got from their own horizon of experience, the more 
negative their assessments tended to become. Ten percent attested to a poor 
interethnic atmosphere in their hometown, but 22 percent felt the same with 
regard to their own republic, and 31 percent thought so with a view toward 
the country as a whole. Most of those polled attributed ethnic tensions to 
nationalist propaganda, political egoism, regional disparities, and economic 
problems, not to religious, ethnic, and cultural differences.59
The social distance between nations and nationalities also widened at the 
end of the 1980s. The percentage of ethnically mixed marriages had not in-
creased significantly since 1960 and averaged at 12 percent, even in ethnically 
diverse Bosnia-Herzegovina. More than half of those questioned expressed a 
moderate to very strong objection to marriage outside their ethnic community. 
Yet, even here the picture appears more complex because of the differen-
tiations people made. Researchers found that the greatest aversions were 
to marriages between Macedonians and Albanians and between Serbs and 
Albanians. Relationships between Croats and Serbs caused the least aversions, 
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whereby among women, the less educated, and the very religious, many people 
tended to prefer complete ethnic seclusion.60
The spheres of socialization in which each individual moved varied, 
which helps explain why ethnic affiliation began to take precedence over 
state citizenship in the late 1980s. Although everyone was subjected to insti-
tutions extolling patriotic loyalty to the Yugoslav state, such as the schools, 
the military, and the workplace, the primary milieu of socialization was that 
of the usually ethnically homogeneous family. For example, in the villages of 
central Bosnia where Croats and Muslims lived side by side, neighbors still 
helped each other build houses and harvest crops; they met to drink coffee, 
chat, and watch television together just as they had in earlier times. Hospitality 
and a sense of village community shaped a social-moral code that each ethnic 
community considered to be part of their own innermost culture. Still, most 
people continued to believe that a marriage partner from another nationality 
would disrupt family life.61 When institutions and values, and even the state 
itself, broke down at the end of the 1980s, nothing was left to counterbalance 
the trend toward ethnic segregation.
A person who argued that ethnic affiliation was gradually becoming insig-
nificant in Yugoslavia was therefore just as correct as the person who argued 
that religion and ethnic affiliation were still paramount categories of identity. 
Especially in the large cities, a person’s origin, nationality, and religion were 
of little interest in the 1980s, but the picture was quite different in the rural 
parts of the country, where the influence of family background, relatives, and 
ethnicity had never waned. This phenomenon of a simultaneous occurrence 
of very different if not contradictory perceptions explains why people’s views 
and interpretations of the world around them differed so drastically and almost 
developed into ideological trench warfare in the 1990s. “Yugoslavia was a 
multicultural biotope,” claimed one side. “No, it was a constant powder keg of 
primordial conflicts,” countered the other. Actually, in the day-to-day realities 
of life, both occurred simultaneously: coexistence and conflict.
Fin de siècle
Because social change had progressed at such a rapid pace and had simply 
overridden antimodern sentiments after 1945, society became all the more 
disconcerted when the dynamics of progress floundered and then came to 
a sudden halt. What had previously been applauded was now rejected and 
criticized. Similar to what was happening in the West, philosophers, writers, 
and artists became exasperated with an ever more complex and globalized 
world in all its negatives guises. Riding a wave of postmodern criticism of 
the existing order, intellectuals renounced key fundamental certainties of the 
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industrial age, such as modernity, progress, and the future. At the same time, 
earlier utopias like Marxism were thoroughly bankrupt, and ultraliberalism 
and market radicalism seemed to have exhausted their credibility because 
the shock therapy they prescribed had thrown the Yugoslav economy into an 
abyss of recession. No alternative societal models were in sight. Therefore, 
what happened first was the total deconstruction of all known dogmas. The 
protagonists of postmodernity fled into a rather noncommittal analysis of 
discourse, symbols, and culture, in which they offered no ideas of their own 
for explaining the past or shaping the future. The zeitgeist was plagued with 
a lack of orientation and an intellectual caste that had surrendered in the face 
of diffuse feelings and fantasies — all of which created the ideal conditions 
from which a new politics of identity could emerge.
The ideological vacuum and the identity crisis among intellectuals took 
on many manifestations. Only a very small part of society, one located in the 
more developed regions of the country, turned to the new social movements 
organized in environmental, peace, antinuclear, and women’s groups. The 
majority drifted into seemingly nonpolitical types of group awareness, into 
consumerism, or into a generally apocalyptic mood. Hedonism and commod-
ity fetishism shaped the lifestyle of the dizelaši (named after the fashion label 
Diesel), who believed in nothing except extravagant behavior. One critical 
contemporary commented: “The guys who belong to this, let’s say, ‘move-
ment,’ wear streetwear from the clothing brands Diesel and Nike, usually 
track pants, and — very important — they always stick their shirt into their 
pants. They are bald and look like bodybuilders. And it is very popular to run 
around packing heat. . . . The women fulfill the other half of the heterosexual 
code: sexiness, short skirts, bare midriff.”62 This all had very little to do with 
the traditional virtues of the Kosovo myth, but very much to do with the role 
models presented at the time in Rambo movies and commercial television 
broadcasts like MTV.
The music of the younger generation also expressed a change of values 
and a questioning of norms, as can be seen in the multitude of rock bands 
that existed as the vehicles of an increasingly aggressive protest culture. In 
1982, there were about 3,000 rock bands in the entire country, but by 1987, 
the number had already increased to more than 5,000. The cult groups of the 
1980s were Laibach (Ljubljana), Riblja čorba (Fish Soup) from Belgrade, Leb 
i sol (Bread and Salt) from Skopje, and Bijelo dugme (White Button) from 
Sarajevo, whose lead guitarist, Goran Bregović, gave the group’s music a 
signature sound by combining Balkan folklore with Western rock elements.63 
In addition there were other types of music, such as punk, rap, techno, and 
heavy metal.
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Instead of expressing social and generational criticism as had been done 
earlier, the bands of the 1980s like Šizike (The Lunatics), Električni orgazam 
(Electric Orgasm), Videosex, and 4R (The Fourth Reich) paid homage to an 
apocalyptic culture. Contemporary music was nihilistic, iconoclastic, Nazi-
like, and pornographic in its texts, performance, gestures, habits, and symbols. 
The Slovene group Laibach startled with its Nazi punk, decorated the stage 
with swastikas, and sang the praises of Adolf Hitler. “We want a great totali-
tarian leader,” said one musician. “God is a totalitarian being. Totalitarianism, 
for us, is a positive phenomenon.”64 Heavy criticism of societal values was 
coupled with aggressive fin de siècle moods. The group Satan Panonski sang 
in English: “Auto-destruction is eruption; it will destroy all my enemies, my 
victory is toxicant peace.”65
Soccer clubs had always cultivated a strong feeling of allegiance. In the 
mid-1980s, the stadiums first gave effusive fans a place to work off their frus-
trations in public. Hardly a game took place in which the public did not hold 
up posters featuring politicians and saints, wave flags, sing Chetnik songs, 
or give the fascist Ustasha salute. Hooliganism and violent incidents became 
increasingly frequent. Starting in 1989, the press was full of warnings about 
excessive chauvinism. In May 1990, violent rioting took place in connection 
with a Serbian–Croatian game. From then on, the aggression that had orig-
inally been focused on a competitive sport took on a dynamic of its own, 
and the soccer stadium became an arena for fights between nationalities.66 
One of the most well-known warlords was the president of the fan club for 
the Belgrade soccer club Red Star Belgrade, Željko Ražnjatović. In October 
1990, he founded the Serb Volunteer Guard, also known as Arkan’s Tiger, 
and linked the milieu with a particularly vulgar version of newly composed 
music, turbofolk. In 1995, he staged a lavishly gaudy wedding event with his 
bride, the pop icon Ceca. Within his and other soccer clubs, a particular milieu 
of violence had emerged already by the late 1980s. Since daily life for many 
young men was fully devoid of meaningful activity, this void was filled with 
a latent chauvinistic and aggressive counterculture, with excessive drinking, 
video games, and violent pornography. It produced a hollow, sadistic atmo-
sphere that later transformed into open bellicosity. Many of the members of 
these fan clubs would later join one of the numerous paramilitary units. Soccer 
teams represented the ethnic nation, and the fans were the soldiers. Not long 
after that, the worst atrocities of the war were perpetrated by these people.
18.
Disintegration and the Collapse 
of the State (1989 to 1991)
1989: The Beginning of the End
As communist regimes collapsed one after another throughout Eastern Europe, 
centrifugal forces in the multinational state of Yugoslavia grew stronger and 
the crisis there reached an unprecedented, dramatic climax. Political deadlocks 
prevented any hope of an orderly transfer to multiparty democracy and a mar-
ket economy. The adversaries Slovenia and Serbia entrenched themselves ever 
deeper in what were, in principle, incompatible standpoints. Unfortunately, the 
Yugoslav political system did not have a procedure with which to solve such 
a conflict. Both sides remained unrelenting. They were willing to violate the 
system’s established checks and balances and thus completely undermine the 
legitimacy of time-proven institutions like the constitutional court. From this 
point on, all that counted were the particular interests of each republic — the 
common good of Yugoslavia as a whole no longer mattered.
In one last major effort to turn things around at the end of 1988, the federal 
parliament introduced privatization and abolished the system of socialist prop-
erty rights and self-management. However, it lost the battle against inflation, 
which was galloping at a rate of 2,700 percent, because the republics refused 
to reduce their expenditures substantially. On the advice of the International 
Monetary Fund, Prime Minister Ante Marković implemented a shock ther-
apy in December modeled after Poland’s example: he froze wages, stopped 
subsidies, and introduced the strict monitoring of expenditures. Although 
he succeeded in stabilizing the currency within a few months, many ailing 
government-owned enterprises still could not survive the liberal market com-
petition. In mid-1990, the rates of growth and production both plummeted, 
and in December every other job was endangered by the new radically neo-
liberal course.1
Growing tension in Kosovo pushed the Serbian parliament in March 1989 
to rescind the province’s autonomy for all practical purposes. In doing so, 
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Belgrade improved its ability to enforce its authority over the entire republic, 
but at the same time it squandered any remaining trust in the federal state. 
In light of the impending change of Kosovo’s status, various associations of 
Slovene intellectuals called for a major rally in Ljubljana to demonstrate sol-
idarity with the Kosovars. Demonstrators wore stickers with a Star of David 
and the words “Kosovo, my homeland.” The parallels drawn to the Holocaust 
through this action angered the Serbian public, and within twenty-four hours 
a million people had gathered in front of the federal parliament building in 
Belgrade. They chanted “Slovenia lies!” and “Slovenia is a traitor!” The crowd 
directed all its hate against the Albanians and their Slovenian sponsors.2
Slobodan Milošević, who had become the president of Serbia in May 
1989, continued to work single-mindedly toward the destruction of Yugoslav 
federalism à la Kardelj. In doing so, he whipped up other peoples’ fears of 
Serb hegemonic politics and gave the rebellious regions a concrete reason to 
reject thoroughly any cooperation with Belgrade. The Kosovars boycotted 
Serbian institutions, and Ljubljana warned that the republic’s party could de-
clare independence if Belgrade failed to desist in its efforts to maintain its 
majority position.
In July 1989, Milošević presented a comprehensive proposal for constitu-
tional reform in Yugoslavia in which the principle of consensus at the federal 
level would be replaced with qualified majority decision making. Milan Kučan 
countered by calling for an “asymmetrical federation.” Each republic would 
separately negotiate its relations with the federation, whereby some would 
forfeit more sovereignty and others less to the central government.3 Because 
this proposal could not get the backing it needed, the Slovenian parliament 
amended the Slovenian constitution in September 1989 by adding the right 
to self-determination and secession. “First of all we are Slovenes and only 
then Communists,” elaborated Milan Kučan at an urgently called Central 
Committee meeting in Belgrade where he felt he was being threatened with 
JNA military intervention.4 Both the collective executive leadership at the 
federal level and the federal constitutional court immediately declared the 
constitutional changes null and void — to no avail. In November there was 
a scandal when the Slovenian police decided to forbid demonstrators from 
Serbia from entering Slovenia. In response, Belgrade broke all bilateral trade 
relations with Slovenia; in turn, Ljubljana refused to make its contribution to 
the federal development fund.5
By the time the League of Communists met in January 1990 for its four-
teenth extraordinary congress, the relations between the republics were already 
thoroughly poisoned. Slovenia’s delegates could not find sufficient support for 
their renewed demands for more autonomy and subsequently walked out of the 
congress in disgust. The Croats then refused to continue any debate on reform. 
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The congress was adjourned, and soon after that Tito’s party, the guarantor of 
“brotherhood and unity” in the multinational state, broke apart.
Meanwhile, the communist systems in the entire Eastern bloc were also 
falling apart. Soon after his ascension to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, 
Mikhail Gorbachev announced the introduction of glasnost and perestroika 
and thus paved the way for democratic elections and change throughout all of 
Eastern Europe. Since Moscow finally allowed its long-time allies to choose 
whatever form of government they wanted in 1989, thus withdrawing its latent 
threat to intervene, all resistance against the transformation to a democratic 
market economy soon dissipated. Communism left Europe, and the Cold War 
ended. With the restructuring of the international order, the crucial foreign 
policy pillars of the Yugoslav model crumbled: socialism, nonalignment, and 
self-management became superfluous once the Cold War came to an end. 
Tito’s strongest trump card had been outplayed: the Soviet military threat no 
longer existed.
Gradually it began to dawn on the West that something was brewing 
in Yugoslavia. Europe seemed to be growing together, which meant that 
Yugoslavia was losing its superb strategic importance for the United States 
and Western Europe as a buffer to the Eastern bloc. Consequently, it also 
meant that the country was losing its privileged access to cheap credit. In the 
foreign ministries of Western countries, other events had priority, such as the 
ramifications of German reunification, the Iraq War, the putsch in Moscow, 
and the Maastricht Treaty. The United States now relegated Yugoslavia to 
the status of a European problem. But no one in Europe found the time and 
interest to work out a strategy for overcoming the crisis of the collapsing 
multinational state.
Multiparty Democracy
As was happening all over Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia’s political leadership 
decided to hold elections in the course of 1990. Instead of being the first step in 
the transition to a stable democracy, however, the democratic transformation 
worked like a fire accelerant, setting ablaze issues of ethnicity and disinte-
gration.6 The emerging spectrum of parties was organized along the lines 
of ethnic identity, not political programs. The socialist system had operated 
according to the principle of collective power sharing and “national key,” so 
that the logic behind having quotas had long been put into practice. Many 
people believed that only their own national party would represent them well 
in difficult times. This allowed the new ethnopolitical elites to mobilize pop-
ulistic support easily for their program, without having to make concessions 
to democratic procedure. Mass rallies suggested plebiscitary approval and 
camouflaged the fact that an authoritarian style of leadership and the political 
control of the media continued to be commonplace. The knee-jerk support for 
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ethnic solidarity explains how Slobodan Milošević was able to further consol-
idate his power position, but also why nonreligious people from Bosnia tended 
to support an Islamic-leaning party. In the spring of 1990, only 26 percent of 
the Slovenes, 48 percent of the Croats, 49 percent of the Albanians, 68 percent 
of the Macedonians, 71 percent of the Serbs, 80 percent of the Montenegrins, 
and 84 percent of the Muslims identified with the Yugoslav state.7 Nine out 
of ten Yugoslavs considered the relations between the various peoples and 
republics to be bad or even very bad.8
Across the entire country, nationalist-oriented parties were formed. For 
those who supported a Yugoslav stance, the only parties committed to the 
cause were the Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia led by Ante Marković 
and the League of Communists. In Slovenia and Croatia, the parties that 
prevailed in the elections of April 1990 were those that championed inde-
pendence. In Slovenia the multiparty alliance DEMOS led by Jože Pučnik 
won a clear majority of 55 percent of the vote. The result was not so clear 
in Croatia, where the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica, HDZ) under Franjo Tudjman won 42.2 percent while the League 
of Communists of Croatia–Party of Democratic Reform (SKH-SDP) received 
37.3 percent. The plurality voting system turned this slight lead into a crushing 
majority of 58 percent of the seats in the three chambers of parliament and a 
majority of 67.5 percent in the most powerful of these, the lower house. Stipe 
Mesić became prime minister and Franjo Tudjman president.9 In Macedonia 
the nationalist forces also prevailed in the form of the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National 
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). In Serbia and Montenegro, however, the socialists 
remained in power. In December 1990, Slobodan Milošević’s Socialist Party 
of Serbia won 194 of the 250 parliament seats up for election. In Montenegro 
the League of Communists won 83 of 125 mandates and its leader, Momir 
Bulatović, the presidency. The most difficult situation was that in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where three ethnically affiliated parties dominated the elections 
in November and December 1990: the Muslim Party of Democratic Action 
(Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) with 87 seats, the Serbian Democratic 
Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS) with 71, and the Croatian HDZ-BiH 
with 44 mandates. True to the Yugoslav political tradition of power sharing, 
they created a government coalition.10
In all of the republics, the new parties called for solidarity of their re-
spective nation. Franjo Tudjman’s pledge to deliver Croatian statehood relied 
on mobilizing not only the masses in Croatia, but also the political émigrés 
whom he had invited to the HDZ congress held in Zagreb in February 1990. 
He also counted on the backing of the Herzegovina lobby, a strong pillar of his 
support within his party, when he demanded the right to self-determination 
“of the entire Croat people within its natural and historical borders.”11 The 
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campaign slogans of the HDZ promised that Croatia would “be defended at 
the Drina” and that “Herzegovina is Croatia.”12 Later about 400,000 Bosnian 
Croats received Croatian citizenship, including the right to vote.
Transnational networks were probably decisive in these elections. The 
HDZ depended highly on “emigrant Croatia” (iseljena Hrvatska), especially 
as Tudjman had been systematically building his party since 1987 with the 
financial help of exile groups in the United States and Canada, including that 
of rightwing extremists who distributed maps of Croatia showing the borders 
of 1941.13 Tudjman co-opted the “diaspora,” assuming that its members were 
victims of a divided people that needed to be reunited. Using the catchword 
“reconciliation” (pomirenje), he encouraged all Croat exiles and guest workers 
to return to their homeland in the spring of 1990.14
In Bosnia, Alija Izetbegović also campaigned with his party, SDA, for 
Muslim unity, for the unification of “our people” who lived along “the long belt 
of land from Novi Pazar to Cazin, interspersed with Serbs and Croats.”15 More 
precisely he strove to mobilize the Slavic Muslims in Sandžak, the region of 
the homeland “occupied” by Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore he demanded 
that this region be given a special autonomous status. At campaign rallies the 
crowds cheered and chanted “Sandžak is ours!” and “Sandžak is Bosnian!”16
The SDA used religious rituals to appeal to the nationalist feelings of a 
largely secularized Muslim population. Campaign events started with reli-
gious forms of greeting, and the party’s green flag featured the crescent. In 
1991, Izetbegović proposed that Bosnia-Herzegovina enter the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).17 At the same time, the SDA attracted tradi-
tionalist, laicist-liberal, religiously conservative, and Islamic fundamentalist 
supporters. To Muslims, the anomic state of Bosnian society appeared to offer 
no other source of strength, cohesion, and stability than the affiliation with 
the Bosniak nation, whose patron the SDA rose to become. Because religion 
now represented the foremost distinctive characteristic of ethnicity, Islamic 
symbolism also appealed to the secularized part of the electorate.
Another influential factor was the transborder mobilization of Yugoslav 
Albanians. In December 1989, the writer Ibrahim Rugova founded the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK) with 
hundreds of offshoot party groups in Germany, Switzerland, the United States, 
and Canada. His Kosovar shadow government, which set up its headquarters 
in Bonn in 1991, leveled a 3 percent solidarity tax on its fellow countrymen 
in order to support the political struggle back home.18
The Hot Spot, Eastern Bosnia
Bosnia-Herzegovina lay in the crosshairs of the germinating controversy 
over Yugoslavia’s territorial inheritance since Croat and Serb nationalists 
each claimed the region and the Muslims considered it the very heart of their 
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homeland. Therefore, nationalism thrived also in local politics. Because the 
nationalist propaganda of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims was espe-
cially prevalent in multiethnic communities, the local newspapers tried to 
outdo each other in their accusations about who was exploiting, threatening, 
and supposedly soon driving away whom — very similar to the way things had 
developed earlier in Kosovo.19
At campaign rallies, powerful slogans beckoned people to support the 
common cause. Nationalist-oriented Serbs let themselves get caught up in the 
assertion repeated over and over again that the Serbian people had to assert 
themselves in a never-ending battle that required them to constantly be on their 
guard against persecution. In August 1990, the Muslim-leaning SDA held a 
mass commemoration for the victims of Chetnik violence during the Second 
World War in Foča. As a sign of forgiveness, it was planned to throw flowers 
from the historical bridge over the Drina. The Serbs who were invited to the 
event suspected it to be an open provocation and instead commemorated those 
persecuted in the Ustasha state.20
Tensions were building to dangerous levels in many areas, such as in the 
Eastern Bosnia town of Srebrenica, where local chapters of the new parties 
were formed in August 1990. An uneasiness spread as supporters of the Serb 
SDS raced through the center of town in an open car, outfitted with knives 
for everyone to see and giving the three-finger Serb salute. They did the same 
in Potočari, prompting people to throw rocks at them. The leading candidate 
of the Serb party, Miodrag Jokić, then gave a flaming campaign speech in 
which he declared his hometown to be inalienably Serbian land. As he spoke, 
supporters of the Muslim SDA gathered in front of the local culture cen-
ter, waving green flags and yelling: “We want weapons, we want weapons!” 
Tensions spiraled upward throughout the evening, creating an explosive sit-
uation. In Kravica, Serbs built barricades and the Muslims followed suit in 
“their” municipalities.21
Here, as in other places, the tone of the election campaign rallies be-
came increasingly aggressive. The SDA politician Ibran Mustafić attacked 
his political opponent, calling him Satan and saying that a stake should be 
driven through his heart to keep him from becoming a vampire. Another 
SDA man, Hamed Salihović threatened: “We will deepen the Drina, so that 
the enemy, the dušman, cannot cross it!” And yet another, Besim Ibišević 
predicted: “With our votes we will destroy the two greatest evils: communism 
and Yugoslavia . . . the prison of the Bosniak people!”22 As these men spoke, 
the crowd shouted: “We want weapons!” and “Long live Saddam Hussein!”23
The campaign rhetoric had no causal connection whatsoever to the real 
problems that society was facing, but many people felt that the simple mes-
sages from the new leaders spoke to their concerns. Key terms like “people” 
and “nation” helped reduce complex, often unfathomable events to seemingly 
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obvious interests shared by their ethnic community. They were being offered a 
simple interpretation of the way things stood, and many were glad to embrace 
it in light of the fear, uncertainty, and helplessness that plagued them.24 The 
new party leaders interpreted the staged approval of the masses as a mandate 
to refuse all willingness to negotiate. All that counted now was what the na-
tion (allegedly) demanded: to implement a people’s own interests without any 
consideration of the needs of the others.
Preparations for Independence
Immediately after the elections, preparations began in Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Kosovo for independence. On 2 July 1990, both the Slovenian and the Croatian 
parliaments voted with overwhelming majorities to declare their sovereignty, 
as did a group of members of parliament from Kosovo. The Slovenian foreign 
minister Dimitrij Rupel rejoiced in announcing that “Yugoslavia no longer 
exists.”25 In December 1990, 88.5 percent of the Slovenian citizens voted in 
favor of independence in a referendum. The objection of the constitutional 
court was simply ignored.
The presidents of Slovenia and Croatia pushed ahead with a proposal to 
transform Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states, de facto no more 
than a loosely organized customs and monetary union. When the Yugoslav 
government under Ante Marković convened a meeting between the leaders 
of the republics for the last time in December 1990, to debate constitutional 
reform, only a whisper of a chance still existed to save Yugoslavia, because 
the federation simply no longer possessed any legitimacy and authority.
Still bitter about the rescindment of Kosovo’s autonomy, Albanians chose 
a path of open confrontation. They set up their own parallel state with a gov-
ernment, presidency, and systems for taxation, education, and health care. 
In September 1990, they presented the constitution for a sovereign republic. 
A year later a referendum was held on the question of independence.
The step-by-step disintegration of Yugoslavia put its strongest institu-
tion to the test: the Yugoslav People’s Army was fast becoming an armed 
force without a country. In March 1990, Slovenia and Croatia began to build 
their own police and military forces and collected millions in donations from 
abroad to buy weapons.26 General Kadijević declared publicly a month later 
that the People’s Army was prepared to use “all means necessary” to defend 
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia — an open threat to intervene.27
In the spring of 1991, Yugoslavia entered another stage in the irreversible 
process of its dissolution. The parties began to make concrete preparations for 
war.28 The final straw came in May when Serbian and Montenegrin leaders 
blocked Croatia’s Stipe Mesić from assuming the office of the federal presi-
dency, as he was scheduled to do according to the rotation principle. He had 
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publicly boasted that he would be the last president of Yugoslavia, only to 
retract that statement later. This left Yugoslavia with no head of state and 
no commander in chief of the armed forces. All of the other components of 
Yugoslav statehood vanished. Identities and loyalties were being redefined, 
and the long-applied mechanisms of power sharing and mediation no longer 
existed. The collapse of the political order, the disintegration of the multiethnic 
spheres, and the loss of the state monopoly of power created a dangerous vac-
uum. Anyone closely observing the situation at the time could already sense 
that the country was headed toward a highly explosive conflict.
The Radicalization of the “Serbian Question”
With the impending demise of Yugoslavia, the “Serbian Question” that had 
first arisen in the nineteenth century resurfaced. In 1991, more than a fourth 
of the Serb people of 8 million lived outside their own republic: 580,000 were 
in Croatia (12.2 percent), another 1.4 million lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(31 percent), and 200,000 (10 percent) were threatened with separation from 
Serbia by the secession of historically significant Kosovo. Why should Serbs 
tolerate the division of their people just as the Germans were celebrating their 
reunification?
In Serbia, a consensus evolved across all the parties: the objective to be 
defended above all others in this historical situation was the national unity 
of the Serb people. Even formerly critical intellectuals were convinced that 
Serbian president Milošević finally had to rectify the historic injustice inflicted 
on his people.29 In January 1991, Milošević expressed what many people were 
feeling when he declared: “The fate of Yugoslavia can only be decided by the 
peoples [not the republics]. . . . And administrative borders cannot simply be 
declared as national borders. . . . As far as the Serb people are concerned, 
they want to live together in one nation state. Therefore, any partition that 
divides the Serb people and disperses them among several sovereign states is 
unacceptable.”30 This message reverberated in catchy slogans like “One State 
for All Serbs!” and “Only Unity Can Save the Serbs!” At the same time, the 
other republics were also insisting on their sovereignty. For them, any change 
to the existing borders was completely out of the question.
The Serbs living in Croatia were motivated not only by hegemonic claims, 
injured national pride, and resentment over the fait accompli of national bor-
ders, they were also truly afraid. They felt embittered that the new constitution 
of their homeland defined the country as the “national state of the Croats,” 
thereby denigrating all other ethnic groups to the status of minorities.31 The 
introduction of old-new state symbols prompted concern and anger and 
evoked memories of the Second World War. Zagreb selected the historic red 
and white checked šahovnica (chessboard coat of arms) as the emblem on its 
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national flag, which is 500 years older than fascism but had been usurped 
by the Ustasha state during the war. Although the sequence of the colors in 
the checked pattern was different, this was not sufficient to dash the fears of 
anti-Serb sentiments. What did it mean that the Croatian language was being 
“cleansed,” that the kuna was introduced as the country’s currency (as it had 
been in the fascist era), and that streets and public buildings were being re-
named after such people as the writer Mile Budak, the guiding spirit behind 
the persecution of the Serbs under Ante Pavelić?32
Nationalist Serbs came up with a simple antidote to the threatening in-
dependence of Croatia: if the Croats decided in favor of secession from the 
federation, the Serbs in Croatia would simply insist on remaining in Yugoslavia. 
After all, in the (so-called) Krajina, Serbs were in the majority and could count 
on strong allies on the other side of the Bosnia-Herzegovina border.
On 25 July 1990, just a few weeks after the parliament in Zagreb an-
nounced its declaration of sovereignty, the Serbs declared the “sovereignty and 
autonomy of the Serb people in Croatia.” They set up street blockades. “We 
saw many people from our village with arms,” remembered one contemporary. 
“Hunting rifles, but not weapons from the army. They gathered in the village 
center and discussed what to do at night. They were frightened that the Croats 
would come at night to kill Serbs.”33 In August of that year, policemen in Knin 
refused to hiss the hated šahovnica, thus igniting the first armed conflicts. 
When Croatia held a referendum on independence on 19 May 1991, Croatian 
Serbs initiated a boycott and voted in favor of remaining in Yugoslavia in a 
plebiscite that they had organized themselves. Incidents of armed conflict 
then occurred in Pakrac, in the Plitvice National Park, and in Borovo Selo.34
War on Their Minds
The less the political class was willing to compromise, the more the confronta-
tion was fought out in the media. The new rulers took control, especially of the 
state television.35 In October 1990, Yugoslav president Borisav Jović lamented 
“the wave of hatred and national prejudice” and the “open information and 
propaganda war” between the republics. “The media war has assumed such 
intensity that the opposing sides can be considered belligerents.”36
Like all other Yugoslav institutions, the media system was undergoing 
an internal process of disintegration. Previously, the Yugoslav broadcasting 
system had coordinated the eight studios operating in the republics, and each 
studio contributed its part to what was then compiled into a common pro-
gram. After a period of great disgruntlement occurred over problems with 
this coordination in the 1980s, the broadcast stations started to send their 
own correspondents to neighboring republics and to produce their own news. 
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In 1988, Zagreb and then Sarajevo pulled out of the nationwide television 
and radio cooperation. When the Serbs celebrated the 600th anniversary of 
the Battle of Kosovo in 1989 and Slobodan Milošević held a major speech in 
commemoration of it, eight different camera crews bustled about at the historic 
site of the Gazimestan monument in Kosovo. Each reported its own version 
of the events. Forgotten was the maxim on which Tito’s policy for dissemi-
nating information had been based, namely to criticize only the nationalism 
expressed in one’s own republic, not that in the others. Now the media was 
immersed in attacks on other ethnic groups, and clear enemy images were 
used to distinguish between “us” and “them.”37
The print press, radio, and television dedicated much of their reporting 
to historical topics, particularly to the atrocities of the Second World War. 
All sides gathered evidence with which to cultivate their own victimization 
and to incite a collective feeling of revenge. One example was the Serbian 
daily newspaper Politika in 1990 when it published headlines for stories on 
Croatia that read “1941 Started with the Same Methods!” and “The Genocide 
Is Not Allowed to Happen Again.” Likewise, the Croatian newspaper Vjesnik 
reported on a Serbian “doomsday plan” and Croatian television on “Chetnik 
Lunacy” in May 1991.38 The Serb writer Dobrica Ćosić said in a television 
broadcast in August 1991 that one of the greatest sins of his generation had 
been their wish to forget the crimes of the Ustasha regime.39 In 1990, the 
Bosnian politician Adil Zufilkarpašić repeatedly sought Muslims who wanted 
to take revenge for the events of 1942. “I . . . asked them, how they envisioned 
to do this — after all, we were now dealing with another generation, and the 
times were also different.”40 But it was difficult to argue against the main-
stream, when politicians, the media, clergy, and intellectuals were tooting 
the same horn.
However, public opinion was not at all dominated by outright enthusi-
asm for war. Instead, a yearning for normality was growing. In many areas, 
protests and demonstrations against intolerance and hate were held in 1990 
by women’s, youth, and veteran organizations, as well as the trade unions.41 
A poll taken in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar in May 1990 showed that 
a large majority hoped with fatalistic optimism that the crisis could be over-
come, and only a minority feared civil war.42 The public became gradually and 
rather subliminally attuned to war as somber metaphors crept into people’s 
vocabulary. Words like “fate,” “soul,” “martyr,” “exodus,” and “genocide” 
evoked a situation of existential threat in which the opposing sides seemed to 
be quarreling no longer over negotiable conflicts of interest, but over histor-
ically determined or strictly moral issues of principle. In January 1991, the 
leadership of Croatia announced apodictically that it would not negotiate any 
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solution that did not lead to independence, while the Serbian side proved to be 
no less stubborn in saying that they would not consider any option that would 
destroy the state of Yugoslavia.
No conflict must inevitably and unstoppably lead to catastrophe. At any 
time, immediately before and even after war broke out, there would have 
been opportunities to turn the ship around. But too many people were grimly 
prepared to assert the supposedly greater national interests at any price. In 
January 1991, the writer Slavenka Drakulić realized: “The war is already here. 
I know that now. It tricked me — it tricked us all. Its onset already lies in the 
fact that we expect it.”43
PART VI
the deMISe oF YugoSlavIa 
(1991 to the PreSent)

19.
The War of Succession  
(1991 to 1999)
The Diplomatic Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
On 25 June 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. 
Suddenly the international community was confronted with a number of con-
tentious issues. Did the actions of these two republics constitute unlawful 
secession or had Yugoslavia simply collapsed into its constituent parts? Were 
the borders between the republics international boundaries or were they only 
administrative divisions? Was an international armed conflict developing or 
a civil war?
That the path to independence would be clouded by violence had been 
obvious for months. After declaring independence, the Slovenes took the 
first step toward establishing an international border to Croatia, and in re-
sponse, the Yugoslav People’s Army occupied the border posts. Following the 
first armed confrontation, a “Ten-Day War” developed from which Slovenia 
emerged relatively unscathed, having lost eighteen soldiers, as opposed to 
forty-four dead JNA soldiers.1
Shocked representatives of the European Community managed to con-
vince Slovenia and Croatia to sign a ceasefire agreement on 7 July 1991 on 
the Adriatic island of Brioni. The republics also agreed to postpone their 
independence for three months and to start negotiations over the future of 
Yugoslavia and its eventual breakup. Subsequently, the Yugoslav govern-
ment ordered the pullback of its army on 18 July, which meant, in essence, 
the recognition of Slovenia’s independence. Ever since this “little war,” the 
two-million-people republic has been very proud that it repelled the attack 
of the powerful Yugoslav People’s Army through its superior war strategy.2 
However, Belgrade’s main concern at the time was not to prevent Slovenia’s 
independence but to keep the entire Serb population in a single nation state. 
Since very few Serbs lived in Slovenia, the conflict was quickly over.
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Already in the spring of 1991, isolated incidents of violent clashes 
between Croatian Serbs and Croatian police forces occurred in places like 
Plitvice and Borovo Selo. It was, however, not until after Croatia’s declara-
tion of independence on 25 June 1991 that larger armed conflicts erupted in 
the regions of Banija, Dalmatia, and Slavonia between Croatian armed forces, 
on the one hand, and the Yugoslav People’s Army and rebel Serb forces, on 
the other. The first mass killing of Croatian civilians and soldiers by local 
Serb units occurred in Kozibrod on 26 July 1991, followed by atrocities in 
other villages in Slavonia, Banija, and Dalmatia and in the town of Vukovar.
As key political and military leaders — including Serbia’s member of the 
federal presidency, Borisav Jović, and JNA admiral Branko Mamula — have 
acknowledged, plans were already in place in summer 1991 to create a new 
rump-Yugoslavia that encompassed Croatia’s and Bosnia’s Serb populations.3 
The People’s Army General Staff had decided to “defend” Serbs living in 
Croatia and to strive for full control over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another aim 
was to “create and defend a new Yugoslav state with those people who so 
desired it, currently the Serbs and the Montenegrins.”4
The Croatian government decided on 14 September 1991 to attack all 
garrisons of the People’s Army, which prompted the Yugoslav General Staff 
to respond by launching a major offensive from eastern Slavonia, expelling 
non-Serbs from the areas over which they took control.5 Yugoslav troops sur-
rounded the city of Vukovar and shelled its center. Serb paramilitary units 
invaded the city and its surrounding areas, leaving a bloody trail of horror 
behind them. For weeks, the baroque city suffered from massive bombard-
ment until, reduced to rubble, it surrendered in November. The historic city of 
Dubrovnik, “the pearl of the Adriatic,” was attacked in October 1991.6 Within 
a few weeks the embattled region came completely under the control of the 
rebellious Serbs. The Croat population, a total of more than half a million peo-
ple, were systematically driven out or fled. On 19 December 1991, President 
Milan Babić proclaimed the formation of the “Republic of Serb Krajina,” the 
capital of which was Knin.7
The international community had few tools for managing such a crisis at 
the time. International crisis management was still considered an inadmissi-
ble external intervention in the domestic affairs of another state. Moreover, 
international law was contradictory. On the one hand, the United Nations 
Charter protected a people’s right to self-determination, a right that Slovenia 
and Croatia invoked, but on the other, it obliged its members to safeguard sov-
ereignty and the territorial integrity of states, which is what Belgrade insisted 
on.8 However, the Yugoslav problem was not just a question of international 
law, it was also a political dilemma to which various answers could be found. 
Germany and Austria supported the efforts of the republics of Slovenia and 
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Croatia to become independent, while the UN Secretary General and the 
governments in London, Paris, and Washington wished to see the unity of 
Yugoslavia maintained. Although these positions seemed to be subliminally 
reminiscent of the loyalties to their First World War alliances, what Paris, 
London, and Moscow actually feared above all else was that the precedent 
being set by Slovenia and Croatia would trigger a chain reaction of declara-
tions of independence.
After Jacques Poos, foreign minister of Luxembourg, proclaimed rather 
grandiloquently that “this is the hour of Europe,” the European Community 
hosted a peace conference in The Hague on 7 September 1991. Yet all at-
tempts to mediate and all threats of sanctions came to nothing.9 Innumerable 
ceasefires were broken. It was not until Cyrus Vance, special envoy of the 
UN secretary-general, proposed to send Blue Helmets into the disputed areas 
in November 1991 that the Yugoslav People’s Army pulled out of Croatia. 
Following a UN-brokered truce in January 1992, an international United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed a month later in those 
areas in Croatia where Serbs constituted the majority or a substantial minority 
of the population, with the aim of preparing for a political solution to this 
conflict.10 Although many refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
could return to their places of origin, the number of Croats living within the 
Krajina had fallen from 353,595 to 18,200 by 1993–1994. On the other hand, 
tens of thousands of Serbs fled Croatia. By mid-October 1991, 78,555 refugees 
from Croatia had arrived in Serbia.11
Contrary to his Luxembourgian counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
the German foreign minister, thought in the spring of 1991 that Yugoslavia 
had already effectively broken apart into its constitutive parts, which was 
why the independence of Slovenia and Croatia were not to be seen as acts 
of secession violating international law but as legitimate legal acts. For this 
reason he sought to gain formal recognition of the two new states, especially 
since the German foreign ministry (as well as Austria’s foreign office) believed 
that the Yugoslav People’s Army could be deterred from undertaking larger 
military actions if the conflict was internationalized.12 However, in London 
and Paris it was feared that a diplomatic fait accompli would only heat up the 
crisis militarily, since formal recognition would then deprive the international 
community of its only diplomatic leverage for an overall political solution. On 
23 December 1991, Bonn duped its partners by officially recognizing Slovenia 
and Croatia unilaterally. The German public was disturbed to witness war and 
the plight of the refugees in neighboring regions, and media like the newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung never tired of condemning what they called 
Serbian-Orthodox barbarism, against which the Catholic countries of Slovenia 
and Croatia had to defend themselves. Following decades of reticence and 
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restraint in international relations, the German government also saw this crisis 
as the first favorable moment since its own reunification in 1990 to assume 
a more prominent role on the stage of international politics, one that corre-
sponded to Germany’s economic stature. For the sake of political unity, there 
was little else the other European countries could do but follow suit, which 
they did by formally recognizing Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992.13
Germany’s unilateral action created facts on the ground and left a bitter 
aftertaste among its European partners,14 and the internationalization of the 
Yugoslavia problem had all but the desired effect. After Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was formally recognized on 6 April 1992, the deterrence strategy failed. In 
a type of blitzkrieg, Bosnian Serb armed forces, supported by the JNA, con-
quered the greater part of Bosnian territory within weeks. The now rather 
sheepish Germans had to bear the brunt of the fierce criticism leveled against 
them by their allies.15 Later, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) 
would spill into Kosovo (1998–1999) and Macedonia (2001).
To what degree did Germany’s foreign policy contribute to the approach-
ing disaster? Certainly the timing and circumstances of its formal recognition 
were poorly considered. Why should Slovenes and Croats be permitted to 
exercise the right to self-determination, but not the Serbs in Croatia and 
Bosnia or the Albanians in Kosovo? Why were no plans drawn up to provide 
humanitarian relief for the very probable case of the outbreak of war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, when all signs pointed in the fall of 1991 to an armed conflict? 
The policy of recognition aimed to appease the German public and neglected 
the wider regional dimensions of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The further 
course of events revealed, with disastrous consequences, the contradictions 
of the German approach. According to its constitutional law, Germany was 
barred from using its armed forces “out of area,” that is, for purposes other 
than self-defense. Thus, it could not provide any military cover to non-NATO 
members such as the Yugoslav successor states. To think that other govern-
ments would deploy their military and thereby risk the lives of many soldiers 
for a policy they considered wrong was unrealistic. That said, it is more than 
questionable that diplomatic means would have been able by this point to 
prevent or even effectively contain the war, in light of the determination of 
actors on the ground to use military force.
War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
During the bombardment of Dubrovnik and Vukovar, the Bosnian government 
in Sarajevo was deeply concerned about the future of its multiethnic republic. 
According to the 1991 census, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina totaled 
4.37 million, of which 43.5 percent were Muslims, 31.2 percent Serbs, 17.4 per-
cent Croats, and 5.5 percent Yugoslavs. The remaining 2.4 percent consisted 
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of numerous other nationalities. Not a single municipality was homogenous, 
and clear ethnic boundaries did not exist. Therefore, at first the Bosnian co-
alition government backed the idea to reform Yugoslavia, but not to dissolve 
it. Following the German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, this option 
seemed obsolete. Bosnian Croats and Muslims did not want to remain in a 
Serb-dominated Yugoslav rump state, and the Bosnian Serb leadership took 
steps toward forming autonomous areas with quasi-state powers.
On 14 October 1991, the Muslim SDA and the Croat HDZ-BiH party 
groups in Bosnia’s parliament drafted a resolution for independence against 
the votes of the Serb SDS. The incensed Serbs then quit the coalition and, in 
protest, refused to participate any longer in the institutions. Reminiscent of 
what happened at the Yugoslav federal level in 1989/1990, all of the repub-
lic’s institutions and organizations split into ethnic components, including 
parliament, city councils, factory assemblies, the media, and security forces. 
In one public speech, Radovan Karadžić, the Serb political leader, called for 
ethnic segregation “like in Turkish times.”16 On 24 December 1991, Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s rump government successfully petitioned the European 
Community for official recognition, along with Macedonia, Slovenia, and 
Croatia.17 In contrast, Montenegro decided to remain united with Serbia. In 
1992, the two republics formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
Starting in the fall of 1991, Bosnian Serbs worked on their transition 
to independence in much the same way as their fellow Serbs in Croatia did. 
In November, they held an illegal plebiscite to remain in Yugoslavia and on 
9 January 1992, proclaimed the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Republika srpskog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine; later, the Serb 
Republic, Republika Srpska) which was to include all municipalities, local 
communities, and populated places in which over 50 percent of the Serbs had 
voted in the plebiscite to remain in Yugoslavia.
In accordance with the terms set by the European Community for the 
recognition of new states, the Bosnian government organized a referendum on 
independence, held on 29 February and 1 March 1992, which the Serbs boy-
cotted, as was expected. Voter participation in this referendum still reached 
nearly 64 percent, of which 99 percent voted in favor of independence. On 6 
April 1992, the anniversary of the German attack on Yugoslavia in 1941 and 
the day of the liberation of Sarajevo in 1945, Bosnia-Herzegovina was offi-
cially recognized by the European Community as a sovereign state. The next 
day, the Bosnian Serbs then declared their own independence.18
Prior to these events, local skirmishes had already occurred. Both SDS 
and SDA members erected barricades and checkpoints in Sarajevo in order to 
take control of strategic buildings, military equipment, and city quarters. The 
first shooting began on 5 April, out of which extensive gunfire and shelling 
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developed on both sides. Violent clashes also occurred in many other parts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in early April 1992 and quickly escalated into a major 
armed conflict. Once independence was declared, the armed forces of the 
Bosnian Serbs, aided by the Yugoslav People’s Army, launched an assault 
and first overran eastern Bosnia along the Drina River, the northern Posavina 
corridor, eastern Herzegovina, and Bosnian Krajina, thereby creating a terri-
torial bridge between Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. General Ratko 
Mladić ordered his 250,000-man army to drive the non-Serb population out of 
the areas they conquered.19 Within a couple of months, hundreds of thousands 
of people were on the move, and several tens of thousands were killed. The 
100,000 soldiers from the Bosnian Muslim Territorial Defense Force and the 
SDA-loyal paramilitary troops were poorly armed and thus unable to stop the 
Serbs. By July 1992, barely four months after the outbreak of war, the Serb 
para-state controlled more than two-thirds of the Bosnian territory.20
In many regions, such as in the Eastern Bosnian town of Foča, where the 
Chetniks, the Ustashas, and Muslim militias had committed some of the worst 
atrocities of the Second World War, people experienced an eerie feeling of 
déjà-vu. Although half of the town’s population were Bosniaks, the Bosnian-
Serb leadership declared the town to be part of their new state in the fall of 
1991. The region was remote and impoverished but important for the war due 
to its strategic location and transportation routes. On 8 April 1991, the Serb 
forces began shelling the town with grenades and artillery and conquered it 
a few days later.
Paramilitary units and volunteers like Arkan’s Tigers, Vojislav Šešelj’s 
Chetniks, and the White Eagles combed the streets and houses. They forced 
men and women to line up, then systematically separated and herded them 
into camps. The paramilitary bands revived practices known from the Second 
World War: the men were driven to the bridges, shot, and their bodies thrown 
into the river. Within a few weeks, nearly the entire Bosniak population had 
been driven out. The towns of Zvornik, Višegrad, Bijeljina, and many other 
locations were the scenes of similarly cruel and severe crimes.21
The Serb forces thoroughly encircled Sarajevo and maintained the siege 
on the city for forty-four torturous months until the war ended. From the hills 
surrounding Sarajevo, they shelled the city incessantly, sometimes showering 
it with as many as 500 grenades per hour. Snipers arbitrarily gunned down 
civilians when they went out to get water, stood in line for food, sat in the 
streetcar, or simply walked down the street. “We had been encircled . . . from 
all sides. . . . Everybody shot at us constantly, like beasts. They were trying to 
kill as many of us as they could.” A man living in Sarajevo at the time, Bakir 
Nakaš, described how he managed to survive: “We managed to get by using 
only a litre of drinking water every day. We got used to it. We got used to 
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living, getting on without electricity, without drinking water. . . . Every day on 
your way to work you ran the risk of being killed or injured.”22 Sheer survival 
became the central objective of the entire city.
Although Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina had established 
joint command structures and had been fighting side by side against the Serbs 
since the start of the war, relations deteriorated in the autumn of 1992 when 
disputes arose over the future constitution of the independent state. The na-
tionalist wing of the Croat HDZ party, centered in Herzegovina, advocated 
the unification of areas settled by Croats with Croatia. In November 1991 the 
autonomous region Herceg Bosna was formed and declared to be a separate 
state on 3 July 1992.23 Its army, the Croatian Defense Council, now began 
to conquer areas in which the majority of the population were Muslims. In 
October 1992, the so-called “war within the war” broke out between these 
two former allies, resulting in serious violations of international humanitarian 
law against civilians on both sides. Franjo Tudjman, who did not preclude 
the idea of annexing Herzegovina for Croatia, sent troops to support his fel-
low countrymen militarily.24 After a meeting between the Croatian president 
and Slobodan Milošević in Karadjordjevo on 25 March 1991, evidence grew 
stronger that Zagreb and Belgrade might reach an agreement on the division 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a heavy toll to the Muslims.25
The “war within the war” changed the world’s image of Croatia as an 
innocent victim of Serb aggression and caused outright perplexity in the West. 
The fighting between the former allies caused horrendous destruction in cen-
tral Bosnia and in Herzegovina, for which the demolition of the historic town 
of Mostar, including the famous sixteenth-century Old Bridge, by the Croatian 
Defense Council remains symbolic. Not until March 1994 could international 
mediators settle the conflict and commit the adversaries to the formation of a 
common state entity, the mutually disliked Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Yet, the fighting continued in many regions.
“Ethnic Cleansing”
As the war expanded, a form of mass atrocity thought to be forgotten sud-
denly confronted the shocked world community: “ethnic cleansing.” This 
euphemism stood for the planned and violent removal of undesired population 
groups from conquered territory, be it through deportation, displacement, or 
annihilation, as had occurred during the nineteenth century, the Balkan Wars, 
and the Second World War.26
There is no doubt whatsoever that “ethnic cleansing” took place in a 
systematic and planned way. The regional context, the systematic implemen-
tation, and the summation of the results preclude any other conclusion except 
that homogenization was not a side effect of war but its main objective.27 
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Approximately 70 percent of the expulsions, involving more than 2.2 mil-
lion people, had already occurred between April and August 1992, during 
which time Serb armed forces attacked thirty-seven municipalities, most 
notably Zvornik, Bratunac, Vlasenica, Višegrad, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Ključ, 
and municipalities along the Sava River Valley. In total, approximately 850 
Bosniak- and Croat-occupied villages were obliterated, and entire families 
disappeared. Roma and Romani communities were also heavily affected.28
“Ethnic cleansing” was sought after politically, prepared by adminis-
trative bodies, and carried out within the framework of military operations 
by special forces of the regular army or by paramilitary units. Very similar 
to what occurred during the Second World War, the attackers tortured and 
massacred civilians, and burned down houses and entire villages. The aim of 
“ethnic cleansing” was to reinforce claims to the conquered territory and to 
create there an unequivocal power structure.29
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
was able to prove later that the political preparation of mass expulsion in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina dated back to the first half of 1991 when the Bosnian 
Serbs, led by the SDS, decided to form a separate state and to arm their fellow 
countrymen. When the parliament dissolved in October 1991, ethnic segrega-
tion was already evident. In December 1991, the so-called crisis staffs (later 
war presidencies) began to convene as extraordinary administrative bodies, 
which took steps in preparation for the separation of the ethnic groups. After 
the Bosnian-Serb parliament proclaimed the founding of the Republic of the 
Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992, the new bodies 
brought the claimed regions systematically under their control starting in late 
March. Ethnic exclusion was a key organizing principle of the new state; 
Muslims, Croats, and other non-Serbs were not wanted there.30
The ethnic composition of many municipalities changed radically. For 
instance, in 1991, Bosniaks and Croats made up 51 percent of the population 
in the eastern Bosnian town of Foča, but by the end of the war, this figure 
had dropped to only 3.8 percent. Overall, four-fifths of all non-Serbs were 
driven out of the territory of the Republika Srpska during the three and a 
half years of war. As a result, in thirty-seven municipalities the share of non-
Serbs fell from 726,960 (53.97 percent) in 1991 to 235,015 (36.39 percent) in 
1997, whereas the number of non-Serbs in the Croat-Bosniak–held territory in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had increased by 41.18 percent. Altogether, the number 
of non-Serbs in the areas that now form the Republika Srpska had fallen by 
81.74 percent.31 Whereas most incidents of “ethnic cleansing” were attributed 
to the Bosnian Serbs at the beginning of the war, the Croat and Bosniak armed 
forces also started in 1993 to homogenize the regions they conquered in order 
to consolidate territorial gains.32 According to estimates made by the Office 
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of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Serb 
population fell between 1991 and mid-1994 from 43,595 to 5,000 in Western 
Hercegovina; from 79,355 to 20,000 in the Zenica region; from 82,235 to 
23,000 in the Tuzla area; and from 29,398 to 1,609 in the Bihać region.33 Yet, 
a clear majority of the dead and displaced were Bosniaks.
In the spring of 1992, the world was alarmed when photographs became 
public of Serb prisoner of war camps that resembled concentration camps, 
such as Omarska, Keraterm, and Manjača. Experts would later compile a 
list of about 400 prisons, police stations, schools, warehouses, or factories in 
which the warring sides interned men, women, and children under inhumane 
conditions. On the heels of these revelations came shocking reports of mass 
executions and mass rapes, torture and mutilation. “Bosnia” became the code 
word for an extreme brutalization of the war — and of the guilty conscience of 
the international community.
The more numerous and defiant the unwanted population groups were 
in a region, the more brutal were the measures taken against them. “Ethnic 
cleansing” was sometimes carried out through intimidation and discrimina-
tion, sometimes by way of detention and deportation or by torture and mass 
murder. Civilians were deliberately attacked and humiliated. Acts of savagery 
laden with symbolism and methods of killing and mutilating known to have 
been used throughout history intensified the feelings of indignity, intimida-
tion, and fear not only among those experiencing it, but also among all those 
who had to witness it or heard about it: Muslims were forced to recite Christian 
prayers; women were publicly raped; people were tortured by having religious 
symbols scratched into their skins — practices that evoke cultural patterns and 
symbolic codes.
Part of the logic behind the permanent usurpation of territory was to 
thoroughly eradicate the basis of existence for the unwanted populations, so 
that they would never return. Houses, neighborhoods, town centers, and in-
frastructure were targeted for complete destruction. All cultural evidence of 
these groups were also to disappear, which explains why the historic centers 
of cities were deliberately shelled and churches, mosques, cemeteries, librar-
ies, archives, and other buildings were destroyed. Nearly every mosque and 
three out of four Catholic churches were damaged or completely demolished 
during the war. Orthodox churches and monasteries were also targeted for at-
tack.34 Therefore, “ethnic cleansing” was not only directed against the physical 
presence of people, but also against sociocultural systems, meaning against 
institutions, identities, collective memory, and life worlds. The idea of turning 
these claimed regions into independent and homogeneously Serbian territory 
was supported in Belgrade.35 This would later lead, for the first time in history, 
to the trial of a former head of state — President Slobodan Milošević — before 
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an international criminal tribunal on the charges of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, and violations of the 
laws or customs of war. The main counts against him were related to his 
command authority over the Yugoslav People’s Army, which was involved “in 
the planning, preparation, facilitation and execution of the forcible removal of 
the majority of non-Serbs.” The indictment also accused him of supporting the 
political leadership and armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs, participating in the 
planning and execution of “ethnic cleansing” operations, supporting irregular 
forces, and manipulating the media. Charges of genocide and complicity to 
commit genocide included the mass killings in Srebrenica and murder or mis-
treatment of Bosnian Muslims in detention facilities. Milošević’s unexpected 
death in 2006 at the detainment center in The Hague during the proceedings 
brought a sudden end to his trial.36
Yet, there is ample evidence that the Yugoslav People’s Army logisti-
cally supported the campaign for a separate Serb state by providing supplies 
of arms and gasoline. As many as 2,000 of its soldiers fought alongside the 
Bosnian-Serb forces, and various Yugoslav officers served under their com-
mand. Special operation units of the Serbian ministry of internal affairs, 
such as the “Red Berets,” also operated on Bosnian territory.37 In February 
2007, the International Court of Justice rejected the appeal made by Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1993 to apply the charge of genocide against Serbia. But the 
judges did find that Belgrade had not used its influence to prevent the serious 
mass crimes perpetrated in its neighboring state.38
The Perpetrators
In every society people exist who voluntarily commit crimes. Whether due to 
narcissistic personality disorders or sadistic dispositions, these people expe-
rience a feeling of exuberance and liberation in their actions. The snipers of 
Sarajevo, for example, enjoyed putting victims in their crosshairs and having 
an unbridled power over life and death, as one of them stated in an interview. 
Among the volunteers in the special operations units were many who were 
filled with hatred toward an envisioned enemy, enjoyed killing, or simply 
craved the business of war. The warlords attracted social outsiders, petty crim-
inals, hooligans, and weekend fighters who saw the war as an adventure or a 
way to earn extra income.39
However, the widespread expulsion on the scale experienced in Bosnia 
was only possible because thousands of “ordinary men,” and very few 
women, participated in these crimes alongside those who were predisposed 
to violence.40 The International Criminal Tribune for the former Yugoslavia 
estimates that 15,000 to 20,000 people participated in planning, administering 
and executing “ethnic cleansing,” including members of the political leader-
ship, the bureaucracy, the police, and the military, who acted on their own or 
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carried out the instructions of their superiors. Many described later that they 
experienced the war as a matter of defense in which killing was a necessary 
evil.41 A sense of duty, an ideal of masculinity, and group pressure interacted 
here. “There was no choice,” testified the Serb commander Dragan Obrenović. 
“You could be either a soldier or a traitor. . . . We didn’t even notice how we 
were drawn into the vortex of interethnic hatred.” 42 Others were driven by 
delusion, a sense of duty, opportunism, fear, sadism, or greed. Exhaustion, 
stress, and alcohol led to emotional deadening and lowered inhibitions. The 
police chief of Bosanski Šamac, Stevan Todorović, simply lost his nerve in 
the face of the daily artillery shelling, the mountain of corpses, and the plight 
of refugees. He was scared, panicky, and became an alcoholic. In this condi-
tion, he paid little attention to the butchery carried out by his subordinates.43 
Many defended their actions on the reasoning that they were simply carrying 
out their superior’s orders, similar to the excuses of German executioners 
from the Second World War. Dražan Erdemović, a 23-year-old executioner 
in Srebrenica, emphasized that he had fled from the executions at the first 
available opportunity. Allegedly he did not kill willingly.44
Amid all this, individuals still had leeway and opportunity to make their 
own choices. Grozdana Ćećez, a Serb woman who was raped every evening 
by her Muslim guards at the Čelebići camp, tried to ward off the attacks by 
humiliating her abusers with the question: “I could be your mother . . . don’t 
you have a mother?” The effect varied. Only one of the men was embarrassed, 
apologized, and left without having done what he had come for. Others, how-
ever, were not halted by her words, including one of her husband’s former work 
colleagues and one of her son’s classmates.45
Perpetrators found it easier to justify their own actions if they could re-
sort to symbolic forms of legitimation. The president of the Serb Republic in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Biljana Plavšić, expressed remorse and referred to her 
obsession over time with experiences and memories from the Second World 
War.46 Radovan Karadžić reached into the prop box of folklore to proclaim 
himself the descendant of the linguistic scholar Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and 
had himself filmed in a bizarre pose wearing historical costume. Hajduks, the 
Robin Hoods of the Balkans during the Ottoman era, were depicted as the role 
models for the warlords. Whoever took part in the battles were perpetuating 
the historical fight and carrying on the tradition of heroic deeds that had been 
celebrated in oral history for generations.47
The Media and the Escalation of Violence
The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia came to the conclusion that the 
media was guilty of contributing significantly to the brutalization of the war. 
Radio, television, and the printed press created enemy images and stereotypes, 
spread rumors and untruths, provoked fear, hate, and revenge, and broke down 
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moral barriers. They resorted to well-tested propaganda strategies to give 
the war the necessary psychological underpinning, especially by portraying 
everything as black or white, by demonizing the enemy, by ignoring, exag-
gerating, and falsifying information, by drawing parallels between current 
occurrences and historic events and myths, by using hateful language and 
constantly repeating the same messages.48 The authors of a study on media 
communication noted correctly that the Yugoslav war was “the mere contin-
uation of the evening news by military means.”49
Since the motto “no pictures, no news” prevailed in the media age, 
the warring parties hired professional public relations agencies abroad to 
promote their cause. Alone in the United States, they signed at least 157 
contracts with partners between 1991 and 2002, a figure that most certainly 
represents just the tip of the iceberg. Among the jobs to be done, for exam-
ple, was to improve the image of Slovenia and Croatia as Western European 
countries or to equate the Serbs with Nazis.50 Thanks to satellite technology 
and digital recording, editing, and transmission capabilities, international 
news channels — especially CNN, BBC, and later Al Jazeera — brought im-
ages of the war directly from the crisis regions to the rest of the world, 
thereby mobilizing a global civil society calling for humanitarian and mil-
itary intervention.51
Hate-filled tirades appeared in the media on all sides, making it soon hard 
to distinguish between true and false. In the Serbian evening news, an alarmed 
public learned that Muslim extremists had supposedly fed Serb children to 
the lions in the Sarajevo zoo. More dangerous than such horror myths were 
the many unverifiable, one-sided, or falsified news stories about events that 
sounded plausible, such as the report that Bosnian troops were shelling their 
own civilian population in Sarajevo in order to place the blame on the Serbs.52 
German politicians were also tricked into believing a bogus report or two, 
including one in which Serb doctors were said to be implanting dog fetuses 
into Bosniak women. Such stories not only perpetuated repulsive images of 
the enemy, they also appealed to forms of media voyeurism.53
The war allowed aggression to be acted out openly and provided a frame-
work in which violent acts were suddenly wanted, encouraged, and socially 
sanctioned.54 Under exceptional conditions, people can certainly be tempted 
into committing deeds that they never would do under peaceful circumstances. 
This makes it almost impossible to maintain friendly neighborly relations in 
wartime. Once war has erupted, it becomes the source for a vicious cycle of 
never-ending violence. It alters ideas, emotions, aims, behavior, and identities 
of people from the ground up. People who are otherwise respectable citizens 
may carry out personal vendettas under the guise of higher national interests 
and thus attribute a type of private meaning to the war, and this may even 
prompt acquaintances to go after one another.55
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Insecurity and anxiety are the most important means by which to trans-
form ethnic distance and latent nationalism into open antagonism. The 1993 
British documentary We Are All Neighbors shows how uncertainty and fear, 
rumors and media disinformation, followed by the first violent incidents and 
finally the outbreak of war, turned peaceful coexistence into distrust, then 
rejection, and eventually hate. In a village not far from Kiseljak in central 
Bosnia, life seemed to be rather normal in 1993. As long as the artillery fire 
was only to be heard faintly in the distance, Croats and Muslims met for coffee 
as usual. No one believed that anything could change the good neighborly re-
lations. But the more the war interfered with daily life and the closer the front 
approached the village, the more uneasy people began to feel. By the time the 
first refugees arrived, people were talking about “us” and “them.” Visits with 
one another became less frequent; some no longer greeted the others. Out of 
doubt grew distrust, out of insecurity developed fear, and out of that, betrayal. 
When Croat troops were about to launch an attack on the village and therefore 
warned the local Croats, not one gathered up enough courage to inform their 
Muslim neighbors. All Muslims could do once the assault started was to tear 
out of town head over heels under a shower of grenades.56
Similar examples of crumbling solidarity could be observed everywhere 
as people became fearful of losing their homes or their lives.57 In mid-1991, 
the Croat Witness E reported that, shortly before the assault on Vukovar, his 
Serb friends left town. Why, he asked them. “They would shrug their shoul-
ders and they would say, ‘We believe you will see it soon too.’ ” 58 Witness DD, 
whose husband and two sons were murdered in the massacres in Srebrenica, 
described the relationship to her Serb acquaintances: “We were friends, in 
fact. We went to have coffee at each other’s houses. And if we were working 
on something, we would help one another. We would help them, and they 
would help us.” She later saw one of these neighbors standing among the 
soldiers who took away her 14-year-old son, who was never seen again. At 
that moment she remembered that many Serb women and children had left 
the area a few days before the attack. “Then someone asked, ‘Where are you 
going? What’s happening?’ . . . Their answer was very vague. ‘Some fools 
could come along and do who knows what.’ . . . And we were wondering. Until 
then, they didn’t do anything wrong. They didn’t hurt us and, of course, we 
didn’t hurt them either.”59
Containment Policy
While public opinion in the West favored military intervention in light of the 
horrific images from Bosnia that flicked across people’s television screens ev-
ery evening, political leaders remained reticent. Die for Sarajevo? Politicians 
and military experts knew that it would not be enough to simply make threat-
ening gestures, but they feared the risks of deploying ground troops.60 Nor 
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was there any hope that an intervention could offer political solutions since 
the warring parties had already rejected one peace plan after another.
Because the war continued to escalate, the credibility and reputation of the 
international community in dealing with Yugoslavia suffered. Miscalculations 
and delayed reactions as well as conflicting national interests and evaluations 
prevented the West from presenting a united front and made it look thoroughly 
helpless, disoriented, and devoid of any overall concept on how to cope with 
the situation. An army of special envoys, diplomats, and military experts 
scurried around just trying to catch up with the tumultuous events, hundreds 
of ceasefires were broken, and the heads of state of the world’s greatest pow-
ers exposed themselves to public ridicule by arrogant provincial politicians 
from the Balkans. Not only did the international community lack the political 
will to form a united approach, it also possessed no effective instruments of 
conflict management.61
For all these reasons, the international community limited itself to de-
veloping a strategy of humanitarian relief and containment. It imposed an 
arms embargo and commissioned the United Nations in Sarajevo with the 
distribution of food and medicine. Serbia and Montenegro, which had united 
as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, were punished in May 1992 with com-
prehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions. In February 1993, the UN 
Security Council established the International Criminal Court for the Former 
Yugoslavia to prosecute the worst war crimes.62
In light of the relatively weak response from the West, the Bosnian 
government received support from the Islamic world. Hundreds of millions 
of U.S. dollars are thought to have been spent between 1992 and 1995 on 
illegal weapon sales. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Indonesia were 
particularly prominent sponsors. Radical, violence-prone groups from abroad 
also arrived in the embattled region, including up to five thousand Iranian, 
Afghani, and Saudi mujahideen fighters who joined the Bosniak armed forc-
es.63 Although conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran, between the Sunnis 
and Shiites, stood in the way of a unified Islamic policy, pan-Islamic solidarity 
was strengthened. This encouraged the re-Islamization of Bosnian Muslims, 
who felt abandoned by the West.64
Brutal “ethnic cleansing” continued to force thousands of people to flee to 
the cities, where unsustainable conditions had prevailed for months. Therefore, 
the UN Security Council declared Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, 
and Bihać “safe areas” in April and May 1993. Lightly armed Blue Helmet 
peacekeeping forces were to provide humanitarian aid under the protection 
of possible NATO air strikes. The concept of the safe areas revealed serious 
flaws from day one, starting with the fact that peacekeepers were being sent 
into a region in which there was no peace to keep. The rules of their deploy-
ment referred to consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, and nonuse of 
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force except in self-defense. The Blue Helmets therefore did not have either 
the mandate or equipment and arms necessary for active battle. “Knowing that 
any other course of action would jeopardize the lives of the troops, we tried 
to create — or imagine — an environment in which the tenets of peacekeep-
ing . . . could be upheld,” stated UN secretary-general Kofi Annan later.65 The 
Security Council passed more than 200 resolutions to stitch together a complex 
and contradictory mandate, the boundaries of which were incomprehensible 
to all. Where did this mandate start, where did it end? Ultimately, the tragedy 
was that the term “safe area” duped the population into believing these areas 
offered a measure of protection that actually never existed. Furthermore, there 
was an extreme disparity between the UN’s aims and its resources: instead of 
the 34,000 soldiers demanded by UN headquarters to man the six designated 
safe areas, the UN member states only sent 7,500 soldiers to serve.66
Meanwhile, the possibility of “humanitarian intervention” was being de-
bated throughout the West. These debates between advocates and opponents 
of such intervention were particularly controversial in Germany, where the 
central question was whether Germany should and could participate in mili-
tary operations abroad in the future, although these were expressly prohibited 
by the constitution. Because the German air force had been participating in 
the international airlift to Sarajevo since July 1992, members of Germany’s 
Liberal and Social Democratic parties turned to the Constitutional Court in 
April 1993. The judges ruled on 12 July 1994 that Germany could take part 
in peacekeeping missions without having to first amend the constitution, as 
long as parliament approved the mission by simple majority. Step by step, the 
self-imposed limitation on military involvement that had prevailed in Germany 
since 1945 gave way to a greater acceptance of the idea to deploy German 
troops abroad and to assume a new foreign policy role in world politics.67
Srebrenica
On the morning of 11 July 1995, Bosnian-Serb army and police units stormed 
the safe area of Srebrenica, which had been under artillery fire for days. 
Although the president of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, had ordered 
the removal of the Muslim population from the enclaves of Srebrenica and 
Žepa back on 8 March, the attack caught the 150 Dutch UN troops deployed 
there completely by surprise.68 During the torturous July days that followed, 
as many as 8,200 men and boys were systematically executed by Serb forces, 
making the Srebrenica massacres the first legally recognized genocide on 
European soil since 1945. In a tragic way, this incident symbolized the belated, 
helpless, and fully inadequate response of the West.
From the standpoint of the Bosnian Serbs, there were many reasons to 
attack the city. They viewed eastern Bosnia as ancient Serbian territory, the 
Drina River as an “internal river” and not a “border,” as General Mladić 
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expressed it. “The main obstacle today is Srebrenica with which the Germans 
and Americans, who defend it, want to fix Serbia’s border at the Drina,” he said 
in addressing his soldiers. “It is your task to prevent this.”69 In the summer of 
1995, Mladić’s troops controlled all of eastern Bosnia with the exception of 
a few enclaves, while the Bosnian army only launched attacks periodically 
against the regions surrounding what were actually demilitarized safe areas. 
Bosniak troops had grown increasingly strong since 1994, had retaken regions, 
and were preparing to break the siege of Sarajevo in the summer of 1995. In 
this context, the Bosnian military pulled soldiers out of Srebrenica, a clear in-
dication that they did not intend to make a serious effort to defend the enclave. 
Furthermore, the Serbs could count on encountering no resistance from the 
UN peacekeeping troops. That spring a precedent had been set in Croatia in 
which the Croatian army had overrun the UN safe area in western Slavonia 
and driven out the Serb population living there. Last but not least, contempt 
and revenge against the balija, a derogatory term for Muslims, played a role 
after Muslim militias had caused a bloodbath in the villages of Glogova and 
Kravica on the Orthodox Christmas Eve of 1993. “Kad, tad ” — sooner or later, 
Serbs vowed, there would be revenge.70
A dangerous concoction of strategic scheming, nationalist incitement, and 
outright vengefulness was brewing as Mladić’s men waited for an opportunity 
for the ultimate reckoning with the Muslims. In the preceding months, thou-
sands had flown to the safe area from the large territories under Serb control. 
Instead of 9,000 people, there were now 30,000 people in the city — another 
reason why the UN military experts believed that Srebrenica could not be 
taken by force. General Mladić assessed the situation differently and assumed 
that he could force the city to surrender without a major battle by placing it 
under siege. However, contrary to expectations, Muslim soldiers, along with a 
good number of the male population, decided to break out of town during the 
night of 11 July. This made the Serbs hopping mad. It was then, at the latest, 
that Mladić must have given the order to massacre as many men and boys as 
they could find. Following the assault on the city, his troops captured all those 
seeking protection on the grounds of the UN compound in Potočari or hiding 
in the surrounding woods. Thousands were taken away in buses, packed into 
empty school buildings or warehouses, and then slaughtered like livestock or 
systematically executed.
The 17-year-old Witness O, who was able to escape, severely injured, 
after a mass shooting on the morning of 15 July 1995, recounted the events 
of that night: “The situation was chaotic. We were all tied up. . . . the firing 
started, and then they would call out people in groups of five. . . . And when it 
was my turn . . . we were told to find a place for us, . . . when we were on the 
right-hand side of the truck, I saw rows of killed people. It looked like they 
had been lined up one row after the other. . . . And when we reached the spot, 
 The War of Succession (1991 to 1999)  313
somebody said, ‘Lie down.’ And when we started to fall down to the front, 
they were behind our backs, the shooting started. . . . I felt pain in the right 
side of my chest . . . . I was waiting for another bullet to come and hit me and 
I was waiting to die. . . . I don’t know how long it took. They kept bringing 
people up. . . . Once they had finished, somebody said that all the dead should 
be inspected . . . and if they find a warm body, they should fire one more bullet 
into their head.”71 Miraculously, Witness O was overlooked, so that he was 
later able to crawl away on all fours into the forest.
Both the UN and the government of the Netherlands promised to in-
vestigate and report their findings on the greatest mass murder of postwar 
European history to a shocked world. Their reports placed responsibility on 
many shoulders:72 the UN Security Council, for limiting its involvement to 
containment and choosing a peacekeeping mission that was not implementable 
and based on an ill-conceived concept of safe areas; the UN member states, for 
sending too few, poorly trained, and insufficiently equipped Blue Helmets into 
a highly dangerous operation; the imprudent UN commanders in Srebrenica 
who did not have serious reconnaissance equipment at their disposal, for eval-
uating the situation quite falsely up to the bitter end and for not concerning 
themselves with the fate of those taken prisoner by the Serbs after the town 
fell; the headquarters of the UN peacekeeping forces in Zagreb, for turning 
down requests by the UN troops on site for NATO air power; and the defense 
minister of the Netherlands, for supporting that decision because he feared 
reprisals against fifty-five of his soldiers who served as Blue Helmets and who 
were being held hostage by the Serbs. Yet, with all that said, incidents of mass 
murder on this scale far exceeded what most people could have imagined.
The Dayton Peace Accord
NATO had been bombing Serb positions on a limited scale since the brutal 
mortar attack on the Markale market in Sarajevo on 6 February 1994, in which 
at least 68 people were killed and 197 injured. But the Srebrenica massacre 
became a clarion call to action for the West, and the alliance started a cam-
paign of massive bombardment. With the help of foreign arms shipments and 
American military advisers, the Croatian and Bosniak armed forces became 
more professionally run, improved their military clout, and could seriously 
challenge the previously superior Bosnian Serb army.73 The myth of Serb 
invincibility was definitely shattered when the Croatian army overran the 
UN safe area in western Slavonia in May 1995 and finally conquered the 
so-called Republic of Serb Krajina in its Operation oluja (Storm) in August 
1995, thereby driving away 150,000 to 200,000 Serbs. In cars, buses, and 
horse-drawn wagons, tens of thousands of men, women, and children fled 
head over heels, with barely any time to gather together the bare necessities. 
Once the political leadership also bolted, the statelet collapsed altogether. The 
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Serbs only managed to hold onto an area in eastern Slavonia that was later 
reincorporated peacefully into Croatia. As far as it was concerned, Zagreb 
had thus solved the “Serb question” permanently. Very few of the displaced 
Serbs returned to their homes when the war ended.74
All of these factors led to a military standoff in mid-1995. Bosnian Serbs 
and Croat-Muslim troops each controlled about half of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. That fall, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke presented an 
agreement that he intended to bulldoze through. For three weeks, the pres-
idents and the delegations from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia 
were housed in a lockdown situation at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near 
Dayton, Ohio, until they came to an agreement on 21 November 1995. The 
peace accord was formally signed in Paris a month later on 14 December.75
The Dayton Accord squared the circle by keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
a unified state with its prewar borders (Muslim position) and by dividing it into 
two quite independent yet constituent entities (Serb position). The Federation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was ruled by Croats and Muslims, received 51 
percent of the territory and thus a symbolic majority. A complicated system 
of cantons was meant to fulfill the Croat demand for autonomy (but never 
did). The other entity continued to be the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), 
which received 49 percent of the territory. Very few competencies were dele-
gated to the central government in Sarajevo, namely foreign policy, issues of 
citizenship, and monetary policy. The so-called entities governed themselves 
practically autonomously and were permitted their own currency, police force, 
and army. The agreement guaranteed that all refugees and displaced persons 
could return and demanded the prosecution of war criminals. To implement 
the accord, the international community installed a High Representative with 
quasi-dictatorial powers and sent a 60,000-strong peacekeeping force under 
NATO (and later EU) command.76
The initial euphoria over the end of the war soon subsided, and the general 
mood sobered. Society had changed to such a degree that peaceful coexistence 
of the different nationalities seemed impossible. Roughly 100,000 people had 
lost their lives, and more than two million had been driven from their homes. 
The Dayton Accord created a highly complicated and barely functional state 
that was weakened by a general unwillingness to cooperate, political radical-
ism, and serious economic problems. Last but not least, the new state suffered 
from the fact that a major part of the population did not identify with it.77
War in Kosovo
All hopes that the Dayton agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina would bring 
lasting peace to the former Yugoslavia were dashed when unrest broke out in 
Kosovo in 1997. The “forgotten of Dayton” — the Albanians in Kosovo — drew 
attention to themselves after the West continued to consistently ignore their 
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demands for independence. Radicalized by the loss of autonomy, human rights 
abuse at the hands of Serb security forces, and growing economic problems, 
the underground organization Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) burst onto the 
scene with a series of terror attacks. The Serb special police forces and army 
started a massive crackdown that caused mass expulsions and killings. Yet, 
neither the sanctions leveled against Belgrade by the European Community 
nor the numerous warnings of the United States and European powers were 
of any avail. When forty-five Albanians were murdered in Račak in January 
1999, determination grew in the West to end the conflict militarily in order to 
prevent a “second Bosnia.” The last diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group 
failed in February 1999 at the Château de Rambouillet near Paris when, de-
spite being threatened with military action, Slobodan Milošević rejected the 
final version of a peace plan, because this would have meant the stationing 
of NATO troops on the FRY sovereign state’s territory, which he deemed a 
violation of international law.78
The Social Democratic Party–Green Party coalition government of 
Germany was soon faced with the parliamentary inquiry on whether Germany 
could participate in NATO air strikes even without a mandate from the UN 
Security Council. Those in favor drew parallels between the crimes occur-
ring in Kosovo and Hitler’s annihilation policy, which gave the basic German 
narrative of its Nazi history a new emphasis. No longer was the main lesson 
from the past “never again war,” but rather “never again Auschwitz!” The 
order of the day was not military abstinence, but intervention. The German 
parliament decided by a large majority to participate in Operation Allied Force 
against Serbia.79
On 24 March 1999, NATO began its first air war “out of area” against mil-
itary installations, infrastructure, and industrial plants in Serbia and Kosovo, 
accompanied by a large media campaign to present the intervention as a “just 
war.” “Our credo at NATO was just to be on the air the whole time,” NATO 
spokesman Jamie Shea explained later, “crowd out the opposition, give every 
interview, do every briefing.”80 But instead of forcing Belgrade to relent, the air 
strikes only incited Serbian armed forces and special police to even greater de-
structiveness. Within a few days, as many as 800,000 people fled their homes 
or were expelled, most of them finding refuge in Macedonia and Albania. Yet 
the accusation persistently leveled by Western governments and NATO that 
the Serbian armed forces were deploying a long-prepared “Horseshoe Plan” 
of targeted “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo was proven later to be false.81
Slobodan Milošević did not give in until eleven weeks later, on 9 June 
1999. Under the pressure of the air strikes, he eventually agreed to trans-
form Kosovo into a UN protectorate within Yugoslavia. The relieved Contact 
Group, which had been having painful discussions about the necessity of 
ground-troop intervention, assured that the territorial integrity of the FRY 
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would be upheld. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 on 10 June 
1999, which established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo and shortly thereafter a peacekeeping force under NATO command 
arrived there. The international civilian and military presence would oversee 
the return of refugees and IDPs and the withdrawal of military forces from 
Kosovo. The main objective was to promote “the establishment, pending a 
final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo.” 
A process to determine the future status of Kosovo was started, which resulted 
in a proposal by UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari to grant Kosovo “super-
vised independence,” which Serbia immediately rejected and which therefore 
did not obtain Security Council approval.
However, in Serbia, the end of the Kosovo war set the country on a new 
political course. In October 2000, after a lost election, mass demonstrations, 
and a march on Belgrade, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia swept Slobodan 
Milošević out of office and extradited him a year later to the International 
Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. Under a new democratic government, Serbia 
started a process of “Europeanization,” and sanctions were lifted.
Meanwhile, the UÇK looked around for a new field of operation. In the 
Preševo Valley of southern Serbia and in Macedonia, where a fourth of the 
population is Albanian, it carried out attacks with the aim being to consolidate 
all areas inhabited by Albanians. More than 200 people died in its conflict 
against the Macedonian security forces, and about 100,000 fled or were driven 
out. The EU and the United States mediated a peace agreement in August 
2001 that granted Albanians more rights and left the country with at least the 
temporary hope of more stability.82
Shortly thereafter, with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the 
last institutional remnant of Yugoslavia dissolved. It was transformed in 2003 
into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In May 2006, Montenegro left 
the union with Serbia after a slight majority of 55.5 percent of voters backed 
independence in a referendum. The new state was immediately recognized 
by Belgrade.83
On the basis of the Ahtisaari plan, Kosovo unilaterally declared its inde-
pendence on 17 February 2008. Although the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), in its advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, concluded that the unilateral dec-
laration of independence did not violate general international law or Security 
Council resolutions, the international community remained split over this 
question, including the EU. The United States was one of the first countries 
to officially recognize the newest state in Europe. As of May 2018, 113 out of 
193 UN member states have recognized Kosovo.84
Gradually Yugoslavia dissolved into its constitutive parts in what seems 
to be an almost logical consequence of the process of disintegration that had 
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started in the 1980s. The erosion of political institutions, the demise of the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force, and the cessation of international control 
mechanisms created a vacuum of authority that enabled actors to pursue their 
specific interests ruthlessly with military means. The result was a hybrid of 
civil war and war of aggression in which more than 100,000 people lost their 
lives. The economization of the conflicts and the media involvement in them 
led some to believe that what occurred in Yugoslavia constituted the prototype 
of “new war.”85 However, the form of this armed conflict was not new, only 
the way in which it was perceived and subsequently interpreted from abroad. 
Actually, it was but a continuation of the secular process of nation and state 
building that began in the nineteenth century with the collapse of foreign rule 
over the Balkans and led in periodic stages to armed conflicts and “ethnic 
cleansing.” In this process, the ethnic-inclusive South Slavic idea has eventu-
ally succumbed to its strongest rival, the idea of a homogeneous nation state. 
The new political order of the post-Yugoslav era arose as a consequence of mil-
itary force, in the same way as the entire map of European statehood evolved.
20.
What Remained of Yugoslavia
Unfinished Peace
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, seven states have emerged where 
Yugoslavia once existed: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo. In a region of the world known for 
centuries for its unique ethnic and cultural plurality, more than four million 
people were shifted around in pursuit of the ideal homogeneous nation state.
The new map of the Balkans reflects the federal makeup of the former 
multinational state and all its shortcomings. When Yugoslavia broke apart, the 
national question again became acute, yet was left unresolved. This question 
seems somehow anachronistic in a coalescing Europe, but it still harbors a 
significant potential for unrest. Only the Slovenes and — with minor excep-
tions — the Croats and Montenegrins came out of the breakup with territorially 
consolidated state entities. The Serb people, however, were divided into three 
states. Serbia was not to include historic areas of Serb settlement in Croatia 
and lost its medieval center, Kosovo. The societies of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Kosovo became deeply divided ethnically and suffered severe economic 
setbacks. It cannot be thoroughly ruled out that border changes will occur 
in the future should the areas inhabited by Serbs or by Albanians unite to 
create larger nation states. Macedonia also suffers from the repercussions of 
Yugoslavia’s demise. Because of Greek objections the small country could not 
be recognized under its chosen name. In 1993, it was accepted for membership 
in the United Nations under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Since then Greece also blocked the ad-
mission of its small neighbor into the EU and NATO. Countless international 
attempts at mediation had failed before, in mid-2018, the parties eventually 
agreed to name the country Republic of North Macedonia. These examples 
show that the phase of independent nation-state building may not simply be 
skipped on the path to an integrated Europe.
On the surface, calm has been restored throughout the entire region. The 
main protagonists of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, presidents Milošević, 
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Tudjman, and Izetbegović, are dead and were replaced by a new generation 
of politicians. The worst excesses of nationalism have been fenced in, and 
progress is being made, if at very different speeds, in establishing democratic 
institutions, rule of law, and freedom of the press.
Except for the Serbian veto of Kosovo’s declared independence, the new 
states have formally recognized each other and publicly apologized for the 
war crimes committed. But even Serbia and Kosovo have started a process of 
normalization. Those individuals who shouldered the major political respon-
sibility for “ethnic cleansing” were extradited to the ICTY in The Hague. 
Limited capacity made it impossible to try all but the most important de-
fendants there, so the tribunal turned over the less prominent cases to the 
jurisdiction of the successor states. By December 2017, when the tribunal had 
concluded all 161 cases and was closed down, no suspect was still at large, 
including the Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladić and Bosnian Serb President 
Radovan Karadžić.
There is also a glimmer of hope regarding the economic situation in the 
Balkans. The Yugoslav wars, followed by the international embargo against 
Serbia and Montenegro, caused immense damage, estimated to be well over 
$110 billion. The collapse of Yugoslavia also broke up a cohesive economic 
area into unproductive mini-economies, and the introduction of a market econ-
omy came at a high price. Severely hit by the global economic and financial 
crisis in 2007–2008, the region suffered from deep recession, shrinking em-
ployment, and declining income. A decade later, relevant economic data is 
pointing upward. But whereas growth rates nearly match the high rates of the 
eastern Central European EU accession countries, unemployment and brain-
drain remains persistently high. Meanwhile, regional cooperation has been 
revived, for example through free trade agreements and common infrastruc-
ture projects. Although not all disputes stemming from secession have been 
settled, the relations between the countries have nearly normalized.
Only Bosnia-Herzegovina, the broken heart of Yugoslavia, could not 
be mended. Not only was it stipulated that institutions, currencies, and the 
armed forces be separated along ethnic lines, but this also became the case 
for languages, schoolbooks, and even restaurant menus. Everything is trans-
lated back and forth between Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian, which is known 
in international newspeak simply as “BSC.” Children are taught in separate 
classrooms, where the spirit of community and communality is systematically 
drilled out of them. Those who do not agree with this new apartheid must live 
abroad or in internal emigration.
Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina also left Europe with a political system in 
which Islam assumes an important role in public life. The formerly open-
minded, tolerant Bosnian Muslim culture yielded to a systematic Islamization 
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from the top down. “The Islamic tradition is the foundation of the Bosnian 
people’s identity,” said the religious leader of the country, Reis-ul-Ulema 
Mustafa Cerić. “Without Islam . . . we are nothing and nobody.”1 A novelty 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the war is the presence of followers of funda-
mentalist Wahhabism, who maintain veritable strongholds in central Bosnia 
between the cities of Tuzla, Zenica, and Travnik.2 Overall, the strategy of 
Islamization has had mixed success. Although more veiled women now pop-
ulate the streets, other religious practices, including the Koran studies, the 
prohibition of alcohol and pork, the introduction of Sharia, and daily prayers, 
have remained rather uncommon and seem to many to be superimposed and 
strange. At the end of the 1990s, only 5 to 10 percent of the adult men attended 
Friday prayers, and not even every tenth child participated in classes learning 
the Koran.3 Therefore it seems unlikely that Bosnia-Herzegovina will ever 
become an Islamic state.
Titostalgia
Since the political system underwent change, so did memory culture. However, 
the biographies of many people are still influenced by their earlier socialist 
socialization.4 Faced with deep social insecurity and uncertain prospects for 
the future resulting from the transformation, many seek refuge in the vision 
of an idealized past, be it out of political conviction, out of spite, or simply as 
a psychological reflex to help them cope with their new social environment. 
This yearning for the good days of long ago and for the old emotional hearth 
made Josip Broz one of the most beloved and respected personalities in the 
post-Yugoslav region.5 For his documentary Tito among the Serbs for the 
Second Time, the director Želimir Žilnik had a Tito double, dressed in a uni-
form and wearing sunglasses, stroll down the Belgrade’s central pedestrian 
zone in 1992. A man on the street beams at the sight of him: “You are back. 
Back then we had [only] one Tito. Now we have a dozen. It’s wonderful that 
you are back!”6
In the new millennium, the appeal of this idol has not changed much for 
people. Antique shops, souvenir stands, and street vendors offer a wide as-
sortment of artifacts from industrial mass culture that are linked to a nostalgia 
for better times: retro-fashion, keyrings, cigarette lighters, pens, postcards, 
T-shirts, socks, and busts with Tito’s image. There are Tito parties and Tito 
doubles, Tito cooking classes and a federation of Tito societies. In Slovenia, 
it is very popular to take nostalgic trips on the Blue Train.7 Each day people 
sign their names in the guestbook at the house in Kumrovec where Josip Broz 
was born. To those living in a present full of disappointment and uncertainty, 
Tito appears as the incarnate positive, as the indefinable good. The idealization 
and romanticization of an irretrievable past consolidate in the focus on this 
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one man to become a type of retrospective utopia and the antithesis of the 
problem-ridden future.8
Yet there will be no return to Yugoslavia. Article 142 of the Croatian 
constitution reads: “It is prohibited to initiate any procedure for the association 
of the Republic of Croatia into alliances with other states if such association 
leads, or might lead, to a renewal of a South Slavic state community or to any 
Balkan state form of any kind.”9 In Croatia and its neighboring countries, 
“Yugo-nostalgia” has become a damning label to stigmatize all things yester-
year and morally suspect, even though usually this nostalgia does not express a 
yearning for the return of the old regime but for the return “of an era of peace 
and a united, open, and tolerant country,” claims the writer Rada Iveković.10 
“Suddenly all this national classification started, which was thoroughly for-
eign to us,” explained a journalist. She found it totally “incomprehensible how 
people should so classify others or themselves and even invoke an association 
with a certain past, with some history.”11
The younger generation no longer has personal memories of Yugoslavia 
and did not even consciously experience the war. When a feeling of solidarity 
arises among the fraternal foes, as it sometimes does, then it is usually of a 
folkloric nature, not a political one. One example was when Marija Šerifović 
from Serbia won the 2007 Eurovision Song Contest in Helsinki due in part to 
the enthusiastic support she received from all of the neighboring countries of 
the former Yugoslavia. Many young people have never left their country, so 
that the horizon of their experience ends at the respective national borders, 
while older generations reminisce about how wonderful the times were when 
the red passport of Yugoslavia opened all border gates.
European Perspectives
Amid unified Europe, with its more than 512 million inhabitants, the post- 
Yugoslav region remains a blank spot on the political map at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century. The per capita prosperity of the Western Balkan 
candidate and potential candidate states is, at best, a third of that in the EU.12 
This alone is a great motivation for many to join the EU. They want finally 
to be a part of the family of European peoples and to be viewed no longer 
as urchins and notorious troublemakers from the Balkans. As one journalist 
summarized: “Those of us from the other Europe . . . are always somewhat 
aware that, no matter how famous or successful we are, we are looked upon 
as children of communism, like people with a handicap who can never accept 
[the] rules of democratic, Christian, liberal, capitalist Europe.”13
For the people of the Balkans, “Europe” invokes images and stirs imag-
inations in a way that coalesces into a shining new myth, capturing a wide 
spectrum of hopes and emotions. Visions of the future associated with 
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this magical term are diffuse and often completely unrealistic. However, 
“Europeanization” is presented as an objective barring any alternative, as 
promise, as fate. Actually, the European Union has indeed held out the pros-
pect of full membership for all post-Yugoslav states, but under conditions 
that most of them will probably not be able to fulfill for many years. The 
first country to join the EU was Slovenia in 2004, followed by Croatia in 
2013. The hurdles confronting the other countries are the slow development 
of institutions, sprawling corruption, and the continued discrimination against 
minorities. Along the lines of “we are acting as if we want to take them in, 
and they act as if they believe us,” each side still mutually reassures the other 
of the good will between them. In early 2018, the European Commission de-
clared, within the framework of a new Western Balkans strategy, that Serbia 
and Montenegro could join the EU in 2025 if conditionality was met. The 
conditions include the strengthening of the rule of law, the transformation 
to a market economy, efforts to fight corruption, the establishment of good 
neighborly relations, and structural adjustments to enable acceptance of the 
Community acquis.
Yet the fervor about Europe continues unabated, just as it did throughout 
the entire twentieth century. Once again, postulates of national identity clash 
with those of European modernity, political parties and societies are divided 
into Westerners and traditionalists, and those mired in yesteryear depict their 
national culture as authentic and morally uncorrupt. Due to the paternalistic 
attitude of Americans and West Europeans, there is a good measure of ambiva-
lence concerning a liberal market economy, foreign investment, Euro-Atlantic 
integration, and dealing with one’s own wartime past. For some, wrote the 
Bosnian magazine Dani, Europe is a “magic formula for peace, prosperity, 
freedom to travel, and free chance to work abroad,” while for others it rep-
resents nothing but “new slavery . . . known as West European democracy.” 
Even today, just as in the past, the postulates of progress and Europeanization 
are not fundamentally questioned. The only concern centers on choosing the 
proper path to “reasonably defend our identity, our cultural and spiritual val-
ues.”14 So, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the observation once 
made by a Bosnian intellectual still appears to be accurate: “Nothing is as it 
once was. And nothing is different.”15
Concluding Remarks
The South Slavic idea was born of the Enlightenment. The ideals of progress, 
humanism, reason, and science nurtured the concept of a commonality of 
Croats and Serbs and directed the desire for self-determination, participation, 
and prosperity toward a concrete political program: the formation of the state 
of Yugoslavia. Not only elite groups but many ordinary people held high hopes 
in this project, which in the nineteenth century still felt utterly utopian. So, 
although the founding of the state only came about as a consequence of the 
First World War, it was not an “artificial” creation.
However, unification in 1918 came late, too late for the various identities 
that prevailed among the South Slavic peoples to merge into an understanding 
of the Yugoslav nation as the synthesis of different cultures and historical tra-
ditions. Although the different populations spoke similar dialects or languages 
and shared many cultural characteristics, their sense of belonging was based 
in each case on different criteria. For the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, a major 
source of ethnic identity and distinction was religion, for the Slovenes and 
Macedonians it was language that counted, and for the Montenegrins it was a 
specific historical-political heritage. Because various foreign powers had long 
dominated the Balkans, no consensus emerged about what it was that united a 
nation. Was it a common language and culture (as in Germany and Italy) or the 
tradition of the state (as in France)? In a way, the South Slavic lands appeared 
to be a laboratory for competing and sometimes even contradictory concepts 
of identity and national ideologies.
The peoples of Yugoslavia were unequally involved in the conception and 
construction of their state. Nation building did not occur synchronously in 
the South Slavic regions. In the run-up to the First World War, the Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs had a fairly well-established ethnic self-awareness, whereas 
the Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians only developed this decades 
later. This time lag may also account for the failure to consolidate an integral 
South Slavic understanding of nationhood — a Balkan version of the melting 
pot — either before or after the founding of Yugoslavia, despite linguistic and 
cultural ties, traditions of ethnic coexistence, and the active steps taken by the 
state toward nation building. If the masses failed to seize upon the overarching 
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Yugoslav identity offered to them, it was because their different forms of col-
lective awareness were already too solidified, the social barriers erected by 
tradition too high, and expressions of collective interests and political cultures 
often incompatible.
Enormous historical-political and socioeconomic disparities intensified 
the diversity of living conditions, experiences, and interests. This led to more 
conspicuous divisions and conflicts, especially during crises. Yet at all times it 
was a Herculean task to reconcile the various local conditions and traditions: 
Central European features emanating from Slovenia and Croatia; Ottoman-
Balkan ones from Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia; and the Islamic 
heritage that marked Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both Yugoslav states, each with 
its own unique approach, floundered in the attempt to offset this diversity.
A powerful motive for South Slavic unification from the nineteenth cen-
tury onward was the desire to overcome backwardness. The elites in Zagreb 
and Belgrade were completely under the spell of the European model of prog-
ress and sought to imitate Western developmental strategies. Politically they 
promoted the ideals of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and liberal-
ism, but the highly agrarian nature of their societies meant that they lacked the 
requisite societal structure. This is why elements of a modern constitutional 
state, economic policy, and governance are oddly mixed together with older 
traditions, identities, and values. In other words, the ambivalence of Southeast 
European reform policy did not result from anti-Western attitudes but from 
the effort to harmonize tensions between a need for cultural identity, on the 
one hand, and rational progressive thinking, on the other.
At the turn of the twentieth century the long march toward modernity 
began. For the first time, one could see signs of the fundamental transforma-
tion that was to come in the economy, social relations, cultural expression, 
mentalities, and everyday life. Around 1900, the essential tracks were laid 
for the development of an industrial society even in the South Slavic agrarian 
regions. The first areas of industrial concentration were formed; large-scale 
migration ensured that cities grew and were transformed; new methods of 
communication, such as the distribution of printed matter, led to social mobi-
lization and the spread of critical self-reflection, one of the key characteristics 
of modernity.
Yet these processes did not develop fully until after the Second World 
War. A mixture of optimism about progress, planning euphoria, and modern-
izing furor catapulted the Yugoslavs after 1945 into a period of epoch-making, 
sociocultural innovation in employment and social stratification, in lifestyles 
and everyday living, in the role of the sexes and generations, in attitudes and 
values. It took until the 1960s for these innovations to permeate all spheres of 
human life, aided not least by modern social policy, the revolution in education, 
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the spread of technology and the media, and the changing aesthetic standards 
of modern art, literature, architecture, and film. Admittedly, as in other south-
ern European states, remnants of older social interrelationships persisted, such 
as patronage and cronyism. Still, within a generation, Yugoslavs were liter-
ally “up to speed.” The desire to make up for lost time and catch up with the 
more developed world was no longer confined to the political and intellectual 
classes, but encompassed almost the entire population.
The Yugoslav model of socialism combined a variety of ideas and con-
cepts, originating from nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers, social 
reformers, and politicians on ways to cope with the challenges of modernity. 
The notion prevailed that entire societies could be designed and constructed 
on the basis of reason — one of the basic intellectual assumptions of modernity. 
Socialism committed itself explicitly to the attempt to achieve justice and mo-
dernity by way of comprehensive social intervention. On one hand, its ideals 
were inspired by the Enlightenment and nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
reform movements that emphasized values such as rationality, efficiency, 
education, hygiene, prosperity, and social security. These ideas fit into the 
Europe-wide context of a world permeated by science and technology. On the 
other hand, its ideals were substantially influenced by communist dogma: the 
Marxist ideology, a radical humanism, atheism, collectivism, and patriotic 
virtues such as friendship between peoples and “brotherhood and unity.” Last 
but not least, the Yugoslav social model also incorporated liberal-bourgeois 
values, principles, and practices into its modernizing strategies, includ-
ing — within limits — the market economy and private property, consumer 
goods fetishism, and the free movement of labor. The system even tolerated 
the fact that a segment of its citizenry submitted themselves to the laws of 
capitalist wage labor by working abroad. So Yugoslav modernity after 1945 
consisted of a particular combination of various norms, values, and practices, 
on the basis of which the multinational state formulated its own unique re-
sponse to the challenge of the new age.
As varied as the preconditions were at the beginning of the twentieth 
century in Europe and as contrasting as the various blueprints for a social 
order became as time wore on, by the end of the century a strong degree of 
uniformity existed across the entire continent in terms of the social and oc-
cupational structures, family types and gender roles, ways of life, attitudes, 
and values. Fundamental long-term processes such as industrialization, sec-
ularization, the advance of technology, urbanization, and the development 
of critical self-reflection began later in Yugoslavia, progressed at a different 
pace and along somewhat different lines than in the West, but in the long run 
followed the trend toward inner-European convergence. Tito’s system favored 
and fostered close exchange relationships with foreign countries and thus a 
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constant transfer of goods, knowledge, and values. International connections, 
for example in the form of labor migration and tourism, even served as major 
pillars supporting this model, which is why the social and attitudinal differ-
ences between Yugoslavia and Western Europe never ran as deep as they did 
between the capitalist and the Eastern bloc countries.
Independent of the evolving political, social, and economic parameters, 
four long-standing structural phenomena influenced the development of 
Yugoslavia in the twentieth century: first, ethnic and religious diversity, which 
repeatedly cast a new light on the question of a fair reconciliation of interests 
and of the legitimacy of the political system; second, a striking backwardness 
compared to West and Central Europe, which put the economy at a competitive 
disadvantage; third, exposure to rival Great Powers influences; and fourth, 
regional disparities that caused persistent feelings of discrimination. These 
four factors, exacerbated by global economic crises, repeatedly narrowed the 
political leeway, which in turn reinforced doubts about the legitimacy of the 
state and its ability to fulfill its promises of progress.
Therefore, internal conflicts were not predetermined by questions of 
ethnic, cultural, or religious identity but arose primarily from diverging in-
terests, worldviews, and political persuasions. They were caused particularly 
by the tensions resulting from the dynamics of sociocultural transformation 
in general and recurring crises of modernization in particular. The battle over 
the best model of government did not necessarily take place between Serbs 
and Croats, but first and foremost between bourgeois liberals, right-wing na-
tionalists, and communists. Sometimes it was separatists fighting unitarists, 
sometimes federalists against centralists. One ongoing confrontation was be-
tween the defenders and reformers of the constitution. The battle lines cut 
right across peoples, regions, and republics. Yet with the development of mass 
society and the mass media in the twentieth century, the politicizing of differ-
ences became a main contributor to political strife.
As everywhere on the Continent, large-scale change in the twentieth 
century led to a hostile backlash in the form of hostility toward science and 
rationality, a kind of civilization criticism. The proliferation of lifestyles and 
the encroachments of the modern state resulted in deep insecurities and even 
in an entrenched anti-Western stance. Because the sociocultural transforma-
tion of South Slavic societies took place over a much shorter period and at a 
faster pace than in the West, the mental, psychological, and social shocks were 
particularly severe. Exclusivist nationalism, ethnic fervor, and fundamentalist 
religion flourished particularly in times of historic upheaval, such as the late 
1930s and the 1980s.
The ongoing European crisis of the interwar period aggravated the 
Yugoslav structural problems of diverse legacies, social plight, and ethno-
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political confrontation. The lack of legitimacy and the teething troubles of 
a young parliamentary system, exacerbated by the syndrome of backward-
ness and the shock waves of the world economic crisis, narrowed the scope 
for compromise and compensation between the various political camps and 
interest groups, entrenched the blockades on decision making, deepened 
internal contradictions, and undermined the acceptability of a state whose 
optimistic promises collided all too brutally with the bitter reality of the crisis. 
New social experiences turned enthusiasm into anxiety. In contrast to more 
developed European countries under quite similar conditions, however, the 
societal soil was not fertile for the germination and growth of the extremist 
ideologies of fascism and bolshevism; they never became widely attractive as 
alternatives to the liberal bourgeois model. It is true that other undermining 
factors were also at work here, such as the experience of the world war, the 
weaknesses of the parliamentary political system, burgeoning class warfare, 
and cultural pessimism. But unlike its neighbors, Yugoslavia did not provide 
advantageous conditions for these extremist ideologies. In the countryside, 
deep-seated religious, family, and social affinities left few possibilities for a 
radical critique of society. Unlike in Italy, Germany, and Spain, the conser-
vative and monarchist forces in Yugoslavia did not enter into power-sharing 
compromises with the radical right. If Hitler had not invaded the whole of 
Europe and subjected the Balkans to his inhuman scheme for a New World 
Order, it is unlikely that either the fascist Ustasha or the communists would 
ever have had a chance to gain political power. The most popular alternative 
to the bourgeois-capitalist model of development at that time was the agrar-
ian movement.
Only by way of what were — in every respect — the revolutionary upheav-
als of the Second World War, coupled with the experience of years of marginal 
existence in a society struggling to survive, could the communists rise to 
power in Yugoslavia in their own right. Under the firm control of Tito, they 
succeeded in bringing under their wing a very diverse spectrum of milieus 
and motivations for the fight against occupation, exploitation, and terror, while 
the established power groups, such as the bourgeois classes, the monarchists, 
and the nationalists, compromised themselves through collaboration. With 
their backs against the wall, the communists also made the most spellbinding 
promises. Their program brought together the three existential questions that 
had constantly bedeviled the South Slavic lands: addressing the existential 
concerns of peasants and workers, ending exploitation and foreign domina-
tion, and achieving national reconciliation through “brotherhood and unity,” 
something that acquired paramount significance in the age of fascism. Against 
the backdrop of terror and mass violence, a fundamental historical shift was in 
the making. It was facilitated by the complete collapse and irretrievable loss 
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of respect for the old system, shaped by the rapid and radical transformation 
in social conditions, and facilitated by a new international environment.
In contrast to the Eastern bloc countries and despite the limitations im-
posed on individual liberties, Tito’s rule possessed genuine legitimacy. It 
sprang from three sources: the successful war of liberation, the defiance of 
Stalin, and Tito’s personal integrity and authority. The relative stability of the 
regime resulted from a number of internal and external factors: Tito’s skillful 
balancing act between East and West, which earned his policies a great deal of 
international recognition and made a name for Yugoslavia in its own right with 
regard to foreign affairs; a complex state model combining federal rights with 
the principles of ethnic power-sharing that helped curb nationalist infighting; 
and a socialist system that did not eschew elements of a free market economy, 
cultural liberalism, or civil rights and garnered international prestige. The 
average citizen harbored the illusion of living in an everlasting consumer 
wonderland and was particularly glad to have escaped the clutches of the 
Soviet Union. In short, Tito breathed new self-confidence into this deeply 
traumatized and humiliated nation.
Abroad, Yugoslavia was also widely viewed as a bearer of hope, because 
its system of self-management rejected bolshevism and its politics of non-
alignment represented a clear counterpoint to the Cold War. Especially in the 
so-called Third World, high expectations were pinned on the former Balkan 
no-man’s-land, which prominently propagated such global issues as decolo-
nization, disarmament, and the fight against poverty at the United Nations. 
Yugoslavia’s international reputation helped cover up both the country’s in-
complete modernization and its internal divisions.
By the early 1960s, a shadow was already growing across the unbri-
dled faith in progress that characterized Yugoslavia’s development during 
the postwar decades. Changes in society and political reforms since the 1950s 
accelerated the complexity of social stratification, lifestyles, and values; in-
creased the range of interests and opinions; and strengthened centrifugal 
forces that challenged one-party rule. Inadvertently, socialist modernization 
acted as the catalyst for a new nationalism. First, it served to deepen regional 
disparities rather than level them out. Second, the revolution in education, 
the structural changes in the economy, and geographical mobility produced 
upwardly mobile social groups, who would end up being the ones to actu-
ally complete the process of nation building among Muslims, Albanians, and 
Macedonians. Third, this created new competition for advancement, status, 
power, and resources between the Yugoslav peoples. Fourth, mass media and 
mass society provided new means of communication and political mobiliza-
tion that new elites could use for their nationalist cause, thereby enabling a 
growing alienation from the Yugoslav mainstream to take root.
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Tito ruled the country with his charismatic leadership style until his death 
in 1980. Under the specific historical circumstances of the Second World 
War, his exceptional political ability took him right to the top, earning him 
unquestioned loyalty and legitimacy among the political class and enormous, 
emotionally laden popularity among his fellow countrymen. He represented 
the most important and sometimes sole guarantee of the political compromise 
hammered out by the leaders of the nationalities during wartime. It is hard to 
overstate how important his role as a referee was to the survival of the system, 
a reality that the elites accepted until the very end, if often with clenched teeth. 
But even if Tito had been granted immortality, he could not have held back the 
internal erosion of the Yugoslav system. Ever more complex realities, together 
with the increasing pluralism of Yugoslav society and growing dependence on 
the world economy, diminished the value of talents that had been ultimately 
important in wartime but counted for little in a global industrial society. From 
the 1960s onward, the forces demanding more freedom of speech, democracy, 
and civil rights multiplied.
The 1970s — here, too, there are parallels across all of Europe — signaled 
the onset of a profound crisis of modernity and modernization that marked an 
epochal turning point. Old industrial sectors of the economy went into decline 
during these years and thereby undermined the foundation of Yugoslavia’s 
postwar boom. Its industries were chronically underfinanced, technologically 
backward, and overly bureaucratized. The negotiated economy, built on priv-
ileges, showed no capacity to adjust to the changed global context. Declining 
industrialization in the 1970s brought on a crisis of the system. Planning for 
the future became impossible, and the raison d’être of socialism was ren-
dered null and void. The Yugoslav state lost its inner logic and its structure. 
Consensus was replaced by doubt, disengagement, and demoralization.
As republics and nations drifted ever further apart in socioeconomic 
terms and the unifying political ideology of communism became obsolete, 
the supposedly undisputed legitimacy of Tito’s regime came under pressure 
even while he was still alive. The people’s democracy promised “brother-
hood and unity” by invoking the ideals of the French Revolution to weld the 
nationalities together on the basis of a socialist order. But by foregrounding 
the equality of nations and nationalities, the communists reduced the triad of 
“liberty, equality, fraternity” to a question of nationality. Tito’s Yugoslavia 
was based by definition on a compact between its peoples and republics; that 
is to say, on collective and not individual rights. As a result, the central prem-
ises of the liberal era — liberty and democracy — went by the board. Because 
the one-party system only knew mechanisms for reducing social pluralism to 
national interests, it strengthened the trend toward the affirmation of national 
affiliation. Especially after 1974, federalism and proportional representation 
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for nationalities institutionalized competition and conflicts between peoples 
and republics, rather than along political and ideological lines. What could be 
more obvious than to discover that regional elites compensated for a lack of 
democracy with nationalism?
In the 1980s, Yugoslavia slipped into the deepest economic, political, and 
social-psychological crisis in its history, resulting in disorientation, insecurity, 
and a fear of the future. Economic plight and a reform backlog contributed 
to a growing loss of legitimacy, sense of purpose, and confidence, while the 
intransigence of the republics robbed the central government of its last vestiges 
of governance. As the crisis became more complex and comprehensive, the 
adversaries became more unyielding, the compromise more unstable, and the 
strategies proposed to deal with the situation less convincing. The political 
system proved to be structurally incapable of adjusting to changing social and 
world economic conditions without abolishing itself in the process. Thus, a 
growing discrepancy evolved in these years between expectations and reality, 
which threw into flux the life plans of many people.
This crisis was total in its dimensions and impact, particularly because 
it chipped away at roles, values, and identity. The more communism lost its 
power of conviction, the more tempting it seemed to escape into faith, ethnic 
identity, folk culture, and history. Yet the aim was not to revive the past but to 
renegotiate the troubled relationship between state, politics, and society. In this 
context, many remarkable ideological hybrids emerged, such as Milošević’s 
brand of socialist market-economy nationalism or the Bosniak variant of a 
secular-religious Islam — a paradox only on the surface. These new national-
isms did not bring down the system themselves but were rather the unwanted 
product of it.
The 1980s marked a turn to nationalism in all the republics, from which 
new political parties profited the most. They created a new sense of purpose 
in the ideological vacuum that followed disenchantment with socialism. All 
types of conflict were now declared to be genuine national differences. The 
new aggressive and overbearing nationalisms in the republics all had similar 
roots, defined themselves in contrast to one another, and used similar rhetoric 
in their arguments. The tragic conclusion is that, as so often in ethnically 
diverse states, democratization acted as an accelerant in the process of polar-
ization and disintegration. In such difficult times, many people felt the only 
acceptable leaders were those who, with the aid of mass nationalistic agita-
tion, upheld a pretense of democratic legitimacy that never actually existed, 
perhaps because the new party structures now controlled the public domain, 
above all the media.
Why Yugoslavia broke up and why this happened through military force 
are two distinct questions that need to be analyzed separately. The collapse 
itself can be attributed to two sets of causes. First, the state was burdened from 
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its inception with structural problems of the longue durée, particularly the 
large discrepancies in socioeconomic development, the ethnic rifts between 
the peoples that were never quite overcome, and disparate political-historical 
traditions. Sources of friction were reduced through major and fundamental 
historical compromise, such as the one agreed upon in 1917 by the leaders 
in Corfu and renewed in 1943 in Jajce. However, in times of crisis the scope 
for compensation narrowed, and a sense of disadvantage and discrimination 
emerged. Besides these structural factors, a second set of causes is made up of 
situational factors. Against the backdrop of Tito’s death, a profound economic 
and sociopolitical crisis in the mid-1980s, and the ensuing existential concerns 
and anxieties people had about the future, many Yugoslavs turned to language, 
nation, and religion for their main sources of identity. With the ideological 
turn initiated by perestroika, followed by the downfall of communism all 
over Europe, central integrating forces disappeared, the first and foremost of 
these being the unifying socialist ideology but also the Soviet menace as the 
ultima ratio of a stable polity. The end of the East–West conflict marked the 
collapse of the “third way” of workers’ self-management and international 
nonalignment, two fundamental pillars of Yugoslav state identity. In other 
words, under very specific historical circumstances, certain economic, socio-
cultural, and power-political conflicts came to a head. Faced with changing 
conditions in global politics and radicalized by a dramatic crisis in state and 
society, these conflicts were reinterpreted into ethnonationalist contexts. The 
erosion of political order, the disintegration of a multiethnic space, and the loss 
of the state monopoly of force left a dangerous vacuum at the end of the 1980s.
So why did Yugoslavia implode with military violence, when Czechs 
and Slovaks parted company on peaceful terms? In both countries there 
were structural conflicts, but in Yugoslavia the internal tensions appeared 
incomparably deeper and all-encompassing. On one hand, they were driven 
by power-political and socioeconomic antagonisms, which steadily increased 
after 1945, instead of gradually fading away, as they did in Czechoslovakia. 
On the other, these tensions were permanently underlaid by a history of bloody 
conflict that was ever accessible for update and reinterpretation, with the 
Second World War serving as its chief point of reference. Czechs and Slovaks 
had never fought each other in a cruel civil war.
The constellation of the main players was also specific to Yugoslavia. 
With its republics, the country had created competing rivals roughly equal 
in strength and in possession of all the features of a sovereign state, includ-
ing military power. This ostensible symmetry was particularly dangerous 
during the period of Yugoslavia’s dissolution because there was a clash of 
irreconcilable interests — interests that were perceived by the opposing par-
ties as vital. While the renegade republics and provinces saw no alternative 
to independence, for the Serbs the collapse of the state posed a threat to their 
332 Concluding Remarks
core national priorities. So a conflict ensued from which it was only possible 
to emerge either as the winner or the loser, a typical “zero-sum” situation.
Still, the decision for or against war was not made by structures, but 
by people. In the end the decision on how to handle the deep fissures in the 
relationships between the republics was a political one. If there must be a di-
vorce, then let us make it a peaceful one, said the more judicious and prudent 
participants, who had recognized the dangers early on of an all-or-nothing 
approach. But too many players on each side were determined to assert sup-
posedly higher nationalist interests by any means and at any cost. As the last 
vestiges of the Yugoslav state system, such as the party, the presidency, media 
networks, and security sector, vanished in 1990/1991, no checks and balances 
were left to steer the process of disintegration. Identities and loyalties were 
redefined, and well-established mechanisms of power-sharing and mediation 
were cast aside. Neither the political will nor any institutional mechanism 
existed to unlock the internal stalemate.
In the final analysis, the likelihood of escalation into war arose only be-
cause the state monopoly on the use of force folded with the demise of state 
institutions. In the resulting vacuum, those presidents, politicians, and gener-
als with a political will to make war were joined by other influential agents, 
such as warlords, criminal networks, and diaspora circles, who stood to gain 
also financially from armed conflict. In a functioning state polity such groups 
could never have influenced the course of events as greatly as they did in 
ex-Yugoslavia after 1991/1992.
The much-cited Balkan culture played actually only a minor role in the 
final act of the Yugoslav drama. The traditional glorification of violence, the 
bloodthirsty folk epics, the cult of arms, and patriarchal customs formed the 
backdrop for strategies of communication and ways of acting in warfare, but 
they do not explain its deeper causes. Structural phenomena, including expe-
riences, events, and memories, were never static variables but were constantly 
being reinterpreted and reconstructed as conditions changed. The invocation 
of symbolic language helped activate the resources of history, culture, and 
religion, mobilize people, and legitimize the power of certain authorities. 
The media and nationalistic propaganda created a climate of violence but 
did not cause an automatism of reaction. At literally every point in historical 
development there was latitude for individual decision making. No one can 
use anthropology, structure, culture, or the inherent dynamics of violence 
to excuse themselves from their responsibility for war and crimes against 
humanity. Nothing was irreversible, nothing was inevitable.
Appendix A
Parties, Political Organizations, 
and Committees
Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko 
vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ)
Black Hand (Crna ruka)
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, KPJ)
Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ)
Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava, HSP)
Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK)
Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratska opozicija Slovenije, 
DEMOS)
Democratic Party (Kingdom of Yugoslavia) (Jugoslavenska demokratska 
stranka, JDS)
Democratic Party (Serbia) (Demokratska stranka, DS)
Democratic Peasant Coalition (Seljačko-demokratska koalicija, HSS-SDS)
Frankians (Frankovci)
Green Shirts (Zelene košulje)
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Vnatrešna Makedonska 
Revolucionerna Organizacija, VMRO)
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization — Democratic Party for 
Macedonian National Unity (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna 
Organizacija — Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno 
Edinstvo, VMRO-DPMNE)
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ)
League of Communists (1990, Savez komunista — Pokret za Jugoslaviju, 
SK-PJ)
Liberation Front (Osvobodilna fronta, OF)
Nationalist Youth (Jugoslavenska napredna nacionalistička omladina, 
JNNO)
National Defense (Narodna odbrana)
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Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija Jugoslavenskih 
nacionalista, ORJUNA)
Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA)
Peasant Party (Croatia)
Croatian Peoples’ Peasant Party (Hrvatska pučka seljačka 
stranka, HPSS)
Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljačka 
stranka, HRSS)
Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS)
Radical Party/Radical People’s Party (Narodna radikalna stranka, NRS)
Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS)
Serb Liberal Party (Srpska liberalna stranka, SLS)
Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka, SNS)
Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka, SLS)
Social Democratic Party of Croatia and Slavonia (Socijal-demokratska 
stranka Hrvatske i Slavonije)
Socialist Workers’ Party of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička radnička partija 
Jugoslavije, SRPJ)
Unification or Death (Ujedinjenje ili smrt)
Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia (Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije)
United Opposition (Udružena opozicija)
Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna)
Yugoslav Action (Jugoslovenska akcija, JA)
Yugoslav Club (Jugoslavenski klub)
Yugoslav Committee (Jugoslavenski odbor)
Yugoslav Muslim Organization (Jugoslovenska muslimanska 
organizacija, JMO)
Yugoslav National Movement Zbor (Jugoslovenski narodni pokret Zbor)
Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslavenska nacionalna stranka, JNS)
Yugoslav Radical Union (Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica, JRZ)
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table 1 Historic Regions of the Kingdom of SHS, 1918
Region Area in km2
Population Size 
(1910/1914)
Serbia (including Kosovo, Vardar-Macedonia, 
and part of Sandžak) 95,405 4,670,000
Montenegro (including part of Sandžak) 9,840 238,423
Bosnia-Herzegovina 51,199 1,898,044
Vojvodina (Baranya, Bačka, Banat) 19,233 1,380,000
Croatia (including Slavonia, Syrmia, and 
Međimurje) 43,307 2,715,237
Dalmatia (without Rijeka, Cres, Lošinj, Zadar, 
and Lastovo) 12,729 621,503
Slovenia (Carniola, Styria, Mur River Region) 16,198 1,056,464
Total 247,911 12,579,671
Source: Džaja, Jugoslawismus, 13.
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table 2 Populations of the Kingdom of SHS (according to the census of 31 
January 1921)
Native Language In Numbers In %
Serbo-Croatian 8,911,509 74.36
Slovenian 1,019,997 8.51
Czech or Slovakian 115,532 0.96











Source: Statistički pregled Kraljevine Jugoslavije [1921] po banovinama, Belgrade 1930, 5.
table 3 The Partition of Yugoslav Territory, 1941
Population Size, 1941  
(estimated)
Acquired by Area in km2 In Numbers In %
German Empire 9,600 775,000 4.9
Italy 10,600 760,000 4.8
Montenegro — 435,000 2.7
Albania 28,000 795,000 5.0
Croatia 98,600 6,300,000 39.6
Bulgaria 28,200 1,260,000 7.9
Hungary 11,600 1,145,000 7.2
Banat 9,800 640,000 4.0
Serbia 51,100 3,810,000 23.9
Yugoslavia 247,500 15,920,000 100.0
Source: Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens, 113.
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% of Total 
Population
Slovenia Slovene 90.5 Croat 2.9
Serbia (proper)1 Serb 85.4 Yugoslav 4.8
Kosovo Albanian 77.4 Serb 13.2
Croatia Croat 75.1 Serb 11.5
Montenegro Montenegrin 68.5 Muslim 13.4
Macedonia Macedonian 67.0 Albanian 19.8
Serbia (entire) Serb 66.4 Albanian 14.0
Vojvodina Serb 54.4 Hungarian 18.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslim 39.4 Serb 32.0
Source: Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji, 519.
1Serbia excluding Kosovo and Vojvodina.










Serb 6,547,117 41.51 7,806,152 42.08 8,140,452 36.30
Croat 3,784,353 23.99 4,293,809 23.15 4,428,005 19.75
Muslim 808,921 5.13 972,960 5.25 1,999,957 8.92
Montenegrin 425,703 2.70 513,832 2.77 579,023 2.58
Macedonian 810,126 5.14 1,045,516 5.64 1,339,729 5.97
Slovene 1,415,432 8.97 1,589,211 8.57 1,753,554 7.82
Albanian 750,431 4.76 914,733 4.93 1,730,364 7.72
German 55,337 0.35 20,015 0.11 8,712 0.04
Hungarian 496,492 3.15 504,369 2.72 426,866 1.90
“Yugoslav” — — 317,124 1.71 1,219,045 5.44
Other 678,186 4.30 571,570 3.08 799,004 3.56
Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, Jugoslavija 1945–1985, 56.
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Slovene Slovenia 1,753 1,712 97.7
Macedonian Macedonia 1,339 1,279 95.5
Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina 1,999 1,630 81.5
Croat Croatia 4,428 3,454 78.0
Serb Serbia 8,140 6,182 75.9
Montenegrin Montenegro 579 400 69.2
Albanian Kosovo 1,730 1,226 70.9
Hungarian Vojvodina 426 385 90.3
Source: Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji, 519.
table 7 Percentage of Economic Sectors in the Yugoslav Gross Domestic 
Product, 1947–19841
1947 1965 1975 1984
Primary sector: Agriculture, 
forestry, water management 44.6 21.7 16.9 15.7
Secondary sector: Industry, 
construction, skilled crafts, and trades 37.6 47.6 50.5 53.5
Tertiary sector: Transport, trade, 
gastronomy, other 17.8 30.7 32.6 30.8
Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, Jugoslavija 1945–1985, 75.
11974 prices.
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table 8 Level of Prosperity in Yugoslavia Compared with Other European 





Yugoslavia 100 100 4.70
Italy 346 249 2.80
Austria 428 360 3.70
Hungary 63 84 6.50
Greece 172 153 4.00
West Germany 619 445 2.80
France 539 409 3.10
Great Britain 604 358 1.70
Spain 250 186 3.00
Portugal 103 87 3.70
Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, Jugoslavija 1945–1985, 220.
table 9 Social Distance to Other Ethnicities (in %)1
Serbs Croats Slovenes Macedonians
1966 1990 1966 1990 1966 1990 1966 1990
Montenegro 9 8 16 29 13 31 15 22
Croatia 10 24 — 4 12 18 18 27
Macedonia 13 22 16 34 17 34 — 11
Slovenia 45 52 45 36 — 2 47 49
Serbia — 3 26 35 25 39 25 23
Montenegrins Albanians Hungarians Muslims
1966 1990 1966 1990 1966 1990 1966 1990
Montenegro — 7 29 42 30 24 27 35
Croatia 14 27 22 43 15 26 15 37
Macedonia 17 29 49 60 36 39 48 54
Slovenia 48 53 50 56 46 49 47 58
Serbia 22 14 39 58 31 29 31 48
Source: Baćević et al., Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici, 174.
1Explicit nonacceptance of a marriage partner from another ethnic group.
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GDP per capita 
(index no.) Birthrate1
1953 1988 1953 1988 1947 1987
Yugoslavia 100 100 100 100 26.1 15.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina 16.7 18.8 83 68 35.1 15.3
Croatia 23.2 19.9 122 128 22.4 12.8
Macedonia 7.7 8.9 68 63 35.0 18.5
Montenegro 2.5 2.7 77 74 28.9 15.8
Serbia (entire) 41.1 41.5 86 90 25.1 15.6
Serbia (proper)2 26.3 24.8 91 101 23.1 12.6
Kosovo 4.8 8.0 43 27 38.5 29.1
Vojvodina 10.0 8.7 94 119 24.4 11.5




Inhabitants per  
Physician
1948 1981 1952 1987
Yugoslavia 25.4 9.5 2,565 534
Bosnia-Herzegovina 44.9 14.5 3,314 680
Croatia 15.6 5.6 1,947 477
Macedonia 40.3 10.9 4,324 530
Montenegro 26.4 9.4 4,473 674
Serbia (entire) 26.8 10.9 2,440 515
Serbia (proper)2 27.4 11.1 2,104 440
Kosovo 62.5 17.6 8,527 1,092
Vojvodina 11.8 5.8 2,556 511
Slovenia 2.4 0.8 1,704 496
Source: Pleština, Regional Development, 180–81.
1Number of live births per 1,000 inhabitants.
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